# UAT-12643 (suspected North Korea-aligned) hides Overlord RAT C2 addresses in Solana transaction memos; Good Game stealer deployed

> Cisco Talos tracks UAT-12643, a financially motivated Windows malware campaign that stores AES-encrypted, Base58-encoded Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 addresses in Solana Memo Program transactions from an operator-controlled wallet, allowing C2 rotation without redeploying implants. Delivery uses LNK files disguised as PDFs, HTA droppers and MSBuild project files, with the Python Good Game stealer and a clipboard hijacker as companion payloads. Talos assesses North Korea alignment with low confidence.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T08:37:49Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T08:37:49Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6433
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6433.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6433
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UAT-12643 (North Korea)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Cisco Talos (disclosed 2026-11-18) tracks UAT-12643, a financially motivated actor targeting cryptocurrency holders, gaming account owners and VoIP/messaging software users. Its toolset consists of a Go-based modular Windows RAT (Overlord), the publicly available Python infostealer 'Good Game' v1.1.2 (by CirqueiraDev, repackaged with PyInstaller on Python 3.12.0), and a compact C++ multi-cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. The actual initial-delivery method was not observed; artifacts include LNK files disguised as PDFs (with Word, Windows Update or Edge PDF icons), HTA droppers run via mshta.exe and an MSBuild project file (dl.xml).

LNK variants download the payload either with MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile (saved as RuntimeBroker.exe) or with certutil -urlcache -f, using a double-extension filename. Both were built on a machine named win-8oa3ccqae4d and a LNK generator script (payload URL + icon type) was recovered. The HTA dropper uses MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP to fetch a raw binary and ADODB.Stream to write it to %TEMP%\s.exe, then runs it hidden. The MSBuild dl.xml uses an inline C# CodeTaskFactory task compiled and run in memory, downloading with a spoofed 'Microsoft BITS/7.8' User-Agent.

Overlord RAT supports 35 commands: keylogging (GetAsyncKeyState), webcam, microphone and desktop audio capture, screenshots, extensive file operations, process enumeration/termination, command/script execution with streamed output, a reverse SOCKS proxy into the victim network, and HTTP plugin download with reflective DLL injection. It detects in-memory execution to suppress artifacts in sandboxes. With admin rights it obtains SeDebugPrivilege and calls NtSetInformationProcess to set ProcessBreakOnTermination, so forced termination triggers a CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED BSoD. Persistence is an HKCU Run value with a randomized name pointing to a binary in the user's Application Data 'Network' folder, plus WinRE persistence: a .bat launcher and a randomly named (20-character) copy written to %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ with ResetConfig.xml patched, surviving 'Reset this PC'.

C2 resolution is the novel element: encrypted WebSocket C2 URLs (up to 566 bytes per Memo Program transaction) are published from an actor-controlled Solana wallet. The RAT calls getSignatures then getTransaction (jsonParsed), scans instructions for data exactly 43 characters long (AES-256-encrypted, Base58-encoded URL) and ignores the rest. Solana is only a lookup service, not the command or exfiltration channel. The observed C2 channel is a WebSocket on port 5173.

Good Game stealer collects from 23 Chromium/Firefox browser variants, Discord tokens (LevelDB, validated against the Discord API), Roblox ROBLOSECURITY cookies, 21 crypto wallets, Steam/Riot/Epic/Rockstar launchers, Telegram sessions, a system profile with IP geolocation (ipwhois.app), a screenshot and webcam frame, and a keyword-filtered sweep of user folders (English/French/Spanish/Portuguese terms such as seed phrases, 2FA backup codes, passwords). It exits on sandbox/VM indicators, zips data to SK_<8 chars>.zip, uploads to upload.gofile.io and posts the link plus a victim fingerprint to a Discord webhook. Persistence uses HKCU Run value 'Zoipers' and the Startup folder; Task Manager is disabled (DisableTaskMgr=1) during collection. The clipboard hijacker (mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc) copies itself to %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe with Run value MsgEdgeUpdate and replaces clipboard crypto addresses every 500 ms with attacker wallets.

Infrastructure: a staging server at 41.216.188.11 ran a Flask file-delivery service (port 8000) with an exposed root folder; ports 5173 (Overlord WebSocket C2), 5656 and 5959 (Python stealer TCP C2). Attribution is low confidence: Overlord was used by UNK_DeadDrop (Proofpoint, June 2026, a very likely North Korea-aligned cluster) and Solana-memo C2 was reported in March 2026 against Lazarus/TraderTraitor, but other actors have also used Overlord and Solana-hosted addressing (October 2026). A Solana lookup alone is not evidence of compromise; stronger hunting leads are a non-browser Windows process querying Solana followed by an unfamiliar WebSocket, or a GoFile upload followed by a Discord webhook request from the same process. Blocking the staging IP does not remove installed implants.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1218.005 Mshta
- T1127.001 MSBuild
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1542 Pre-OS Boot
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1090 Proxy
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Registry Persistence and Task Manager Disable - Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate, AppData Network Run Value, DisableTaskMgr** (`TL-2026-6433-SPL-002`)

