# Ukraine, FBI arrest ransomware gang members tied to $40.5M in ransoms (Chaos/BlackSuit-linked, ex-Conti network, AI voice-phishing + remote-access abuse)

> Ukraine's National Police and the FBI arrested four suspected key members of an international ransomware organization (at least 27 core members, 60+ in the wider network incl. former Conti members) after 66 searches in Kyiv and 11 regions. The group allegedly extracted over $40.5M from at least 28 companies using AI-generated voice vishing, fake corporate VPN login pages and TeamViewer/AnyDesk remote access, followed by double extortion; court records name Chaos ransomware, but authorities have not confirmed ties to Conti, BlackSuit or Chaos.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T23:25:03Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T23:25:03Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6388
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6388.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6388
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 18 (2 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-11-18 Ukraine's National Police (Cyber Police Department and Main Investigation Department, with the Prosecutor General's Office and TacTeam units) announced, together with the US FBI, the arrest of four suspected key members of an international ransomware organization after an investigation lasting more than two years. 66 simultaneous searches were conducted in Kyiv and 11 Ukrainian regions; investigators seized computer equipment, phones, bank cards, about $370,000 and EUR 20,000 in cash. Charges are Part 2 of Article 255 (participation in a criminal organization) and Part 5 of Article 361 (unauthorized interference with information systems) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, with up to 15 years' imprisonment. The investigation is ongoing and other network members are still being identified.

Police say the organization comprises at least 27 people from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia, within a wider network of more than 60 participants across eight jurisdictions that includes former Conti members. At least 28 companies paid more than $40.5M (about UAH 1.8 billion) in ransoms. Targets included oil and gas, pharmaceutical, industrial/manufacturing, logistics, financial and critical-infrastructure organizations. In one case 1.4 TB was stolen from a US company; an initial $10M demand was settled for $5M. Ukrainian court records (as reported by LeMagIT and BleepingComputer) name Warren Oil Company (1.4 TB copied, 84.5 BTC / ~$5M paid, August 2024), Newpark Resources ($1.5M, December 2024), Quantum Health ($5M after a $15M demand, June 2026) and Maxxis International-USA (claimed by BlackSuit in November 2024).

Tradecraft per police and the press: pre-attack reconnaissance of the target's finances, assets, employees and IT weaknesses; a custom platform that places automated AI-generated voice calls (vishing) impersonating IT support with spoofed phone numbers; phishing pages imitating corporate VPN logins, with capture of the victim's two-factor code (Warren Oil case); persuading employees to install TeamViewer or AnyDesk under false pretenses, with one attacker keeping the employee on the phone while another worked in the systems; then data theft, encryption (Chaos per court records) and threats to publish stolen data (double extortion), with ransoms paid in cryptocurrency (BTC referenced).

