# Overlord RAT: open-source Go RAT delivered via fake Zoom installer (.NET downloader), with optional Solana-based C2 resolver (disabled in observed build)

> Jamf Threat Labs (2026-08-06) found a macOS campaign in which a .NET 10 downloader posing as a Zoom installer fetches a garble-obfuscated Go agent built from the open-source Overlord framework, which beacons over TLS WebSocket (validation disabled) to hub.zoom.com.kg:5173. Overlord provides keylogging, screen/webcam/audio capture, remote desktop, interpreter execution and plugin loading; its Solana C2 resolver exists in the framework but was disabled in the analysed build. Proofpoint separately documented Overlord use by the likely North Korea-aligned UNK_DeadDrop cluster against developers.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T22:07:04Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T22:07:04Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6625
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6625.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6625
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Overlord is an open-source, cross-platform remote access framework written in Go (public repository github.com/vxaboveground/Overlord; Malpedia lists the repository reference dated 2026-03-05 and tracks the family as win.overlord). This record covers two independently reported uses of the framework.

Campaign 1 - Fake Zoom installer (Jamf Threat Labs, Ferdous Saljooki, 2026-08-06). Stage 1 is a macOS ARM64 Mach-O named ZoomMeetings, built as a self-contained .NET 10 single-file application (Jamf says it is the first time it has seen .NET used as a macOS downloader of this kind). The Mach-O wrapper embeds 34 PE DLLs; one carries 'Zoom Communications, Inc' / 'Zoom Meetings Installer' metadata and the other 33 are .NET runtime libraries. Strings in the malicious DLL are base64-encoded and XOR'd with key 0x94 and identifiers are obfuscated, which kept static AV engines from detecting the sample at analysis time. The downloader fingerprints OS and architecture via RuntimeInformation, requests one of three platform-specific payloads (macOS ARM64, macOS Intel, Windows x64 per GBHackers) from attacker infrastructure (cdn.zoom.com.kg) with a random 6-character ts= token (the server returns HTTP 401 without it), writes the payload to /tmp/ZoomMeetings and launches it with a backgrounded nohup. It simultaneously downloads the legitimate Zoom installer (.pkg on macOS, .exe on Windows) and prints a success message regardless of payload outcome. A second, earlier downloader build, ZoomInstallerFull, has plaintext strings and an embedded PDB path /Users/ollie/Documents/TheEgg/obj/Release/net10.0/osx-arm64/linked/ZoomInstallerFull.pdb. The initial delivery vector was still under investigation. Jamf does not analyse a Windows payload, although the downloader has a Windows branch.

Stage 2 is the Overlord agent (zoomMacArm), a Go binary compiled with garble (not part of Overlord's standard build), which mangles pclntab names and defeated GoReSym. The hardcoded C2 is hub.zoom.com.kg:5173 over secure WebSocket with TLSInsecureSkipVerify defaulting to true. Overlord capabilities per Jamf: system-wide keylogging via CGEventTap, screen capture streaming, microphone capture (miniaudio), webcam capture, system information (CPU, RAM, battery, OS, architecture, admin status), filesystem operations (browse/read/write/upload/download/move/rename/delete/chmod/zip), process control (list/kill/suspend/resume), script execution through bash, python3, ruby, node, perl or pwsh, native dylib / WebAssembly plugin loading from C2, self-update, remote desktop over WebSocket or WebRTC, and an opt-in Solana-based C2 address resolver. In the analysed build the Solana toggle resolves to false and no wallet or RPC endpoint is configured, so the hardcoded WebSocket address is used; the Solana capability is therefore a framework feature rather than observed behaviour. Persistence is opt-in via OVERLORD_ENABLE_PERSISTENCE and did not fire in the primary sample, but a second variant (SHA-256 7878031f...) copied itself to ~/Library/Application Support/Overlord/com.zoom, installed the LaunchAgent ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.zoom.plist with label com.zoom, and ran ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice to collect hardware UUID, serial number and model before contacting C2. Per GBHackers, hub.zoom.com.kg, cdn.zoom.com.kg and dash.zoom.com.kg resolve to 18.204.152.241, and hub.zoom.com.lv previously resolved to 179.61.227.46.

