# 'Party' Panel: Malware-as-a-Service Android Banking Trojan Rented to Target Indian Bank Customers

> CloudSEK describes a multi-tenant 'rent-a-trojan' panel whose tenants ('parties') distribute a two-stage Android banking trojan through fake Google Play lure pages hosted on a bare IP. The malware steals card data and SMS OTPs, sets call forwarding, and exfiltrates via Telegram bots and Firebase, targeting customers of six Indian banks and card issuers and users of government services.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T09:25:56Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T09:25:56Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6564
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6564.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6564
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (3 shown free below)

## Description

CloudSEK's XVigil found a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) panel that generates fake Google Play lure pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers. A single unprotected server (103.151.199.22:8080) hosted the panel, the lures and the APKs. The panel API answered without authentication and exposed 50 tenant accounts ('parties'), 34 of them paid licences of 7 to 60 days approved between 8 and 12 November 2026. Each tenant selects a brand, a page design (Play Store clone, netbanking portal or bare download page), a card-data form and its own Telegram bot, and the panel then builds a branded APK. 19 tenants went live on 10 November 2026, and lures and APKs impersonating three of the six targeted institutions were still live on 14 November 2026.

Infection chain: the victim reaches a lure page titled '<BANK> CREDIT CARD - Apps on Google Play' that copies the Play Store layout (bank logo, 4.8-star rating, '500K+ downloads', 'Play Protect Verified' badge). The page collects mother's name, date of birth, card number, expiry and CVV, and a page script streams every keystroke to the panel before submit, so abandoned forms also leak data. The page states the 'web portal is inactive' and walks the victim through installing the APK using Hinglish instructions. The server has no domain or CDN; the operator's one domain, used for a WebSocket node, is on clientHold, and the page falls back to the bare IP.

Stage 1 (com.secure.android.manager) is a dropper labelled '<BANK> CREDIT CARD' padded with invisible Unicode characters. It requests only three permissions, XOR-decrypts a 4.4 MB asset into a second APK and installs it while posing as the Play Store (com.android.vending), so Android 13+ treats it as a store install and skips Restricted Settings; this session-install technique was documented by ThreatFabric in 2023 as SecuriDropper. It also disables the Google Play Protect verifier, starts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel, and performs emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks.

Stage 2 (com.userdb.customer) has no launcher icon, restarts on nine boot and power events and runs a watchdog service. On commands delivered via Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) it forwards every incoming SMS (including bank OTPs) to the C2 (WebSocket ws://103.129.96.11:8080/ws), to Telegram and to an operator phone number, uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos (often including card, Aadhaar and PAN images), sends SMS from the victim's number, and sets call forwarding with the USSD code **21*<number>#. Exfiltration uses a Firebase project and 13 Telegram bots; one admin chat receives alerts from 24 of 26 branded tenants. Together with the card data from the fake page, the operator has what is needed for card-not-present fraud.

Analysis was static only; CloudSEK did not run the samples and did not access victim records, which were referred to the affected institutions, CERT-In and I4C. Attribution to an India-based operator is MEDIUM confidence and circumstantial (Hinglish text, Asia/Kolkata time formatting, Indian hosting, all-Indian targets). No individual was identified, the APKs carry no developer paths or emails, and the payload C2 sits in a range registered to an Indian non-banking financial company that CloudSEK says is most likely compromised or misused. The source gives no malware family name and no CVE. Both stages are signed with the same certificate (CN=editor, SHA-1 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9). A BeaconBeagle lookup of both IPs returned no match (HTTP 404).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1660 Phishing
- T1655.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- T1629.003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1633.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- T1624.001 Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers
- T1541 Foreground Persistence
- T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
- T1533 Data from Local System
- T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1481 Web Service
- T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1616 Call Control
- T1582 SMS Control

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Party Panel Android Trojan - Known Package Names, Signing Certificate or APK Hash on Managed Device** (`TL-2026-6564-SPL-002`)

