# Initial access brokers shift ransomware access sales to private channels (ZeroFox analysis)

> ZeroFox data reported by Help Net Security shows ransomware/extortion activity at record levels (at least 2,381 incidents in Q3 2026; 852 in October 2026) while public initial-access listings fell from about 620 per quarter (early 2025) to about 370 (early 2026) as brokers moved deals to private channels such as Tox. Reported access vectors include session token theft, OAuth token compromise of SaaS vendors, Microsoft Teams voice phishing and help desk password-reset social engineering.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T23:44:12Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T23:44:12Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6389
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6389.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6389
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ZeroFox data summarized by Help Net Security on 2026-11-19 indicates that ransomware and extortion gangs claimed about 718 victims per month through October 2026, up from about 573 per month in 2025. Q3 2026 saw at least 2,381 incidents, the highest quarter on record and about 14% above the previous high of 2,091 (late 2025); October 2026 alone saw 852. By the end of October 2026 the annual total had already passed all of 2025, and 7,239 incidents had been logged through 2026-11-02. Qilin was the most active group with at least 1,104 incidents (about 15% of the total), followed by The Gentlemen with 935. North America remained the most targeted region but its share fell from about 59% (H2 2025) to 46-48% monthly since July 2026, while Asia-Pacific and South America reached their highest shares since at least early 2024.

Public dark web initial-access listings fell from about 620 per quarter (early 2025) to about 370 per quarter (early 2026). ZeroFox researchers interpret this as a shift to private channels rather than reduced criminal activity. The reported drivers are law-enforcement takedowns of broker storefronts - the XSS forum (seized July 2025), RAMP (seized January 2026) and LeakBase (down March 2026, Europol takedown) - pushing deals to the encrypted messenger Tox. Some ransomware groups also appear to handle initial access themselves. Basic access averaged about $1,427 in early 2023 and fell below $500 by Q3 2026, while domain administrator credentials averaged about $8,000. ZeroFox expects more session-token listings (which bypass login and MFA), premium pricing for access to vendors and integration providers, and a growing volume of unverified or exaggerated leak-site claims in 2027.

The article cites access vectors that bypass conventional controls. ShinyHunters-named actors compromised OAuth tokens at Salesloft Drift, Gainsight and Klue (Aug 2025 - Jun 2026) and used authorized sessions to reach customers' Salesforce data, which sign-in monitoring did not flag. Supporting reporting: UNC6395 used stolen Drift OAuth/refresh tokens in Aug 2025 (Salesloft and Salesforce revoked all Drift tokens on 2025-08-20); Salesforce disabled Gainsight-published apps in Nov 2025; and in June 2026 attackers used a dormant Klue API credential from an abandoned integration prototype (2026-06-11), pushed a malicious code update to harvest customer OAuth tokens, and queried customer CRM data, with extortion emails from a group Huntress calls 'Icarus'. Malicious voice phishing over Microsoft Teams reached nearly 10 times its mid-2025 weekly level by mid-2026; Unit 42's 'Spring Ring' reporting (Jan-Apr 2026) describes attackers using external .onmicrosoft.com tenants to pose as IT help desk, guiding victims to Quick Assist or other RMM tools, followed by PowerShell staging, AMSI tampering and a PetitPotam NTLM-relay attempt. Microsoft DART (2026-03-16) documented a similar Teams vishing case involving Quick Assist, a spoofed credential form and a disguised MSI that sideloaded a DLL. Help desk password-reset social engineering is cited as a tested vector.

Caveats: the headline statistics originate from ZeroFox and are single-source; the article links only to a ZeroFox tag page, not a specific report. The source states no CVEs, malware names or IOCs. Network and file IOCs recorded here come from the separately cited Unit 42 Spring Ring report (a Teams vishing campaign), are not tied by sources to a specific ransomware group, and a BeaconBeagle lookup returned no C2 match for the sampled IP or domain. Victim counts for the OAuth campaigns differ across sources (Drift >700 organizations per GTIG; Gainsight >200 instances; Klue 195 customer organizations; ShinyHunters claims close to 1,000 overall, unverified).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Quick Assist Launch Followed by PowerShell Staging or Domain Enumeration (Teams Vishing / Spring Ring)** (`TL-2026-6389-SPL-001`)