Campaign 2 - UNK_DeadDrop (Proofpoint, Saher Naumaan and Carlos Rubio, 2026-06-08). Proofpoint describes Overlord as an open-source Go framework and documents its use by UNK_DeadDrop, an unconfirmed but 'very likely' North Korea-aligned cluster that sent more than 250 emails to nearly 100 organizations over about six weeks in April-May 2026 with fake developer job offers and code-review requests that led to GitHub/GitLab lure repositories (crypto platforms, exploit archives, Foundry testing, AI payments). A hidden .vscode/tasks.json with runOn folderOpen runs vendor/run-update.sh (Linux/macOS) or a VBScript/CMD launcher (Windows), installs a malicious VSIX (google-update-support.vsix) into Cursor, VS Code and VSCodium, strips macOS quarantine, and launches Go Overlord binaries (google-update-support-linux-amd64, -darwin-amd64, -darwin-arm64) that connect over WebSocket Secure to 23.137.105.75:5173. Custom modules browserlogin, companywallet and cleanup steal browser credentials and crypto wallet data; on macOS a darwin-password-prompt Mach-O shows a fake password dialog and the agent then modifies browser Keychain ACLs and dumps the login keychain. On Windows the chain runs AES-256-GCM encrypted JavaScript inside the editor's Electron process (ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1) and abuses a bundled Python to bypass App-Bound Encryption. Proofpoint does not mention Zoom, and it describes no Solana resolver (Solana appears only in a lure repo's description). Jamf states there is no direct overlap between the Zoom campaign and UNK_DeadDrop.

Attribution: none is stated for the Zoom campaign. Jamf notes that the com.zoom LaunchAgent label and plist name match FlexibleFerret, a DPRK-attributed macOS family linked to Contagious Interview, but does not attribute the activity. Proofpoint states attribution of UNK_DeadDrop to a known actor remains unconfirmed. Treat both as unattributed with low-confidence DPRK-aligned overlap. Victim sectors and geography for the Zoom campaign are not stated; UNK_DeadDrop targeting was mostly US-based developers and crypto, finance, technology, education, business services and telehealth organizations. Hunt-rationale note: the originally assigned Infosecurity Magazine article could not be fetched; this record is grounded in the Jamf and Proofpoint primary reports plus Iru, Malpedia, GBHackers and Hackread. Severity HIGH is an analyst judgement based on the RAT's full surveillance and remote-control capability.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1059.006 Python
- T1543.001 Launch Agent
- T1176 Software Extensions
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass
- T1555.001 Keychain
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1219 Remote Access Tools

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Overlord RAT Fake Zoom Installer Stage 2 Launch from /tmp (TL-2026-6625)** (`TL-2026-6625-SPL-001`)

