# VirusTotal Verified-Encryption Ransomware Detection Surfaces .k404 Python Locker Missed by All 75 AV Engines (0/75)

> VirusTotal and Google Threat Intelligence added a sandbox-verified `encrypts-files` tag (CAPE, Zenbox, macOS Mirage) that confirms real document encryption during execution. It flagged system_update.pyw, a Python locker from a .k404 extortion campaign, at 0/75 static AV detections, along with K404T_Fidye.exe (10/75), lkd.exe (3/75) and INC Ransom (.INC, INC-README.txt).

- **Published:** 2026-11-22T17:26:37Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-22T17:26:37Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6656
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6656.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6656
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-11-20 VirusTotal (Karl Hiramoto) published 'Catching Ransomware: Introducing encrypts-files and Stricter MITRE ATT&CK T1486'. The update has three parts: (1) a new `encrypts-files` tag (search `tag:encrypts-files`, trait `behaviour_tags:encrypts_files`, Livehunt constant `vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES`) emitted by CAPE Sandbox, Zenbox and macOS Mirage only after dynamic analysis confirms real encryption of realistic user documents; (2) stricter CAPE T1486 mapping, which cut platform-wide T1486 false positives by 97.6% (7,238 to 171 files per day); (3) real-time Livehunt support. Verification uses cipher-agnostic content checks (destroyed document structure, elevated entropy, non-text bytes), coordinated extension renames of user documents, and exclusions for benign churn (installers, archives, compilers, browser caches, logs). A ransom note drop or crypto API calls alone do not trigger the tag. Since 2026-11-17, 328,257 newly submitted unique files were analyzed and the tag matched 55 of them, with no benign false positives in manual review.

Samples surfaced include system_update.pyw (SHA-256 fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354), a Python locker tied to a .k404 extortion campaign. It scored 0/75 static AV detections at analysis (a figure caption in the post says 0/59, which conflicts with the text and table). It runs under pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\, deletes itself, and rewrites Desktop documents to .k404. Companion samples are K404T_Fidye.exe (10/75; .k404, drops k404t.txt and read_me_restore.txt) and lkd.exe (3/75; .lkd extension, read_me_restore.txt, labeled ransomware.bugbugo). A K404T-Release.zip (4/75) also drops k404t.txt. The same post lists INC Ransom (SHA-256 d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645, 36/75), which uses IOCP to encrypt files to .INC and drops INC-README.txt. Other verified samples in the post's table include HotCrypt.exe (1/75, .aes, WindowsSecurityUpdater persistence), Medusa, BlackWizardLock (.BLWZ), a macOS Heartbreaker sample (.heartbreaker), LockBit 3.0 and WannaCry.

INC Ransom context (secondary sources): Microsoft reported in September 2024 that Vanilla Tempest (formerly DEV-0832, Vice Society) used INC ransomware against US healthcare, with access from Storm-0494 via Gootloader, the Supper backdoor, AnyDesk, the MEGA sync tool, RDP and WMI Provider Host for lateral movement. Huntress (2026-09-25) documents varied INC intrusions: valid accounts/RDP, PsExec/WMI and scheduled-task lateral movement, Defender tampering, BYOVD EDR killers, exfiltration via 7-Zip, MEGAsync, Restic and rclone, Impacket atexec.py to launch the encryptor, and notes INC-README.txt and DATALEAK_PRESS_RELEASE.txt. Huntress cautions that an INC note or extension alone does not prove the same operator performed the intrusion. The article gives no attribution for the .k404 campaign; the Vanilla Tempest link applies only to INC.

Defender takeaways: the 0/75 score reflects the sample at analysis time and does not prove every endpoint product would miss it. A missing `encrypts-files` tag is not a clean verdict: samples needing arguments or passwords, VM-check exits, long sleeps, unreachable C2 key servers, or DLLs needing custom exports may not encrypt in the sandbox. Hunt with `entity:file tag:encrypts-files p:10-` and Livehunt rule HUNT_Evasive_Ransomware_LowAV_EncryptsFiles.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1059.006 Python
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1569.002 Service Execution
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1560.001 Archive via Utility
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**K404T Python Locker (system_update.pyw) Executed via pythonw.exe from WindowsSystemUpdate Path — Execution** (`TL-2026-6656-SPL-001`)

