Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-6538
Mior (Device-as-Memory) Attack Breaks AMD SEV-SNP: Arbitrary Guest Memory Access and Forged Attestation (CVE-2026-0462)
ETH Zurich researchers showed Mior, a boot-time attack on AMD SEV-SNP in which a PCIe device (a commodity GPU) is made to look like system memory to the Platform Security Processor, so parts of the Reverse Map Table are never initialized in DRAM. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6538, CVE-2026-0462 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Mior, Device-as-Memory, AMD-SB-3059 |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| CVSS | 5.9 |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | AMD EPYC 7003 (Milan) SEV-SNP; AMD EPYC 8004 and 9004 (Genoa/Siena) SEV-SNP; AMD EPYC 8005 and 9005 (Turin, Zen 5) SEV-SNP; AMD EPYC Embedded (several lines, not named in sources) |
| Tools | NVIDIA RTX 3080 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1036 Masquerading, T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware, T1565.001 Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | cloud, technology, finance, health, government administration |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6538 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 10 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Mior CVE-2026-0462 - SEV-SNP Attestation Accepted Below AMD-SB-3059 Minimum TCB[SNP]
Attestation-forgery exposure for Mior (CVE-2026-0462, AMD-SB-3059). Mior lets a malicious host obtain a PSP-signed report carrying a benign launch measurement, and the report is only trustworthy on patched firmware. CSA guidance is to make attestation verifiers enforce minimum TCB[SNP] (0x1F for EPYC 7003 Milan, 0x1E for 8004/9004 Siena/Genoa/Bergamo, 0x8 for 8005/9005 Turin) and fail closed. This search finds verifier events where the report was accepted although TCB[SNP] was below that minimum, meaning the relying party is fail-open on the vulnerable firmware.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1562, T1036, T1211
- Data sources: snp_attestation_verifier_logs
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=attestation sourcetype="snp:verifier" earliest=-24h
```CVE-2026-0462 AMD-SB-3059: verifier accepted a report whose TCB[SNP] is below the minimum. Minimums per CSA guidance: Milan 0x1F (31), Genoa and Siena 0x1E (30), Turin 0x8 (8)```
| eval fam=lower(cpu_family)
| eval min_tcb=case(fam="milan",31, in(fam,"genoa","siena","bergamo"),30, fam="turin",8)
| eval tcb_snp_n=tonumber(replace(tcb_snp,"^0x",""),16)
| where isnotnull(min_tcb) AND isnotnull(tcb_snp_n) AND tcb_snp_n<min_tcb AND in(lower(verdict),"pass","accepted","trusted","success")
| fillnull value="unknown" guest_id verifier_host
| stats count as accepted_reports values(tcb_snp) as tcb_snp values(min_tcb) as min_tcb_dec values(measurement) as measurement min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by guest_id cpu_family verifier_host
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table guest_id cpu_family tcb_snp min_tcb_dec accepted_reports measurement verifier_host first_seen last_seenMicrosoft KQL
let HexDigits = "0123456789abcdef";
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SyslogMessage has "tcb_snp"
| extend Verdict=tolower(extract(@"verdict=([A-Za-z]+)", 1, SyslogMessage)),
Family=tolower(extract(@"cpu_family=([A-Za-z]+)", 1, SyslogMessage)),
TcbHex=tolower(extract(@"tcb_snp=(?:0x)?([0-9a-fA-F]{1,2})([^0-9a-fA-F]|$)", 1, SyslogMessage)),
GuestId=extract(@"guest_id=([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(TcbHex)
| extend TcbPadded=iff(strlen(TcbHex) == 1, strcat("0", TcbHex), TcbHex)
| extend TcbSnp=indexof(HexDigits, substring(TcbPadded, 0, 1)) * 16 + indexof(HexDigits, substring(TcbPadded, 1, 1))
| extend MinTcb=case(Family == "milan", 31, Family in ("genoa", "siena", "bergamo"), 30, Family == "turin", 8, 0)
| where MinTcb > 0 and TcbSnp < MinTcb and Verdict in ("pass", "accepted", "trusted", "success")
| project TimeGenerated, HostName, GuestId, Family, TcbSnp, MinTcb, Verdict, SyslogMessageSigma
title: Mior CVE-2026-0462 SEV-SNP Attestation Accepted Below Minimum TCB SNP
id: a47d2b90-6e13-4c58-8f0a-9d3c1e7b5a03
status: experimental
description: Detects attestation verifier events where an SEV-SNP report was accepted although TCB[SNP] is below the AMD-SB-3059 minimums (Milan 31, Genoa/Siena/Bergamo 30, Turin 8, i.e. 0x1F, 0x1E, 0x8). On such firmware Mior (CVE-2026-0462) can forge a report with a benign launch measurement. Assumes the verifier logs tcb_snp as a numeric value.
