# North Korean Remote IT Worker Fake Construction Front Company "The Great House" (thegreathouse.us) Uses Deepfake Video Calls and Telegram Outreach

> Silent Push assesses with confidence that thegreathouse.us, a fake Lynchburg, VA construction and engineering company, is operated by a North Korean remote IT worker seeking US construction and engineering contracts to generate revenue for the DPRK regime. The operator used a real-time deepfake on a video call and Telegram contact; no malware delivery was reported.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T01:49:22Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T01:49:22Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6522
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6522.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6522
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** DPRK Remote IT Worker (North Korea)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-11-19 Silent Push published research exposing "The Great House" (thegreathouse.us), a website presenting as a construction and engineering company in Lynchburg, Virginia. The site advertises Design & Build, Project Management, Construction, Remodeling, Renovation, Preconstruction and Interior Design, and claims "10+ years in business, 200+ clients, 60k+ sqft built". The domain was created on 2025-10-18, which contradicts the claimed decade of operation.

Attribution rests on the registrant email devtop0109@gmail.com. Silent Push reports that this address registered thegreathouse.us and no other domain, and that it appears on a publicly reported list of roughly 1,400 addresses compiled by third-party researchers and attributed to DPRK IT workers. Silent Push states it can "confidently assess" the site is operated by a North Korean remote worker. The page notes that the tradecraft matches Contagious Interview (also tracked as a Lazarus subgroup, Famous Chollima and WageMole) front companies, but it does not attribute this site to Contagious Interview by name. It describes this operation as having moved into a new industry.

Operational tradecraft: unlike earlier Contagious Interview fronts, which lured job-seekers into running malicious code, this front targets prospective clients and pursues construction and engineering contracts directly. Silent Push made first contact through the Telegram account thegreathouse19, which is published on the website. On the first call (about 25 minutes) the operator kept the camera off and resisted identity verification. On the second call the operator used real-time deepfake software that showed layering artifacts and facial distortion, kept the mouth out of frame, could not keep lip movement in sync with the voice, declined a request to hold a hand in front of the face, and then ended the video feed. The operator introduced himself as "Edward", while the site lists the company email james@thegreathouse.us. Contact details conflict: the site shows (434) 261-0111 (Lynchburg area code), the tel: link markup contains +1 479-410-0717 (Arkansas), and the domain registration lists +1 351-345-0257 (Massachusetts) with a New York registrant address. A LinkedIn company page (linkedin.com/company/the-great-house) is associated with the front.

No malware is stated to be delivered in this operation, and no IP addresses, hosting, registrar, certificate or CVE data are published for it, so the indicators are domain, email, phone, social and persona artifacts. Contextual infrastructure from the earlier April 2025 Silent Push Contagious Interview report (BlockNovas, Angeloper Agency, SoftGlide and related hosts) is recorded below and labelled as related context only; it is not stated to be operationally linked to The Great House. Silent Push also cites a separate DPRK recruiting scheme in which US, EU and Latin American citizens are offered 35% of a salary to act as the face and legal identity, with 65% returned to the DPRK worker via cryptocurrency, wire transfers or third-party payment processors. Defender guidance from the source: test video calls for deepfakes (hand in front of face, head turn, lean back), reconcile website contact details against registration data, compare claimed history to domain age, verify contractor licenses through the state licensing board directly, treat Telegram-only contact and pushback on verification as red flags, and report suspected activity to the FBI via IC3.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1585.002 Email Accounts
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DPRK IT Worker Front 'The Great House' (thegreathouse.us) - Web Proxy Contact (Domain, Telegram, LinkedIn)** (`TL-2026-6522-SPL-001`)