TL-2026-6389: Detects the post-vishing chain reported by Unit 42 (Spring Ring) and Microsoft DART: a victim launches Quick Assist after an external-tenant Teams 'help desk' call, then the operator runs obfuscated PowerShell (AMSI bypass via amsiInitFailed, encoded or download-cradle commands, san-sid.com staging) and domain enumeration (whoami /groups, net group /dom). Correlates the signals per host in 30-minute windows so a lone Quick Assist session by IT does not alert. Initial-access brokers and ransomware affiliates use this chain to obtain hands-on-keyboard access.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.004, T1219, T1059.001, T1033, T1069.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*quickassist.exe" OR Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe" OR Image="*whoami.exe" OR Image="*net.exe" OR Image="*net1.exe")
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval qa=if(like(lower(Image),"%quickassist.exe"),1,0)
| eval ps=if((like(lower(Image),"%powershell.exe") OR like(lower(Image),"%pwsh.exe")) AND (like(cmd,"%amsiinitfailed%") OR like(cmd,"%-enc%") OR like(cmd,"%downloadstring%") OR like(cmd,"%san-sid.com%")),1,0)
| eval enum=if(like(cmd,"%whoami /groups%") OR like(cmd,"%group /dom%"),1,0)
| bin _time span=30m
| stats sum(qa) as quick_assist_launches sum(ps) as suspicious_powershell sum(enum) as enum_cmds values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, _time
| where quick_assist_launches>0 AND (suspicious_powershell>0 OR enum_cmds>0)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("quickassist.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "whoami.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe")
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend QA = FileName =~ "quickassist.exe",
         PS = FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and Cmd matches regex "amsiinitfailed|-enc|downloadstring|san-sid[.]com",
         Enum = Cmd contains "whoami /groups" or Cmd contains "group /dom"
| summarize QuickAssistLaunches = countif(QA), SuspiciousPowerShell = countif(PS), EnumCommands = countif(Enum), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 20) by DeviceName, Window = bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| where QuickAssistLaunches > 0 and (SuspiciousPowerShell > 0 or EnumCommands > 0)
| project Window, DeviceName, QuickAssistLaunches, SuspiciousPowerShell, EnumCommands, Commands
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Quick Assist Launch or Post-Vishing Staging and Enumeration (TL-2026-6389)
id: 6f3b1c2e-8a41-4d7b-9c55-2e1a7d0b4f61
status: experimental
description: Detects Quick Assist execution and the follow-on activity reported in Spring Ring Teams vishing intrusions - AMSI bypass via amsiInitFailed, staging from san-sid.com, and domain enumeration with whoami /groups and net group /dom. Single-event form; correlate Quick Assist with the other selections per host for higher fidelity.
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/
  - https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/16/help-on-the-line-how-a-microsoft-teams-support-call-led-to-compromise
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.004
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1219
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1033
  - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_quick_assist:
    Image|endswith: '\quickassist.exe'
  selection_enum_whoami:
    Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: '/groups'
  selection_enum_net:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\net.exe'
      - '\net1.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'group /dom'
  selection_powershell:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'amsiInitFailed'
      - 'san-sid.com'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Help desk staff legitimately using Quick Assist
  - Administrators running whoami /groups or net group /dom during troubleshooting
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Help desk staff legitimately using Quick Assist alongside PowerShell troubleshooting on the same host
- Administrators running whoami /groups or net group /dom during support sessions

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known help desk jump hosts and service accounts, or allow-list Quick Assist on IT-owned devices. Raise the correlation window or require suspicious_powershell>0 to cut noise further. If Quick Assist is blocked by policy, alert on any single launch. Adjust the Sysmon index name to your environment.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Microsoft Teams Contact from Help Desk-Themed External onmicrosoft.com Tenant (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Spring Ring Host Artifacts: IntegrityData Python, vhlp-/scnr- Executables and Scheduled Task Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Low-Prevalence DLL Side-Loading from User-Writable Directory (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Sign-in or Token Use from Spring Ring Vishing Proxy IPs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell AMSI Tampering via amsiInitFailed (Spring Ring Stager) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PetitPotam-Style NTLM Coercion via Anonymous IPC$ Access on Domain Controller (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Salesforce Bulk Data Access via OAuth Connected App (Drift / Gainsight / Klue Pattern) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Endpoint Connection or DNS Lookup to Spring Ring Vishing Infrastructure ([indicator] and Proxy IPs) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `193.32.248[.]251`
- Domain: `san-sid[.]com`
- File hash: `24ab9fe5d5be62d3bf055a0ca4508e8bca2996b6d78649dce8145d8a27bc1c5b`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Ransomware access brokers are moving their deals off public forums](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/19/ransomware-access-brokers-cybercrime/)
- [Klue breach: Salesforce data theft and extortion of Huntress (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/19/klue-salesforce-data-breach-huntress/)
- [ShinyHunters' OAuth Pivot: A Year of SaaS Supply-Chain Breaches (CSA research note)](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-shinyhunters-oauth-saas-abuse-20260716-csa/)
- [Spring Ring: voice phishing campaigns via Microsoft Teams (Unit 42)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/)
- [Help on the line: how a Microsoft Teams support call led to compromise (Microsoft)](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/16/help-on-the-line-how-a-microsoft-teams-support-call-led-to-compromise)
- [Salesforce investigates new incident echoing Salesloft Drift compromise (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2025/11/20/salesforce-investigates-new-incident-echoing-salesloft-drift-compromise/)
- [Europol LeakBase forum takedown (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/03/05/europol-leakbase-forum-takedown/)
- [ShinyHunters 'does not like Salesforce at all,' claims the crew accessed Gainsight 3 months ago (The Register)](https://www.theregister.com/2025/11/21/shinyhunters_salesforce_gainsight_breach/)
- [The role of initial access brokers in ransomware operations (ZeroFox)](https://www.zerofox.com/intelligence/the-role-of-initial-access-brokers-in-ransomware-operations/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6389