Detects the macOS fake Zoom installer chain used to deploy the open-source Overlord Go RAT: the .NET 10 downloader (ZoomMeetings / ZoomInstallerFull) writes the garble-obfuscated agent to /tmp/ZoomMeetings and launches it with a backgrounded nohup. Also matches published SHA-256 hashes of the downloader and agent variants. Behaviour-first with hash corroboration; maps to user execution of a malicious file masquerading as Zoom.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.002, T1036.005, T1059.004, T1105
- **Data sources:** splunk_cim_endpoint_processes, macos_endpoint_security, defender_for_endpoint_macos
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_path="*/tmp/ZoomMeetings" OR Processes.process="*nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings*" OR Processes.process_name="ZoomInstallerFull*" OR Processes.process_hash="*7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522*" OR Processes.process_hash="*d4cf150d6effeea315f136cdf448e32f4a8daac9e95f46def6a31ba18787dae3*" OR Processes.process_hash="*2c0bb97632bb9b90ee97be2ac350a557b08d84a7dad1f3ef63ffd83be1ab1f00*" OR Processes.process_hash="*7878031f2bd907e7300133b3e8ce640f3cdcba56686eaca3539d4c22773bc233*" OR Processes.process_hash="*9d8948e64f75c203e28f90f5bd7678dde6bd351c7507eecdaaeab2fbe4ec43bb*" OR Processes.process_hash="*5334c468f0ffd5899a949ac3e0bc4665f80c658cb46e1a972df4e4ba0bb905f8*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process
| rename Processes.* as *
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| table firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name process_name process_path process count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath has "/tmp/" and FileName =~ "ZoomMeetings")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings"
    or FileName startswith "ZoomInstallerFull"
    or SHA256 in~ ("7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522", "d4cf150d6effeea315f136cdf448e32f4a8daac9e95f46def6a31ba18787dae3", "2c0bb97632bb9b90ee97be2ac350a557b08d84a7dad1f3ef63ffd83be1ab1f00", "7878031f2bd907e7300133b3e8ce640f3cdcba56686eaca3539d4c22773bc233", "9d8948e64f75c203e28f90f5bd7678dde6bd351c7507eecdaaeab2fbe4ec43bb", "5334c468f0ffd5899a949ac3e0bc4665f80c658cb46e1a972df4e4ba0bb905f8")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Overlord RAT Fake Zoom Installer Stage 2 Launched From /tmp (TL-2026-6625)
id: 5b0e7c1a-3f42-4d8e-9a61-2c7d94e0b1a3
status: experimental
description: Detects the Overlord Go agent staged by the fake Zoom .NET downloader being launched from /tmp/ZoomMeetings via nohup, or execution of the ZoomInstallerFull downloader build (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-08-06).
references:
    - https://www.jamf.com/blog/fake-zoom-installer-delivers-overlord-rat-macos/
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_stage2:
        Image|endswith: '/tmp/ZoomMeetings'
    selection_nohup:
        CommandLine|contains: 'nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings'
    selection_downloader:
        Image|endswith: '/ZoomInstallerFull'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that happens to stage a binary named ZoomMeetings under /tmp (rare; validate the signer)
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Admin or packaging tooling that legitimately stages a binary called ZoomMeetings under /tmp
- Security researchers detonating the published samples in a lab

**Tuning notes:** Scope Endpoint.Processes to macOS hosts and your EDR index; allow-list the notarized Zoom installer signer if your telemetry exposes it; hash terms are exact-match IOCs and can be refreshed from the TL-2026-6625 IOC list.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Overlord UNK_DeadDrop Lure Repo Payload and Malicious VSIX Execution (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord Keychain Dump and Browser Credential Theft on macOS (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 on TCP/5173 From Staged Binary (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord Gatekeeper Quarantine Strip and zoom.com.kg Payload Fetch (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord RAT Agent Interpreter Execution (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lookalike zoom.com ccTLD Domain Resolution (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord RAT com.zoom LaunchAgent Persistence and Hardware Discovery (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overlord RAT Known C2 and Payload Infrastructure Contact (TL-2026-6625) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `18.204.152[.]241`
- Domain: `hub[.]zoom[.]com[.]kg`
- File hash: `7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Fake Zoom installer uses .NET downloader to deliver Overlord RAT on macOS (Jamf Threat Labs)](https://www.jamf.com/blog/fake-zoom-installer-delivers-overlord-rat-macos/)
- [Don't Fear the Repo: UNK_DeadDrop Phishing Campaign Targets Developers to Steal Cryptocurrency (Proofpoint)](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal)
- [Overlord RAT - Iru Threat Library](https://www.iru.com/threats/overlord-rat)
- [Overlord RAT (win.overlord) - Malpedia](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.overlord)
- [Fake Zoom Installer Uses .NET Downloader to Deploy Overlord RAT on macOS (GBHackers)](https://gbhackers.com/fake-zoom-installer-uses-net-downloader/)
- [Fake Zoom Installer Targets Mac and Windows With Overlord RAT (Hackread)](https://hackread.com/fake-zoom-installer-mac-windows-overlord-rat/)
- [Overlord open-source C2/RAT framework repository (vxaboveground)](https://github.com/vxaboveground/Overlord)
- [macOS FlexibleFerret: further variants of DPRK malware family unearthed (SentinelOne, cited by Jamf)](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-flexibleferret-further-variants-of-dprk-malware-family-unearthed/)
- [Contagious Interview malware delivered through fake developer job interviews (Microsoft, cited by Proofpoint)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/11/contagious-interview-malware-delivered-through-fake-developer-job-interviews/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6625
