# Turla Cereal Exchange Toolset (CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, CerealBox): 12 Related Loader Files and Hunting Guidance

> ESET disclosed on 2026-11-10 that the Russia-aligned Turla group used Cereal, a modular .NET espionage toolset, on Microsoft Exchange servers at two government organizations (Kazakhstan and Romania). ReversingLabs correlated 12 related CerealLoader files and published hunting guidance; it does not establish additional victims or a new initial-access method.

- **Published:** 2026-11-19T18:31:58Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-19T18:31:58Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6487
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6487.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6487
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Turla (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 32 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Cereal is a modular espionage toolset that ESET attributes to Turla (aka Snake, Secret Blizzard, Waterbug) with high confidence, based on concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarities to older Turla malware. ESET first detected it on a Kazakhstan government Exchange server on 2025-11-28, then found a Romanian government organization compromised on 2025-12-23 after improving detection. In Romania, the collection module was configured to target mail to or from NATO and EU institutional addresses. No CVE is associated and the initial-access vector is not established in the sources.

The toolset uses the compromised Exchange server itself as the control point. ESET observed no external C2 infrastructure and could not identify operator ingress IPs. CerealLoader is the only component written to disk as a recognizable unencrypted .NET file; it decrypts and runs other assemblies. CerealRunner carries encrypted .NET programs and arguments and executes them in memory, and CerealSprinter loads other components. CerealNeuron is a passive backdoor with no built-in commands that listens for encrypted HTTPS requests on paths resembling OWA, Autodiscover and ActiveSync (/owa/sdds/, /AUTODISCOVER/PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/MICROSOFT.EXCHANGE.PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/INTEGRATED/API/, /MICROSOFT-SERVER-ACTIVESYNC/INTEGRATED/API/). Requests must be correctly encrypted and pass integrity checks; malformed requests get a legitimate-looking Exchange error page. CerealHermit is a CerealNeuron variant with network functions removed that reads encrypted command files from disk. CerealIron injects .NET assemblies into non-.NET processes, and CerealMoth runs a named method from a loaded assembly. Each operator task is a separate small compiled .NET program: observed tasks include retrieving mailboxes via Exchange Web Services, Active Directory queries (computers, users, groups, DNS), WMI queries (processes, TCP connections), LSA Secrets extraction, listing volume snapshots, and listing/reading/deleting files.

CerealBox is the most distinctive component. It is delivered through a nested chain of Cereal components ending with CerealIron injecting it into EdgeTransport.exe. It locates already-registered transport agents in memory and wraps their handlers (its logic runs, then control returns to the original code), so no new agent appears in Exchange configuration and mail delivery is unaffected. It selects messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match hardcoded sender, recipient, subject or attachment-name lists and not the ignore lists; matches are compressed, encrypted and staged on disk for later exfiltration.

Loading and evasion tradecraft includes proxy-DLL side-loading (loaders impersonate version.dll, WTSAPI32.dll, SensApi.dll and dbghelp.dll with every export forwarding to the genuine System32 DLL), DLL hijacking in C:\Windows\System32\wbem (ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll loaded by the WMI service), abuse of the .NET native image cache with names such as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll (the malicious file loads first, then falls back to the real library), and Vtable Fixups to run native code before normal .NET execution. Some samples activate only when the parent process is Exchange's search service, and loaders stay quiet in generic sandboxes while awaiting their Exchange/Windows host context; observed evasion includes extended sleeps, unusual process creation and direct/indirect system calls. Near-identical single-task binaries suggest an automated compilation and packaging framework. ReversingLabs also notes older related Turla tooling: NetInjector/NetBootstrapper (Unit 42 IronNetInjector, 2021), LightNeuron (ESET 2019, also abused Exchange transport agents) and Neuron/Nautilus (NCSC 2017).

ReversingLabs contributed file correlation: 12 related CerealLoader files, byte-different copies (two appended .dnmd sections of 23,552 bytes each), MVIDs, a shared import hash, additional NetInjector copies, YARA hypotheses and hunting guidance. Its historical corpus dates (earliest ESET-listed loader compiled 2022-04-27, first uploaded to VirusTotal from Kazakhstan 2022-05-11) are first-seen dates, not proof of deployment or new victims. Severity is an analyst judgment based on nation-state attribution and government targeting; no CVSS applies.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1505.002 Transport Agent
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1497.003 Time Based Checks
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1003.004 LSA Secrets
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1074.001 Local Data Staging

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Turla CerealLoader - Unsigned ncobjapi.dll / wbemcomn.dll Loaded from System32\wbem (WMI DLL Hijack)** (`TL-2026-6487-SPL-001`)

