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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-6384

"Hello Again" Attack Bypasses Windows Hello and BitLocker PIN Lockout via TPM State Rollback (CVE-2026-43613)

mediumMONITORING

Researchers showed that an attacker with physical access can roll back firmware-TPM (fTPM) saved state held in SPI flash, including the failed-guess counter, to defeat PIN lockout. A 4-digit Windows Hello PIN falls in about 40 hours (69 days by design), and worst-case cracking of a default 6-digit BitLocker TPM+PIN startup PIN drops from 19 years to about 20 days.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6384, CVE-2026-43613, CVE-2026-45585
Also known asHello Again
SeverityMEDIUM
CVSS5.1
First disclosed
Exploitation statusPublic proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE
EPSSCVE-2026-45585: 0.4% (40.3th percentile)
Affected productsAMD Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon processors (Secure Processor firmware / NV controller); Winbond SPI NOR flash with RPMC (HMAC key leak via voltage glitch); Microsoft Windows Hello PIN and BitLocker TPM+PIN on fTPM platforms (AMD, Intel, Pluton); Intel Intel fTPM non-volatile state (rollback demonstrated per paper)
ToolsLow-cost SPI/RPMC interposer board
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing, T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access, T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsenterprise, government administration, finance, technology
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6384 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Windows Hello / BitLocker PIN Guess Burst With Reboot Cycling (Hello Again, CVE-2026-43613)

Detects the observable footprint of the Hello Again fTPM saved-state rollback (TL-2026-6384, CVE-2026-43613): a single host logging far more failed PIN logons than the TPM anti-hammering lockout should allow, together with repeated restarts inside the same window. Under normal operation the TPM lockout counter stops guessing after a handful of failures; a loop of guess, lockout, restore saved fTPM state, guess again lets an attacker with physical access keep guessing, which shows up as sustained PIN failures plus reboot cycling.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1110.001, T1212, T1211
  • Data sources: wineventlog:security, wineventlog:system, windows_security_4625
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=wineventlog earliest=-24h ((sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625 (Logon_Type=2 OR Logon_Type=7 OR Logon_Type=11) (Sub_Status=0xC000006A OR Status=0xC000006D)) OR (sourcetype=WinEventLog:System ((SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General EventCode=12) OR EventCode=6005)))
| eval evt=if(EventCode=4625,"pin_fail","boot")
| bin _time span=12h
| stats count(eval(evt="pin_fail")) AS pin_failures count(eval(evt="boot")) AS boots values(Account_Name) AS account_list BY host _time
| where pin_failures>=20 AND boots>=2
| eval tl_ref="TL-2026-6384 CVE-2026-43613 Hello Again fTPM state rollback"
| table _time host account_list pin_failures boots tl_ref

Microsoft KQL

let Fails = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 4625 and LogonType in (2, 7, 11)
| where tolower(SubStatus) == '0xc000006a' or tolower(Status) == '0xc000006d'
| summarize PinFailures = count(), Accounts = make_set(TargetUserName) by Computer, Window = bin(TimeGenerated, 12h);
let Boots = Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where (Source == 'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General' and EventID == 12) or (Source == 'EventLog' and EventID == 6005)
| summarize Boots = count() by Computer, Window = bin(TimeGenerated, 12h);
Fails
| join kind=inner Boots on Computer, Window
| where PinFailures >= 20 and Boots >= 2
| project Window, Computer, Accounts, PinFailures, Boots

Sigma

title: Windows PIN Logon Failure Event (Hello Again TPM Lockout Rollback Hunting)
id: 3f1c8a52-7d4e-4b19-9a62-5c0e1d7b8a01
name: tl_6384_pin_fail
status: experimental
description: Failed interactive, unlock or cached PIN logon (bad password substatus). Base event for the Hello Again (CVE-2026-43613) lockout-bypass burst correlation below.
references:
    - https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126
    - https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7079.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.t1212
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1211
    - cve.2026-43613
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4625
        LogonType:
            - 2
            - 7
            - 11
        SubStatus: '0xC000006A'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Users mistyping a PIN
level: low
---
title: Excessive PIN Failures Beyond TPM Lockout Threshold (Hello Again CVE-2026-43613)
id: 8b7e2d14-95c3-4f60-a1d8-2e4f6c9b0a02
status: experimental
description: Twenty or more failed PIN logons on one host in 12 hours exceeds what TPM anti-hammering lockout normally permits and suggests fTPM saved-state rollback and continued guessing.
references:
    - https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.t1212
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1211
    - cve.2026-43613
correlation:
    type: event_count
    rules:
        - tl_6384_pin_fail
    group-by:
        - Computer
    timespan: 12h
    condition:
        gte: 20
falsepositives:
    - Shared kiosk or lab devices with many users and frequent typos
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Shared kiosks, lab or training machines where many users mistype PINs on one host
  • A user who forgot a recently changed PIN and retried repeatedly across several reboots

