# RevStealer: Commercial Infostealer with Sandbox-Aware Anti-Analysis (Score-Based Environment Gate, H.264 Hardware Probe) and Polygon Dead-Drop C2 Failover

> RevStealer is a commercially sold Windows infostealer distributed through game-cheat lures, trojanized/impersonated software and a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' Electron app. Its native payload exits on CIS-region language settings and when a ten-check weighted environment score (including an MFTEnumEx hardware H.264 encoder probe) reaches 7, then steals browser, wallet, gaming and credential data, uses Polygon smart contracts for C2 failover and deletes itself.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T00:37:57Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T00:37:57Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6392
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6392.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6392
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

RevStealer (Malpedia: win.revstealer; tracked by Elastic Security Labs as REF2859) has been sold as a commercial infostealer since at least February 2026, when the earliest sample was seen on VirusTotal; Gen Threat Labs first documented it in July 2026. Elastic reported roughly 4,700 samples matching its detection over the past year (a file count, not confirmed infections). Joe Security analyzed a sample that showed little activity in a standard sandbox and attributed its final native payload to RevStealer based on ThreatFox IOC 1850356 (relay7.apiforge.click), the Malpedia entry and code-level similarity to a MalwareBazaar reference sample (13543ef85a0988a09ef430a1f114f920a670a82f9e360ff9e6872252062d4768); the two builds differ in dispatcher order and build-specific constants.

Delivery and loading: Elastic found at least 17 YouTube channels (many hijacked, using short AI-generated videos) promoting the cheat sites elitecheatsx.live and resight-cheats.net; other samples impersonated Slack, qBittorrent, SteelSeries GG and Blender. Morphisec (31 Aug 2026) documented a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' project on GitHub/cheat sites delivering a ~101 MB archive containing a windowless 64-bit Electron loader with an AES-256-CBC-encrypted native payload resource. The loader attempts to add the user's AppData folder to Microsoft Defender exclusions, drops the payload to a randomly named AppData directory, launches it hidden and detached, and tries to delete its staging file. Pre-decryption checks require >=2 GiB RAM, >=2 logical CPUs, a non-blocklisted hostname/username and a recognized graphics adapter; a timing check around a JavaScript debugger statement wipes the encoded string table on pauses over ~100 ms. Most samples are packed with VMProtect. Anthropic itself was not compromised; the lure only impersonates the brand.

Anti-analysis in the final native payload (Joe Security, Elastic, Morphisec): (1) a language-based kill switch - default/system language and keyboard layout are hashed with FNV-1a and compared to an embedded table of CIS/Central Asian locales (Russian, Ukrainian and others); a match terminates execution; (2) a weighted environment gate of ten checks (nine weighted checks plus one direct host-identity gate) covering display/GPU/PCI vendor, CPU topology/core count, running-process blocklist, physical memory, username/computer-name blocklist, system uptime, sleep/timing acceleration, Media Foundation hardware H.264 support, CPUID consistency and virtualization. The Media Foundation check initializes Media Foundation and calls MFTEnumEx to enumerate hardware H.264 video encoders, which virtual machines frequently lack and which many sandboxes do not monitor. When the cumulative score reaches 7 the sample resets internal state and exits after a short randomized delay. Joe identified FUN_140005FFC as the scoring routine in the reference sample and a bare-metal Joe Sandbox run (analysis 1948922) is cited to defeat the gate. Additional hardening includes import-less API resolution/API hashing, 14 indirect syscall wrappers, string encryption, a vectored exception handler so one failing collector does not end the session, a CAPTCHA/verification window (random six-character token on raw builds) that blocks automated execution, and runtime-only decryption of the C2 configuration.

Collection and C2: the stealer harvests Chromium credentials and cookies (including a Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass that launches the browser under a debugger with a hardware breakpoint to read the key from memory), 225 Chromium wallet-extension IDs and 51 standalone wallet apps, password managers, Windows Credential Manager, messaging, VPN/FTP, OBS Studio, Sticky Notes, 2FA apps, selected documents, and gaming accounts (Steam, Battle.net, EA Desktop, Roblox session cookie, Minecraft launchers). It profiles the host (hardware, locale, environment block, processes, installed apps), captures the clipboard and a screenshot, and streams encrypted typed records to the C2 without an on-disk archive. Each build has a primary C2 and a Polygon smart-contract address; if the primary is unreachable it queries up to five public Polygon JSON-RPC endpoints and decrypts the fallback C2 with an embedded AES key (EtherHiding-style dead drop resolver). The core stealer has no persistence and self-deletes after exfiltration.

Follow-on modules (Elastic activity set; not observed delivered to a live RevStealer host, so linkage rests on shared code): ProManager (wallet/extension theft, overlays, password-field capture; Run key), WinUpdate (clipboard crypto-address replacement, mnemonic theft; scheduled task/Run key), SoftManager (reverse SOCKS5 proxy over encrypted WebSocket; logon script/scheduled task/Run key) and LockAppHost (XMRig miner; CMSTP UAC bypass, Defender exclusions, disables 5 Windows Update services, 11 update tasks and 2 malware-removal tasks; hides in suspended nslookup.exe/svchost.exe; Run key or service). Elastic's public YARA rule has no coverage for LockAppHost.

