# Com-Affiliated Vishing Campaigns (Bling Libra/ShinyHunters and Related CL-CRI Clusters) Driving SSO/MFA Phishing, Data Theft and Extortion

> Unit 42 reports ongoing vishing campaigns by Com-affiliated actors, including Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) and CL-CRI-1116/1147/1182/1192/1264/1274, targeting financial services, healthcare and legal organizations mainly in the U.S., UK and Australia. Operators pose as IT support, steer employees to adversary-in-the-middle SSO/MFA phishing pages, enroll their own MFA devices, exfiltrate Microsoft 365 and SaaS data, and extort victims via Teams and email. CL-CRI-1192 (Helix, tracked by Google as UNC6671) additionally used a sideloaded malicious Chrome-branded browser extension.

- **Published:** 2026-11-20T22:27:50Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-20T22:27:50Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6626
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6626.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6626
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Bling Libra
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks, published 2026-11-20) documents a set of financially motivated, Com-affiliated clusters that have run high-volume voice-phishing (vishing) operations since early 2026. The named clusters are Bling Libra (ShinyHunters, first observed 2019), CL-CRI-1116 (Redact, formerly BlackFile, January 2026), CL-CRI-1147 (Pink, May 2026), CL-CRI-1182 (Falcon, mid-2026), CL-CRI-1192 (Helix, June 2026), CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex, September 2026) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder, September 2026). Unit 42 states that CL-CRI-1192 is the cluster Google tracks as UNC6671, and that Vortex and Cinder overlap with UNC6671 activity; the article does not fully reconcile these statements. Attribution is criminal only, with no nation-state link and no CVE involved.

Initial access is social engineering rather than exploitation. Callers impersonate internal IT support resolving an authentication problem and direct the employee to an organization-specific phishing subdomain (for example {company}.mfaregister.com, or a Cloudflare Pages redirect of the form connect-pages-{company}.pages.dev leading to {company}.oskeyregister.com). These pages act as adversary-in-the-middle proxies, relaying credentials and MFA approvals in real time. Unit 42 observed Doko's Panel, an operator-controlled AiTM kit that some Com actors share; Okta-targeting variants rename the default backend.php handler to api_FyekIDWY.php (previously reported by Push Security). Lure domains are registered mostly via NiceNIC (and Cnobin, Tucows, Dominet) behind Cloudflare, with SSO, MFA, passkey, oskey, enroll and portal keywords. Harvested credentials and tokens are used from residential proxy networks and commercial VPNs.

After authentication, actors enroll their own MFA devices within minutes (device names such as Pixel 10a and Pixel 9 Pro XL were reused across accounts), authorize unapproved OAuth apps or data-sync utilities, generate cloud temporary credentials, stage secondary accounts, modify mailbox rules and calendar settings, and clear security alerts. CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder) avoided Duo re-prompts by replaying a persistent keep-me-signed-in session token from proxy infrastructure. Exfiltration relies on native cloud utilities and APIs rather than custom malware: Rclone, SaaS-to-SaaS transfers, and Python scripts (python-httpx, python-requests with the Microsoft Graph SDK) pulling Microsoft 365 mailbox, OneDrive and SharePoint data. Extortion messages are sent to employees over Teams and internal email from compromised accounts, directing them to Tor-hosted negotiation sites, with threats of regulatory reporting against healthcare victims.

