# The Gentlemen Ransomware Gang Claims NVIDIA Breach on Leak Site (Unverified)

> The Gentlemen, a double-extortion ransomware-as-a-service group active since 2025, listed NVIDIA on its leak site on 2026-11-18 with a countdown timer of roughly 10 days. No sample files, IOCs or CVEs were published and NVIDIA has not confirmed a breach, so the claim remains unverified.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T04:04:45Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T09:29:40.916Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6407
- **ID:** TL-2026-6407
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** TRACKING
- **Actor:** The Gentlemen
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 38 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-11-18 the ransomware group The Gentlemen (tracked by Sophos CTU as GOLD SHERWOOD and by Microsoft as Storm-2697) added NVIDIA to its dark-web leak site. Per Cyber Security News, the listing shows NVIDIA's logo, the NVDA ticker, a revenue figure of $303 billion with no reporting period, a countdown of 237h 50m 39s, the text 'DATA INFO - SOON', and a reference to Tox for ransom talks. It includes no sample files and does not say which systems were reached, what data is held, or when any intrusion occurred. Ransomware tracker Breach House indexed the listing on 2026-11-18 with leak status 'pending'. NVIDIA has not publicly confirmed a breach, and there is no verified evidence of data theft or encryption. It is also unclear whether the claim concerns NVIDIA systems, a third party, or neither. Severity is held at MEDIUM pending verification; escalate if NVIDIA confirms, or if sample data or IOCs are published.

Background on the actor (describes the group's past operations, NOT confirmed activity against NVIDIA): The Gentlemen is a RaaS brand active since at least July 2025 (first Windows sample on VirusTotal 2025-07-17). Group-IB reports about 20 members, a Russian-speaking administrator using the handle 'hastalamuerte', and links to the earlier ArmCorp group, a Qilin affiliate. Unit 42 reports a 90% affiliate payout and a May 2026 BreachForums partnership to recruit affiliates, pentesters and initial access brokers. A May 2026 leak of the group's internal backend database was analyzed by Check Point Research, which also tied a SystemBC proxy botnet of more than 1,570 hosts to a Gentlemen affiliate; that figure comes from SystemBC C2 telemetry and is not a confirmed ransomware victim count. Provendata reported 1,081 publicly claimed leak-site victims as of 2026-11-09.

Observed TTPs from prior intrusions (Sophos CTU review of 15 incidents, Trend Micro, Group-IB, Unit 42): initial access via exposed or compromised Fortinet/FortiGate edge devices and VPN credentials (including use of CVE-2024-55591 per third-party reporting; Sophos saw Fortinet artifacts but could not confirm exploitation), brute-forced or stolen VPN credentials without MFA, and initial access brokers. Post-compromise activity includes discovery with Advanced IP Scanner/SoftPerfect/Nmap, credential theft (Mimikatz per third-party research, DPAPI tooling, NetExec), lateral movement with RDP and PsExec, tunnelling via Cloudflared and Chisel, persistence via AnyDesk and Datto RMM, and exfiltration with Rclone (also Restic, MinIO Client, FileZilla, MEGAsync, WinSCP). Defenders should expect EDR killers (GentleKiller variants, Havoc, Xkpsm-Killer) and bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver abuse (ThrottleBlood.sys, xkpsm.sys, nogbc.sys, G11.sys, dmx.sys, viragt64.sys), disabling of Defender and over 200 service-disable commands (Veeam, SQLWriter, BackupExec), event-log clearing, shadow-copy deletion, and Go-based lockers deployed from NETLOGON shares or via PsExec, producing README-GENTLEMEN.txt and a six-character file extension (.7mtzhh in documented samples). Median time from first observed post-compromise activity to ransomware deployment was about two days, with the shortest under 24 hours. Windows, Linux and ESXi lockers exist; only the Windows variant was seen deployed by Sophos.

Defensive guidance: treat the NVIDIA listing as a claim to monitor, not a confirmed incident. NVIDIA-related organizations and their suppliers should review Fortinet/VPN exposure and authentication logs, hunt for the documented tooling and artifacts below, and watch for NVIDIA statements or published sample data. Note that the IOCs below are drawn from the group's past intrusions and are not evidence of compromise at NVIDIA.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1074.001 Local Data Staging
- T1090 Proxy
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**The Gentlemen - Backdoor Admin Account on FortiGate Edge Device (Initial Access)** (`TL-2026-6407-SPL-001`)