Detects the CerealLoader DLL-hijack technique used by Turla's Cereal toolset (TL-2026-6487): a malicious managed proxy DLL named ncobjapi.dll or wbemcomn.dll placed in C:\Windows\System32\wbem and loaded by the WMI service / WmiPrvSE.exe. Genuine copies are Microsoft-signed, so an image load of either name from that folder that is unsigned or has an invalid signature is high-fidelity evidence of CerealLoader on an Exchange server (T1574.001, T1036.005).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.001, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_endpoint, windows_image_load
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 earliest=-24h
  (ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\ncobjapi.dll" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\wbemcomn.dll")
```TL-2026-6487 CerealLoader wbem hijack - genuine copies are Microsoft signed```
| eval signed_state=lower(coalesce(Signed,"unknown")), sig_status=lower(coalesce(SignatureStatus,"unknown"))
| where signed_state!="true" OR sig_status!="valid"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Hashes) as hashes values(Company) as company values(sig_status) as signature_status by host Image ImageLoaded
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-6487 CerealLoader: ncobjapi.dll / wbemcomn.dll written into System32\wbem by a non-servicing process
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where tolower(FolderPath) startswith @"c:\windows\system32\wbem\"
| where tolower(FileName) in ("ncobjapi.dll", "wbemcomn.dll")
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in ("trustedinstaller.exe", "tiworker.exe", "msiexec.exe", "wusa.exe", "dism.exe", "dismhost.exe", "poqexec.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Turla CerealLoader Unsigned DLL Loaded From System32 WBEM Folder
id: 3f6c1a52-8b4e-4d27-9a31-c5e0b7d2f401
status: experimental
description: Detects an unsigned or invalidly signed ncobjapi.dll or wbemcomn.dll loaded from C:\Windows\System32\wbem, the WMI service DLL hijack used by Turla CerealLoader (Cereal toolset) on Exchange servers.
references:
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/exchange-for-breakfast-turlas-cereal-tricks-are-not-for-kids/
  - https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/inside-turlas-cereal-12-exchange-loaders-older-traces-and-new-ways-to-hunt
  - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1574.001
  - attack.t1036.005
  - attack.g0010
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\'
    ImageLoaded|endswith:
      - '\ncobjapi.dll'
      - '\wbemcomn.dll'
  filter_signed:
    Signed: 'true'
    SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
  condition: selection and not filter_signed
falsepositives:
  - Servicing or hotfix activity replacing WMI components while Sysmon signature lookups are incomplete
  - Third-party WMI providers that legitimately ship a re-signed copy
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Windows servicing (TrustedInstaller / TiWorker) replacing WMI repository DLLs
- Third-party WMI providers shipping their own wbem component DLLs

**Tuning notes:** Sysmon must log EventCode 7 (ImageLoad) for the wbem folder. Baseline signed hashes of ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll per OS build and allow-list them; add the SHA256 values from the research IOC list as a direct-match leg. Scope to Exchange servers first, then widen.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Turla CerealLoader - Proxy DLL Side-Loading (version/WTSAPI32/SensApi/dbghelp) and Known SHA256 Hits on Exchange Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla CerealBox - EdgeTransport.exe Staging Files Outside Exchange Directories (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla CerealNeuron - Listener Paths Seen at Reverse Proxy / WAF / Load Balancer (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla Cereal - .NET Native Image Cache Tampering (Microsoft.Exchange.*.ni.dll Written by Non-NGEN Process) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla Cereal - LSA Secrets Registry Access by Exchange or WMI Host Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla Cereal - Loopback / Self-Originated EWS Requests on Exchange (Mailbox Retrieval Task) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla CerealIron / CerealBox - Injection and Unexpected Modules in EdgeTransport.exe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Turla CerealNeuron - Passive Backdoor Listener Paths in Exchange IIS Logs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 32)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `13fe1eb9b182b076a815f84d34b66365809d0cff32df6f5b85aa7ef4deee98e0`
- File hash: `12e2060236a9b2a2933dfdb92b571949f7595fbe884642de83fea2817f17b94f`
- File hash: `41164eb06adc72b187edaf90d73ca73be729d4ebfdecf57d7398561136941651`

Full set of 32 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Inside Turla's Cereal: 12 Exchange loaders, older traces and new ways to hunt (ReversingLabs)](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/inside-turlas-cereal-12-exchange-loaders-older-traces-and-new-ways-to-hunt)
- [Exchange for breakfast: Turla's Cereal tricks are not for kids (ESET Research)](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/exchange-for-breakfast-turlas-cereal-tricks-are-not-for-kids/)
- [ESET Research: Russia-aligned Turla group uses novel Exchange tool to spy on EU, NATO emails](https://www.eset.com/us/about/newsroom/research/eset-research-turla-cereal-exchange-email-espionage/)
- [ESET malware-ioc repository (turla)](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc)
- [Turla hackers use new Cereal malware to spy on govt Exchange servers (BleepingComputer)](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/turla-hackers-use-new-ceral-malware-to-spy-on-govt-exchange-servers)
- [Russia-Linked APT Turla Turned Exchange Servers Into Their Own Control Room (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/202800/apt/russia-linked-apt-turla-turned-exchange-servers-into-their-own-control-room.html)
- [Turla's Cereal malware turns victims' Exchange servers into spy hubs (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/?p=390766)
- [Russia-Linked Turla Hijacks Exchange Servers to Spy on NATO and EU Emails (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://infosecurity-magazine.com/news/turla-cereal-exchange-email)
- [Turla LightNeuron: An email too far (ESET)](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/07/turla-lightneuron-email-too-far/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Turla (G0010)](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6487
