# Exposed Unauthenticated Ollama/AI Servers Marked and Probed by Third Parties (Rapid7: 'Open by default. Already occupied.')

> Rapid7's 10 Nov 2026 scan of 20,354 pre-selected IPv4 hosts found 7,627 hosts answering AI/notebook APIs without authentication, almost all Ollama. 54.8% of the 7,675 exposed Ollama servers carried third-party model names/tags (callback registries, tunnel pulls, marker names, encoded file-path payloads) indicating intent to probe or abuse; successful exploitation is not confirmed.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T15:02:40Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T15:02:40Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6345
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6345.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6345
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2024-37032

## Description

Rapid7 (Christiaan Beek) scanned a pre-selected set of 20,354 IPv4 addresses on 10 November 2026 across ports 3000, 5000, 8000, 8080, 8501, 8888 and 11434, sending one unauthenticated HTTP request per service (Ollama /api/tags, Jupyter /api/kernels, MLflow experiment search, JupyterHub /hub/api/, Streamlit and Grafana health endpoints). No inference, write or exploitation requests were sent. Raw scanner output was 14,064 findings on 11,891 IPs; after removing 1,513 findings on 429 likely honeypot/sensor hosts (148 hosts sharing an identical five-service llama3.1:8b fingerprint and 281 hosts where one IP:port answered as multiple products), critical findings fell from 387 to 39. 7,714 findings on 7,627 hosts were confirmed unauthenticated AI or notebook APIs, almost all Ollama (7,675 servers listing 106,938 model entries and 18,733 distinct tags). Only 0.3% were served over HTTPS and about 65% sit in hosting/cloud networks (OVHcloud, Hetzner, Contabo, Oracle Cloud, Tencent Cloud, DigitalOcean account for 42%). Top countries: Germany 1,306, China 1,130, United States 1,097, France 549, India 301.

The central observation is that 54.8% (4,209) of exposed Ollama servers held artifacts left by third parties, visible only as model names/tags. 40.3% (3,091) carried marker or 'I was here' models (e.g. zzvitals-beacon:latest, verif_sys:latest, ops-verify:latest, dsv4probe:24h, pwn_ctl_<host-ip>_ae52...:latest); 34.7% (2,666) had models pulled from a non-official registry, including 23.7% from a raw IP:port and 22.4% via a free tunnel or temporary registry (trycloudflare.com, ttl.sh, bore.pub, Pinggy); 15.5% (1,190) held gpt-4o / gpt-4 / claude-3-opus aliases usually alongside tinyllama; 712 model names embed the IP of the host they sit on. The most frequent callback registries were 24.144.109.68:9882 (trigger/benign, trigger/plamo2-<id>), 103.249.201.108:9882, 76.13.49.213:9882, 62.31.247.107:9882, 43.143.113.68:8899 (library/tens) and 185.165.171.21:8899 (recon/probe). Rapid7 describes the pattern as Find -> List -> Call back -> Mark -> Reach, i.e. SSRF-style registry pulls used for egress confirmation and inventory tagging. Marker timestamps run from 10 June to 3 November 2026, and some June markers were still present on 10 November, suggesting nobody owns or monitors those servers.

55 hosts (0.7%) carried model names embedding Base64/hex-encoded file paths (e.g. L2V0Yy9zaGFkb3c = /etc/shadow, L3Byb2Mvc2VsZi9lbnZpcm9u = /proc/self/environ) that resemble path-traversal probes: host fingerprinting (47 hosts, /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ), secrets in environment or service configuration (28 hosts, Ollama systemd unit and override.conf), credentials and keys (15 hosts: /etc/shadow, SSH authorized_keys, AWS config, the Ollama private key on 10 hosts), persistence paths (11 hosts: /etc/ld.so.preload, new systemd service files) and cloud metadata (1 host, Oracle Cloud). These mirror the exploit chain of CVE-2024-37032 ('Probllama', Wiz Research): a missing digest-format validation in Ollama before 0.1.34 permits path traversal via /api/pull (arbitrary file write), /api/push (file read) and code execution by corrupting /etc/ld.so.preload. Rapid7 cannot confirm whether any target ran a vulnerable build, so the artifacts show attempted intent rather than success.

