# Hyflock Ransomware Group Claims Samsung Group Breach (1 TB Data Exfiltration, ESX and Domain Controller Compromise)

> The Hyflock ransomware-as-a-service group listed Samsung Group (samsung.com, KR, Technology) on its leak site on 2026-11-22, claiming it exfiltrated 1 TB of data, obtained ESX administrator privileges, attacked domain controllers named samsung-cps, samsung-rtm and samsung-brn, and encrypted systems over a weekend. All details are unverified attacker claims aggregated by ransomware.live; Samsung has not confirmed them and no second source was found.

- **Published:** 2026-11-22T14:05:27Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-22T14:05:27Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6654
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6654.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6654
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** HYFLOCK
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 15 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2022-40684

## Description

On 2026-11-22 ransomware.live recorded a leak-site post by the Hyflock group titled 'Samsung Group: 1TB Data Breach from Ransomware Attack' (victim domain samsung.com, country KR, sector Technology; estimated attack date 2026-11-22). The post is written as a taunt aimed at the victim's ransomware-defense reporting. It states that the group 'gained access through the initial entry point' without naming a vector, 'spent two days inside' and obtained ESX administrator privileges. According to the post, the victim took the ESX device offline, but the group's credentials were not rotated and the device was later brought back online, so attacker access persisted. The post names three domain controllers (samsung-cps, samsung-rtm, samsung-brn), claims that all passwords were set to a single weak value, claims it began downloading 1 TB of data, and says systems were encrypted over the weekend. It further claims the victim detected the breach only a few hours after most data was encrypted, then took machines offline and changed all credentials, and that the group had remained undetected for over a month. The same post lists the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Poland, India, the United Kingdom and France (the sentence is garbled in the source). There is no ransom amount, contact, deadline, hash, IP or tool name on the victim page. Note the internal inconsistency between 'two days inside' and 'undetected for over a month'.

About the actor: ransomware.live tracks Hyflock (first victim 2026-09-09, 23 victims, 17 countries as of 2026-11-22, 12 in November). Check Point Research (published 2026-11-04) analysed four generations of the Hyflock ransomware between April and October 2026: an April Rust core, a July separate loader carrying the payload, configuration and key material, an early-October Go-based carrier that registers a scheduled task, and an Oct 17 standalone Rust encryptor that stages a copy of itself under a directory resembling a legitimate software update component, registers a scheduled task, accesses network shares and attempts to interfere with system recovery. In the Oct 17 build only the first 4,096 bytes of larger files are encrypted, and Check Point recovered 73 CRC-valid internal components from seven encrypted Office files without a key (no decryptor was produced). Group-pitched features (AES-128-CTR plus RSA-4096 hybrid encryption, vulnerable-driver EDR killing, GPO deployment, cloud-backup encryption) are self-reported and unverified; Group Policy spreading is present but disabled in the recovered configuration. Flare reports that handle hyflock123 launched the RaaS on the Duty-Free forum on 2026-05-14 with an operator cut of 20% on the first job and 15% on the second, and claimed prior LockBit and Qilin work, which Flare says cannot be corroborated. WatchGuard lists a Babuk lineage, the alias Nishi, the extension .locked, and the ransom notes 'How to Restore My Files.html/.txt' and 'What happen of my file.txt'. The sources do not state the initial access method of the Hyflock affiliates, any ESXi/VM-specific encryptor, or any exfiltration tool.

Context on exposure: the ransomware.live page also shows HudsonRock infostealer data for samsung.com (4,382 compromised employees, 2,481,605 compromised users, 2,163 third-party employee credentials, 200 externally exposed assets) and ParanoidLab data (11,365,720 passwords, 92,486 critical; 2,629,285 cookies, 5,837 critical; last queried 2026-11-15). It also carries a 'FortiBleed' note stating samsung.com FortiOS SSL-VPN credentials were exposed via a leak referencing CVE-2022-40684 (FortiOS/FortiProxy/FortiSwitchManager administrative-interface authentication bypass, CVSS 3.1 9.8, fixed in FortiOS 7.0.7 / 7.2.2). Neither source states that this CVE or those credentials were the attack vector, so no CVE is attributed to this threat. Ransomware.live reports Hyflock victims with infostealer exposure in 59.1% of cases with a domain, which is correlation only. Attribution rests solely on the group's own leak-site claim and is treated as MEDIUM confidence; the claims should be handled as unverified until Samsung or a second source confirms.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1078.002 Domain Accounts
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Hyflock Ransomware — Scheduled Task Persistence from Update-Themed Directory** (`TL-2026-6654-SPL-001`)