Detects installation of the Party stage 1 dropper (com.secure.android.manager), the stage 2 SMS-stealing payload (com.userdb.customer, no launcher icon, boot-receiver and watchdog persistence), any app signed with the shared CN=editor certificate (SHA-1 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9), or either published SHA-256 hash (TL-2026-6564). Telemetry is an MDM/MTD app-inventory feed ingested into Splunk.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1655.001, T1406, T1624.001, T1541, T1629.003
- **Data sources:** mdm: mdm:android:app_inventory (Intune/MTD app inventory export), Microsoft Defender DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory, Microsoft Defender DeviceFileEvents
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=mdm sourcetype="mdm:android:app_inventory" earliest=-24h
| search (package_name IN ("com.secure.android.manager","com.userdb.customer") OR signing_cert_sha1="927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9" OR file_sha256 IN ("66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7","5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff"))
| eval stage=case(package_name=="com.secure.android.manager","stage1_dropper", package_name=="com.userdb.customer","stage2_payload", true(),"cert_or_hash_match")
| fillnull value="unknown" device_id user app_label installer_package
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stage values(app_label) as app_label values(installer_package) as installer by device_id, user, package_name
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let pkgs = dynamic(["com.secure.android.manager","com.userdb.customer"]);
let hashes = dynamic(["66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7","5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff"]);
union isfuzzy=true
( DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
  | where OSPlatform has "Android"
  | where SoftwareName has_any (pkgs)
  | project TimeGenerated=now(), Source="DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory", DeviceName, Indicator=SoftwareName, Detail=SoftwareVersion ),
( DeviceFileEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
  | where SHA256 in~ (hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="DeviceFileEvents", DeviceName, Indicator=SHA256, Detail=FolderPath ),
( AndroidAppInventory_CL
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
  | where PackageName_s in~ (pkgs) or SigningCertSha1_s =~ "927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9" or FileSha256_s in~ (hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, Source="AndroidAppInventory_CL", DeviceName=DeviceId_s, Indicator=PackageName_s, Detail=SigningCertSha1_s )
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Party Panel Android Trojan Package, Certificate or Hash Installed
id: 8d2a4e90-1b73-4c6f-a5d8-2e9f0c3b7a12
status: experimental
description: Detects the Party MaaS stage 1 and stage 2 package names, the shared CN=editor signing certificate SHA-1 and the published APK SHA-256 hashes in Android app-inventory telemetry (TL-2026-6564).
references:
    - https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/inside-party-panel-android-banking-trojan-targeting-indian-banks
    - https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/droppers-bypassing-android-13-restrictions
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1624.001
    - attack.t1541
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1655.001
    - attack.t1406
logsource:
    product: android
    category: package_install
detection:
    selection_pkg:
        PackageName:
            - 'com.secure.android.manager'
            - 'com.userdb.customer'
    selection_cert:
        SigningCertSha1: '927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9'
    selection_hash:
        Sha256:
            - '66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7'
            - '5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - None expected because the package names, certificate and hashes are specific to this campaign
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or malware analysts running the samples on enrolled lab devices

**Tuning notes:** Map the index, sourcetype and field names (package_name, signing_cert_sha1, file_sha256, installer_package) to your MDM/MTD feed; the sourcetype shown is a naming convention, not a guaranteed product sourcetype. Exclude lab devices by device group. Treat any hit as confirmed compromise: isolate, tell the user to dial ##002# to cancel call forwarding, and block the card.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Android APK Sideload Download from Bare-IP HTTP Host (Party Panel stage 1 delivery) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android Dropper Spoofing Play Store Installer (com.android.vending) and Play Protect Disabled (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android Banking Trojan Exfiltration via Telegram Bot API (sendMessage / sendDocument / sendPhoto) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android Browser Request to Bare-IP /customer/?party= Lure Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android USSD Call Forwarding (**21*) and SMS Interception by Party Stage 2 Payload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Query for Party Panel Operator Domain [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Party Panel Android Banking Trojan - Fake Play Store Lure Page / Panel Server Access (TL-2026-6564) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Party Panel Stage 2 WebSocket C2 - [indicator]:8080 /ws (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `103.151.199[.]22`
- Domain: `sanaminfotech[.]online`
- File hash: `66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Inside the 'Party' Panel: How Fraudsters Rent Android Banking Trojans to Target Indian Bank Customers (CloudSEK)](https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/inside-party-panel-android-banking-trojan-targeting-indian-banks)
- [Bypassing Android 13 Restrictions with SecuriDropper (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/droppers-bypassing-android-13-restrictions)
- [National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (India)](https://cybercrime.gov.in/)
- [Inside MR ROBOT: Malware-as-a-Service Targeting Indian Bank Customers (CloudSEK, related rented Android banking platform; not linked to Party by the source)](https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/inside-mr-robot-malware-as-a-service-targeting-indian-bank-customers)
- [Social engineering attacks lure Indian users to install Android banking trojans (Microsoft, related campaign)](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/11/20/social-engineering-attacks-lure-indian-users-to-install-android-banking-trojans)
- [CyberDakait: seven Android trojans targeting Indian banking (Group-IB, related)](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cyberdakait-seven-android-trojans-indian-banking/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6564
