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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0192

Trojanized Red Alert Rocket Warning App — Arid Viper Mobile Spyware Campaign Targeting Israeli Users

highMONITORING

A mobile spyware campaign attributed to Arid Viper (APT-C-23) distributes a trojanized version of Israel's Red Alert rocket warning Android application via SMS phishing. The malicious app impersonates the legitimate civil defense app, retaining full alert functionality while exfiltrating SMS messages, contacts, GPS location, and account data to attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0192
Also known asRedAlert Trojan Campaign, Red Alert Mobile Espionage Campaign
SeverityHIGH
CVSS7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
Affected productsN/A (Trojanized third-party app) Red Alert / Oref Alert (Trojanized); Google Android
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-494, CWE-295
AttributionAPT-C-23 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusPalestine
MalwareRedAlert Trojan
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1406 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1407 Download New Code at Runtime, T1417 Input Capture, T1418 Software Discovery, T1426 System Information Discovery, T1430 Location Tracking, T1437 Application Layer Protocol, T1533 Data from Local System, T1624 Event Triggered Execution, T1630 Indicator Removal on Host, T1632 Subvert Trust Controls, T1636 Protected User Data and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment, military, civilian, critical-infrastructure
Target regionsIsrael, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0192 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Arid Viper Spyware Artifacts — Trojanized Loader Files and Hidden Asset Extraction

Detects creation of file artifacts associated with the Arid Viper (APT-C-23) trojanized Red Alert spyware campaign, including the hidden embedded asset file 'umgdn', the spyware Dalvik module 'DebugProbesKt.dex', and masquerading loader files (RedAlertSetup, redalert-update, com.red.alertx). These artifacts indicate an active multi-stage spyware deployment on the endpoint.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1036.005, T1140, T1407
  • Data sources: sysmon, endpoint_detection
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
  (TargetFilename="*umgdn*" OR TargetFilename="*DebugProbesKt*" OR TargetFilename="*RedAlertSetup*" OR TargetFilename="*redalert-update*" OR TargetFilename="*com.red.alertx*" OR TargetFilename="*RedAlert.apk*")
| stats count values(TargetFilename) as files values(Image) as creating_processes by Computer
| eval severity="high", campaign="Arid Viper TL-2026-0192"
| table _time Computer creating_processes files count severity campaign

Microsoft KQL

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName has_any ("umgdn", "DebugProbesKt", "RedAlertSetup", "redalert-update", "com.red.alertx", "RedAlert.apk")
| summarize Count=count(), Files=make_set(FileName), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| extend Severity="High", Campaign="Arid Viper TL-2026-0192"
| project FirstSeen, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, Files, Count, Severity, Campaign

Sigma

title: Arid Viper Spyware Artifacts — Trojanized Loader and Hidden Asset Files
id: e4f7a192-0002-4c9a-b5e2-2a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of files associated with the Arid Viper (APT-C-23) trojanized Red Alert spyware campaign including the hidden asset file umgdn, spyware module DebugProbesKt.dex, and masquerading loader files.
references:
    - https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/mobile-spyware-campaign-impersonates-israels-red-alert-rocket-warning-system/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/07
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1407
logsource:
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'umgdn'
            - 'DebugProbesKt'
            - 'RedAlertSetup'
            - 'redalert-update'
            - 'com.red.alertx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Android development environments using similar debug class names
    - Security researchers handling the malware sample in sandboxes
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Android development environments using similar debug class naming conventions
  • Security researchers analyzing the malware sample in controlled sandboxes

