# EggStreme Malware Framework Revised (Custom Loader Ciphers, Passive-Mode Agent, SMB/VBScript Staging) in Suspected Chinese APT Attacks on Philippine Government Organizations

> A suspected Chinese APT has rebuilt its fileless EggStreme malware framework after Bitdefender's September 2025 disclosure, changing loader cryptography, adding a passive listening agent on TCP 5060, adding AD reconnaissance and in-memory PowerShell/.NET/PE execution, and moving lateral movement to SMB-delivered VBScript. Victims are multiple Philippine government organizations, with Taiwan a low-to-medium confidence lead.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T15:23:49Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T15:23:49Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6346
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6346.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6346
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 29 (3 shown free below)

## Description

EggStreme is a multi-stage, mostly fileless framework first documented by Bitdefender on 2025-09-17 in an intrusion against a Philippine military company. The chain is: EggStremeFuel (aka RawCookie) profiles the host and sideloads/deploys EggStremeLoader; EggStremeLoader sets up persistence and decrypts EggStremeReflectiveLoader; the reflective loader runs EggStremeAgent (aka Gorem RAT), the core backdoor. EggStremeWizard is a secondary backdoor providing reverse shell and file upload/download, and EggStremeKeylogger was injected into processes in the original intrusion. All stages rely on DLL sideloading with DLLs named after system libraries (e.g. advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, xwizards.dll, mscorsvc.dll), staging via file shares, in-memory execution, and mutual TLS (wolfSSL over raw TCP with an inner AES-256-CBC layer).

Bitdefender's follow-up (reported by The Hacker News on 2026-11-18) shows the operators revised the toolkit after disclosure. The Fuel configuration moved to AES-256-CBC (first build 2025-09-29). The loader cipher changed from RC4 (keys such as google, Windows, svchost) to RC5-32 CBC (build 2025-10-13), then to a custom 8-byte-block CBC cipher (variant A, 2025-10-28), a host-bound RC4 build keyed from the C: volume serial number (2025-11-11), and custom cipher variant B from mid-December 2025. Payloads are hidden in files that mimic system data such as C:\Windows\Media\Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll and wpndatabase.dat. The agent gained AD reconnaissance (commands 24-26), TCP forwarding (76/77), WMI queries with credentials (79), token impersonation (80), an embedded .NET loader (83), hosted in-memory PowerShell (84/85), and PE staging with reflective execution via the export werfault (86-88). A passive-mode agent opens a listener on TCP 5060 instead of beaconing, with an inbound firewall rule named 'Core Networking - SIP'. The operators moved from a single 2019 certificate authority (linking 32 domains) to campaign-specific CAs. The keylogger does not appear in any observed post-disclosure agent build.

Lateral movement shifted from Impacket-like tooling, Stowaway proxying and Netlogon script injection to an unmanaged SMB-reachable staging system: a batch wrapper (C:\Users\Public\Officelog.bat) launches a VBScript (C:\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs) through WScript.exe, which stages StandaloneUpdater.exe (imitating OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe) with an HKCU Run-key persistence value. Valid domain credentials are reused across machines. Initial access is unknown. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracks CL-STA-1048, which used EggStremeFuel and EggStremeLoader between March and September 2025, alongside MASOL RAT and TrackBak. The same article covers separate China-nexus activity against Southeast Asian governments (Mustang Panda PlugX ASEAN Summit lures in late October 2026; Earth Alux with FINALDRAFT, PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT); it is context rather than part of the EggStreme cluster, and no link is claimed.

Attribution remains a suspected Chinese APT; Bitdefender makes no new attribution claim and could not tie the original campaign to a named group.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1078.002 Domain Accounts
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1543.003 Windows Service
- T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1090.001 Internal Proxy
- T1571 Non-Standard Port

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**EggStreme SMB-Staged VBScript (prncnfg.vbs) and Officelog.bat Execution from C:\Users\Public** (`TL-2026-6346-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the revised EggStreme lateral-movement stage (TL-2026-6346): a batch wrapper C:\Users\Public\Officelog.bat launches C:\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs through WScript.exe, which stages StandaloneUpdater.exe. Any WScript.exe execution of a .vbs from the Public profile is also flagged. Tracks T1059.005, T1570 and T1021.002.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.005, T1570, T1021.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon:EventCode=1 (index=sysmon, sourcetype XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*\\wscript.exe" CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\*.vbs*") OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\Officelog.bat*" OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\prncnfg.vbs*")
| eval indicator=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)Officelog[.]bat"),"Officelog.bat",if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)prncnfg[.]vbs"),"prncnfg.vbs","public_vbs_via_wscript"))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User, Image, indicator
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "wscript.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\" and ProcessCommandLine has ".vbs")
    or ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\Officelog.bat"
    or ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: EggStreme SMB-Staged VBScript and Batch Wrapper Execution from C:\Users\Public
id: 3f6a1c2e-8b41-4d27-9a53-6e0c71b4d101
status: experimental
description: Detects WScript.exe running a VBScript from C:\Users\Public or execution of Officelog.bat / prncnfg.vbs from that folder, the SMB-delivered staging chain reported for the revised EggStreme framework (TL-2026-6346).
references:
    - https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-fileless-malware-cyberattack-apac
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wscript:
        Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_named:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\Officelog.bat'
            - '\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts deliberately staged in C:\Users\Public by IT software deployment
    - The legitimate prncnfg.vbs lives in System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts and does not match the Public path
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- IT software deployment tooling that stages scripts in C:\Users\Public
- Admins running ad-hoc VBScript maintenance scripts from the Public profile

**Tuning notes:** Adjust the index name to your Sysmon index (index=sysmon is assumed). Exclude known deployment accounts or parent processes by User/ParentImage. The legitimate Microsoft prncnfg.vbs is in System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts, so the query keys on the Public path.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- EggStreme DLL Side-Loading — System-Named DLLs from Non-System Paths (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme Post-Exploitation AD Reconnaissance and WMI with Credentials (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme Passive-Mode Agent Listener on TCP 5060 and Stowaway Proxy Port (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme In-Memory PowerShell/.NET Hosting by Non-PowerShell Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme Passive Agent Firewall Rule 'Core Networking - SIP' Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme C2 and Staged Domain DNS Resolution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme StandaloneUpdater Run-Key Persistence Masquerading as OneDrive (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme C2 Infrastructure Connections (mTLS Agent, Fuel and Wizard) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 29)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.115.225[.]73`
- Domain: `fsstore[.]org`
- File hash: `a363c1529033fb6017985ce07ab0ad57`

Full set of 29 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The Hacker News: New EggStreme Malware Variant Goes Silent to Evade Security Tools in Government Attacks](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/eggstreme-hackers-rebuild-malware-with.html)
- [Bitdefender: EggStreme malware revises architecture and infrastructure](https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure)
- [Bitdefender: EggStreme Malware: Unpacking a New APT Framework Targeting a Philippine Military Company](https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-fileless-malware-cyberattack-apac)
- [The Hacker News: Three China-linked clusters target Southeast Asian government (CL-STA-1048)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/three-china-linked-clusters-target.html)
- [The Hacker News: Chinese APT deploys EggStreme fileless malware](https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/chinese-apt-deploys-eggstreme-fileless.html)
- [The Record: Philippine military company suspected China espionage EggStreme malware](https://therecord.media/philippines-military-company-suspected-china-espionage-eggstreme-malware)
- [Hackread: Chinese APT Hits Philippine Military Firm with New EggStreme Fileless Malware](https://hackread.com/chinese-apt-philippine-military-eggstreme-fileless-malware/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6346
