# AhnLab ASEC: October 2026 APT Attack Trends (Domestic, Korea) - LNK/HWP spear phishing delivering XenoRAT, Xctdoor and .NET RAT

> AhnLab ASEC reports APT spear-phishing campaigns against Korean targets observed in October 2026, using malicious LNK and HWP lures, with LNK the most common vector. Payloads include XenoRAT, Xctdoor, an unnamed .NET RAT, PowerShell/AutoIt backdoors and an abused MeshAgent, with Dropbox, GitHub, GitLab and PubNub used for staging and C2. The report body does not state attribution.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T06:36:12Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T06:36:12Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6549
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6549.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6549
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

AhnLab Security Intelligence Center (ASEC) monitored APT attacks against Korean targets during October 2026 and published its monthly trend report on 2026-11-20. Most attacks were delivered by spear phishing with work-themed lures, and malicious LNK shortcut files had the largest share of all delivery types (the report gives no numeric statistics). The report groups the confirmed attacks into types by execution flow.

Type A (LNK): a PowerShell command inside the LNK extracts HEX data and restores a decoy document plus a malicious VBS file; persistence is a Run registry value; commands are received and results exfiltrated through a PubNub channel. Type B (LNK hosted on GitLab): a document-disguised LNK runs mshta, VBScript, PowerShell, Dropbox-hosted content or a DLL-based loader; the malware collects browser login data, cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, keystrokes and clipboard contents, and abuses the legitimate remote-management tool MeshAgent. Type C (LNK, GitHub): LNK PowerShell writes Base64 data in %temp%, downloads a decoy and further scripts from GitHub, creates a scheduled task and deploys XenoRAT.

Type D (LNK, Dropbox): the LNK, VBS and Python files from Dropbox and an AES-encrypted DLL are used to inject code into caspol.exe, after which Xctdoor is loaded in memory and performs command execution and screen capture over HTTP. Type E (PowerShell): Base64 PowerShell decodes a decoy and malicious scripts with XOR, registers a scheduled task disguised as a Google Chrome update and loads a .NET-based RAT in memory for remote control. Type F (LNK, Dropbox API): the LNK restores a decoy and an XOR-encoded ZIP containing a legitimate AutoIt interpreter and a malicious script; system information is exfiltrated through the Dropbox API and a BAT command file is then downloaded and run (backdoor function). Type G (HWP): a Hangul document disguised as defense-industry work material; double-clicking the attached icon runs WinObj, which side-loads a malicious version.dll; a scheduled task then runs a PowerShell backdoor that sends system information and the process list to a C2 server and supports remote command execution and file transfer. An additional 'Unknown' type was delivered by spear phishing but not detailed.

Attribution: the report body contains no attribution statement. The page's tag list includes 'Kimsuky' and 'kimjongrat', but these are tags only and are not treated here as confirmed attribution. Separately, earlier ASEC research (Aug 2026) attributes Xctdoor distribution to the Larva-26005 cluster, which ASEC links to CRAT; that is background and not a stated link for the October activity. No CVE or vulnerability exploitation is described; the page publishes five MD5 hashes and five URLs on 104.253.175.177 and 31.59.138.144. BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for both IPs at research time. Severity is an analyst judgement.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1059.006 Python
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1218.005 Mshta
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**LNK/HWP Spear-Phishing Script Host Chain (mshta, wscript, PowerShell Staging) — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-6549-SPL-001`)

