# ROMULUS ClickFix Delivery Platform Deploys CNCMachineRMS RAT and Legion Loader

> ROMULUS is a ClickFix malware delivery platform that Blackpoint Cyber assesses likely operates as a delivery service. It distributes the CNCMachineRMS remote access trojan (remote desktop control, screen streaming, mic/camera capture, file management, recon, on-demand payloads, DNS-over-HTTPS C2) and Legion Loader through separate chains. Victims are reached via ClickFix lures, including Google-ad-promoted ChatGPT Custom GPTs that point to lure sites.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T08:13:50Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T08:13:50Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6555
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6555.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6555
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 31 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ROMULUS was first publicly documented by Forescout Research (Vedere Labs) on 2026-10-14 as a shared ClickFix delivery platform. Forescout reports that pivoting on VirusTotal and Shodan identified six IP addresses exposing the same ROMULUS login frontend, and that two endpoints serve a PowerShell staging script which decides the next stage: either a trojanized MSI carrying a malware loader, or an encrypted archive containing Legion Loader (also known as Satacom downloader, CurlyGate and RobotDropper). Operator identity is unknown.

Initial access is social engineering. Huntress (2026-09-28) observed Google search ads for 'chatgpt' leading to Custom GPT pages titled 'Plus 5.6' that showed a fake 'Service Availability Notice' and pushed users to a 'backup domain' (a Google Sites page, later also gptverification.com) with a CAPTCHA-style ClickFix prompt. The victim pastes a PowerShell command that runs 'irm' against the decimal form of a payload IP (1614733393 = 96.62.224.81), so dotted-IP detections miss it. Huntress SOC reported at least 40 incidents from the Google Sites domain. Per Blackpoint, the obfuscated stager downloads the installer, removes the Mark of the Web, and runs it silently via msiexec.exe; download infrastructure used decimal IP notation.

In the Stardock variant, IconEdit2Turb.msi masquerades as the 'Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool', installs to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\, sets ARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT=1 to hide from installed-program lists, and uses a WixShellExec custom action to launch the legitimately signed DeElevate64.exe. A modified DeElevator64.dll gains a dependency on I++u.dll, which reads an encrypted payload hidden inside a fake System.Net.Http NuGet package (Build.dat), decrypts ~341 KB of x64 shellcode with a position-dependent XOR, and runs it through the EnumSystemCodePagesW callback. The shellcode opens a proprietary obfuscated archive (execute_engine_disconnect.raw, 1,128 entries) holding a 3,904-byte controller script (class 16001) and the ~1.58 MB native RAT shellcode (class 16100). Huntress documented an earlier Canon-themed variant (ISOSimple.msi, 'Advanced Printer Configuration Reader', sideloading COTFileReadApp.exe/ceiinfolog.dll, archive monitor.raw). Other installer lures named by Blackpoint: ISOSimple.msi, FilesInspectorX.msi, ClipboardFusion.msi, AllMyBasic.msi.

Persistence is a HKCU Run value plus a scheduled task, both named 'Stardock DeElevation Tool' (Canon variant: 'Canon Configuration Reader'); controller-script tasks re-create the Run entry every 150 seconds and the scheduled task every 875 seconds, with an additional shutdown monitor restoring registry persistence. The RAT resolves its active C2 'Gate' using DNS over HTTPS through public resolvers (Huntress: Cloudflare, Google, Quad9). Blackpoint attributes the RAT to CNCMachineRMS with high confidence (matching SHA-256 with the Huntress-recovered implant, family-specific strings such as 'CNCMachineRMS\tasks' and 'task_payload.bin', and matching storage structures) and notes the same storage format (1,128 records, class 16001 at 3,904 bytes) in LevelBlue SpiderLabs' BabaDeda-chain sample (IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe sideload, published 2026-08-10). LevelBlue describes CNCMachineRMS as a 1.14 MB x64 implant with no import table, API hashing, stack strings and an embedded scripting language, with interactive shell, file manager, screen capture, local-account backdoor creation, 20 typed commands, and a 600-second beacon.

