# Blockchain-Based C2 Resolution (EtherRAT, TONResolver) in Fake Guest-Complaint Phishing Targeting Hotels

> Cofense reports phishing campaigns using fake guest complaint, review, or inquiry emails against hospitality staff (front desk, reservations, guest relations). A linked archive holds a disguised LNK that downloads a NodeJS runtime and installs EtherRAT or TONResolver, which fetch their C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract or the TON blockchain so C2 can rotate without changing the malware.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T17:37:38Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T17:37:38Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6482
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6482.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6482
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Cofense Intelligence observed phishing emails posing as hotel guests who submit complaints, negative reviews or inquiries, addressed to front desk, reservations and guest relations mailboxes. The lure asks the recipient to review a photo or document; some messages are sent as replies inside existing threads, and Cofense assesses with moderate confidence that generative AI writes each email uniquely. The embedded link delivers an archive containing an LNK shortcut with a mismatched .JPG extension and a dummy .MP4 file whose size changes on every download, likely to defeat hash-based detection.

Executing the LNK downloads a NodeJS runtime and installs one of two JavaScript RATs. EtherRAT queries a smart contract on Ethereum via a public JSON-RPC endpoint and decodes the returned value into its C2 domain. TONResolver does the same against the TON blockchain. Trend Micro's separate analysis of TONResolver (tracked as TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A, Japanese hotel and accommodation targets) shows the LNK (disguised as a PNG) running PowerShell that rebuilds a domain from two large integers and fetches a PS1 script to %TEMP% (served only when the User-Agent contains 'PowerShell'). The script hides its window, downloads Node.js v24.13.0 from nodejs.org if needed, drops a JavaScript payload under %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Nodejs\ and runs it with node.exe. The payload is obfuscated with a custom VM and persists through the HKCU Run key, with mutex-based single-instance checks.

TONResolver resolves its C2 by calling the get_domain getter on a TON contract through tonapi.io; an update wallet authorises domain changes with op_code 0x17BE49CF. C2 traffic is a WebSocket session using ECDH secp256k1 key exchange, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-CBC with a 20-second keepalive. Provisional command types cover endpoint information (username, hostname, OS, CPU, memory, MAC, domain), arbitrary JavaScript execution, file retrieval and execution, and PowerShell execution. Trend Micro's MDR observed follow-on activity: an executable in %TEMP% that interacted with lsass.exe and accessed Chrome and Edge profile data (suspected credential theft).

Because C2 is rotated by a small blockchain transaction, blocking a single domain is ineffective; Cofense notes that blocking one blockchain's APIs may not stop the other family. Domain history on the contracts shows repeated rotation (TON contract: 2026-02-07, 2026-02-09, 2026-02-20, 2026-06-02). Cofense assesses with moderate confidence that this activity continues earlier Booking.com-spoofing ClickFix campaigns that delivered PureRAT, NetSupport Manager RAT and infostealers, but cannot rule out a shared kit used by multiple actors. No named actor is attributed. Note: a different EtherRAT campaign documented by Sysdig (React2Shell/CVE-2025-55182, Linux, different contract) shares the family name and Ethereum dead-drop technique but is not evidenced as the same operation; its indicators are not included here.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1036.007 Double File Extension
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**EtherRAT/TONResolver LNK-Launched Hidden PowerShell Download Loader (Node.js Staging)** (`TL-2026-6482-SPL-001`)