Detects the first execution stage of the October 2026 Korean-targeted APT campaign (ASEC, TL-2026-6549): a malicious LNK or HWP lure launching mshta with a remote script, wscript/cscript from user-writable paths, or PowerShell downloading follow-on content from Dropbox, GitLab, GitHub, PubNub or the campaign IPs 104.253.175.177 / 31.59.138.144. Covers Types B, C, D and F delivering XenoRAT, Xctdoor and AutoIt/Python backdoors.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.005, T1218.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(
  (Image="*\\mshta.exe" (CommandLine="*http://*" OR CommandLine="*https://*" OR CommandLine="*vbscript:*"))
  OR ((Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe") (CommandLine="*\\AppData\\*" OR CommandLine="*\\Temp\\*" OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\*" OR CommandLine="*\\ProgramData\\*"))
  OR ((Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") (CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadFile*" OR CommandLine="*Net.WebClient*" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-RestMethod*" OR CommandLine="*Start-BitsTransfer*" OR CommandLine="*iwr *") (CommandLine="*dropbox*" OR CommandLine="*gitlab*" OR CommandLine="*githubusercontent*" OR CommandLine="*github.com*" OR CommandLine="*pubnub*" OR CommandLine="*104.253.175.177*" OR CommandLine="*31.59.138.144*"))
)
```TL-2026-6549 T1566.001 T1204.002 LNK and HWP lure script-host chain: mshta remote script, wscript/cscript from user-writable paths, PowerShell staging download from Dropbox/GitLab/GitHub/PubNub or campaign IPs```
| eval stage=case(match(Image,"(?i)mshta\\.exe$"),"mshta_remote_script",match(Image,"(?i)(wscript|cscript)\\.exe$"),"script_host_user_path",true(),"powershell_staging_download")
| fillnull value="n/a" User
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, stage
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User stage parent_images command_lines count
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "mshta.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http://", "https://", "vbscript:"))
    or (FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains_any (@"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Users\Public\", @"\ProgramData\"))
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("DownloadString", "DownloadFile", "Net.WebClient", "Invoke-WebRequest", "Invoke-RestMethod", "Start-BitsTransfer")
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("dropbox", "gitlab", "githubusercontent", "github.com", "pubnub", "104.253.175.177", "31.59.138.144"))
| extend Stage = case(FileName =~ "mshta.exe", "mshta_remote_script", FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe"), "script_host_user_path", "powershell_staging_download")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Stage, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: LNK/HWP Lure Script Host Chain - Mshta Remote Script, User-Path WScript, PowerShell Staging Download
id: 3f1c2a7e-8b4d-4e61-9a05-6c2d7e1b4a10
status: experimental
description: Detects script-host execution patterns used by the Korean-targeted LNK/HWP spear-phishing campaign in the ASEC October 2026 report (TL-2026-6549), namely mshta loading a remote script, wscript/cscript running from user-writable paths, and PowerShell downloading from Dropbox/GitLab/GitHub/PubNub or the campaign IPs.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/96683/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1218.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_mshta:
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - 'vbscript:'
    selection_wscript:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
    selection_ps:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_ps_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
    selection_ps_platform:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'dropbox'
            - 'gitlab'
            - 'githubusercontent'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'pubnub'
            - '104.253.175.177'
            - '31.59.138.144'
    condition: selection_mshta or selection_wscript or (selection_ps and selection_ps_download and selection_ps_platform)
falsepositives:
    - Administrators running mshta/HTA-based internal tooling
    - Legitimate logon or inventory scripts run by wscript from AppData or ProgramData
    - Developers or admins using PowerShell to fetch scripts from GitHub or GitLab
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators running mshta/HTA-based internal tooling
- Legitimate logon scripts executed by wscript from ProgramData or AppData
- Developers or admins using PowerShell to pull scripts from GitHub or GitLab

**Tuning notes:** Scope to non-developer, non-admin hosts first. Allow-list known internal HTA/logon-script hashes and paths, and exclude approved GitHub/GitLab automation accounts. Adjust the index and sourcetype to your Sysmon ingestion; enable Sysmon EventCode 1 with command-line logging (or Windows 4688 with command-line auditing).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- HWP Lure Spawning [indicator] with Side-Loaded [indicator] — Exploitation Phase (Type G) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- caspol.exe Process Injection, Script-Host Launch and Network Activity — Post-Exploitation (Xctdoor) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ASEC October 2026 Campaign IOC Sweep — C2/Staging URLs, IPs and MD5 Hashes — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- LNK-Launched PowerShell Decoding Embedded Payload (Hex/Base64/XOR) to VBS or Temp — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AutoIt or Portable Python Interpreter Running from User-Writable Path — Post-Exploitation Backdoor Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unsanctioned MeshAgent Remote Management Tool Deployment — C2 / Remote Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scheduled Task Masquerading as Chrome Update and Run-Key Script Launcher — Post-Exploitation Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Script Hosts and caspol.exe Reaching PubNub, Dropbox API, GitHub/GitLab or Campaign IPs — C2 and Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `104.253.175[.]177`
- File hash: `00fb5037e6a111c55f9d6673a103bf0a`
- IP address: `31.59.138[.]144`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [2026년 10월 APT 공격 동향 보고서(국내) - AhnLab ASEC](https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/96683/)
- [Analysis of the Connection Between Xctdoor and Past CRAT Attack Cases (Larva-26005) - AhnLab ASEC](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/94847/)
- [Larva-26005: Tracing Xctdoor's Connection to CRAT Attacks - SOC Prime](https://socprime.com/active-threats/larva-26005-tracing-xctdoors-connection-to-crat-attacks/)
- [South Korea APT Threat Report August 2026 Attack Trends - SOC Prime](https://socprime.com/active-threats/south-korea-apt-threat-report-august-2026-attack-trends/)
- [July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea) - AhnLab ASEC](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95171/)
- [May 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea) - AhnLab ASEC](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/94271/)
- [Larva-26005 actor profile - Malpedia](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/larva-26005)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6549
