# NoName057(16) DDoSia campaign: Intrinsec OpenCTI connector operationalizes DDoSia target configurations

> NoName057(16), a pro-Russian hacktivist group, runs volunteer-powered DDoS campaigns with the Go-based DDoSia tool against European targets, including many French public and private entities. On 2026-11-18 Intrinsec's CTI cell released an OpenCTI connector (listed on the Filigran Hub) that ingests DDoSia target configurations from the Witha.Name API, so defenders can treat the continuously renewed target lists as an intent signal.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T18:23:09Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T18:23:09Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6362
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6362.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6362
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** NoName057(16) (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 21 (3 shown free below)

## Description

NoName057(16) has conducted distributed denial-of-service campaigns against European targets for several years, emerging in March 2022 days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its DDoSia tool is distributed as compiled Go binaries (the banner suggests the authors call it "Go-Stresser") through Telegram channels and a Telegram bot. Volunteers contribute bandwidth, do not choose targets, and receive target configuration files that are renewed continuously as the group issues new orders. Europol states that participants were paid in cryptocurrency and that gamified elements (leaderboards, badges, shout-outs) sustained involvement.

Recorded Future's analysis describes the client protocol: volunteers register via the DDoSia Telegram bot and receive a client_id.txt containing a unique User Hash; the client ID is a UUID4 with the process ID appended. The client logs in with an HTTP POST to /client/login, reporting system information (username, OS, kernel version and architecture, platform family, CPU cores, registration time, time zone), then retrieves targets with an HTTP GET to /client/get_targets. Requests carry cookies U (User Hash), C (Client ID) and K (random Base32 value). Payloads are AES-GCM encrypted with a key derived from the User Hash and Client ID, which hinders researcher analysis. The decrypted JSON contains a targets array (target_id, request_id, host, ip, type, method, port, use_ssl, path, body, headers) and a randoms section with rules for generating random strings appended to requests to vary traffic and evade simple filtering or caching. Attack type examples are application-layer (http2) floods, with randomized browser-like User-Agent strings.

The control infrastructure is multi-tiered. Recorded Future reports Tier 1 C2 servers rotating with an average lifespan of about nine days, running nginx/1.18.0 on Ubuntu, with Tier 1 connecting only to ACL-restricted Tier 2. Censys, tracking from June 2025, suspects three tiers (client-facing Tier 1, short-lived Tier 2 relays, and Tier 3 core management/accounting), reports about 6 active control servers at any time with a mean lifespan near 2.5 days, VPS hosting (typically Azea, sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2025; AS56971 HostVDS) exposing mostly 22/TCP and 80/TCP. The two vendors' lifespan figures differ because of differing vantage points and methodology. Recorded Future observed new targets added in two daily waves (about 05:00-07:00 UTC and about 11:00 UTC on weekdays), suggesting a Russian work schedule. Over its July 2024-July 2025 window it counted over 3,700 unique hosts targeted (Ukraine 29.47%, France 6.09%, Italy 5.39%, Sweden 5.29%; government/public sector 41.09%, transportation/logistics 12.44%, technology/media/telecom 10.19%).

Operation Eastwood (14-17 July 2025), coordinated by Europol and Eurojust with 12 countries, took down over 100 systems and key central servers, with two arrests (France, Spain), seven arrest warrants (six from Germany, one from Spain), 24 house searches and over 1,000 supporters warned. Recorded Future reports new C2 servers appeared the day the operation ended and the infrastructure was re-established by 23 July 2025; a Vot Tak/RKS.Global investigation reported activity did not decline afterward. Censys put Telegram group subscribers at about 45k before the disruption and about 14k in December 2025.

The 2026-11-18 Intrinsec article describes an OpenCTI external-import connector, published on the Filigran Hub, that queries the API opened by the Witha.Name research group (previously CSV only) and imports DDoSia configuration data into OpenCTI as entities. Intrinsec frames the data as a near-real-time intent signal: targeted sectors, upcoming waves, and whether an organisation's own assets appear in target lists, rather than a post-incident indicator. The article itself lists no IOCs, CVEs or named targets; the IOCs in this record come from Recorded Future and Censys. Severity MEDIUM is an analyst judgment: DDoSia causes availability impact, but Europol reported incidents were mitigated without major disruption.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1583.003 Virtual Private Server
- T1583.005 Botnet
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1090 Proxy
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings — Exploitation (Impact)** (`TL-2026-6362-SPL-001`)