Tuning notes: Add new file indicators as variant APKs are discovered. Exclude known malware analysis sandbox paths. Correlate with DNS detections (SPL-001) for higher confidence alerts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Arid Viper Trojanized APK Distribution — Malicious Download and Phishing URL Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper Data Staging — Sensitive Data Harvesting Artifacts in Temporary Directories · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper C2 Beaconing — Repetitive HTTPS POST to Analytics Exfiltration Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper Trojanized Red Alert APK — Known Malicious File Hash Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper Persistence — SvcUpdate Registry Run Key and Boot Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper C2 Infrastructure — Outbound Connection to Known Campaign IP Addresses · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper Campaign Infrastructure — C2 and Distribution Domain DNS Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Arid Viper HTTPS C2 Exfiltration — Outbound POST to Analytics Endpoint via Proxy · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0192.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 44.208.242[.]141
  • Domain: ra-backup[.]com
  • URL: hxxp://bit[.]ly/3Ozydsn

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

A sophisticated mobile spyware campaign is actively targeting Israeli civilians by distributing a trojanized version of the Red Alert (Oref Alert) rocket warning application for Android. The campaign leverages SMS phishing (smishing) messages that impersonate Israel's Home Front Command, urging recipients to install what appears to be an urgent wartime update to the emergency alert application.

The malicious APK (package name com.red.alertx) employs a multi-stage architecture designed for stealth and persistence. Stage 1 functions as a loader that uses a custom IPackageManagerSignatureProxyLoader to hook the Android PackageManager via dynamic proxy and Java reflection. This proxy intercepts signature verification calls and returns a hardcoded Base64-encoded X.509 certificate (originally issued 2014-07-12, valid until 2114-06-18) that impersonates the legitimate Home Front Command app's signing credential. The loader also forces getInstallerPackageName() to return com.android.vending, making the app appear as though it was installed from the Google Play Store.

Stage 2 extracts a hidden asset file named 'umgdn' from the APK's assets directory. This file contains the legitimate Red Alert application, which is loaded into memory by overwriting Android runtime fields (mAppDir, sourceDir, publicSourceDir). The legitimate app runs in the foreground providing real rocket alerts, while the spyware payload operates silently in the background.

Stage 3 deploys the core spyware module (DebugProbesKt.dex) which requests 20 Android permissions, 6 of which are security-sensitive: ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (GPS tracking with geofencing), READ_SMS (full SMS database extraction via Telephony.Sms.CONTENT_URI), READ_CONTACTS (contact harvesting with phone numbers and emails), GET_ACCOUNTS (device account enumeration via reflection-based AccountManager invocation), RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED (persistence across reboots), and SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW (overlay capability for credential phishing).

The malware employs aggressive obfuscation including Base64-encoded strings with unique 32-byte XOR keys per string, class/method name randomization, trivial wrapper functions to obscure control flow, and runtime reflection for all sensitive API calls. Installed applications are enumerated via PackageManager and exfiltrated in batches of 200.

All harvested data is staged locally and continuously transmitted via HTTPS POST requests to the C2 endpoint at api.ra-backup.com/analytics/submit.php. The C2 domain ra-backup.com was registered on June 23, 2025 through Namecheap, with infrastructure hosted across AWS (44.208.242.141, 44.200.176.254) and fronted by Cloudflare (104.21.64.137, 172.67.137.156).

The campaign was discovered on March 1, 2026 when the APK was submitted to VirusTotal (achieving only 3/65 detections initially) and Israeli citizens began reporting suspicious SMS messages on social media. Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) completed full analysis by March 2, and the Israeli National Cyber Directorate issued public warnings by March 6.

Attribution analysis links the campaign to Arid Viper (APT-C-23 / Desert Falcons / Two-tailed Scorpion), a Hamas-aligned cyberespionage group active since at least 2013 with a history of deploying surveillance malware targeting Israeli users across Android, iOS, and Windows platforms. The use of trojanized Android applications, targeting of Israeli civilians, and spyware capabilities are consistent with Arid Viper's established operational patterns. However, researchers note these indicators are not uniquely attributable — a similar 2023 campaign was attributed to hacktivist group AnonGhost.