Tuning notes: Raise or lower the 20 failure and 2 reboot thresholds per fleet baseline. Bins are fixed 12h buckets, so a burst straddling a boundary can split; use a sliding window if needed. Confirm in your environment which fields carry Hello PIN failures (Security 4625 versus Microsoft-Windows-HelloForBusiness/Operational) and add that log if 4625 is not produced at the lock screen. Exclude kiosk hosts via a lookup.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SPI Flash / Firmware Image Write Tool Execution (fTPM State Rollback Hunting) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Archive Staging Shortly After PIN Failure Burst and Successful Logon (Hello Again Data Collection) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windows Hello / PRT Sign-In From New IP on Managed Device (Hello Again SSO Exposure) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Written Under Recovery Path (Related GreatXML BitLocker Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unexpected BootExecute Value Change Including [indicator] (Related YellowKey) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPI Programmer / Interposer Class USB Device Enumerated (Hello Again Hardware Tooling) · unlock with TL Creds
  • PIN Failure Burst Followed By Successful Interactive Logon (Hello Again PIN Recovery) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WinRE Image Mount and Hive Load Activity (Related YellowKey BitLocker Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6384.

Sample indicators (2 of 12)

  • URL: hxxps://arxiv[.]org/abs/2611.18126
  • URL: hxxps://www[.]amd[.]com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7079.html

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 12 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

12 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

"Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs" (Werling, Finder, Jacob, Prein, Kühnapfel, Seifert; ACM CCS '26, arXiv:2611.18126 submitted 13 November 2026) is described as the first practical security analysis of JEDEC Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC) in shipping x86 systems. Windows Hello allows PINs as short as four digits, which is only viable because the TPM anti-hammering lockout limits guesses. Most modern x86 PCs use a firmware TPM that runs inside the processor, has no private storage, and saves its non-volatile state, including the failed-guess counter, to the motherboard SPI flash chip. If a saved state copy is restored after lockout, the failed-guess count resets and the attacker can keep guessing. On newer platforms, rollback protection for that state is delegated to RPMCs inside the flash chip, which are meant to only increase.

The researchers report two failures in the RPMC design. First, a short voltage glitch makes Winbond SPI flash (described as the largest NOR flash maker, over 25% market share) leak the HMAC key that signs counter values, allowing forged counter values; this is a chip design problem that only new flash designs can close. Second, the AMD non-volatile (NV) controller does not verify that an RPMC increment actually completed, so an interposer board between processor and flash can block the increment, report success, and let the PC accept the old state. On two AMD desktops without RPMC flash, simply writing an old flash image back reset the fTPM lockout counters with no special board. The paper states rollback of fTPM NV state works on AMD, Intel and Pluton platforms and that the attack was demonstrated end-to-end on locked, encrypted hardware. The attacker loop is: save the fTPM state, guess PINs until lockout, restore the saved state, and repeat.

