# BankWeaver Campaign: Misconfigured Temenos Quantum Fabric (formerly Kony Fabric) Abused to Deploy FabricShell and FabricShadow Web Shells

> Forescout's Vedere Labs reported the BankWeaver campaign, in which attackers abused an internet-exposed Temenos Quantum Fabric authentication service that issued privileged tokens while accepting anonymous access, then deployed the FabricShell and FabricShadow Java implants without any password. One financial institution compromise is confirmed; six other banks appear to share the same exposure but are not confirmed compromised.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T21:24:07Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T21:24:07Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6622
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6622.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6622
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 14 (3 shown free below)

## Description

BankWeaver was identified by Forescout Vedere Labs during a breach investigation at a financial services institution in early September 2026 and publicly reported on 2026-11-19. The target is Temenos Quantum Fabric (formerly Kony Fabric), digital banking middleware that links customer-facing web and mobile applications to identity systems, payment services, databases and customer records. No CVE or CVSS score has been assigned: the activity abuses an access-configuration weakness rather than a software vulnerability, and Temenos attributed the behavior to the service's access settings.

Initial access: an internet-facing Fabric authentication service was configured to accept anonymous access while also being able to issue privileged tokens. Attackers obtained the anonymous application token that Spotlight normally issues before sign-in and exchanged it for an administrator token; the token meant for anonymous application access was accepted across an administrative trust boundary. No credential theft or guessing was required. The exact endpoints and token format were not described in the secondary sources reviewed.

Execution and persistence: with administrative rights the operators abused Fabric's support for custom Java integration services, uploading malicious Java components through the platform's extension and deployment mechanism. The code loads as a normal Fabric service and runs with the application's network and database access, so it survives closing of the anonymous-access route. FabricShell is registered as a Fabric service and executes operating system commands, returns output, runs arbitrary database queries (reported as returning up to 50 rows at a time) and was found carrying hard-coded PostgreSQL connection details belonging to another victim. FabricShadow is a reconnaissance hook that runs before data requests are processed; it collects hostname, network interfaces/addresses, Java version and service account, keeps a local copy and sends results to attacker infrastructure. Reported artifacts include the service names ReconJavaService, recon.ReconService and ReconPreProcessor, the package recon_svc.jar, helper scripts shell.sh and shell<number>.sh, the local output file /tmp/.recon_out, content markers RECON_PREPROCESSOR, RECON_DONE, RECON_ERR and RECON_FROM_FABRIC, the HTTP header X-A: k1, and outbound ports 5005, 5006 and 25565.

Infrastructure: Forescout observed more than 30 rotating source IP addresses, many reportedly compromised UK residential devices (home routers and NAS devices) plus a few rented VPS nodes. Payloads were hosted on sendit.sh, temp.sh, plainraw.com/plainraw.sh and 37.187.78.41. One secondary source reports FabricShadow sent collected data to a web shell on another victim's Red Hat Process Automation Manager deployment used for staging. Any link to a separate botnet is unconfirmed. No threat actor has been attributed; a North Korea/Solana claim in one secondary article concerns a separate actor (UAT-12643, per Cisco Talos) and is not supported as related to BankWeaver.

Scope and response: one compromise is confirmed. Six other banks across Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas appear to share the configuration and exposure but compromise was not confirmed. Temenos released updates and guidance to make privileged authentication services private and advised removing internet access to Spotlight and Fabric administrative/authentication services (restrict to a private network or MFA-gated gateway). Closing the route does not remove an installed implant: defenders should preserve logs, memory and packages, revoke sessions, rotate secrets, rebuild nodes from known-good images and hunt for unexpected Java package registrations, service imports and publishing events, and for Java/Tomcat processes spawning shells or downloaders. No file hashes or affected version numbers were published in the sources reviewed.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1090 Proxy
- T1584.008 Network Devices
- T1584.004 Server
- T1608.001 Upload Malware
- T1074.001 Local Data Staging
- T1074.002 Remote Data Staging

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BankWeaver - Java/Tomcat Spawning Shells, Downloaders and FabricShell/FabricShadow Artifacts (Post-Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-6622-SPL-002`)

