# EggStreme Malware Rebuilt After Disclosure: Suspected Chinese APT Revises Toolkit Targeting Philippine Government

> Bitdefender reports that a suspected Chinese APT group re-engineered its EggStreme malware framework and infrastructure after the September 2025 disclosure, continuing to target Philippine government organizations (high confidence) and possibly Taiwan (low to medium confidence). Changes include a raw-TCP mutual-TLS agent transport with inner AES-256-CBC, an expanded command set, a passive listening agent variant, new loader ciphers and campaign-specific certificate authorities.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T00:16:39Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T05:56:22.488Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6391
- **ID:** TL-2026-6391
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 45 (3 shown free below)

## Description

EggStreme is a multi-stage, largely fileless Windows espionage framework first documented by Bitdefender in September 2025 (v1) following an intrusion at a Philippine military company. Its chain consists of EggStremeFuel (stage-1 sideloaded DLL that profiles the host and deploys the loader), EggStremeLoader (persistence; decrypts and runs the next stage), EggStremeReflectiveLoader, EggStremeAgent (core backdoor, also tracked as Gorem RAT; Fuel is also tracked as RawCookie), EggStremeKeylogger and EggStremeWizard (secondary reverse-shell/file-transfer backdoor). Palo Alto Networks tracks CL-STA-1048, which used some components (Fuel, Loader) from March to September 2025; Bitdefender notes the tools may be shared by more than one actor and has not confirmed that it is the same cluster.

On 2026-11-18 Bitdefender published an update describing a v2 generation built after disclosure. Rotated hashes, domains and IPs are the cheap changes; the substantive ones are: (1) the agent transport moved from gRPC over mutual TLS to raw TCP with mutual TLS (wolfSSL) plus an inner AES-256-CBC layer with hardcoded keys/IVs and embedded certificates; (2) Fuel configuration protection moved from RC4 (filename key) to AES-256-CBC, with the config stored at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Notifications\wpndatabase.dat imitating wpndatabase.db; (3) loader cryptography progressed from XOR/RC4 to RC5-32 CBC and then to two custom CBC ciphers (variants A and B) with the hardcoded string KERNEL32 as key/IV, with the payload file carrying its own 8-byte key (so protection is weak); (4) new agent commands for Active Directory recon (24-26), TCP forwarding (76/77), WMI queries with supplied credentials (79), token impersonation (80), loading embedded .NET assemblies (83), in-memory PowerShell (84/85) and reflective PE execution (86-88); (5) a passive-mode agent that listens on TCP 5060 and adds an inbound firewall rule named 'Core Networking - SIP' via the COM firewall API (edge traversal enabled), instead of beaconing; (6) removal of the keylogger from all observed post-disclosure agent builds (EggStremeWizard has not been retired); and (7) a shift from a single 2019 certificate authority to apparently campaign-specific CAs.

Initial access remains unknown. Bitdefender's first investigation began with a logon script on a network share of unclear origin; in later incidents valid domain credentials and a reachable share were sufficient. Lateral movement now uses an unmanaged host outside endpoint management to stage a package (legitimate executable, malicious sideloading DLL, config file) plus VBS/batch files, which are run remotely over SMB with WScript. Persistence is a HKCU Run value (StandaloneUpdater) pointing into the OneDrive setup\logs directory. Encrypted payloads are hidden in files with innocuous names such as Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll, appmain.sdb and systemZones.res. Sideloading DLL names include advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, DevicesPlatform.dll and xwizards.dll.

Defensive takeaways from Bitdefender: hash, domain and CA pivots are weakening, but development hosts serving certificates for several unrelated domains on ports 8443-8445 can reveal staged domains. Recommended detections cover WScript/cmd running scripts from C:\Users\Public\, Run keys pointing into OneDrive setup\logs, reads of the listed payload paths by non-Windows processes, creation of the 'Core Networking - SIP' rule, listeners on TCP 5060, and CLR or System.Management.Automation loads in non-.NET processes. No CVEs are involved. Attribution is a technical assessment of a suspected Chinese APT, not a statement about any government.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1587.003 Digital Certificates
- T1078.002 Domain Accounts
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1090.001 Internal Proxy
- T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process
- T1055 Process Injection