Capabilities reported for the RAT include remote desktop and screen streaming, camera/microphone/system-audio capture, file management, reconnaissance, on-demand execution of further payloads, and (per Huntress) AMSI bypass, ntdll unhooking and VM checks in the loader. No post-exploitation activity has been observed by Blackpoint. Blackpoint stresses that ROMULUS distributing both CNCMachineRMS and Legion Loader through separate chains does not establish a shared operator. No CVEs, CVSS score, named threat actor, or targeted sector are stated in the sources; severity is an analyst judgment based on full remote-control capability. Note: Forescout's 'From ClickFix to C2' post (Lorem Ipsum Loader / AxolotlLoader) is a different cluster and is not part of ROMULUS; the lure domains listed in the 2026-11-20 Hacker News roundup (e.g. veriffication-redirect.com, login.microsoftofice.cz, updates.howclens.com) belong to other ClickFix campaigns and are not attributed to ROMULUS. The Forescout ROMULUS report itself could not be retrieved in full; its details here come from secondary coverage and the Blackpoint/Huntress reports.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1106 Native API
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1136.001 Local Account
- T1218.007 Msiexec
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ROMULUS ClickFix PowerShell Stager Using Decimal-Notation IP — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6555-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the ROMULUS ClickFix paste-and-run step (TL-2026-6555): PowerShell using irm/iwr/Invoke-RestMethod or DownloadString against an IP host written in decimal form (1614733393 = 96.62.224.81) or a known ROMULUS payload IP. Dotted-IP rules miss the decimal form. Maps to Malicious Copy and Paste (T1204.004), PowerShell (T1059.001) and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105). from_explorer=1 indicates a Run-dialog launch, which strengthens the signal.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.004, T1059.001, T1105
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine)
| eval has_cradle=if(match(cl,"(^|[\\s;|])(irm|iwr|invoke-restmethod|invoke-webrequest)\\b") OR like(cl,"%downloadstring%") OR like(cl,"%net.webclient%"),1,0)
| eval decimal_host=if(match(cl,"https?://[0-9]{8,10}([/:\\s]|$)"),1,0)
| eval known_ioc=if(like(cl,"%1614733393%") OR like(cl,"%96.62.224.81%") OR like(cl,"%167.76.44.160%") OR like(cl,"%167.148.201.224%") OR like(cl,"%/app/5dbd80d34839/%"),1,0)
| eval from_explorer=if(match(lower(ParentImage),"\\\\explorer\\.exe$"),1,0)
| where has_cradle=1 AND (decimal_host=1 OR known_ioc=1)
| table _time host User ParentImage Image CommandLine decimal_host known_ioc from_explorer
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| where cl matches regex @'(^|[\s;|])(irm|iwr|invoke-restmethod|invoke-webrequest)\b' or cl has_any ("downloadstring", "net.webclient")
| where cl matches regex @'https?://[0-9]{8,10}([/:\s]|$)' or cl has_any ("1614733393", "96.62.224.81", "167.76.44.160", "167.148.201.224", "/app/5dbd80d34839/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: ROMULUS ClickFix PowerShell Stager Fetching Payload via Decimal-Notation IP
id: 5b0f3a52-8c1e-4d2a-9f47-6e1a2c3d4b01
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell download cradles (irm/iwr/Invoke-RestMethod/DownloadString) that reach an IP host written in decimal notation (e.g. 1614733393 = 96.62.224.81) or a known ROMULUS payload IP, as pasted by victims of the ROMULUS ClickFix lures (TL-2026-6555).
references:
    - https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat
    - https://www.forescout.com/blog/romulus-analysis-of-a-new-multi-payload-clickfix-delivery-platform/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cradle:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'irm '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
    decimal_host:
        CommandLine|re: 'https?://[0-9]{8,10}([/:\s]|$)'
    known_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '1614733393'
            - '96.62.224.81'
            - '167.76.44.160'
            - '167.148.201.224'
            - '/app/5dbd80d34839/'
    condition: selection_img and selection_cradle and (decimal_host or known_ioc)
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or software deployment scripts that download tooling from a bare IP address
    - Internal lab or CTF hosts that serve scripts from decimal-form IPs
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators or deployment scripts that fetch tooling from a bare IP address
- Internal lab hosts serving scripts from a decimal-form IP

**Tuning notes:** Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 (or 4688 with command-line auditing) and PowerShell parent context. Adjust index=sysmon to your index. Prioritise rows with from_explorer=1. Exclude documented deployment servers by IP. Extend known_ioc with new ROMULUS payload IPs and their decimal forms as they are published.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ROMULUS Silent msiexec Install and Mark-of-the-Web Removal — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Signed Binary DLL Sideload and I++u.dll Loader — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DoH Resolver Contact from Non-Browser Process — ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS C2 Gate Resolution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS ClickFix MSI Staging by PowerShell and Lure Installer Names — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Install and Payload Artifacts — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Beaconing from Masquerading Install Directory — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Run Key and Scheduled Task Persistence — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ROMULUS and CNCMachineRMS Infrastructure Connections — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 31)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `96.62.224[.]81`
- Domain: `cloubflare[.]top`
- URL: `hxxps://sites[.]google[.]com/view/antibot172881`

Full set of 31 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ROMULUS ClickFix Attacks Deliver RAT That Can Spy on Users and Control PCs (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/romulus-clickfix-attacks-deliver-rat.html)
- [CNCMachineRMS: The Missing Piece in the ROMULUS Campaign (Blackpoint Cyber APG)](https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/)
- [ROMULUS: Analysis of a New Multi-Payload ClickFix Delivery Platform (Forescout Vedere Labs)](https://www.forescout.com/blog/romulus-analysis-of-a-new-multi-payload-clickfix-delivery-platform/)
- [Attackers Abuse ChatGPT Custom GPTs to Deliver RAT via ClickFix (Huntress)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat)
- [CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT at the End of a BabaDeda Chain (LevelBlue SpiderLabs)](https://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain)
- [LevelBlue CNCMachineRMS full technical report (PDF)](https://www.levelblue.com/hubfs/Web/Library/Documents_pdf/CNCMachineRMS.pdf)
- [ROMULUS ClickFix Platform Tricks Users (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/romulus-clickfix-platform-tricks-users.html)
- [ROMULUS Malware Server Leverages ClickFix to Deliver Multiple Payloads (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/romulus-malware-clickfix-deliver/)
- [Attackers Abuse ChatGPT Custom GPTs (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/attackers-abuse-chatgpt-custom-gpts-to.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6555