Flags creation or change of FortiGate administrator objects named support_fortinet, badmin, forti-api or MicrosoftSupporte, the backdoor and decoy account names Group-IB documents on Fortinet devices compromised by The Gentlemen affiliates (initial access via exposed FortiGate or CVE-2024-55591 per third-party reporting). Behaviour-first: it keys on the admin-object change, not on a specific exploit. Note the NVIDIA leak-site listing is an unverified claim and these indicators come from prior intrusions.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1190, T1078, T1133
- **Data sources:** fortigate, index=network sourcetype=fgt_event, CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet CEF)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
```TL-2026-6407 The Gentlemen: backdoor FortiGate admin accounts created after edge-device compromise (Group-IB)```
index=network sourcetype=fgt_event earliest=-24h cfgpath="system.admin" (cfgobj="support_fortinet" OR cfgobj="badmin" OR cfgobj="forti-api" OR cfgobj="MicrosoftSupporte")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(logdesc) as logdesc values(action) as action values(user) as changed_by values(srcip) as srcip by devname cfgobj
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - last_seen
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let gentlemen_accounts = @"(?i)(support_fortinet|badmin|forti-api|MicrosoftSupporte)";
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceVendor =~ "Fortinet"
| where Message contains "system.admin" or AdditionalExtensions contains "system.admin"
| extend Blob = strcat(Message, " ", AdditionalExtensions, " ", SourceUserName, " ", DestinationUserName)
| where Blob matches regex gentlemen_accounts
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, SourceUserName, DeviceAction, Activity, Message
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: "FortiGate Backdoor Admin Account Created - The Gentlemen Ransomware"
id: 3f0a6c52-6407-4b1e-9a01-0d7c2e5b8a11
status: experimental
description: "Detects creation or modification of FortiGate admin objects named support_fortinet, badmin, forti-api or MicrosoftSupporte, backdoor account names documented by Group-IB for The Gentlemen ransomware affiliates after compromising Fortinet edge devices."
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hastalamuerte-gentlemen-raas-ttps
    - https://www.sophos.com/blog/ungentlemanly-behavior-insights-into-a-ransomware-operation
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1133
    - cve.2024.55591
logsource:
    product: fortinet
    service: fortigate
detection:
    selection:
        cfgpath: 'system.admin'
        cfgobj:
            - 'support_fortinet'
            - 'badmin'
            - 'forti-api'
            - 'MicrosoftSupporte'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators who happen to use an account called forti-api for automation
    - Vendor support sessions that create a temporary support account
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate administrators using an automation account named forti-api
- Fortinet or MSSP support personnel creating a temporary support account

**Tuning notes:** Confirm your FortiGate logs reach Splunk with the Fortinet FortiGate add-on (index and sourcetype may differ, adjust index=network). Allowlist change-managed admin creations by user and srcip. Extend the account list with any new names from threat-intel updates.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- The Gentlemen - VPN Password Guessing Followed by Successful Tunnel (Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - Pre-Encryption Service Disable, Recovery Inhibition and Log Clearing (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - PsExec, NETLOGON Deployment and RDP Fan-Out (Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - Network Discovery Tooling (Advanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect, Nmap, NetExec) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - LSASS Credential Dumping and Credential Tooling (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - Ransom Note [indicator] and Encrypted File Artifacts (Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - BYOVD Driver and EDR Killer Activity (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- The Gentlemen - Rclone Exfiltration, Tunnelling and Remote Access Tooling (C2 / Exfiltration) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 38)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `194.87.31[.]69`
- File hash: `51b9f246d6da85631131fcd1fabf0a67937d4bdde33625a44f7ee6a3a7baebd2`
- IP address: `91.107.247[.]163`

Full set of 38 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The Gentlemen Ransomware Gang Allegedly Claims to Have Breached NVIDIA (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/nvidia-data-breach-claim/)
- [The Gentlemen ransomware group profile (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/the-gentlemen-ransomware-group/)
- [Ungentlemanly behavior: Insights into a ransomware operation (Sophos CTU)](https://www.sophos.com/blog/ungentlemanly-behavior-insights-into-a-ransomware-operation)
- [Unmasking The Gentlemen Ransomware (Trend Micro)](https://trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html)
- [Hasta la vista, Hastalamuerte: An Overview of The Gentlemen's TTPs (Group-IB)](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hastalamuerte-gentlemen-raas-ttps)
- [The Gentlemen Ransomware (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/the-gentlemen-ransomware/)
- [DFIR Report: The Gentlemen (Check Point Research)](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/dfir-report-the-gentlemen/)
- [When the ransomware gang gets hacked: what the Gentlemen leak reveals (Check Point)](https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/when-the-ransomware-gang-gets-hacked-what-the-gentlemen-leak-reveals-about-modern-ransomware-risk/)
- [SystemBC C2 Server Reveals 1,570 Victims (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/systembc-c2-server-reveals-1570-victims.html)
- [The Gentlemen Ransomware: Attack Chain, IOCs, and Incident Response Guide (Provendata)](https://www.provendata.com/blog/gentlemen-ransomware)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6407
