# Bazuka Android Malware Framework Uses Fake Screen Overlays for Credential Theft and Device Control

> ThreatFabric reports Bazuka, a modular Android fraud framework (dropper/downloader, core and 23 DEX modules) found in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC-relay banking trojan. It is delivered via droppers posing as a 'premium' TikTok app (com.tiktok.premium) and provides overlays, keylogging, SMS/2FA interception, crypto clipboard hijacking, remote control, ADB/Wireless Debugging abuse and NFC card interaction, with an LLM-assisted operator panel.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T17:33:37Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T17:33:37Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6604
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6604.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6604
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Bazuka is a previously undescribed Android fraud framework documented by ThreatFabric on 2026-11-18 and covered by The Hacker News on 2026-11-20. ThreatFabric encountered it in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC card-relay application and initially judged it a simple wrapper before finding a full framework: a dropper or downloader, a core component and 23 modules. The panel is operated in an affiliate (traffer) model: traffers create landing pages (for example IPTV-themed pages) and lure victims with social-media ads or bogus sites. The sample dropper masquerades as a 'premium, adult-friendly version of TikTok' (package com.tiktok.premium; VirusTotal filename TikTok18-Dropper-tiktok18-premium-...apk). The panel's dropper builder can set minimal manifest permissions (without Accessibility), which ThreatFabric says shows intent to pass Google Play review; ThreatFabric has not observed this actually happening.

Infection chain: the dropper asks the victim to allow installation from unknown sources and installs a stager (package com.tiktok.premium.pro) via PackageManager sessions; a variant 'downloader' directly downloads the core. The stager/downloader fetches the core and campaign-specific modules. The core and modules are DEX files loaded in memory with InMemoryDexClassLoader (not written to disk) and are not obfuscated. The core orchestrates C2, loads modules, dispatches commands, collects device information, and manages permissions and updates. It runs a threat-level check (Build class, sensors, debugger/security-app presence, battery), grants itself permissions through Accessibility or ADB shell commands, disables the Google Play Protect component through the accessibility API, can enable Developer options and Wireless Debugging and intercept the pairing PIN to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon, and supports a self-destruct command (clears storage, deletes the database, disables the app). Commands are queued by priority, with enableUninstallProtection highest. C2 uses two WebSocket channels, Control and Data, with frames encrypted using ChaCha20-Poly1305 and rotating keys. Infrastructure includes Cloudflare-fronted brokerok.org subdomains plus raw IPs embedded in certificates bundled with the droppers.

The 23 modules cover: call_forwarding (USSD), clip_monitor (swaps BTC, ETH, TRC20 and SOL wallet addresses), contacts, device_control (ADB shell commands), file_manager, input_recorder (keylogger with regex for card numbers, wallet addresses and passwords), location, media (photos, camera, microphone), oem_power, optics (remote control, screencasting, phishing overlays), preflight, proxy (reverse TCP proxy), push, screen_control (lock-screen PIN, password and pattern capture), self_adb (embedded ADB client), session_ui (HTML phishing overlays), smsmessage (read/send SMS, extract verification codes, attempt deletion), system_checker (anti-analysis), tapread-nfc_module (contactless bank card interaction), toast, twofa (one-time codes), uninstall_shield (blocks uninstall/force-stop) and ussd. A novel overlay technique screenshots the home or lock screen and displays it on command to conceal background activity. ThreatFabric states the framework does not include automated payments.

The operator control panel integrates LLMs (locally hosted or API-accessed) for chat, victim 'score' (how attractive a victim is as a target), a permission-grant click-through strategy and AI agents that identify victims of interest. The panel UI mixes English and Russian; Russian-language slang, the domain brokerok.org and a Moscow-hosted server (95.181.213.21, ONE DASH VPS) are noted by ThreatFabric as indicators, but no actor or country attribution is made. Targeted countries, banks and apps are not stated in the sources. ThreatFabric notes the panel frontend was reachable without authentication and the first in-the-wild attempts suggest the product has found a buyer. Severity HIGH is an analyst judgment from the described capabilities, not a vendor rating.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1660 Phishing
- T1655.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- T1407 Download New Code at Runtime
- T1629.003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- T1629.001 Impair Defenses: Prevent Application Removal
- T1633.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- T1623.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features
- T1417.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
- T1417.002 Input Capture: GUI Input Capture
- T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
- T1517 Access Notifications
- T1429 Audio Capture
- T1513 Screen Capture
- T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1521.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1604 Proxy Through Victim
- T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1641.001 Transmitted Data Manipulation
- T1582 SMS Control

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Bazuka C2 - brokerok.org, gargona.cash and Known Infrastructure IPs in DNS, Proxy and Firewall Logs** (`TL-2026-6604-SPL-003`)