Detects Fabric middleware Java/Tomcat processes spawning shells, downloaders or host-recon utilities, and any command line referencing BankWeaver artifacts (shell.sh, shell<number>.sh, sendit.sh, temp.sh, plainraw, 37.187.78.41, /tmp/.recon_out, recon_svc.jar, RECON_ markers). Covers FabricShell command execution and FabricShadow host fingerprinting. Maps to T1059.004, T1505.003, T1105, T1082, T1033.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.004, T1505.003, T1105, T1082, T1033, T1016, T1074.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon_for_linux, linux:sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval parent=lower(ParentImage), img=lower(Image), cmd=lower(CommandLine), pcmd=lower(coalesce(ParentCommandLine, ""))
| eval java_parent=if(match(parent, "/(java|tomcat[0-9]*|catalina[.]sh)$") OR like(pcmd, "%catalina%") OR like(pcmd, "%fabric%"), 1, 0)
| eval spawn_tool=if(match(img, "/(sh|bash|dash|curl|wget|nc|ncat|python[0-9.]*|perl|whoami|id|hostname|uname|ifconfig)$"), 1, 0)
| eval ioc=if(match(cmd, "(shell[0-9]*[.]sh|sendit[.]sh|temp[.]sh|plainraw[.](com|sh)|37[.]187[.]78[.]41|[.]recon_out|recon_svc[.]jar|recon_preprocessor|recon_done)"), 1, 0)
| where ioc=1 OR (java_parent=1 AND spawn_tool=1)
| stats count values(CommandLine) AS cmds values(Image) AS children min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY Computer, ParentImage, User, ioc
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let iocs = dynamic(['shell.sh','sendit.sh','temp.sh','plainraw.com','plainraw.sh','37.187.78.41','.recon_out','recon_svc.jar','RECON_PREPROCESSOR']);
let proc = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('java','tomcat','catalina.sh') and FileName in~ ('sh','bash','dash','curl','wget','nc','ncat','python3','whoami','id','hostname','uname','ifconfig')) or ProcessCommandLine has_any (iocs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, Detail=ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Signal='process';
let files = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('recon_svc.jar','.recon_out') or FolderPath has '/tmp/.recon_out' or FileName matches regex '^shell[0-9]*[.]sh$'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, Detail=FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Signal='file';
union proc, files
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: BankWeaver - Java or Tomcat Spawning Shells and FabricShell/FabricShadow Artifacts
id: 8b3d9e17-4c2a-4f6b-a105-7e9d2c3f5a02
status: experimental
description: Detects Java/Tomcat processes on Temenos Quantum Fabric middleware spawning shells, downloaders or recon utilities, and command lines referencing BankWeaver artifacts (shell.sh, sendit.sh, temp.sh, plainraw, 37.187.78.41, /tmp/.recon_out, recon_svc.jar).
references:
    - https://www.forescout.com/blog/bankweaver-campaign-abuses-digital-banking-middleware-to-deploy-web-shells/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/java'
            - '/catalina.sh'
            - '/tomcat'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
            - '/curl'
            - '/wget'
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
            - '/whoami'
            - '/hostname'
            - '/uname'
            - '/ifconfig'
    selection_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'shell.sh'
            - 'sendit.sh'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'plainraw.com'
            - 'plainraw.sh'
            - '37.187.78.41'
            - '/tmp/.recon_out'
            - 'recon_svc.jar'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Tomcat or Fabric maintenance scripts that legitimately invoke shell helpers
    - Legitimate use of temp.sh or similar file-sharing services by administrators
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Tomcat or Fabric maintenance and startup scripts that legitimately invoke shell helpers
- Administrators legitimately using temp.sh or similar sharing services from middleware hosts

**Tuning notes:** Baseline legitimate Java-to-shell chains on Fabric nodes for two weeks and allowlist by exact command line. Requires Sysmon for Linux or MDE for Linux on middleware hosts; adjust index/sourcetype to your pipeline. The IOC arm is high fidelity and should page; the parent/child arm should alert at medium until baselined.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- BankWeaver - Fabric Anonymous Token Abuse and Java Service Upload via WAF/Proxy Logs (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Java/Tomcat Child Processes and FabricShadow File Artifacts in MDE (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Java Process Outbound to Payload Hosts and Ports 5005/5006/25565 in MDE (C2 / Staging) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Fabric Anonymous Token Abuse and Java Service Upload Web Request (Sigma, Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Java/Tomcat Child Shells and FabricShell/FabricShadow Artifacts (Sigma, Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Fabric Middleware Outbound to Payload Hosts and Non-Standard Ports (Sigma, C2 / Staging) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Fabric Anonymous Token Abuse and Java Service Upload (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BankWeaver - Outbound to Payload Hosts and Ports 5005/5006/25565 from Fabric Middleware (C2 / Staging) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 14)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `37.187.78[.]41`
- Domain: `plainraw[.]com`
- Domain: `plainraw[.]sh`

Full set of 14 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Forescout: BankWeaver campaign abuses digital banking middleware to deploy web shells](https://www.forescout.com/blog/bankweaver-campaign-abuses-digital-banking-middleware-to-deploy-web-shells/)
- [Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without Passwords (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/temenos-banking-platform/)
- [Hackers Hijack Banking Servers Without Passwords Using BankWeaver Attack (Cyberpress)](https://cyberpress.org/bankweaver-hijacks-banking-servers/)
- [BankWeaver Abuses Misconfigured Temenos Middleware to Deploy Java Web Shells (Mallory)](https://mallory.ai/stories/01a1f3f6-063b-726d-8e5c-0659b68d094d)
- [Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without Passwords (Cryptika)](https://www.cryptika.com/hackers-exploit-misconfigured-temenos-banking-platform-to-deploy-web-shells-without-passwords/)
- [Temenos Quantum Fabric (formerly Kony)](https://www.temenos.com/products/quantum/fabric/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6622