---

**Revalidated on 2026-03-12**

This threat has been extensively validated through multi-vendor corroboration across at least 10 independent security organizations. The campaign was first detected on March 1, 2026 when Israeli citizens reported suspicious SMS messages on social media, and was independently analyzed by Acronis TRU (primary discoverer), CloudSEK, Palo Alto Unit 42, Infosecurity Magazine, The Register, Hackread, GBHackers, CyberPress, RedPacket Security, and PCRisk. The Israeli National Cyber Directorate issued official warnings. CloudSEK's analysis revealed additional infrastructure details beyond the original reporting: five C2/infrastructure IP addresses (216.45.58.148 on QuadraNet, 44.208.242.141 and 44.200.176.254 on AWS, 104.21.64.137 and 172.67.137.156 on Cloudflare), a third-stage payload (DebugProbesKt.dex) not previously documented in our threat record, and four distribution URLs including compromised WordPress site shirideitch[.]com and three bit.ly shortened links (3Ozydsn, 2O3fHEX, 3GfZoys). AV detection has increased substantially from the initial 3/65 on VirusTotal to broad coverage including Avast (APK:RepMalware [Trj]), ESET-NOD32 (Android/Spy.Agent.FLV Trojan), Kaspersky (HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Agent.avg), and Combo Cleaner (Android.Riskware.Agent.gHXKW). The campaign operates within the broader context of the February-March 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict escalation, with Unit 42 and CloudSEK documenting approximately 60 hacktivist groups becoming active following the February 28 kinetic strikes. Medium-confidence attribution to Arid Viper (APT-C-23) is supported by the group's established pattern of Android trojanization documented in ESET's June 2024 AridSpy research (five campaigns since 2022, three still active), Cisco Talos mobile spyware reporting, and SentinelOne's SpyC23 analysis. The campaign represents a direct tactical evolution from the October 2023 Red Alert exploitation documented by Cloudflare Cloudforce One. As of March 12, 2026, no takedown of the ra-backup[.]com C2 domain has been confirmed, and the campaign is assessed as still active with researchers expecting escalation alongside the ongoing conflict.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1407 Download New Code at Runtime; T1630 Indicator Removal on Host; T1632 Subvert Trust Controls; T1655 Masquerading

Credential Access

T1417 Input Capture

Discovery

T1418 Software Discovery; T1426 System Information Discovery

Collection

T1430 Location Tracking; T1533 Data from Local System; T1636 Protected User Data

Command and Control

T1437 Application Layer Protocol

Persistence

T1624 Event Triggered Execution

Exfiltration

T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access

T1660 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block ra-backup.com and api.ra-backup.com at DNS and firewall level
  • Block IP addresses 44.208.242.141, 44.200.176.254, and 216.45.58.148 at network perimeter
  • Alert users to delete any app with package name com.red.alertx immediately
  • Monitor network traffic for connections to api.ra-backup.com/analytics/submit.php
  • Block bit.ly shortened URLs in SMS messages referencing emergency app updates

Workarounds

  • Perform full factory reset of any device that installed the trojanized app
  • Revoke and rotate credentials for all accounts on compromised devices (Google, email, banking, messaging)
  • Install Red Alert only from the official Google Play Store listing
  • Reject permission requests from emergency apps beyond notification access

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy mobile threat defense (MTD) solutions capable of detecting sideloaded APKs with spoofed signatures
  • Implement SMS filtering to detect phishing messages impersonating government agencies
  • Enforce Google Play Protect on all managed Android devices
  • Conduct user awareness training on sideloading risks during conflict periods
  • Monitor for Arid Viper TTPs across mobile device fleet

Affected and fixed versions

  • N/A (Trojanized third-party app) — Red Alert / Oref Alert (Trojanized)
    Vulnerable versions: com.red.alertx (all versions)
    Fixed in: Official app from Google Play Store
  • Google — Android
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (legacy and modern API levels)