Impact: a recovered Windows Hello PIN also unlocks device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise single sign-on, which can expose company accounts. The BitLocker TPM+PIN pre-boot protector falls to the same technique. The attack needs physical access, special tools and time, so the main risk is lost or stolen laptops holding valuable data. AMD tracks the AMD side as CVE-2026-43613 (bulletin AMD-SN-7079, also cited as AMD-SB-7079), CVSS 5.1: Secure Processor firmware does not properly confirm an RPMC increase finished, so a physically present attacker can suppress counter updates. AMD says physical attacks are outside its normal threat model but that RPMC exists to prevent this kind of interposer attack, and plans firmware fixes for affected Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon lines, with some target dates in November 2026. No in-the-wild exploitation is reported. Whether exploit code has been publicly released is not stated in the sources; the exploitability value reflects the publicly published end-to-end research demonstration. At research time NVD returned no record for CVE-2026-43613 (totalResults 0), and the AMD bulletin page timed out, so AMD details come from the news article. Related physical-access BitLocker bypasses: YellowKey (CVE-2026-45585, WinRE BootExecute abuse, disclosed 2026-05-19, Microsoft rated Exploitation More Likely, manual mitigation issued) and GreatXML (WinRE state triggered by Defender Offline Scan plus crafted unattend.xml, PoC public, reported 2026-06-11, no CVE in the source).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

Credential Access

T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing; T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access

Defense Evasion

T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware

Remediation

Patches

  • Install AMD firmware updates for affected Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon products once released (some target dates in November 2026) per AMD-SN-7079

Immediate actions

  • Keep devices under physical control and watch for signs of tampering until firmware fixes ship (AMD guidance)
  • Treat a lost or stolen laptop as a possible data exposure even when encrypted; revoke Windows Hello / SSO sessions and device-bound credentials
  • Move from TPM-only to TPM+PIN BitLocker protectors (Microsoft guidance following YellowKey): Add-BitLockerKeyProtector C: -TpmAndPinProtector or manage-bde -protectors -add C: -TPMAndPIN

Workarounds

  • Enforce TPM+PIN with Intune or Group Policy ('Require additional authentication at startup') across managed devices
  • Apply Microsoft's WinRE BootExecute mitigation for the related YellowKey issue (CVE-2026-45585): remove the autofstx.exe entry via reagentc /mountre, reg load, reg unload, reagentc /unmountre /commit, then reagentc /disable and /enable

Longer-term hardening

  • Use longer or enhanced alphanumeric startup PINs for BitLocker where strong protection is needed
  • Raise the minimum PIN length via Group Policy and enable enhanced startup PINs
  • The Winbond RPMC HMAC key leak can only be fixed by new flash chip designs

Affected and fixed versions

  • AMD — Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon processors (Secure Processor firmware / NV controller)
    Vulnerable versions: Affected Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon lines per AMD-SN-7079; exact versions not stated in sources
    Fixed in: Firmware fixes targeted from November 2026
  • Winbond — SPI NOR flash with RPMC (HMAC key leak via voltage glitch)
    Vulnerable versions: Chip design issue; specific part numbers not stated in sources
    Fixed in: Requires new flash designs
  • Microsoft — Windows Hello PIN and BitLocker TPM+PIN on fTPM platforms (AMD, Intel, Pluton)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 11 devices using fTPM state in SPI flash; Hello cited on over one billion devices
  • Intel — Intel fTPM non-volatile state (rollback demonstrated per paper)
    Vulnerable versions: Not specified in sources

Timeline

  • Related physical-access BitLocker bypass YellowKey (CVE-2026-45585, WinRE BootExecute abuse) publicly disclosed; Microsoft rates it Exploitation More Likely and issues a manual mitigation, recommending TPM+PIN.
  • Cyber Security News reports Microsoft's YellowKey mitigation guidance, including the move from TPM-only to TPM+PIN BitLocker protectors.
  • Related BitLocker bypass GreatXML (WinRE state triggered by Defender Offline Scan, crafted locked-ioc-4) reported with public PoC and no patch; works against TPM-only protection.
  • Hello Again paper (arXiv:2611.18126, an updated version of the ACM CCS '26 paper) submitted by Werling, Finder, Jacob, Prein, Kühnapfel and Seifert.
  • NVD lookup for CVE-2026-43613 returned no record (totalResults 0) at research time; AMD bulletin page timed out.
  • Cyber Security News publishes coverage citing AMD bulletin AMD-SN-7079 / CVE-2026-43613 (CVSS 5.1); AMD plans firmware fixes with some targets in November 2026.
  • End of the month in which AMD targets firmware fixes for affected Ryzen, EPYC and Athlon lines (some target dates in November 2026; exact dates not stated in sources).

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2026-45585

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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