references:
- https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3059.html
- https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-mior-skyfall-sev-snp-confidential-ai-20261/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1211
- cve.2026-0462
logsource:
product: snp_verifier
service: attestation
detection:
selection_accepted:
verdict:
- 'pass'
- 'accepted'
- 'trusted'
- 'success'
selection_tcb_milan:
cpu_family: 'milan'
tcb_snp|lt: 31
selection_tcb_genoa:
cpu_family:
- 'genoa'
- 'siena'
- 'bergamo'
tcb_snp|lt: 30
selection_tcb_turin:
cpu_family: 'turin'
tcb_snp|lt: 8
condition: selection_accepted and 1 of selection_tcb_*
falsepositives:
- Hosts awaiting firmware update that are intentionally allowed during a documented grace period
level: high
Known false positives:
- Hosts deliberately allowed under a documented grace period while firmware updates are still being scheduled
- Test or lab verifiers that intentionally accept old TCB values
Tuning notes: Field names (cpu_family, tcb_snp, verdict, guest_id, measurement) are assumptions about your verifier log schema: tcb_snp is treated as hex with an optional 0x prefix in SPL and KQL. Minimums come from the CSA note on AMD-SB-3059; re-check them against the AMD bulletin and update them when PI firmware ships in December 2026. The durable fix is to make the verifier fail closed, so this search should trend to zero.
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - SEV-SNP and RMP Initialization Anomalies in Host Kernel Logs · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - SEV-SNP Guest Launched With Debug Policy Bit Set · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - Same SEV-SNP Launch Measurement Attested by Multiple Distinct Guest Images · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - Firmware or BIOS Flashing and BMC BIOS Settings Tools Run on SEV-SNP Host · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - Mior PoC Repository or Project Page Accessed From Corporate Network · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - SEV-SNP Attestation Accepted With Guest Debug Policy Enabled · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - BIOS/UEFI Setting Change plus PCIe Device Insertion on SEV-SNP Host (BMC) · unlock with TL Creds
- Mior CVE-2026-0462 - Non-Hypervisor Process Opening the AMD PSP Device (/dev/sev) on SEV-SNP Host · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 10 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6538.
Sample indicators (3 of 10)
- URL:
hxxps://github[.]com/xca-attacks/mior - URL:
hxxps://xca-attacks[.]github[.]io/mior/ - URL:
hxxps://xca-attacks[.]github[.]io/mior/mior_ccs26.pdf
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 10 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
An attacker who controls the hypervisor and BIOS/UEFI can then read and write confidential-VM memory and make a malicious guest obtain a signed attestation report carrying a benign launch measurement. AMD rates CVE-2026-0462 at CVSS 4.0 5.9 (AMD-SB-3059).
Mior ("Device-as-Memory") targets the initialization of the Reverse Map Table (RMP), the structure SEV-SNP uses to track ownership and permissions of each physical page. The Platform Security Processor (PSP) initializes the RMP in DRAM before SEV-SNP is enabled. According to the authors, an attacker who can stop this initialization from happening can break all SEV-SNP guarantees.
The PSP builds a memory map before SEV-SNP initialization and rejects configurations that may route to MMIO. It reads Infinity Fabric routing registers through a broadcast operation that combines the values from the different fabric entry points with a bitwise OR, so a malicious MMIO range can be masked by a benign range configured at another entry point. In the authors' proof of concept, the hypervisor installs a routing rule at the PSP entry point and configures the other entry points to hide it from the PSP's map checks. The PSP's RMP writes are then redirected to an attacker-controlled PCIe device (the authors say a commodity GPU; the CSA note says an NVIDIA RTX 3080) that behaves like DRAM. The PSP's read-back check passes, but the RMP in real DRAM never receives the writes. The uninitialized entries include the ones that protect the RMP itself. Start-up completes without errors.
With the RMP protections unenforced, the hypervisor rewrites them. It corrupts encrypted guest metadata to enable debugging on a production confidential VM whose policy prohibits it, and then uses PSP debug commands to read and write guest memory. Per the CSA note it restores the original policy afterwards. For attestation forgery, the encrypted launch measurement stored in a benign guest's metadata is copied into a malicious guest's metadata, so the PSP signs a report with the benign measurement. The signing key is not forged; the signed report just does not represent the real state of the CVM. Per the CSA note, ciphertext hiding does not stop the attack because the guest context page is not encrypted like ordinary guest memory.
Prerequisites: control of the hypervisor and the server BIOS/UEFI (modified in the PoC to leave the Data Fabric configuration registers unlocked) plus an attached PCIe device. These are outside the SEV-SNP trusted computing base, but SEV-SNP is designed to protect guests from exactly that attacker. The attack is not remote and gives nothing new against ordinary VMs, which already trust the host. It was evaluated on a Zen 5 EPYC 9135 (SEV-SNP firmware API 1.58.4): debug-policy bypass and attestation forgery succeeded in 1,000 of 1,000 attempts with ciphertext hiding both enabled and disabled (about 1.7 ms average per the CSA note). Zen 3 and Zen 4 were assessed by source-code analysis only and are considered potentially affected. Intel TDX and Arm CCA were not evaluated. Mior is described as separate from Fabricked and RMPocalypse, and as working on firmware older than the Fabricked fix.