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**EggStreme v2 - Script Interpreter Running Staged prncnfg.vbs / Officelog.bat From Users\Public** (`TL-2026-6391-SPL-001`)

Detects wscript, cscript or cmd executing prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat or any .vbs/.bat located in C:\Users\Public. Bitdefender reports EggStreme v2 stages a legitimate executable, a sideloading DLL and a config file on an unmanaged host and then runs VBS/batch files from C:\Users\Public remotely over SMB with WScript to launch EggStremeFuel. Behaviour-first logic that survives hash, domain and IP rotation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.005, T1059.003, T1021.002, T1570
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceProcessEvents, windows_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\cmd.exe") (CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\prncnfg.vbs*" OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\Officelog.bat*" OR (CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\*" CommandLine IN ("*.vbs*", "*.bat*")))
| stats count min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(CommandLine) AS command_lines values(ParentImage) AS parent_images BY host, User, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'cmd.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (@'\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs', @'\Users\Public\Officelog.bat') or (ProcessCommandLine has @'\Users\Public\' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('.vbs', '.bat'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: EggStreme Script Interpreter Running Staged Script From Users Public
id: c6391a01-4e1b-4c5a-9d3f-6a2b7e8f1001
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript, cscript or cmd executing prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat or other scripts from C:\Users\Public, the pattern used by EggStreme v2 to run the staged sideloading package over SMB.
references:
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
    selection_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs'
            - '\Users\Public\Officelog.bat'
    selection_generic:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Users\Public\'
    selection_ext:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.vbs'
            - '.bat'
    condition: selection_img and (selection_ioc or (selection_generic and selection_ext))
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or software deployment tools that stage legitimate scripts in C:\Users\Public
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators or software deployment tooling that legitimately stages .vbs/.bat scripts in C:\Users\Public
- Legacy logon or inventory scripts run from the Public profile

**Tuning notes:** Adjust index/sourcetype to your Sysmon ingestion. Exclude known deployment accounts and parent processes after a baseline period. The two named files (prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat) are high fidelity; the generic Users\Public branch is broader and can be split into a lower-severity hunt.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- EggStreme - System-Named DLL Sideloaded From User-Writable Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - Encrypted Payload Written To Innocuous Payload-Hiding Files (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme Passive Agent - [indicator] Firewall Rule and TCP 5060 Listener (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - Staged Package and Config Files Created On Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - CLR or System.Management.Automation Loaded By Non-.NET Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - Staging Package Files Accessed On Network Share (SMB Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - HKCU Run Key StandaloneUpdater Pointing Into OneDrive setup\logs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EggStreme - Connections or DNS Lookups To Known C2 and Staging Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 45)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.115.225[.]73`
- Domain: `mepintei[.]com`
- File hash: `0f2404810a20ad1c265a94cf7643e38f`

Full set of 45 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [EggStreme Malware: Rebuilt Under Scrutiny (Bitdefender)](https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure)
- [New EggStreme Malware Variant Goes Silent to Evade Security Tools in Government Attacks (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/eggstreme-hackers-rebuild-malware-with.html)
- [Bitdefender malware-ioc repository (2026_11-eggstreme-iocs.csv, 2025_09_10-eggstreme-iocs.csv)](https://github.com/bitdefender/malware-ioc)
- [EggStreme Malware: Unpacking a New APT Framework Targeting a Philippine Military Company (Bitdefender, v1)](https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-fileless-malware-cyberattack-apac)
- [Chinese APT Deploys EggStreme Fileless Malware (The Hacker News, 2025)](https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/chinese-apt-deploys-eggstreme-fileless.html)
- [Chinese APT Actor Compromises Military Firm with Novel Fileless Malware Toolset (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chinese-apt-military-fileless/)
- [Three China-linked clusters target ... (CL-STA-1048 coverage, The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/three-china-linked-clusters-target.html)
- [Custom RATs Target Southeast Asia Governments (Unit 42; related Earth Alux activity cited by The Hacker News, not linked to EggStreme)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6391
