# Payroll Pirates Phishing Campaign Targets Microsoft 365 Financial Workflows (AiTM Session Token Theft)

> Payroll Pirates voicemail-themed phishing emails route victims through Google Meet, Google Ads and Amazon S3 redirects to an attacker-controlled AiTM proxy that relays Microsoft's real sign-in flow and captures session tokens. Operators refresh stolen sessions about every eight hours via residential proxies and quietly collect payroll, invoice and banking email from payroll, HR, finance and admin users.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T01:23:10Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T01:23:10Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6395
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6395.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6395
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Storm-2657
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Arctic Wolf Labs (2026-08-06) observed hundreds of organizations targeted by email in July 2026, with successful intrusions across healthcare, education, manufacturing, government and professional services in the US, Canada and Europe. Wiz classifies the activity as a campaign by the named actor Payroll Pirates (initial access: end-user compromise; impact: data exfiltration). Arctic Wolf reports significant technical and behavioral overlap with the cluster Microsoft tracks as Storm-2755 ("payroll pirate" attacks against Canadian employees, reported April 2026); SRA and The Hacker News describe the overlap as tactical and do not claim attribution.

Initial access is a voicemail-themed email impersonating an automated call notification service, with a Microsoft logo and fabricated caller ID, date, duration and reference number. Subject format: "[Organization] :ATTN: Review messages. Ref id: [random string]". The link passes through a six-hop chain: (1) meet.google.com/linkredirect?dest=..., (2) www.google.com/url?q=..., (3) a Campaign Manager click tracker at adservice.google.com.ph/ddm/clk/..., (4) an HTML object in an Amazon S3 bucket, (5) an idp.* redirector returning HTTP 302, and (6) the AiTM proxy on a Microsoft-themed subdomain (mslogin., msonline., msauth.) or a misspelled office.* domain. Recently used domains were often hosted on Hostinger and were under 10 days old. Arctic Wolf notes the Google Meet/Campaign Manager chain also appeared in public sandbox submissions delivering EvilTokens, Sneaky 2FA and FlowerStorm, suggesting shared delivery infrastructure rather than a common operator.

The proxy stack (OpenResty/1.31.1.1 front end, x-powered-by: Express on the proxy root, PHP/8.2.32 on the fingerprint endpoint) first fingerprints the browser through /st_58200519/class_identifier.php (OS, screen, language, time zone, hardware concurrency, WebDriver status, WebGL vendor/renderer). It then geolocates the victim via api.country.is and stores the result in an rcfh_country cookie valid for seven days, before redirecting to the proxied Microsoft OAuth endpoints (GetCredentialType, /common/login, /common/SAS/BeginAuth, /common/SAS/EndAuth). The real MFA flow is relayed, and the authorization code and ID token are captured at the proxy callback before the victim is sent to the genuine Office 365 site. The proxy sometimes omits the OAuth nonce parameter, producing Entra error 90014 on OfficeHome.

Anomalous sign-ins follow within minutes: initial sign-ins show implausible mobile Safari/Chrome on Windows 10; recurring Outlook sign-ins use Firefox 131.0, Firefox 151.0 or Python Requests instead of Edge. Session maintenance begins 11-24 hours after initial activity and recurs about every 8 hours through rotating residential proxies (mainly anyIP), reusing the same SessionID while IP, ASN and location change. Post-compromise, Microsoft Graph (axios user agent) enumerates users filtered on payroll, hr, finance and human resources terms, then mailboxes are collected for payroll, invoice, payment, banking and benefits content. A limited subset of intrusions created inbox rules that move messages to Deleted Items and mark them read, with those interactive sign-ins coming from hosting infrastructure (AS27176, Datawagon LLC). Most intrusions showed no MFA-method changes, device registration, credential changes or outbound phishing. SRA's June 2026 case data shows Graph reconnaissance from Canadian residential ISP space, initial authentication from US mobile carriers, and broad Graph scopes (Directory.Read.All, Files.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All, Chat.ReadWrite, User.ReadWrite). Microsoft's Storm-2755 reporting describes the end goal as diverting employee salaries by changing direct-deposit details in HR platforms such as Workday. Wiz severity is not provided in the source; HIGH is an analyst assessment.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1550.004 Web Session Cookie
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules
- T1087.004 Cloud Account
- T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
- T1090.002 External Proxy

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Payroll Pirates Redirect Chain (Google Meet / Campaign Manager / S3 / AiTM Domains) — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6395-SPL-001`)

