# CVE-2026-127027: Unauthenticated RCE via DMARC report processing in Analogic Poste.io (before 2.5.22)

> CERT Polska reports that Poste.io versions before 2.5.22 are vulnerable to OS command injection (CWE-78) in DMARC report processing. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can send email to port 25 can run arbitrary commands as root inside the Poste.io container. Fixed in 2.5.22.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T15:11:19Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T15:11:19Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6590
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6590.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6590
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 9
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-127027

## Description

CERT Polska (advisory dated 2026-11-20) states that Poste.io, a self-hosted mail server distributed by Analogic as a Docker image, is vulnerable to remote code execution in its DMARC report processing. Email sent to the dmarc-reports@ address is saved without sender verification. A script that runs as root then unpacks the attachments using unsafe shell commands. This permits command injection through crafted attachments, for example via file names or archive contents.

The advisory states that the only prerequisite is the ability to send an email to the server's port 25. No authentication is needed. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary command execution as root within the Poste.io container. All versions before 2.5.22 are affected, and the issue was fixed in 2.5.22. The vulnerability was reported by Pawel Franczyk (logrox), and CERT Polska participated in coordinating the disclosure.

Sourcing limits: the CERT Polska advisory is the only source found for this CVE. It gives no CVSS score or vector, script name or path, exact shell commands, vendor advisory link, PoC, in-the-wild exploitation, IOCs or threat actor. As of 2026-11-20 NVD returned no record for the CVE, and the CVE.org page did not render usable content. The Poste.io changelog lists 2.5.22 (2026-11-04) as 'security updates, Node.js v26.13.0' without CVE or DMARC detail. The changelog banner urges upgrading to 2.5.26 because older versions are affected by critical vulnerabilities. The CVSS score is not stated by the source, so severity is analyst-assigned (CRITICAL) on the basis of the unauthenticated network vector and root-level code execution. No CISA KEV entry was observed in the portion of the catalog (version 2026.11.18) that could be read.

Post-exploitation consequences (access to mail stored in the container, tooling download, pivoting) are analyst assessments of what root in a mail-server container permits, not facts reported in the advisory. Defenders should upgrade to the latest release (the vendor banner references 2.5.26), review inbound mail to the dmarc-reports@ mailbox for anomalous attachments, and hunt for unexpected child processes of the DMARC unpacking job.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- T1609 Container Administration Command
- T1114 Email Collection

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Poste.io CVE-2026-127027 - Root Shell, Decode-and-Execute, Mail Store or Container Escape Spawned by DMARC Report Processing [Splunk SPL]** (`TL-2026-6590-SPL-002`)

Detects a root shell, decode-and-execute chain, mail store access or container-escape probe spawned by a process whose parent command line references DMARC report handling inside the Poste.io container. This is the expected artifact of CVE-2026-127027 command injection. The advisory does not name the script, so the logic hunts on parent-child behaviour and classifies the child as container escape (T1611), decode-and-execute (T1140), tooling/reverse shell, mail store access (T1114), injection metacharacters or plain shell spawn (T1059.004, T1609).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.004, T1059, T1609, T1114, T1140, T1611
- **Data sources:** sysmon:linux (Sysmon for Linux EventID 1), Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceProcessEvents (Linux), linux_audit (auditd EXECVE) as alternative
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** medium