Detects web/proxy traffic to thegreathouse.us, the Telegram account t.me/thegreathouse19 and the associated LinkedIn company page (linkedin.com/company/the-great-house). Silent Push (2026-11-19) attributes the site to a North Korean remote IT worker running a fake Lynchburg, VA construction company (domain created 2025-10-18) that solicits contracts using Telegram outreach and real-time deepfake video calls. No malware is reported; a hit means a user or vendor-management host engaged with the front and should trigger vendor due-diligence review (TL-2026-6522).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1583.001, T1585.001, T1566.003
- **Data sources:** proxy:pan:threat, proxy:zscaler:nss:web, proxy:bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
- **Severity:** medium
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:threat","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h (url="*thegreathouse.us*" OR dest_host="*thegreathouse.us" OR url="*t.me/thegreathouse19*" OR url="*linkedin.com/company/the-great-house*") | eval ioc_match=case(like(url,"%t.me/thegreathouse19%"),"telegram_thegreathouse19", like(url,"%linkedin.com/company/the-great-house%"),"linkedin_the_great_house", true(),"thegreathouse.us") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by user src ioc_match | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where RemoteUrl has "thegreathouse.us" or RemoteUrl has "t.me/thegreathouse19" or RemoteUrl has "linkedin.com/company/the-great-house"
 | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="DeviceNetworkEvents", Host=DeviceName, User=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Indicator=RemoteUrl, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName),
(CommonSecurityLog
 | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
 | where RequestURL has "thegreathouse.us" or RequestURL has "t.me/thegreathouse19" or RequestURL has "linkedin.com/company/the-great-house"
 | project TimeGenerated, Source="CommonSecurityLog", Host=DeviceVendor, User=SourceUserName, Indicator=RequestURL, Process=RequestClientApplication)
| summarize Hits=count(), First=min(TimeGenerated), Last=max(TimeGenerated) by Host, User, Indicator, Source
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Web Access to DPRK IT Worker Front Company The Great House
id: 6f1c2a9e-3b7d-4e58-9a41-0d52c8b7e1a1
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy traffic to thegreathouse.us, the Telegram account thegreathouse19 and the associated LinkedIn company page, indicators of a fake construction company attributed to a North Korean remote IT worker.
references:
    - https://www.silentpush.com/blog/nk-construction/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
    - attack.t1585.001
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_domain:
        cs-host|endswith: 'thegreathouse.us'
    selection_url:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 't.me/thegreathouse19'
            - 'linkedin.com/company/the-great-house'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or threat-intel analysts investigating the front company
    - Procurement staff legitimately vetting the vendor
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or threat-intel analysts visiting the site for investigation
- Procurement or vendor-management staff performing due diligence on the company

**Tuning notes:** Adjust index/sourcetype to your proxy platform and confirm the url, dest_host, user and src field names. Telegram and LinkedIn URL paths are only visible with TLS inspection; without it, rely on the domain match and DNS detection. Exclude the SOC/TI analyst subnet. Any hit from procurement, estimating or project-management users should open a vendor-risk ticket and be reported to FBI IC3.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- DNS Resolution of DPRK IT Worker Front Domain [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DPRK IT Worker Front - Contract/Payment Language in Email with [indicator] or [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Community-Observed DPRK-Tagged Domains and Contagious Interview Context Domains - DNS Lookups (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Endpoint Network Connection to DPRK IT Worker Front Domain [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Telegram Deep Link or Process Command Line Referencing thegreathouse19 Front Account (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Community-Reported DPRK-Tagged File Hash Execution (Related Context) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DPRK IT Worker Front - Email Correspondence with [indicator] / [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Community-Observed DPRK-Tagged Sibling Infrastructure and Contagious Interview Context Domains - Network Connections (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `37.211.126[.]117`
- Domain: `thegreathouse[.]us`
- URL: `hxxps://t[.]me/thegreathouse19`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Silent Push Exposes North Korean Fake Construction Company](https://www.silentpush.com/blog/nk-construction/)
- [Contagious Interview (DPRK) Launches a New Campaign Creating Three Front Companies (Silent Push, April '25 Update)](https://www.silentpush.com/blog/contagious-interview-front-companies/)
- [Proactively Defending Financial Institutions Against North Korean Remote IT Workers (Silent Push)](https://www.silentpush.com/white-papers-and-reports/proactively-defending-financial-institutions-against-north-korean-remote-it-workers/)
- [North Korean cyber spies created US firms to dupe crypto developers (Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/north-korean-cyber-spies-created-us-firms-dupe-crypto-developers-2025-04-24/)
- [Unmasking DPRK IT Workers: Email Address Patterns as Hiring Red Flags (The Raven File)](https://theravenfile.com/2025/08/19/unmasking-dprk-it-workers-email-address-patterns-as-hiring-red-flags/)
- [FBI IC3 PSA250723-4: North Korean IT worker threat](https://www.ic3.gov/psa/2025/psa250723-4)
- [How AI services power the DPRK's IT contracting scams (Okta Threat Intelligence)](https://sec.okta.com/articles/2025/04/GenAIDPRK/)
- [North Korean synthetic identity creation (Unit 42)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-synthetic-identity-creation/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6522