A second risk is 'self-hosted LLMjacking' (Rapid7 hypothesis, untested): 79% of exposed Ollama hosts list at least one :cloud model (GLM, DeepSeek, MiniMax, Kimi variants) that routes to ollama.com when the host is signed in via 'ollama signin', which links the local ed25519 key at ~/.ollama/id_ed25519 to the owner's account; the same seven cloud models appear on 1,295 unrelated hosts, suggesting automated checks. 28% of hosts run abliterated/heretic/uncensored models. No threat actor is named or attributed; the callback registries may reflect large-scale research scanning, and some remaining 'critical' hosts may still be sensors. Third-party indicators come only from model names, so a clean list does not prove a clean host.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
- T1552.005 Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
- T1098.004 Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
- T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
- T1574.006 Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Ollama API Abuse - Marker Models, Callback Registries and Encoded Path-Traversal Payloads (CVE-2024-37032 pattern)** (`TL-2026-6345-SPL-001`)

Detects HTTP POSTs to the unauthenticated Ollama API (TCP 11434) on /api/pull, /api/push, /api/create, /api/copy or /api/delete whose request body carries the indicators Rapid7 documented for TL-2026-6345: callback registry IPs (24.144.109.68:9882, 103.249.201.108:9882, 76.13.49.213:9882, 62.31.247.107:9882, 43.143.113.68:8899, 185.165.171.21:8899), free tunnel or ephemeral registries (trycloudflare.com, ttl.sh, bore.pub, Pinggy), marker model names (zzvitals-beacon, verif_sys, ops-verify, dsv4probe, pwn_ctl_), Base64-encoded file paths (/etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ, /etc/passwd, /etc/ld.so.preload, authorized_keys) and ../ digest traversal as used in the Probllama chain (CVE-2024-37032). Hits show attempted probing or marking of the server; successful exploitation is not implied.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1190, T1082, T1552.001, T1574.006, T1098.004
- **Data sources:** splunk_stream_http, network_traffic, ollama_api_11434
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=network sourcetype="stream:http" dest_port=11434 http_method=POST uri_path IN ("/api/pull","/api/push","/api/create","/api/copy","/api/delete")
| eval body=coalesce(form_data, http_request_body, "") ```base64 path prefixes are case-sensitive so the body is not lowercased```
| eval registry_callback=if(match(body,"(?i)((24[.]144[.]109[.]68|103[.]249[.]201[.]108|76[.]13[.]49[.]213|62[.]31[.]247[.]107):9882|(43[.]143[.]113[.]68|185[.]165[.]171[.]21):8899|159[.]223[.]110[.]159)"),1,0)
| eval tunnel_registry=if(match(body,"(?i)(trycloudflare[.]com|ttl[.]sh|bore[.]pub|pinggy)"),1,0)
| eval marker_model=if(match(body,"(?i)(zzvitals-beacon|verif_sys|ops-verify|dsv4probe|pwn_ctl_)"),1,0)
| eval encoded_path=if(match(body,"(L2V0Yy9zaGFkb3c|L3Byb2Mvc2VsZi9lbnZpcm9u|L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q|L2V0Yy9sZC5zby5wcmVsb2Fk|L3Jvb3QvLnNzaC9hdXRob3JpemVkX2tleXM)"),1,0)
| eval digest_traversal=if(match(body,"(?i)([.][.]/|%2e%2e)"),1,0) ```Probllama style digest path traversal```
| eval signal_count=registry_callback+tunnel_registry+marker_model+encoded_path+digest_traversal
| where signal_count>0
| eval src_zone=if(cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",src_ip) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",src_ip) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",src_ip),"internal","external")
| stats count as requests min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(uri_path) as endpoints sum(registry_callback) as registry_callback_hits sum(tunnel_registry) as tunnel_registry_hits sum(marker_model) as marker_model_hits sum(encoded_path) as encoded_path_hits sum(digest_traversal) as traversal_hits max(signal_count) as max_signals by src_ip src_zone dest_ip
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - max_signals
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let IocTerms = dynamic(['ttl.sh','bore.pub','trycloudflare.com','pinggy','zzvitals-beacon','verif_sys','ops-verify','dsv4probe','pwn_ctl_','24.144.109.68','103.249.201.108','76.13.49.213','62.31.247.107','43.143.113.68','185.165.171.21','159.223.110.159']);
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ProcessName =~ 'ollama' or SyslogMessage contains '[GIN]'
| where SyslogMessage has '/api/' or SyslogMessage has_any (IocTerms)
| extend ClientIP = extract(@'[|] *([0-9a-fA-F.:]+) *[|] *(?:POST|GET|DELETE)', 1, SyslogMessage)
| extend Endpoint = extract(@'(?:POST|GET|DELETE) +.(/api/[a-z]+)', 1, SyslogMessage)
| extend IocHit = SyslogMessage has_any (IocTerms)
| extend IsExternal = isnotempty(ClientIP) and ipv4_is_private(ClientIP) == false and ClientIP !in ('127.0.0.1','::1')
| summarize StateChangeCalls = countif(IsExternal and Endpoint in ('/api/pull','/api/push','/api/create','/api/copy','/api/delete')), ReconCalls = countif(IsExternal and Endpoint in ('/api/tags','/api/ps','/api/show','/api/version')), IocHits = countif(IocHit), Endpoints = make_set(Endpoint, 10), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, ClientIP
| where StateChangeCalls > 0 or IocHits > 0 or ReconCalls >= 10
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, Computer, ClientIP, StateChangeCalls, ReconCalls, IocHits, Endpoints
| order by IocHits desc, StateChangeCalls desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Ollama State-Changing API Call or Path Traversal Against Exposed Ollama Server
id: 7c1e4b2a-93d5-4f0e-8a67-2b5d1c9e3f41
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to the Ollama pull, push, create, copy or delete API endpoints, or Ollama API requests containing directory traversal sequences, as seen when exposed unauthenticated Ollama servers are marked or probed (TL-2026-6345, Rapid7 research) and in the CVE-2024-37032 Probllama exploit chain.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-self-hosted-ai-renting-compute-exposed-servers
  - https://www.wiz.io/blog/probllama-ollama-vulnerability-cve-2024-37032
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37032
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2024-37032
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection_state_change:
    cs-method: 'POST'
    c-uri|contains:
      - '/api/pull'
      - '/api/push'
      - '/api/create'
      - '/api/copy'
      - '/api/delete'
  selection_api:
    c-uri|contains: '/api/'
  selection_traversal:
    c-uri|contains:
      - '../'
      - '..%2f'
      - '%2e%2e'
  condition: selection_state_change or (selection_api and selection_traversal)
falsepositives:
  - Administrators or CI pipelines legitimately pulling or creating models through a reverse proxy
  - Authorized internal AI platform tooling such as Open WebUI back ends
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators legitimately pulling or copying models from internal or approved registries over the Ollama API
- Internal vulnerability scanners or Rapid7-style exposure scans that send Ollama API probes