AMD lists SEV-SNP as affected (not SEV or SEV-ES) on EPYC 7003, 8004, 8005, 9004 and 9005 and several embedded EPYC lines. SEV firmware fixes are dated 2026-08-12; platform-initialization (PI) firmware is targeted for December 2026 and embedded platforms for January to April 2027 (the GBHackers article says February 2027). A guest OS update alone cannot fix it; BIOS updates must come from the server vendor (Supermicro states BMC updates are also needed for H12/H13/H14 boards). Public PoC code exists on GitHub. No in-the-wild exploitation is stated in any source. Defenders running confidential workloads should make remote attestation verifiers enforce AMD's minimum TCB[SNP] values and fail closed (CSA guidance).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
Persistence
T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
Impact
T1565.001 Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- AMD SEV firmware mitigations dated 2026-08-12 (1.3A.03 for EPYC 7003, 1.3A.4 for 8004/9004, 1.3A.0A for 8005/9005, per The Hacker News)
- PI firmware targeted December 2026: MilanPI-SP3_1.0.0.L (7003), GenoaPI_1.0.0.K (8004/9004), TurinPI_1.0.0.C (8005/9005)
- Embedded EPYC fixes targeted January to April 2027 (February 2027 per GBHackers)
Immediate actions
- Obtain updated BIOS/PI firmware (and BMC firmware where the vendor requires it) from the server manufacturer; a guest OS update alone does not fix CVE-2026-0462
- Make remote-attestation verifiers enforce AMD-SB-3059 minimum TCB[SNP] per processor family (reported by CSA: 0x1F for EPYC 7003, 0x1E for 8004/9004, 0x8 for 8005/9005) and fail closed
- Restrict which PCIe devices can attach to SEV-SNP hosts and lock BIOS/UEFI configuration (CSA recommendation)
Workarounds
- No workaround is listed by AMD or the researchers
Longer-term hardening
- Treat hypervisor and BIOS administration as a controlled trust boundary for confidential workloads; audit BIOS changes and firmware provenance
- Do not rely on a single attestation report as proof of guest integrity; pin expected firmware/TCB versions in the relying party
Affected and fixed versions
- AMD — EPYC 7003 (Milan) SEV-SNP
Vulnerable versions: SEV-SNP guests on platforms without the AMD-SB-3059 firmware
Fixed in: SEV firmware 1.3A.03 (2026-08-12); PI MilanPI-SP3_1.0.0.L targeted December 2026 - AMD — EPYC 8004 and 9004 (Genoa/Siena) SEV-SNP
Vulnerable versions: SEV-SNP guests on platforms without the AMD-SB-3059 firmware
Fixed in: SEV firmware 1.3A.4 (2026-08-12); PI GenoaPI_1.0.0.K targeted December 2026 - AMD — EPYC 8005 and 9005 (Turin, Zen 5) SEV-SNP
Vulnerable versions: SEV-SNP guests on platforms without the AMD-SB-3059 firmware
Fixed in: SEV firmware 1.3A.0A (2026-08-12); PI TurinPI_1.0.0.C targeted December 2026 - AMD — EPYC Embedded (several lines, not named in sources)
Vulnerable versions: SEV-SNP on affected embedded lines
Fixed in: Fixes targeted January to April 2027
Timeline
- ETH Zurich researchers report the Mior vulnerability to AMD (date per the authors' project page).
- AMD SEV firmware mitigations dated for EPYC 7003, 8004/9004 and 8005/9005 (versions 1.3A.03, 1.3A.4, 1.3A.0A per The Hacker News).
- Embargo ends; AMD publishes bulletin AMD-SB-3059 for CVE-2026-0462 (CVSS 4.0 5.9, SEV-SNP only) and the authors publish the project page, paper and PoC code.
- The Hacker News reports Mior and Skyfall as made public that week, including PoC availability and firmware targets.
- Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note on Mior and Skyfall with attestation TCB verification guidance.
- Mior is presented at ACM CCS 2026 in The Hague (conference runs 15-19 November per CSA).
- GBHackers publishes its report on Mior, the source feed article for this record.
- Platform-initialization firmware for EPYC 7003, 8004, 8005, 9004 and 9005 is targeted for December 2026 (month-level target; day is a placeholder for the month).
- Fixes for the listed embedded EPYC platforms are targeted for February 2027 per GBHackers (January to April 2027 per other sources; month-level target).
Sources cited
- AMD-SB-3059: AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Vulnerability amd.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-10
- Mior: Breaking AMD SEV-SNP with Device-as-Memory (project page) xca-attacks.github.io · Research · 2026-11-10
- Mior paper (ACM CCS 2026) xca-attacks.github.io · Research · 2026-11-10
- CSA Research Note: Mior and Skyfall - Malicious Hosts Break AMD SEV-SNP Attestation labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org · Research · 2026-11-14
- Mior PoC code GitHub · Proof of concept · 2026-11-10
- New Mior and Skyfall Attacks Let Rogue Hosts Break AMD SEV-SNP (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-13
- Mior Attack Breaks AMD SEV-SNP Security, Enabling Arbitrary Memory Access and Forged Attestation (GBHackers) gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-18
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.