Timeline

  • Prior Red Alert trojanization campaign observed, attributed to hacktivist group AnonGhost during October 2023 conflict escalation
  • C2 domain locked-ioc-14 registered via Namecheap Inc., indicating operational preparation began at least 8 months before campaign launch [Source: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/mobile-spyware-campaign-impersonates-israels-red-alert-rocket-warning-system/]
  • C2 domain locked-ioc-14 registered via Namecheap, indicating attacker infrastructure preparation approximately 8 months before campaign launch
  • U.S. and Israel launch coordinated strikes on Iranian targets under Operations Roaring Lion and Epic Fury, triggering surge in retaliatory cyber operations from Iran-aligned and Hamas-aligned groups [Source: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iranian-cyberattacks-2026/]
  • Israeli citizens post screenshots of suspicious rocket-alert SMS messages on social media; Acronis TRU discovers the campaign; malicious APK first submitted to VirusTotal (3/65 initial detections at 12:44:22 UTC) [Source: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/mobile-spyware-campaign-impersonates-israels-red-alert-rocket-warning-system/]
  • Trojanized locked-ioc-17 submitted to VirusTotal achieving only 3/65 detections; Acronis TRU discovers campaign; multiple Israeli citizens report suspicious SMS messages on social media
  • Acronis TRU completes full static and dynamic analysis of the trojanized RedAlert APK, documenting multi-stage loader, certificate spoofing, and geofencing capabilities [Source: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/mobile-spyware-campaign-impersonates-israels-red-alert-rocket-warning-system/]
  • Acronis TRU completes full reverse engineering of the multi-stage APK loader, spyware module, and C2 infrastructure
  • Infosecurity Magazine publishes initial coverage of the RedAlert spyware campaign, documenting wartime exploitation vector and Arid Viper attribution assessment [Source: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/redalert-israel-spyware-campaign/]
  • CloudSEK publishes independent technical analysis confirming multi-stage infection chain (loader, umgdn asset, locked-ioc-8), documents 5 C2/infrastructure IPs and 4 distribution URLs; The National reports on Israeli government warnings [Source: https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/redalert-trojan-campaign-fake-emergency-alert-app-spread-via-sms-spoofing-israeli-home-front-command]
  • CloudSEK publishes independent analysis confirming IOCs and identifying additional infrastructure including distribution URLs and staging domains
  • Acronis TRU publishes full technical blog post with detailed MITRE ATT&CK mapping (11 techniques), IOCs, and attribution analysis; The Register publishes coverage noting Israeli National Cyber Directorate warning and quoting TRU researcher Eliad Kimhy on unknown infection scope [Source: https://www.theregister.com/2026/03/06/spyware_disguised_as_emergency_alert/]
  • Acronis TRU publishes full report; Israeli National Cyber Directorate and major Israeli news outlets issue public warnings; widespread media coverage across The Register, Infosecurity Magazine, SC Media, and others
  • Hackread publishes analysis linking campaign to broader geopolitical exploitation pattern alongside January 2026 Mustang Panda/LOTUSLITE (Venezuela) and February 2026 Crescent Harvest (Iran) campaigns [Source: https://hackread.com/hackers-fake-red-alert-rocket-alert-app-spy-israel-users/]
  • Campaign remains active with ongoing SMS distribution; monitoring continues for new infrastructure and variant APKs
  • RedPacket Security publishes coverage confirming Israeli National Cyber Directorate and major Israeli news sites issued warnings; PCRisk publishes malware removal guide with AV detection names [Source: https://www.redpacketsecurity.com/spyware-disguised-as-emergency-alert-app-sent-to-israeli-smartphones/]
  • GBHackers and CyberPress publish updated technical analyses; Infosecurity Magazine article updated; Virus Bulletin posts advisory on X/Twitter; campaign assessed as still active [Source: https://gbhackers.com/trojanized-red-alert-app/]
  • As of 2026-05-29, the Arid Viper (APT-C-23) trojanized Red Alert smishing campaign appears to have wound down active distribution—its C2 (locked-ioc-9) now returns 404 and INCD/media issued warnings—but no confirmed takedown occurred. The Hamas-aligned actor remains operational with multiple AridSpy campaigns still active, so the threat persists (no CVE; KEV N/A).

Sources cited

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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