Detects the DDoSia (NoName057(16)) application-layer HTTP flood: many requests per minute to one path, nearly every request carrying a unique random query string (cache busting) and many distinct randomized browser User-Agents, sent by volunteer-botnet participants. TL-2026-6362, T1499.002.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1499.002, T1583.005
- **Data sources:** web access logs (index=web, sourcetype=access_combined)
- **Severity:** medium
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=web sourcetype=access_combined earliest=-15m@m
```comment: DDoSia (NoName057(16)) application-layer flood - random cache-busting query strings and randomized browser User-Agents hammering one path```
| eval uri_query=coalesce(uri_query,"")
| bin _time span=1m
| stats count AS requests dc(uri_query) AS distinct_queries dc(useragent) AS distinct_uas dc(clientip) AS distinct_sources BY _time host uri_path
| eval query_uniqueness=round(distinct_queries/requests,2)
| where requests>=1000 AND query_uniqueness>=0.7 AND distinct_uas>=10
| sort - requests
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(15m)
| where csUriQuery !in ("", "-")
| summarize Requests=count(), DistinctQueries=dcount(csUriQuery), DistinctUAs=dcount(csUserAgent), DistinctSources=dcount(cIP) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1m), sSiteName, csUriStem
| extend QueryUniqueness = round(todouble(DistinctQueries) / Requests, 2)
| where Requests >= 1000 and QueryUniqueness >= 0.7 and DistinctUAs >= 10
| project TimeGenerated, sSiteName, csUriStem, Requests, DistinctQueries, QueryUniqueness, DistinctUAs, DistinctSources
| order by Requests desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: DDoSia-Style HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings To A Single Path
id: 6f1c2b8e-3a47-4d19-9b52-7c0e1a4d8f01
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of requests to one URI path carrying a very large number of distinct query strings, the cache-busting behaviour of the DDoSia client (NoName057(16)) application-layer floods
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/anatomy-of-ddosia
    - https://censys.com/blog/ddosia-infrastructure
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/connecteur-opencti-ddosia-noname057/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002
    - attack.resource_development
    - attack.t1583.005
    - attack.tool.ddosia
correlation:
    type: value_count
    rules:
        - ddosia_http_request
    group-by:
        - cs-uri-stem
    timespan: 1m
    condition:
        gte: 1000
        field: cs-uri-query
falsepositives:
    - Search or analytics endpoints that legitimately receive unique query strings at high volume
    - Load tests and synthetic monitoring
level: medium
---
title: DDoSia HTTP Request With Query String (Base)
id: 6f1c2b8e-3a47-4d19-9b52-7c0e1a4d8f02
name: ddosia_http_request
status: experimental
description: Base rule for the DDoSia flood correlation, HTTP GET or POST requests carrying a query string
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/anatomy-of-ddosia
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method:
            - 'GET'
            - 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Base rule only, use through the correlation rule
level: informational
```

**Known false positives:**

- Search, autocomplete or analytics endpoints with legitimately unique query strings at high volume
- Load tests, synthetic monitoring and marketing campaign spikes with tracking parameters

**Tuning notes:** Baseline peak requests per path first and raise or lower the 1000 requests/min threshold. Exclude search and API paths with naturally unique queries. Cross-check the target host against DDoSia target lists (Witha.Name feed) to raise priority. DDoSia also randomizes request bodies, so for POST floods add a body or content-length diversity check at the WAF or CDN. Prefer behaviour-based mitigation over geo/ASN blocking because participants are distributed volunteers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings (KQL) — Exploitation (Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia Go Client Execution And [indicator] (KQL) — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval (KQL) — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings (Sigma) — Exploitation (Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia Go Client Execution On Windows (Sigma) — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval (Sigma) — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia Go Client Execution And [indicator] — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 21)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `38.180.143[.]83`
- Domain: `witha[.]name`
- File hash: `8ba11c9e3d3f38a2473620579f61119be9ada9bc0e4dc37fc045017f56248473`

Full set of 21 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Connecteur OpenCTI pour les configurations DDoSia : rendre le renseignement exploitable dans sa propre plateforme (Intrinsec)](https://www.intrinsec.com/connecteur-opencti-ddosia-noname057/)
- [Filigran Hub: Witha.Name OpenCTI integration](https://hub.filigran.io/fr/cybersecurity-solutions/opencti-integrations/withaname)
- [OpenCTI connectors repository: external-import/withaname](https://github.com/OpenCTI-Platform/connectors/tree/master/external-import/withaname)
- [Anatomy of DDoSia: NoName057(16)'s DDoS Infrastructure and Targeting (Recorded Future)](https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/anatomy-of-ddosia)
- [Recorded Future CTA-2025-0722 report (PDF)](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2025-0722.pdf)
- [Investigating the Infrastructure Behind DDoSia's Attacks (Censys)](https://censys.com/blog/ddosia-infrastructure)
- [Operation Eastwood disrupted operations of pro-Russian hacker group NoName057(16) (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/180027/cyber-crime/operation-eastwood-disrupted-operations-of-pro-russian-hacker-group-noname05716.html)
- [Global operation targets pro-Russian cybercrime network NoName057(16) (Sofia Globe)](https://sofiaglobe.com/?p=124267)
- [OpenCTI documentation: external import connectors](https://docs.opencti.io/latest/usage/import/external-connectors/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6362