CL-CRI-1192 (Helix/UNC6671) was linked, with moderate confidence, to a malicious browser extension named 'Google Chrome' (versions 1.6.111 and 1.6.112, shared hard-coded API key and C2), downloaded from oskeysetup.com (31.42.184.213) as folderextension.zip/.crx and sideloaded via Developer Mode. It provides global keylogging, theft of local/session storage and IndexedDB, Microsoft and Google auth-cookie harvesting, QR-code scanning on pages, webcam streaming, and full remote control through chrome.debugger (DevTools Protocol) including hidden screenshots, input dispatch, clipboard theft and navigation. Targeting is concentrated on financial services (about twice healthcare in August 2026), shifted toward healthcare from September 2026, and also covers legal, construction, high-tech and transportation/logistics; the U.S. is the most targeted country, with Australian targeting rising to roughly 13% of observed subdomains in October 2026. Law-enforcement actions against suspected Bling Libra members were reported (Rey detained in Jordan per Reuters 2026-10-03; Umbreon arrested by Dutch police; an alleged extortion-site operator per Krebs). Unit 42 recommends tighter help-desk verification, phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys), browser extension allowlisting, identity-action visibility and alerting on unauthorized data exports.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1550.004 Web Session Cookie
- T1098.005 Device Registration
- T1176.001 Browser Extensions
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1213.002 Sharepoint
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1090 Proxy
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Com Vishing AiTM SSO/MFA Lure Domain Access — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-6626-SPL-001`)