Detects HKCU Run values Zoipers (Good Game stealer), MsgEdgeUpdate (clipboard hijacker) and randomized Run values pointing to AppData\Roaming\Network (Overlord RAT), plus the Good Game stealer setting DisableTaskMgr=1 to hide itself during collection (UAT-12643, TL-2026-6433).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1562.001, T1115
- **Data sources:** sysmon_eventid_13, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_DeviceRegistryEvents, windows_registry_set
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 earliest=-24h
```UAT-12643 registry persistence and defence impairment: Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate, Overlord Run value in AppData Roaming Network, DisableTaskMgr=1```
| eval tobj=lower(TargetObject), det=lower(Details)
| rex field=tobj "currentversion.run.(?<run_value>[a-z0-9_.-]+)$"
| eval det_name=case(run_value="zoipers","GoodGame_Zoipers_RunKey", run_value="msgedgeupdate","ClipboardHijacker_MsgEdgeUpdate_RunKey", isnotnull(run_value) AND match(det,"appdata.roaming.network."),"OverlordRAT_AppData_Network_RunKey", isnotnull(run_value) AND match(det,"msgedgeupdate[.]exe"),"ClipboardHijacker_MsgEdgeUpdate_RunKey", match(tobj,"policies.system.disabletaskmgr$") AND match(det,"0x00000001"),"GoodGame_DisableTaskMgr", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(det_name)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(Details) as run_data values(Image) as writer_images by Computer, User, run_value, det_name
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where (RegistryKey contains "CurrentVersion" and RegistryKey has "Run"
        and (RegistryValueName in~ ("Zoipers", "MsgEdgeUpdate")
            or RegistryValueData contains @"Roaming\Network\"
            or RegistryValueData contains "MsgEdgeUpdate.exe"))
    or (RegistryKey has @"Policies\System" and RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr" and RegistryValueData == "1")
| extend Family = case(
    RegistryValueName =~ "Zoipers" or RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr", "GoodGameStealer",
    RegistryValueName =~ "MsgEdgeUpdate" or RegistryValueData contains "MsgEdgeUpdate.exe", "ClipboardHijacker",
    "OverlordRAT")
| extend Signal = iff(RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr", "TaskManagerDisabled", "RunKeyPersistence")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Family, Signal, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: UAT-12643 Run Key Persistence and DisableTaskMgr - Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate and AppData Network Folder
id: 6e4c9f85-2d71-4a4a-bf6d-8150ac3d2e44
status: experimental
description: Detects HKCU Run values Zoipers (Good Game stealer), MsgEdgeUpdate (clipboard hijacker) and Run values pointing into AppData Roaming Network (Overlord RAT), plus DisableTaskMgr set to 1 as done by the Good Game stealer during collection (UAT-12643, TL-2026-6433).
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1115
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\CurrentVersion\Run\Zoipers'
            - '\CurrentVersion\Run\MsgEdgeUpdate'
    selection_data:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Details|contains:
            - '\Roaming\Network\'
            - '\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe'
    selection_taskmgr:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection_name or selection_data or selection_taskmgr
falsepositives:
    - Third-party software with an identically named Run value (rare)
    - Custom in-house software installed under an AppData Network folder
    - Kiosk or hardening group policy intentionally disabling Task Manager
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Third-party software that happens to use a Run value named Zoipers (Zoiper softphone variants)
- In-house tools installed under an AppData Network folder
- Kiosk or hardening GPO setting DisableTaskMgr=1

**Tuning notes:** Validate Zoipers hits against the Zoiper softphone install path; the name-based branches are high fidelity for MsgEdgeUpdate, the AppData Network path branch may need an allowlist, and DisableTaskMgr should be excluded for GPO-managed kiosk hosts (writer image svchost/gpsvc) and prioritised when the writer is a user-writable binary.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- HTA Dropper, MSBuild Inline-Task Downloader and Known Payload Hashes - Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord RAT WinRE Recovery OEM and AppData Network Persistence - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-12643 Staging and C2 Infrastructure [indicator] / [indicator] Connections (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Double-Extension LNK Lures and Known Staging Artifacts (payment-invoice.pdf.lnk, payload.hta, dl.xml) - Initial Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Clipboard Hijacker MsgEdgeUpdate.exe and Good Game SK_ Staging Archive Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Good Game Stealer GoFile Upload and Discord Webhook from Non-Browser Process - Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- LOLBin Payload Downloaders (MpCmdRun -DownloadFile, certutil -urlcache) - LNK Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Solana RPC Dead-Drop Lookup Followed by WebSocket C2 on Port 5173 - C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `41.216.188[.]11`
- Domain: `gofile[.]io`
- File hash: `b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/)
- [North Korea-Linked Hackers Hide Overlord RAT Server Addresses in Solana Blockchain Transactions](https://gbhackers.com/solana-blockchain-transactions/)
- [Cisco Talos IOCs - UAT-12643 (2026/11)](https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/tree/main/2026/11)
- [Proofpoint: UNK_DeadDrop phishing campaign targets developers (Overlord RAT)](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal)
- [Breakglass Intelligence: Lazarus Group using the Solana blockchain as a dead-drop C2 channel](https://intel.breakglass.tech/post/lazarus-group-is-using-the-solana-blockchain-as-a-dead-drop-c2-channel-and-nobody-noticed-for-4-months)
- [The Hacker News: Eight malicious npm packages (MALFEX, Overlord/Solana)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/eight-malicious-npm-packages-downloaded.html)
- [CirqueiraDev (Good Game stealer developer) on GitHub](https://github.com/CirqueiraDev)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6433