Detects PowerShell started by explorer.exe or cmd.exe (the parent chain of a malicious LNK shortcut from a phishing archive) that uses a download cradle together with a hidden window or Node.js / BigInteger loader markers. This is the first-stage loader of the fake guest-complaint hotel phishing campaign (TL-2026-6482) that rebuilds a domain from two large integers, fetches a PS1 to %TEMP%, downloads Node.js and installs EtherRAT or TONResolver. Maps to T1204.002, T1059.001, T1105, T1027 and T1566.002.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1105, T1027
- **Data sources:** sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1), DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") (ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe")
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval hidden_window=if(match(cmd,"-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden|-win\s+hidden"),1,0)
| eval download_cradle=if(match(cmd,"invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|downloadstring|downloadfile|\biwr\b|\birm\b|\biex\b|net\.webclient|start-bitstransfer"),1,0)
| eval loader_markers=if(match(cmd,"biginteger|\[bigint\]|nodejs"),1,0)
| where download_cradle=1 AND (hidden_window=1 OR loader_markers=1)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User, Image
| table first_seen last_seen host User Image parent_image command_lines count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe')
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('explorer.exe', 'cmd.exe')
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend HiddenWindow = Cmd matches regex @'-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden|-win\s+hidden'
| extend DownloadCradle = Cmd matches regex @'invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|downloadstring|downloadfile|\biwr\b|\birm\b|\biex\b|net\.webclient|start-bitstransfer'
| extend LoaderMarkers = Cmd matches regex @'biginteger|\[bigint\]|nodejs'
| where DownloadCradle and (HiddenWindow or LoaderMarkers)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: EtherRAT/TONResolver LNK-Launched Hidden PowerShell Download Loader
id: 3f6c2a1e-8b47-4d52-9a0e-5c1d7e2b4f01
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell launched from explorer.exe or cmd.exe (typical of a malicious LNK from a phishing archive) using a download cradle together with a hidden window or Node.js/BigInteger loader markers, as seen in fake guest-complaint hotel phishing delivering EtherRAT and TONResolver (TL-2026-6482).
references:
  - https://cofense.com/blog/from-guest-complaints-to-malware-blockchain-abuse-targets-hotels
  - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/26/f/tonresolver.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  selection_cradle:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'DownloadFile'
      - 'Net.WebClient'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
      - 'iwr '
      - 'irm '
  selection_hidden:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
      - '-w hidden'
      - '-win hidden'
  selection_markers:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'BigInteger'
      - '[bigint]'
      - 'nodejs'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_img and selection_cradle and (selection_hidden or selection_markers)
falsepositives:
  - Administrative or software-deployment scripts launched from cmd.exe that download files with a hidden window
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- IT automation or software deployment scripts that start a hidden PowerShell download from cmd.exe
- Legitimate installers invoked by users that use Invoke-WebRequest to fetch Node.js for developer tooling

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known deployment tooling by ParentCommandLine or signed script hashes. On non-developer hospitality endpoints (front desk, reservations) any match is high fidelity; on developer or IT hosts raise the bar to require loader_markers=1. Add the user-writable extraction paths (Downloads, Temp) if you want to narrow further.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Node.js Runtime Executing From User-Writable Path (TONResolver Nodejs Drop) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Follow-On Credential Theft: LSASS Access From User-Writable Path and Browser Credential Store Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EtherRAT/TONResolver Rotating C2 Infrastructure and Community-Observed Sibling Indicators (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Double-Extension LNK Shortcut Created From Phishing Archive (Fake Guest Complaint Lure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node.js From User-Writable Path Spawning Recon or Shell Child (EtherRAT/TONResolver RAT Commands) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Proxy Request to TON Contract get_domain Endpoint or Known Dead-Drop Contract Address (TONResolver, EtherRAT) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TONResolver HKCU Run Key Persistence Launching Node.js (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node.js / PowerShell DNS Resolution of TON and Ethereum Dead-Drop Providers (EtherRAT, TONResolver) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `gateway001kir[.]com`
- Domain: `sslgateway001[.]com`
- Domain: `waygatterol002[.]com`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [From Guest Complaints to Malware: Blockchain Abuse Targets Hotels (Cofense)](https://cofense.com/blog/from-guest-complaints-to-malware-blockchain-abuse-targets-hotels)
- [TONResolver analysis (Trend Micro Research)](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/26/f/tonresolver.html)
- [EtherRAT Dissected: How a React2Shell Implant Delivers 5 Payloads Through Blockchain C2 (Sysdig) - related, separate campaign](https://www.sysdig.com/blog/etherrat-dissected-how-a-react2shell-implant-delivers-5-payloads-through-blockchain-c2)
- [Distribution of EtherRAT Malware Exploiting React2Shell Vulnerability (AhnLab ASEC) - related, separate campaign](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/91658/)
- [TONResolver Malware Uses TON Blockchain to Switch C2 Servers in Japan Hotel Phishing Campaign (VPNCentral)](https://vpncentral.com/?p=252854)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6482