Detects egress to Bazuka C2: brokerok.org subdomains (c2ws, c2data, c2proxy, c2api) fronted by Cloudflare, gargona.cash, vendor-reported IPs 95.181.213.21 and 170.168.61.117 (ports 8082/8443/8444/8445), and community-observed sibling IPs tagged as lower-tier. Covers the Control and Data WebSocket channels (ChaCha20-Poly1305) and the reverse-proxy module.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1437.001, T1521.001, T1604, T1646
- **Data sources:** index=dns (DNS query logs), index=proxy (web proxy logs), index=firewall (firewall traffic logs)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
(index=dns OR index=proxy OR index=firewall) earliest=-24h
``` Bazuka C2: brokerok.org subdomains (c2ws/c2data/c2proxy/c2api), gargona.cash, vendor IPs, plus community-observed sibling IPs ```
| eval host_ioc=rtrim(lower(coalesce(query, url_domain, dest_host)),".")
| eval ip_ioc=coalesce(dest_ip, dest)
| eval c2_domain=if(match(host_ioc,"(^|\.)(brokerok\.org|gargona\.cash)$"),1,0)
| eval vendor_ip=if(in(ip_ioc,"95.181.213.21","170.168.61.117"),1,0)
| eval community_ip=if(in(ip_ioc,"176.125.243.101","91.92.43.93","87.199.197.84","193.27.90.102","103.77.240.232"),1,0)
| where c2_domain=1 OR vendor_ip=1 OR community_ip=1
| eval ioc_tier=if(c2_domain=1 OR vendor_ip=1,"vendor_confirmed","community_observed")
| stats count as events dc(host_ioc) as distinct_hosts values(host_ioc) as c2_hosts values(ip_ioc) as c2_ips values(dest_port) as ports min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src ioc_tier
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - events
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let c2_domains = dynamic(["brokerok.org", "gargona.cash"]);
let vendor_ips = dynamic(["95.181.213.21", "170.168.61.117"]);
let community_ips = dynamic(["176.125.243.101", "91.92.43.93", "87.199.197.84", "193.27.90.102", "103.77.240.232"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where RemoteIP in (vendor_ips) or RemoteIP in (community_ips) or RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains)
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort = toint(RemotePort), RemoteUrl, Source = "DeviceNetworkEvents"),
(DnsEvents
 | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
 | where Name has_any (c2_domains)
 | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer, RemoteIP = tostring(IPAddresses), RemotePort = toint(int(null)), RemoteUrl = Name, Source = "DnsEvents")
| extend Tier = iff(RemoteIP in (vendor_ips) or RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains), "vendor_confirmed", "community_observed")
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Ports = make_set(RemotePort, 10), Hosts = make_set(RemoteUrl, 20), IPs = make_set(RemoteIP, 20) by DeviceName, Tier
| order by Hits desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Bazuka C2 - DNS Resolution of brokerok.org and gargona.cash Infrastructure
id: 0d93b6f8-2c47-4e1a-8a5d-9b4e7f31c6a2
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries for Bazuka C2 infrastructure - Cloudflare-fronted brokerok.org subdomains (c2ws, c2data, c2proxy, c2api) used for the Control and Data WebSocket channels and the reverse proxy module, and gargona.cash.
references:
    - https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/bazuka-android-malware-uses-fake-screen.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1437.001
    - attack.t1521.001
    - attack.t1604
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1646
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_exact:
        query:
            - 'brokerok.org'
            - 'gargona.cash'
    selection_sub:
        query|endswith:
            - '.brokerok.org'
            - '.gargona.cash'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or threat-intel sandboxes resolving the published IOCs
    - Threat-intel feed ingestion that logs lookups of blocklisted domains
level: critical

```

**Known false positives:**

- Threat-intel sandboxes or researchers resolving published IOCs
- Community sibling IPs may be reused or reassigned shared hosting and can be benign

**Tuning notes:** Field names (query, url_domain, dest_host, dest_ip, dest_port, src) follow CIM-style normalisation; align them to your sources. Treat ioc_tier=community_observed as hunt-grade only (community corroboration, two sightings on the vendor IPs, sibling IPs uncorroborated); alert on vendor_confirmed. Vendor IP 95.181.213.21 was offline at research time, so domains are the more durable signal.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Bazuka Dropper Artifacts - TikTok18 Dropper Filename and Published APK Hashes in Defender Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka Modules - Keylogger, Overlay, SMS, Clipper and ADB Module Evidence in Alerts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka C2 - Defender Network and DNS Events to [indicator], [indicator] and Known IPs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka Dropper Install Behaviour - Stager Installed by TikTok Premium Package (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka Self-Protection - Play Protect, ADB and Uninstall Shield Abuse on Android (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka C2 - DNS Queries for [indicator] and [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka Dropper - Sideloaded TikTok Premium Package or Known Hash on Android Fleet (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bazuka Core - Play Protect Disabled, Wireless Debugging Enabled or ADB Pairing PIN Interception (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `95.181.213[.]21`
- Domain: `brokerok[.]org`
- File hash: `f046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Bazuka: the fraud framework that can do it all (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all)
- [Bazuka Android Malware Uses Fake Screen Overlays to Hide Credential Theft and Device Control (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/bazuka-android-malware-uses-fake-screen.html)
- [VirusTotal: TikTok-masquerading Bazuka dropper f046b501...dec5](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5/details)
- [Uncovering ArcticRAT: AI-Powered Android RAT (Zimperium zLabs; related LLM-using Android malware covered alongside Bazuka)](https://zimperium.com/blog/arcticrat-ai-powered-android-rat)
- [WindRelay Android malware (NFC-relay banking trojan linked by The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/windrelay-android-malware-turns-victims.html)
- [RatOn Android malware detected with NFC relay (earlier NFC-relay case, The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/raton-android-malware-detected-with-nfc.html)
- [RatHat Android malware abuses ADB (The Hacker News; ADB-bridging context)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/rathat-android-malware-abuses-adb-to.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6604