Detects users who touch the Payroll Pirates (TL-2026-6395) voicemail-lure redirect chain in web proxy logs: meet.google.com/linkredirect with dest= pointing at adservice.google.com.ph/ddm/clk, the attacker S3 bucket amzn-5646353653563view, or the known idp.* redirectors and mslogin./msonline./msauth./office.* AiTM proxy domains (Storm-2657 / Storm-2755 overlap). The chain precedes Microsoft 365 session token theft via an AiTM proxy.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.001, T1583.001
- **Data sources:** proxy:zscalernss-web, defender_for_office365:UrlClickEvents, web_proxy
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="zscalernss-web" earliest=-24h
| eval url_l=lower(url)
| eval hop_meet=if(like(url_l,"%meet.google.com/linkredirect%") AND like(url_l,"%adservice.google.com.ph%"),1,0)
| eval hop_ads=if(like(url_l,"%adservice.google.com.ph/ddm/clk/%"),1,0)
| eval hop_s3=if(like(url_l,"%amzn-5646353653563view%"),1,0)
| eval hop_aitm=if(match(url_l,"^(https?://)?(idp[.](keyreniao|korminel|kualabemo)[.]com|mslogin[.]milocaroline[.]com|msonline[.]logicalineonline[.]com|msauth[.]monlinelogicaline[.]com|office[.]ofrecie[.]com)([/:?]|$)"),1,0)
| where hop_meet=1 OR hop_ads=1 OR hop_s3=1 OR hop_aitm=1
| stats min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen sum(hop_meet) as meet_hops sum(hop_ads) as ads_hops sum(hop_s3) as s3_hops sum(hop_aitm) as aitm_hops values(url) as urls by user src_ip
| where aitm_hops>0 OR s3_hops>0 OR meet_hops>0
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let aitm_hosts = dynamic(['idp.keyreniao.com','idp.korminel.com','idp.kualabemo.com','mslogin.milocaroline.com','msonline.logicalineonline.com','msauth.monlinelogicaline.com','office.ofrecie.com']);
UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (Url has 'meet.google.com/linkredirect' and Url has 'adservice.google.com.ph')
    or Url has 'amzn-5646353653563view'
    or Url has_any (aitm_hosts)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, UrlChain, ActionType, IsClickedThrough, NetworkMessageId, IPAddress
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Payroll Pirates Phishing Redirect Chain via Google Meet, S3 and AiTM Domains
id: 7c1f3a52-4b8e-4f6a-9d21-5e0a8b3c1d01
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests in the Payroll Pirates redirect chain, a Google Meet linkredirect with an adservice.google.com.ph click tracker destination, the attacker S3 bucket object, or known idp.* redirector and AiTM proxy domains (TL-2026-6395).
references:
  - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/payroll-pirates-strange-new-tides-in-business-email-compromise/
  - https://threats.wiz.io/all-incidents/payroll-pirates-phishing-campaign-targets-microsoft-365-financial-workflows
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.001
  - attack.resource-development
  - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
  category: proxy
detection:
  selection_meet:
    cs-host: 'meet.google.com'
    c-uri|contains|all:
      - 'linkredirect'
      - 'adservice.google.com.ph'
  selection_s3:
    cs-host|endswith: '.amazonaws.com'
    c-uri|contains: 'amzn-5646353653563view'
  selection_aitm_hosts:
    cs-host:
      - 'idp.keyreniao.com'
      - 'idp.korminel.com'
      - 'idp.kualabemo.com'
      - 'mslogin.milocaroline.com'
      - 'msonline.logicalineonline.com'
      - 'msauth.monlinelogicaline.com'
      - 'office.ofrecie.com'
  condition: selection_meet or selection_s3 or selection_aitm_hosts
falsepositives:
  - Security researchers or sandboxes detonating the campaign URLs
  - Legitimate Google Meet link redirects (excluded by requiring the adservice.google.com.ph destination)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security teams or sandboxes detonating the published campaign URLs
- Legitimate Google Campaign Manager clicks (only the combined meet.google.com/linkredirect + adservice.google.com.ph chain alerts)

**Tuning notes:** Adjust the sourcetype/field names (url, user, src_ip) to your proxy vendor or the CIM Web datamodel. Extend the domain list as Arctic Wolf and TL_OSINT_Scan publish new idp.* redirectors; AiTM domains are typically under 10 days old on Hostinger so pair with newly-registered-domain enrichment. Use the S3 bucket name as a high-fidelity pivot.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Payroll Pirates Voicemail Lure Email Delivery and Click — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates Session Reuse Across Rotating Residential Proxies (~8h Refresh) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates MailItemsAccessed with Outlook App ID and Undocumented API ID — C2/Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates AiTM Proxy Fingerprinting Endpoint and Lookalike Microsoft Hosts — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates Inbox Rule Moving Mail to Deleted Items and Marking Read — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates Sign-ins from AS27176 and SRA-Observed Infrastructure — C2/Proxy Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates Anomalous Outlook Sign-in Clients and OfficeHome 90014 — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payroll Pirates Microsoft Graph axios User Enumeration (Payroll/HR/Finance) — Lateral Discovery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `216.247.226[.]32`
- Domain: `idp[.]keyreniao[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/amzn-5646353653563view/url`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Payroll Pirates Phishing Campaign Targets Microsoft 365 Financial Workflows (Wiz Threat Center)](https://threats.wiz.io/all-incidents/payroll-pirates-phishing-campaign-targets-microsoft-365-financial-workflows)
- [Payroll Pirates: Strange New Tides in Business Email Compromise (Arctic Wolf Labs)](https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/payroll-pirates-strange-new-tides-in-business-email-compromise/)
- [Payroll Pirate Campaign: AiTM Session Hijacking and Microsoft Graph Reconnaissance Across Multiple Client Environments (SRA)](https://sra.io/blog/payroll-pirate-campaign-aitm-session-hijacking-and-microsoft-graph-reconnaissance-across-multiple-client-environments/)
- [Microsoft 365 AiTM Phishing Hijacks Payroll and Finance Email (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/microsoft-365-aitm-phishing-hijacks.html)
- [Investigating Storm-2755: Payroll pirate attacks targeting Canadian employees (Microsoft Security Blog)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/?p=146428)
- [Poisoned Office 365 search results lead to stolen paychecks (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/10/poisoned-office-365-search-results-lead-to-stolen-paychecks)
- [Payroll Pirates Abuse AiTM Phishing to Compromise Microsoft 365 (HivePro)](https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/payroll-pirates-abuse-aitm-phishing-to-compromise-microsoft-365)
- [Storm-2755's Silent Payroll Heist Targeting Canada (HivePro)](https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/storm-2755-silent-payroll-heist-targeting-canada/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6395