Attribution caveat: authorities did not confirm that the four arrestees are former Conti members or are affiliated with BlackSuit/Chaos. LeMagIT links the helpdesk-impersonation activity to the BazarCall subgroup that supplied initial access to two Conti teams (one evolving Quantum -> Royal -> BlackSuit, the other Black Basta), a link that is analyst inference. Separately, Cisco Talos (2025-07-24) assessed with moderate confidence that the 2025 Chaos RaaS (unrelated to the older Chaos builder variants) is a BlackSuit/Royal rebrand or formed by ex-members, and documented its tradecraft (spam flooding + vishing to Quick Assist, RMM tools, GoodSync exfiltration, OpenSSH reverse tunnel, partial ECDH/AES encryption, .chaos extension). Talos-derived techniques and indicators here are tagged as Chaos RaaS tradecraft and are not confirmed as the exact arrested cell's tooling. No IOCs were published in the arrest announcements; BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for the Talos-reported C2 IP 45.61.134.36 at research time.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1598.004 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1204 User Execution
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Vishing-Driven Remote Access Tool Launch (Quick Assist / AnyDesk / TeamViewer / ScreenConnect) - TL-2026-6388** (`TL-2026-6388-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection for the initial-access step of the TL-2026-6388 ransomware network: after an AI-generated help-desk vishing call, the employee starts Quick Assist, AnyDesk, TeamViewer or ScreenConnect so the operators can work inside the host. Flags the tool, user, parent process and whether the binary runs outside Program Files.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1219, T1204, T1656
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, sysmon_eventcode_1
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    (Image="*\\QuickAssist.exe" OR Image="*\\AnyDesk.exe" OR Image="*\\TeamViewer.exe" OR Image="*\\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" OR Image="*\\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")
```TL-2026-6388 vishing-to-RMM: employee coaxed into starting a remote-access tool```
| eval tool=case(like(lower(Image),"%quickassist.exe"),"Quick Assist", like(lower(Image),"%anydesk.exe"),"AnyDesk", like(lower(Image),"%teamviewer.exe"),"TeamViewer", true(),"ScreenConnect")
| eval outside_program_files=if(match(lower(Image),"^c:.program files"),0,1)
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(CommandLine) as command_line max(outside_program_files) as outside_program_files by host User tool
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen host User tool count parent_image command_line outside_program_files
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-6388: remote-access tool started on an endpoint (vishing / help-desk impersonation, T1219/T1204)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("QuickAssist.exe", "AnyDesk.exe", "TeamViewer.exe", "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")
| extend Tool = case(FileName =~ "QuickAssist.exe", "Quick Assist", FileName =~ "AnyDesk.exe", "AnyDesk", FileName =~ "TeamViewer.exe", "TeamViewer", "ScreenConnect")
| extend OutsideProgramFiles = tolower(FolderPath) !startswith @"c:\program files"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Executions = count(), ParentProcesses = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10), CommandLines = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10), OutsideProgramFiles = max(toint(OutsideProgramFiles)) by DeviceName, AccountName, Tool
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, AccountName, Tool, Executions, ParentProcesses, CommandLines, OutsideProgramFiles
| order by FirstSeen desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Remote Access Tool Launched - Vishing RMM Abuse (TL-2026-6388)
id: b3a1c5e2-7d41-4c8a-9e12-6f0a2d8b4c11
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Quick Assist, AnyDesk, TeamViewer or ScreenConnect client binaries, the tools employees are talked into starting during AI or help-desk vishing calls attributed to the Chaos and BlackSuit-linked ransomware network.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-fbi-arrest-ransomware-gang-members-tied-to-40m-in-ransoms/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-chaos-ransomware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\QuickAssist.exe'
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\TeamViewer.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved IT help-desk remote support sessions
    - Administrators using sanctioned RMM tooling
level: medium

```

**Known false positives:**

- Approved IT help-desk remote support sessions
- Administrators using sanctioned RMM tooling

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist approved RMM tools by signer, hash or install path and approved hosts or users; prioritise hits where outside_program_files=1 or the parent is a browser, Office or script host; alert on Quick Assist wherever it is not part of your support process.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- MFA Success From a New IP After Lookalike VPN Phishing - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Masquerade Outside System32 (GoodSync) - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Domain Discovery, Impacket atexec and RDP Lateral Movement - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WMIC Product Uninstall of MFA or Security Software and Hidden-Account Registry Key - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Chaos Ransom Note [indicator] and [indicator] Files - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoodSync Execution for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Chaos Encryptor WMI Launch, Encryption Arguments and Recovery Inhibition - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel to Chaos RaaS C2 [indicator] - TL-2026-6388 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 18)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.61.134[.]36`
- Domain: `thesecure[.]biz`

Full set of 18 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Ukraine, FBI arrest ransomware gang members tied to $40M in ransoms (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-fbi-arrest-ransomware-gang-members-tied-to-40m-in-ransoms/)
- [Ukraine National Police: 'A call from IT support and a company in hostage' - acting police chief on exposing hackers who received over $40M](http://npu.gov.ua/news/dzvinok-vid-it-pidtrymky-i-kompaniia-v-zaruchnykakh-holova-natspolitsii-rozpoviv-pro-vykryttia-khakeriv-iaki-otrymaly-ponad-40-mln)
- [Ransomware: coup de filet contre les anciens de Conti (LeMagIT)](https://www.lemagit.fr/actualites/366654897/Ransomware-coup-de-filet-contre-les-anciens-de-Conti)
- [Censor.NET interview with acting National Police head Maksym Tsutskiridze](https://censor.net/ua/n4034335)
- [Ukrainian court registry record cited by LeMagIT/BleepingComputer](https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/141215039)
- [Cisco Talos: Unmasking the new Chaos RaaS group attacks](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-chaos-ransomware/)
- [Conti ransomware shuts down operation, rebrands into smaller units (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/conti-ransomware-shuts-down-operation-rebrands-into-smaller-units/)
- [New Royal ransomware emerges in multi-million dollar attacks (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-royal-ransomware-emerges-in-multi-million-dollar-attacks/)
- [Royal ransomware gang adds BlackSuit encryptor to their arsenal (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/royal-ransomware-gang-adds-blacksuit-encryptor-to-their-arsenal/)
- [Chaos RaaS emerges after BlackSuit takedown (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/chaos-raas-emerges-after-blacksuit.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6388