Detects creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe whose command references a user-writable path (ProgramData, AppData, Users\Public, Temp) and an update/patch/servicing themed name. Check Point reports that the early-October Go carrier and the Oct 17 standalone Rust build of the Hyflock ransomware register a scheduled task and stage a copy of themselves under a directory resembling a legitimate software update component (T1053.005, T1036.005).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*schtasks.exe" OR OriginalFileName="schtasks.exe") (CommandLine="* /create *" OR CommandLine="* -create *") (CommandLine="*ProgramData*" OR CommandLine="*AppData*" OR CommandLine="*Users*Public*" OR CommandLine="*Temp*") (CommandLine="*update*" OR CommandLine="*patch*" OR CommandLine="*servicing*") NOT (CommandLine="*GoogleUpdate*" OR CommandLine="*MicrosoftEdgeUpdate*" OR CommandLine="*OneDrive*" OR CommandLine="*Zoom*" OR CommandLine="*Dropbox*")
| rex field=CommandLine "(?i)/tr[ ]+(?<task_binary>[^ ]+)"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as task_command values(task_binary) as task_binary values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)[/-]create"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(ProgramData|AppData|Users.Public|Temp)"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(update|updater|patch|servicing)"
| where not(ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(GoogleUpdate|MicrosoftEdgeUpdate|OneDrive|Zoom|Dropbox)")
| extend TaskBinary = extract(@"(?i)/tr[ ]+""?([^"" ]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), TaskCommands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10), TaskBinaries = make_set(TaskBinary, 10) by DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, TaskBinaries, TaskCommands, Events
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Hyflock Ransomware Scheduled Task Persistence Pointing at Update-Themed Path
id: 3c7e1a52-8b0d-4f6a-9d21-6654a0000001
status: experimental
description: Detects schtasks.exe creating a task whose command line references a user-writable directory and an update, patch or servicing themed name, the persistence and staging behaviour Check Point reports for the early-October Go carrier and the Oct 17 Rust build of Hyflock.
references:
    - https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/hyflock-ransomware-evolves-with-new-builds-and-encryption-weaknesses/
    - https://www.watchguard.com/wgrd-security-hub/ransomware-tracker/hyflock
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /create '
            - ' -create '
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ProgramData'
            - 'AppData'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temp\'
    selection_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'update'
            - 'patch'
            - 'servicing'
    filter_legit:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'GoogleUpdate'
            - 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate'
            - 'OneDrive'
            - 'Zoom'
            - 'Dropbox'
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Third-party software updaters that register their own scheduled tasks from ProgramData or AppData
    - Administrative deployment scripts that create update tasks
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Third-party software updaters (not in the exclusion list) that register scheduled tasks from ProgramData or AppData
- Admin deployment scripts that create update-themed tasks via schtasks.exe

**Tuning notes:** Extend the NOT clause with the update agents present in your estate; restrict to servers and domain controllers first. Review task_binary: an unsigned binary in an update-named folder outside vendor paths is high priority. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 (or Defender DeviceProcessEvents for the KQL form).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Hyflock Ransomware — ESXi Root Logon from Previously Unseen Source (Valid Accounts) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Ransom Notes, [indicator] Extension and Known Sample Hashes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Bulk Outbound Transfer and Onion Domain Resolution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Executable Staged in Update-Themed Directory (Masquerading) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — ESXi VM Kill, Snapshot Removal and SSH Enablement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Mass Domain Account Password Reset (Domain Accounts) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Recovery Inhibition and Security Tool Tampering (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyflock Ransomware — Administrative Share Fan-Out (SMB Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 15)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `yhgphvfgaecacgtlbn67u7yfhafe6evnj4gs4s2oyb3hzjnlhq45azqd[.]onion`
- File hash: `80c474154b1df816cf513ae978936875b6dd77f47ef6bce78dda83ab1b89525b`
- Domain: `e5hdifgit6ua7k4ggmltume7kbyryksdnlrkc55we33fnshgxfeqgsyd[.]onion`

Full set of 15 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ransomware.live: Samsung Group - 1TB Data Breach from Ransomware Attack (Hyflock)](https://www.ransomware.live/id/U2Ftc3VuZyBHcm91cDogMVRCIERhdGEgQnJlYWNoIGZyb20gUmFuc29td2FyZSBBdHRhY2tASFlGTE9DSw)
- [ransomware.live: Hyflock group profile](https://www.ransomware.live/group/hyflock)
- [Check Point: HYFLOCK Ransomware Evolves with New Builds and Encryption Weaknesses](https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/hyflock-ransomware-evolves-with-new-builds-and-encryption-weaknesses/)
- [GBHackers: HYFLOCK ransomware coverage of Check Point findings](https://gbhackers.com/hyflock-ransomware/amp/)
- [WatchGuard Ransomware Tracker: Hyflock](https://www.watchguard.com/wgrd-security-hub/ransomware-tracker/hyflock)
- [Flare: Ransomware-as-a-Service - LockBit Alumni Launch Competing Programs as Ecosystem Consolidates in Q1 2026](https://flare.io/learn/resources/blog/ransomware-as-a-service-lockbit-alumni-launch-competing-programs-as-ecosystem-co)
- [Fortinet PSIRT FG-IR-22-377 (CVE-2022-40684), cited on the source page in the FortiBleed note](https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-377)
- [NVD: CVE-2022-40684](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2022-40684)
- [HudsonRock exposure lookup for samsung.com, cited on the source page](https://www.hudsonrock.com/search?domain=samsung.com)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6654