No CVE, vulnerability or named threat actor is associated. Severity is analyst-assigned. The Joe Security article date is shown as 06.10.2026 (day/month ambiguous); the timeline places it at 2026-10-06 (DD.MM reading) with that caveat, and first_disclosed uses the earliest unambiguous dated source.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1106 Native API
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks
- T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1218.003 System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- T1090 Proxy
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1496.001 Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**RevStealer Loader Adds AppData Path to Microsoft Defender Exclusions** (`TL-2026-6392-SPL-001`)

Detects the RevStealer (REF2859) Electron loader behaviour of adding the user's AppData folder to Microsoft Defender exclusions before dropping and launching the native stealer payload, via Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference command lines or direct writes to the Defender Exclusions\Paths registry key. The same exclusion tampering is used by the LockAppHost miner module. Defender exclusions on AppData are rare in managed estates, so this is a high-fidelity early signal (T1562.001, T1204.002).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1562.001, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_defender
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h ((EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*Add-MpPreference*" OR CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*") CommandLine="*Exclusion*" (CommandLine="*AppData*" OR CommandLine="*%APPDATA%*" OR CommandLine="*%LOCALAPPDATA%*")) OR (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*Windows Defender*Exclusions*Paths*AppData*")) | eval trigger=if(EventCode=13,"registry_exclusion","powershell_exclusion"), evidence=coalesce(CommandLine,TargetObject) | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(trigger) as trigger values(evidence) as evidence by host, User, Image | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let lookback = 24h;
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('Add-MpPreference','Set-MpPreference') and ProcessCommandLine has 'Exclusion'
 | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('AppData','%APPDATA%','%LOCALAPPDATA%')
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = AccountName, Actor = FileName, Evidence = ProcessCommandLine, Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName, Source = 'process'),
(DeviceRegistryEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where RegistryKey has 'Exclusions' and RegistryKey has 'Paths' and (RegistryKey has 'AppData' or RegistryValueName has 'AppData')
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, Evidence = strcat(RegistryKey, ' ', RegistryValueName), Parent = InitiatingProcessParentFileName, Source = 'registry')
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: RevStealer Loader Adds AppData Path to Defender Exclusions
id: 3f6c1a52-8b7e-4d0a-9c21-5a7d4e9b1f03
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference calls that add an AppData path to Microsoft Defender exclusions, as done by the RevStealer Electron loader and the LockAppHost miner module (TL-2026-6392).
references:
    - https://www.morphisec.com/?p=11634
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-MpPreference'
            - 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_exclusion:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Exclusion'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AppData'
            - '%APPDATA%'
            - '%LOCALAPPDATA%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or developers excluding a per-user build or tool directory
    - Endpoint management scripts that configure Defender exclusions
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators or developers deliberately excluding a per-user build/tool directory under AppData
- Endpoint management or software deployment scripts that configure Defender exclusions

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known admin accounts and management-tool parent processes. Sysmon EventCode 13 must be enabled for the Exclusions registry key. Enable Defender tamper protection so exclusion writes are blocked, and keep this rule as the alert for attempts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- RevStealer Known Sample Hashes and Module Filenames on Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer Follow-On Module Persistence via Run Key or Scheduled Task/Service (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer C2, Module and Lure Domain Contact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer Media Foundation Sandbox-Gate Probe (mfplat.dll in Unsigned AppData Process) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer Browser Process Access by AppData Binary (App-Bound Encryption Bypass) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer LockAppHost XMRig Miner Hidden in nslookup.exe or svchost.exe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer LockAppHost CMSTP INF UAC Bypass Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RevStealer Polygon JSON-RPC Dead-Drop Lookup from Non-Browser Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `relay7[.]apiforge[.]click`
- File hash: `e712d2be2d4554c756b6a2b9aaf22dfa2100e31679c6e9eec8d4501c9730a856`
- Domain: `serve[.]eastpeak[.]xyz`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Inside RevStealer's Sandbox-Aware Anti-Analysis System (Joe Security)](https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/6469689575970038406)
- [REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming infostealer (Elastic Security Labs)](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer)
- [Fake Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop delivering RevStealer (Morphisec Threat Labs)](https://www.morphisec.com/?p=11634)
- [Four RevStealer-linked modules disable Defender and mine crypto (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/four-revstealer-linked-modules-disable.html)
- [Malpedia: win.revstealer](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.revstealer)
- [ThreatFox IOC 1850356 (relay7.apiforge.click)](https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1850356/)
- [MalwareBazaar reference sample 13543ef85a0988a09ef430a1f114f920a670a82f9e360ff9e6872252062d4768](https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/13543ef85a0988a09ef430a1f114f920a670a82f9e360ff9e6872252062d4768/)
- [Joe Sandbox bare-metal analysis 1948922](https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1948922/0/html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6392
