# October 2026 Infostealer Trend Report: Lzveil, StealC, Remus, DarkCloud, AgentTesla

> AhnLab ASEC's October 2026 infostealer trend report describes a newly named infostealer, Lzveil, delivered together with the Remus stealer inside a 7Z archive that contains a password-protected RAR. StealC is also seen in crack/keygen lures spread through SEO poisoning and file hosting, while DarkCloud and AgentTesla arrive as phishing email attachments.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T09:54:20Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T09:54:20Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6565
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6565.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6565
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (3 shown free below)

## Description

AhnLab ASEC's monthly infostealer trend report for October 2026 (published 2026-11-20) is built from ASEC's automated collection system, email honeypot, C2 automated analysis system and AhnLab product diagnostic logs. It reports that infostealers are mainly distributed disguised as cracks and keygens. Lures are promoted through SEO poisoning (search-result ranking manipulation) and hosted on file-sharing and cloud services including Mega and MediaFire, plus an Amazon S3 bucket and a '.cfd' domain. Victims who search for pirated software download an archive and run the payload themselves.

The report's headline finding is Lzveil, described as a new infostealer. Lzveil was distributed together with Remus: the files sit in a password-protected RAR nested inside a 7Z archive, and both stealers were observed executing at the same time on the victim host. StealC is also named as a family frequently identified in the crack/keygen channel. Of the samples ASEC analysed, about 98.4% run as plain EXE files and about 1.6% use DLL side-loading, with python37.dll as the main malicious DLL. ASEC notes that many samples carry version and certificate metadata impersonating Microsoft Corporation (most frequent), Stashabuz Ltd., Tuplemix Technologies and Snako, Inc.; those companies are not involved.

Phishing is the second channel. A DarkCloud sample arrived as an attachment in an email impersonating a US laboratory-equipment company. It collects documents, keylogging data, email client data, browser data, screenshots and cryptocurrency wallet data, and exfiltrated over SMTP in the analysed sample. An AgentTesla sample, a .NET information stealer, arrived in an email impersonating a shipping company and exfiltrated over FTP.

Background on Remus from other public research (not stated in the ASEC report): Gen Threat Labs (2026-04-07) and Flashpoint (2026-07-02) describe Remus as a 64-bit stealer closely related to Lumma, reached via a test-build family called Tenzor, that resolves C2 using EtherHiding and decrypts an embedded ChaCha20 C2 config. Flashpoint reports it sold as MaaS in three tiers (Basic $250, Pro $500, Enterprise $1,000). CIS (MS-ISAC) reports delivery via ClickFix/PLYCHIP, DonutLoader and cracked-software installers, HTTP C2 on non-standard ports, session-cookie theft aimed at MFA bypass, and, from a 29 July developer post, targeting of AI coding clients. The ASEC report does not state a CVE, a threat actor or the C2 servers of Lzveil, so none are asserted here. ASEC does not say which family each listed MD5 belongs to. Severity is an analyst estimate.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1608.006 SEO Poisoning
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Infostealer python37.dll DLL Side-Loading From User-Writable Path — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6565-SPL-001`)

Detects python37.dll (the main malicious DLL in the ~1.6% of ASEC-analysed crack/keygen infostealer samples that use DLL side-loading) loaded by a non-Python host executable running from a user-writable directory. Covers Lzveil, StealC and Remus lures (T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading, T1036 Masquerading) in TL-2026-6565.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.002, T1036
- **Data sources:** sysmon:EventCode=7 (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), MDE:DeviceImageLoadEvents, sigma:windows/image_load
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\python37.dll" earliest=-24h
    NOT Image IN ("*\\python.exe", "*\\pythonw.exe", "*\\py.exe", "*\\pyw.exe")
    Image IN ("*\\Users\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Temp\\*", "*\\Downloads\\*")
```Behaviour: python37.dll loaded by a non-Python host running from a user-writable path. ASEC reports python37.dll as the main side-loaded DLL for crack/keygen infostealers such as Lzveil, StealC and Remus```
| eval dll_unsigned=if(lower(Signed)="false", "yes", "no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(dll_unsigned) as dll_unsigned values(SignatureStatus) as dll_signature_status values(Hashes) as hashes by host, User, Image
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table host User Image loaded_dll dll_unsigned dll_signature_status hashes count first_seen last_seen
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-6565 python37.dll side-loading by non-Python host in user-writable path (T1574.002)
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "python37.dll"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python.exe", "pythonw.exe", "py.exe", "pyw.exe"))
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\ProgramData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\")
| extend SameDirSideload = tolower(replace_string(FolderPath, FileName, "")) == tolower(replace_string(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, ""))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, HostProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, HostPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, DllPath = FolderPath, SameDirSideload, DllSHA1 = SHA1, HostSHA256 = InitiatingProcessSHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Python37.dll Side-Loaded by Non-Python Host From User-Writable Path
id: 7c1f0a52-3b8e-4d6a-9f21-5a4e8c0b1d11
status: experimental
description: 'Detects python37.dll loaded by a non-Python executable running from a user-writable directory. ASEC October 2026 infostealer report names python37.dll as the main malicious DLL in side-loading infostealer samples (Lzveil, StealC, Remus lures). TL-2026-6565.'
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/96698/
    - https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\python37.dll'
    selection_path:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Users\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Downloads\'
    filter_python:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\python.exe'
            - '\pythonw.exe'
            - '\py.exe'
            - '\pyw.exe'
    condition: selection and selection_path and not filter_python
falsepositives:
    - Portable applications or games that legitimately bundle an embedded Python 3.7 runtime
    - Developer tools run from user profile directories
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Portable apps or games bundling an embedded Python 3.7 runtime and a renamed launcher
- Developer tooling unpacked into user profile directories

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist known-good host executables by hash or signer after a 14-day baseline. Raise priority when dll_unsigned=yes or SameDirSideload is true. Ensure Sysmon EventCode 7 is enabled for DLLs loaded from user paths.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Crack/Keygen Infostealer Lure Executed From Archive Temp Directory — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- .NET Utility Spawned as Injection Host by User-Path Loader — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remus EtherHiding RPC and Infostealer IOC Domain Resolution — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Infostealer Phishing Attachment Executed From Mail Client Path — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ASEC Infostealer Hash and ClickFix Domain Execution Match — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remus C2 Over Non-Standard TCP 5902 From User-Path Binary — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Browser Credential and Cookie Store Staging by Non-Browser Process — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Infostealer SMTP and FTP Exfiltration From User-Path Binary — C2 / Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `nzqztr2208262ea[.]cfd`
- File hash: `0094855366c30a9da7d6f4962cb2206f`
- Domain: `arkedfile[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [October 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC, English)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/96698/)
- [2026년 10월 인포스틸러 동향 보고서 (AhnLab ASEC, Korean)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/96697/)
- [Remus: Unmasking The 64-bit Variant of the Infamous Lumma Stealer (Gen Threat Labs)](https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer)
- [Remus Stealer: A New, Not-So-New Infostealer (Flashpoint)](https://flashpoint.io/blog/remus-stealer-a-new-not-so-new-infostealer/)
- [SLTT C2 Traffic Tied to Remus Malware Distribution Operation (CIS)](https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/sltt-c2-traffic-tied-to-remus-malware-distribution-operation)
- [April 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/93750/)
- [May 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/94172)
- [June 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/94486/)
- [Remus infostealer evolves into sophisticated malware-as-a-service platform (SC Media)](https://www.scworld.com/brief/remus-infostealer-evolves-into-sophisticated-malware-as-a-service-platform)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6565