**Tuning notes:** Requires Splunk Stream (or equivalent) capturing request bodies on port 11434; map form_data to your body field. Add known admin source IPs and approved registry hostnames to an exclusion lookup. Treat src_zone=external with any signal as high priority; the IP list is Rapid7-observed and may include research scanners or sensors, so confirm before blocking. Rapid7 could not confirm any target ran a vulnerable build, so triage host version (fixed in 0.1.34) alongside the alert.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Ollama External State-Changing and Recon API Calls Plus IOC Strings in Server Logs (Sentinel Syslog) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Process Writes ld.so.preload, Systemd Unit or authorized_keys (Defender for Endpoint on Linux) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Egress to Callback Registries, Tunnel Services and Cloud Metadata (Defender for Endpoint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Model Pull From Raw IP Registry or Free Tunnel Service (SSRF-Style Callback) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Command-Line Access to Ollama Private Key or Service Override Config (Credential Theft) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Sign-In or Cloud Model Use on Server (Self-Hosted LLMjacking Precursor, Hypothesis) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Process Touching Persistence and Credential Paths (ld.so.preload, systemd, authorized_keys, shadow, environ) via auditd (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ollama Callback Registry IPs and Tunnel Registry Pulls (trycloudflare, [indicator], [indicator], Pinggy) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `24.144.109[.]68`
- Domain: `ttl[.]sh`
- IP address: `103.249.201[.]108`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Open by default. Already occupied. (Rapid7, Christiaan Beek)](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-self-hosted-ai-renting-compute-exposed-servers)
- [NVD - CVE-2024-37032](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37032)
- [Probllama: Ollama Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2024-37032) - Wiz Research](https://www.wiz.io/blog/probllama-ollama-vulnerability-cve-2024-37032)
- [The Register - Wiz: Ollama RCE (Probllama)](https://www.theregister.com/2024/06/24/rce_ollama_wiz/)
- [Critical RCE vulnerability discovered in Ollama AI infrastructure tool - The Hacker News](https://thehackernews.com/2024/06/critical-rce-vulnerability-discovered.html)
- [Probllama in Ollama - Vicarius vsociety](https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/probllama-in-ollama-a-tale-of-a-yet-another-rce-vulnerability-cve-2024-37032)
- [Ollama pull request #4175 (digest validation fix)](https://github.com/ollama/ollama/pull/4175)
- [Ollama release diff v0.1.33...v0.1.34](https://github.com/ollama/ollama/compare/v0.1.33...v0.1.34)
- [BankInfoSecurity - Patched weeks ago, RCE bug in AI tool still Probllama](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/patched-weeks-ago-rce-bug-in-ai-tool-still-probllama-a-25611)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6345