Detects the .k404 extortion campaign's Python locker (TL-2026-6656): pythonw.exe running system_update.pyw or a .pyw from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\, plus execution of the companion K404T_Fidye.exe and lkd.exe lockers or any of the four published SHA-256 hashes. The sample scored 0/75 static AV detections, so behaviour- and artifact-based process telemetry is the reliable signal. The script self-deletes after encrypting Desktop documents, so process-creation logs may be the only surviving evidence.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.006, T1036.005, T1070.004
- **Data sources:** sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, EventCode 1), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*pythonw.exe" (CommandLine="*WindowsSystemUpdate*" OR CommandLine="*system_update.pyw*" OR (CommandLine="*AppData*Roaming*" CommandLine="*.pyw*"))) OR Image="*K404T_Fidye.exe" OR Image="*\\lkd.exe" OR Hashes="*fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354*" OR Hashes="*3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700*" OR Hashes="*a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087*" OR Hashes="*d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(Hashes) as hashes by host, User, Image | eval firstTime=strftime(firstTime,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), lastTime=strftime(lastTime,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where (FileName =~ "pythonw.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has "WindowsSystemUpdate" or ProcessCommandLine has "system_update.pyw" or (ProcessCommandLine has "AppData" and ProcessCommandLine has "Roaming" and ProcessCommandLine has ".pyw"))) or FileName in~ ("K404T_Fidye.exe", "lkd.exe") or SHA256 in~ ("fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354", "3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700", "a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087", "d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256 | order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: K404T Python Locker Executed via pythonw.exe from WindowsSystemUpdate Path
id: 7c1e9b52-3a4d-4f0e-9a6b-1d2c8e5f7a31
status: experimental
description: Detects the .k404 campaign Python locker (system_update.pyw run by pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\), the companion K404T_Fidye.exe and lkd.exe lockers, and the published sample hashes.
references:
    - https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/11/catching-ransomware-introducing.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pyw:
        Image|endswith: '\pythonw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'WindowsSystemUpdate'
            - 'system_update.pyw'
    selection_bin:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\K404T_Fidye.exe'
            - '\lkd.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354'
            - '3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700'
            - 'a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087'
            - 'd243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that installs a folder named WindowsSystemUpdate
    - Internal Python GUI tools launched with pythonw.exe
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Internal Python GUI utilities launched via pythonw.exe from a user profile
- Third-party updaters that legitimately create a WindowsSystemUpdate folder

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist known internal .pyw tools by hash or signer. On hosts with no Python install, alert on any pythonw.exe execution. Replace index=sysmon with your Sysmon index. The hash terms match the four published SHA-256 values; add new variants as they are published.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- INC Ransom Encryptor Execution from perflogs/ProgramData/Public with --sup --hide --mode Switches — Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Defender Tampering and EDR-Killer ([indicator]) Activity Before Encryption — Defense Evasion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Data Staging and Exfiltration Tooling: rclone, MEGAsync, Restic and 7-Zip Archiving — Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- pythonw.exe Running a .pyw Script from a User-Writable Path (Python Locker Behaviour) — Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remote Execution of Payloads via Scheduled Task, WMI, PsExec or atexec-Style Commands — Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AnyDesk Silent Install or Unattended-Access Configuration — Command and Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Encrypted-File Extensions ([indicator]/[indicator]/[indicator]) and Ransom Note Drops — Impact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- INC Intrusion Infrastructure: [indicator], AnyDesk C2 IP, Community-Related IPs and RDP Logons from Them — Command and Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `213.111.185[.]108`
- Domain: `throughoutes[.]net`
- File hash: `fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Catching Ransomware: Introducing encrypts-files and Stricter MITRE ATT&CK T1486 (VirusTotal Blog)](https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/11/catching-ransomware-introducing.html)
- [VirusTotal's New Ransomware Detection Catches Malware Missed by All 75 Antivirus Engines (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/virustotal-ransomware-detection/)
- [Microsoft: Vanilla Tempest hackers hit healthcare with INC ransomware (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-vanilla-tempest-hackers-hit-healthcare-with-inc-ransomware/)
- [INC Ransomware Attack (Huntress Threat Library)](https://www.huntress.com/threat-library/ransomware/inc-ransomware)
- [INC Ransom (SentinelOne Anthology)](https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/inc-ransom/)
- [GOLD IONIC deploys INC ransomware (Sophos)](https://www.sophos.com/fr-fr/blog/gold-ionic-deploys-inc-ransomware)
- [Microsoft: US healthcare sector targeted by INC ransomware affiliate (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-us-healthcare-sector-targeted-by-inc-ransomware-affiliate/)
- [INC (.INC) ransomware virus - removal and decryption options (PCrisk)](https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/27497-inc-ransomware)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6656