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1 User=root ParentCommandLine="*dmarc*" (Image="*/sh" OR Image="*/bash" OR Image="*/dash" OR Image="*/ash" OR CommandLine="*Maildir*" OR CommandLine="*/var/mail*" OR CommandLine="*/data/domains*" OR CommandLine="*dovecot*" OR CommandLine="*base64*" OR CommandLine="*docker.sock*" OR CommandLine="*nsenter*" OR CommandLine="*/proc/1/root*")
| eval behaviour=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(docker\.sock|nsenter|/proc/1/root|chroot /host|--privileged|release_agent)"),"container_escape_attempt", match(CommandLine,"(?i)(base64 -d|base64 --decode|openssl enc -d|xxd -r)"),"decode_and_execute", match(CommandLine,"(?i)(curl|wget|\bnc\b|ncat|socat|/dev/tcp/|chmod \+x)"),"tooling_or_revshell", match(CommandLine,"(?i)(Maildir|/var/mail|/data/domains|dovecot)"),"mail_store_access", match(CommandLine,"\x60|\$\x28|\$\{IFS"),"injection_metacharacters", true(),"shell_spawn")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as child_cmd values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd values(behaviour) as behaviour by host
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table first_seen last_seen host behaviour child_cmd parent_cmd count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where AccountName =~ "root"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has "dmarc" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "dmarc"
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash", "ash")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Maildir", "/var/mail", "/data/domains", "dovecot", "base64", "docker.sock", "nsenter", "/proc/1/root")
| extend Behaviour = case(
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("docker.sock", "nsenter", "/proc/1/root", "chroot /host", "--privileged", "release_agent"), "container_escape_attempt",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("base64 -d", "base64 --decode", "openssl enc -d", "xxd -r"), "decode_and_execute",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl", "wget", "/dev/tcp/", "chmod +x", "ncat", "socat"), "tooling_or_revshell",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Maildir", "/var/mail", "/data/domains", "dovecot"), "mail_store_access",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("$(", "`", "${IFS}"), "injection_metacharacters",
    "shell_spawn")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Behaviour
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Poste.io CVE-2026-127027 Root Shell, Decode-and-Execute, Mail Store or Container Escape Activity Spawned by DMARC Processing
id: 9d2e6a74-31c8-4f0b-b5a7-6c1d0e8f4a52
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a root-owned process whose parent command line references DMARC report handling and that is a shell
    interpreter, decodes and executes a payload, touches the mail store, or probes for container escape. The
    CVE-2026-127027 command injection in Poste.io (before 2.5.22) executes attacker-supplied commands as root
    inside the container from the DMARC attachment unpacking script. The script name is not disclosed in the
    advisory, so this rule hunts on parent-child behaviour. Decode and container-escape branches are
    analyst-assessed post-exploitation behaviour, not reported in the advisory.
references:
    - https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/11/CVE-2026-127027/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1609
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1611
    - cve.2026.127027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        User: 'root'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'dmarc'
    selection_shell:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ash'
    selection_mail:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Maildir'
            - '/var/mail'
            - '/data/domains'
            - 'dovecot'
    selection_decode:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'base64 -d'
            - 'base64 --decode'
            - 'openssl enc -d'
            - 'xxd -r'
    selection_escape:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'docker.sock'
            - 'nsenter'
            - '/proc/1/root'
            - 'chroot /host'
            - 'release_agent'
    condition: selection_parent and (selection_shell or selection_mail or selection_decode or selection_escape)
falsepositives:
    - The DMARC unpacking script legitimately invoking sh -c for archive extraction (baseline the exact command line)
    - Administrators running maintenance scripts that reference dmarc
level: critical

```

**Known false positives:**

- The DMARC unpacking script itself invoking sh -c for archive extraction on every report (baseline and exclude the exact benign command line)
- Administrator maintenance in the container that references dmarc
- Backup or migration jobs reading the mail store while their command line mentions dmarc

**Tuning notes:** Baseline the legitimate unpack command line for the DMARC job on a patched test instance and exclude it exactly; alert on any deviation, especially metacharacters, decode chains or escape artifacts. Verify the parent field names for your sensor (ParentCommandLine / InitiatingProcessCommandLine). The mail-store path list (Maildir, /var/mail, /data/domains, dovecot) is an assumption; adjust to your Poste.io volume layout.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Inbound Mail to dmarc-reports Mailbox or Crafted Attachment Name [Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Root Shell, Decode-and-Execute, Mail Store or Container Escape Spawned by DMARC Report Processing [Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Container Host Tool Download, Mail Exfiltration or Public Egress by Shell/Download Binaries [Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Inbound Mail to dmarc-reports Mailbox or Crafted Attachment Name [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Root Shell, Decode-and-Execute, Mail Store or Container Escape Spawned by DMARC Report Processing [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Container Host Tool Download, Mail Exfiltration or Public Egress by Shell/Download Binaries [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Inbound Mail to dmarc-reports Mailbox or Crafted Attachment Name [Splunk SPL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] CVE-2026-127027 - Container Host Tool Download, Mail Exfiltration or Public Egress by Shell/Download Binaries [Splunk SPL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [CERT Polska: Vulnerability in Analogic Poste.io software (CVE-2026-127027)](https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/11/CVE-2026-127027/)
- [CVE Record CVE-2026-127027](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127027)
- [Poste.io changelog](https://poste.io/changelog)
- [Poste.io documentation](https://poste.io/doc)
- [analogic/poste.io Docker Hub image](https://hub.docker.com/r/analogic/poste.io)
- [NVD CVE API query for CVE-2026-127027 (no record as of 2026-11-20)](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-127027)
- [CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json)
- [CWE-78: OS Command Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
- [CERT Polska Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policy](https://cert.pl/en/cvd/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6590