Detects users reaching Unit 42 reported AiTM lure domains (mfaregister.com, oskeyregister.com, ssosettings.com, settingsportal.com and related) or the connect-pages-{company}.pages.dev Cloudflare Pages redirect used by Com-affiliated vishing callers (Bling Libra/ShinyHunters, CL-CRI clusters) to relay SSO credentials and MFA approvals in real time.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.004, T1557, T1111, T1583.001
- **Data sources:** pan:url, zscaler:nss:web, bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
```Com vishing AiTM lure domains (mfaregister.com, oskeyregister.com and Unit 42 IOC list) TL-2026-6626```
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:url","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h
| eval dom=lower(coalesce(url_domain, dest_host, cs_host, urldomain))
| eval lure_ioc=if(match(dom,"(^|\.)(mfaregister|oskeyregister|keyosregister|settingsportal|ssosettings|mfapasskeysetup|authenroll|installpasskey|myaccountoptions|itkeyportal|enrollmfa|apply-passkey|add-mfa|auth-sso|passkey-mfa|register-passkeys)\.com$"),1,0)
| eval lure_pages=if(match(dom,"^connect-pages-[a-z0-9-]+\.pages\.dev$"),1,0)
| where lure_ioc=1 OR lure_pages=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(dom) as lure_domains by user src
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let lure_apex = dynamic(["mfaregister.com", "oskeyregister.com", "keyosregister.com", "settingsportal.com", "ssosettings.com", "mfapasskeysetup.com", "authenroll.com", "installpasskey.com", "myaccountoptions.com", "itkeyportal.com", "enrollmfa.com", "apply-passkey.com", "add-mfa.com", "auth-sso.com", "passkey-mfa.com", "register-passkeys.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (lure_apex) or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)connect-pages-[a-z0-9-]+\.pages\.dev"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Com Vishing AiTM SSO/MFA Lure Domain Access
id: 6f1c2a1e-3b7d-4c52-9a10-5d8e7b0c1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects web access to adversary-in-the-middle SSO/MFA and passkey lure domains reported by Unit 42 for Com-affiliated vishing clusters (Bling Libra, CL-CRI-1192 and related).
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.004
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.t1111
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
  category: proxy
detection:
  selection_sub:
    cs-host|endswith:
      - '.mfaregister.com'
      - '.oskeyregister.com'
      - '.keyosregister.com'
      - '.settingsportal.com'
      - '.ssosettings.com'
      - '.mfapasskeysetup.com'
      - '.authenroll.com'
      - '.installpasskey.com'
      - '.myaccountoptions.com'
      - '.itkeyportal.com'
      - '.enrollmfa.com'
      - '.apply-passkey.com'
      - '.add-mfa.com'
      - '.auth-sso.com'
      - '.passkey-mfa.com'
      - '.register-passkeys.com'
  selection_apex:
    cs-host:
      - 'mfaregister.com'
      - 'oskeyregister.com'
      - 'keyosregister.com'
      - 'settingsportal.com'
      - 'ssosettings.com'
      - 'mfapasskeysetup.com'
      - 'authenroll.com'
      - 'installpasskey.com'
      - 'myaccountoptions.com'
      - 'itkeyportal.com'
      - 'enrollmfa.com'
      - 'apply-passkey.com'
      - 'add-mfa.com'
      - 'auth-sso.com'
      - 'passkey-mfa.com'
      - 'register-passkeys.com'
  selection_pages:
    cs-host|startswith: 'connect-pages-'
    cs-host|endswith: '.pages.dev'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security awareness tooling that deliberately resolves lure-style domains
    - Threat-intel sandbox or URL-scanning hosts visiting IOC domains
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security awareness or red-team exercises that simulate passkey/MFA lure domains
- Threat-intel sandboxes and URL scanners visiting IOC domains

**Tuning notes:** Extend the domain list from the full ~56 FQDN Unit 42 IOC list. Community (TL_OSINT_Scan) corroborates settingsportal.com and ssosettings.com. Any hit should trigger a help-desk callback and credential/session reset for the user; correlate with Entra sign-ins within 30 minutes.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Doko's Panel Okta AiTM Handler api_FyekIDWY.php — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Malicious Chrome Extension Package Dropped (folderextension) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Session Token Replay and Proxy-Infrastructure Sign-ins — C2 / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UNC6671 Malicious Chrome Extension Download ([indicator]) — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Chromium Unpacked Extension Sideload via Command Line — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rclone Cloud Exfiltration Tool Execution — C2 / Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rogue MFA Device Enrollment After Vishing AiTM Sign-in — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scripted Graph SDK Bulk M365 Exfiltration — C2 / Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `31.42.184[.]213`
- Domain: `oskeysetup[.]com`
- File hash: `ea8d30c42e758559e78bd1fe97f8849011beb7f24c7f092a066a5a62fa7fbe6f`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Dialing for Data: Inside the Com's High-Profile Heists (Unit 42)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/)
- [UNC6671 Targets Financial Services and Enterprise Cloud Environments (Google Threat Intelligence)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6671-targets-financial-services-and-enterprise-cloud-environments)
- [BlackFile vishing extortion operation (Google Threat Intelligence)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/blackfile-vishing-extortion-operation/)
- [Expansion of ShinyHunters-branded SaaS data theft (Google Threat Intelligence)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/expansion-shinyhunters-saas-data-theft)
- [Passkey-themed social engineering leads to identity cloud compromise (Microsoft)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/09/passkey-themed-social-engineering-leads-identity-cloud-compromise/)
- [Inside UNC6671's browser implant (Kevin Pham / Deoxy)](https://deoxy.net/blog/inside-unc6671s-browser-implant/)
- [Threat Spotlight: Helix, new name in data extortion ecosystem (ReliaQuest)](https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-helix-new-name-in-data-extortion-ecosystem/)
- [Inside a criminal phishing panel (Push Security)](https://pushsecurity.com/blog/inside-criminal-phishing-panel)
- [Extortion in the Enterprise: Defending Against BlackFile Attacks (RH-ISAC)](https://rhisac.org/threat-intelligence/extortion-in-the-enterprise-defending-against-blackfile-attacks/)
- [Urgent threat alert: ShinyHunters vishing campaigns and domain impersonation (Health-ISAC)](https://health-isac.org/urgent-threat-alert-shinyhunters-vishing-campaigns-and-domain-impersonation/)
- [Behind the scenes of a vishing operation (Okta)](https://www.okta.com/blog/threat-intelligence/behind-the-scenes-of-a-vishing-operation/)
- [Vishing actors target Microsoft Entra passkey enrollment (Okta)](https://www.okta.com/blog/threat-intelligence/vishing-actors-target-microsoft-entra-passkey-enrollment-/)
- [Unit 42 timely threat intel: Pink extortion brand activity](https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-06-03-Pink-Extortion-Brand-Activity.txt)
- [Unit 42 timely threat intel: CL-CRI-1182 activity](https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-07-15-CL-CRI-1182-activity.txt)
- [Key ShinyHunters hacker detained in Jordan is cooperating (Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/key-shinyhunters-hacker-detained-jordan-is-cooperating-sources-say-2026-10-03/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6626
