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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0206

KadNap P2P Botnet — 14,000+ Asus Routers Compromised via Custom Kademlia DHT C2

highACTIVE

Large-scale botnet targeting Asus home and SOHO routers using a custom Kademlia DHT-based peer-to-peer C2 infrastructure. Over 14,000 compromised devices (60% in the US) are monetized through the Doppelganger proxy-as-a-service, a rebrand of the Faceless service previously powered by TheMoon malware.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0206
Also known asKadNap, Silence of the Hops
SeverityHIGH
CVSS8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Affected productsAsus Home and SOHO Routers; Various Edge Networking Devices
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-798, CWE-287, CWE-306
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareKadNap
ToolsCustom Kademlia DHT
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1496 Resource Hijacking, T1573 Encrypted Channel and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, small-business, telecommunications, financial, government, healthcare
Target regionsNorth America, East Asia, Europe, Oceania, South America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0206 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: KadNap Staging Server Communication and Dropper Download

Detects network connections to KadNap initial staging server (212.104.141.140) used for downloading the aic.sh dropper script during the exploitation phase. Also detects outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests from edge devices or routers to this known malicious IP, which is the first indicator of KadNap infection.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1059.004, T1105
  • Data sources: firewall, network_traffic, proxy_logs
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=firewall sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="cisco:asa" OR sourcetype="fortinet:traffic" dest_ip="212.104.141.140" | eval threat="KadNap_Staging_Server" | stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action | where count > 0 | eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") | table src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action, count, first_seen, last_seen, threat

Microsoft KQL

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DestinationIP == "212.104.141.140"
| extend ThreatName = "KadNap_Staging_Server"
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity, ThreatName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: KadNap Staging Server Communication and Dropper Download
id: f7e8d9c0-b1a2-4e3f-8d5c-6a7b8c9d0e1f
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to KadNap initial staging server 212.104.141.140 used for aic.sh dropper download
references:
    - https://blog.lumen.com/silence-of-the-hops-the-kadnap-botnet/
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/kadnap-malware-infects-14000-edge.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/10
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: firewall
detection:
    selection:
        dst_ip: '212.104.141.140'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate traffic to this IP is highly unlikely given confirmed malicious attribution by Lumen Black Lotus Labs
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate traffic to 212.104.141.140 is highly unlikely given confirmed malicious attribution by Lumen Black Lotus Labs

Tuning notes: Update staging server IP if new infrastructure is identified. Expand to include proxy log sources. Consider adding src_ip filters for known edge device subnets to reduce noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • KadNap Dropper Script Execution and Malicious Binary Download · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap SSH Lockout via Firewall Rule Manipulation · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap C2 Server Communication and Configuration File Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Malicious ELF Binary Hash Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Hidden C2 Configuration and Persistence File Creation · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap NTP-Based Infohash Generation and Doppelganger Domain Communication · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Cron Persistence at 55-Minute Mark and Binary Masquerading · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Kademlia DHT Bootstrap Node Communication · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0206.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 212.104.141[.]140
  • Domain: doppelganger[.]shop
  • File hash: 0b3dbb951de7a216dd5032d783ba7d0a5ecda2bf872643c3a4ddd1667fb38ffe

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Active since August 2025 with ARM and MIPS ELF binaries.

KadNap is a sophisticated botnet malware discovered by Lumen Black Lotus Labs that primarily targets Asus home and SOHO routers, though it has been observed infecting other edge networking devices. The malware was first detected in August 2025 with approximately 10,000 compromised devices, growing to over 14,000 daily distinct victims by February 2026.

The infection chain begins with a shell script (aic.sh) downloaded from the initial staging server at 212.104.141.140. This script establishes persistence by creating a cron job that executes at the 55-minute mark of every hour, pulling and executing a malicious shell script renamed to .asusrouter stored at /jffs/.asusrouter. The script then downloads an architecture-appropriate ELF binary (supporting ARM and MIPS processors), renames it to 'kad', and executes it.

KadNap's most notable feature is its custom implementation of the Kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol for command-and-control communications. Upon execution, the malware forks a child process that connects to BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes to discover peers. It generates infohashes by creating a bencoded string using an XOR key computed from NTP server time (querying time-a.nist.gov, time-b.nist.gov, time.windows.com, ntp.asql.co.uk, chronos.csr.net) combined with system uptime. A hardcoded 0x40-byte string (6YL5aNSQv9hLJ42aDKqmnArjES4jxRbfPTnZDdBdpRhJkHJdxqMQmeyCrkg2CBQg) is SHA-1 hashed to derive AES encryption keys for peer communications.

Two persistent DHT nodes at 45.135.180.38 and 45.135.180.177 serve as stable entry points into the botnet's P2P network. Once a bot contacts these nodes, it receives C2 configuration files: .sose (stored at /tmp/.sose containing C2 IP:port pairs) and fwr.sh (stored at /tmp/.fwr.sh containing firewall rules). The malware actively blocks SSH access on port 22 to prevent administrator remediation.

The botnet infrastructure is segmented by device type, with separate C2 servers for Asus routers versus other edge devices. On average, three to four C2 servers are active at any given time. The operator infrastructure includes servers at 85.158.111.100, 89.46.38.74, 154.7.253.12, 212.104.141.88, 91.193.19.226, and 79.141.161.152.

Compromised devices are monetized through a proxy-as-a-service called Doppelganger (doppelganger.shop), which launched in May/June 2025 and is assessed to be a rebrand of the Faceless proxy service previously powered by TheMoon malware victims. Doppelganger claims to offer residential proxies across 50+ countries with '100% anonymity' and is specifically tailored for criminal activity including credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, and other malicious operations.

Geographically, over 60% of infected devices are located in the United States, with additional concentrations in Taiwan (5%), Hong Kong (5%), Russia (5%), and victims across the UK, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain.

---

**Revalidated on 2026-03-12**

POST-DISCLOSURE UPDATE (2026-03-12): Following the March 10 public disclosure, Lumen has proactively null-routed all KadNap C2 traffic traversing its backbone infrastructure, providing partial disruption for traffic that routes through Lumen-operated networks. IOCs have been pushed to public threat intelligence feeds. However, due to KadNap's decentralized P2P architecture leveraging the Kademlia DHT protocol, the botnet remains structurally resilient — sinkholing individual nodes does not collapse the mesh, and infected devices will re-discover peers through DHT bootstrap. The Doppelganger proxy-as-a-service marketplace (doppelganger.shop) remains operational with no reported domain seizure or law enforcement action.

Two critical ASUS vulnerabilities disclosed in November 2025 — CVE-2025-59366 (CVSS 9.8, AiCloud authentication bypass via path traversal + OS command injection) and CVE-2025-59367 (CVSS 9.3, DSL router authentication bypass granting immediate administrative control) — affect the same ASUS router families targeted by KadNap. While no direct exploitation of these CVEs by KadNap operators has been confirmed (assessed primary vector remains credential-based access), the overlap in affected device population represents a significant amplification risk. Organizations should treat firmware patching for these CVEs as an urgent priority alongside KadNap-specific IOC blocking.

Multiple industry sources now confirm KadNap-compromised nodes are actively leveraged for credential stuffing campaigns, DDoS amplification, and brute-force attacks proxied through residential IP addresses, making detection by target organizations significantly harder due to the legitimate-appearing source IPs.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading

execution

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

command-and-control

T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

initial-access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

resource-development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply latest Asus firmware updates for all router models
  • Enable automatic firmware updates where supported

Immediate actions

  • Reboot affected Asus routers to clear in-memory malware
  • Block connections to known C2 IPs: 85.158.111.100, 89.46.38.74, 154.7.253.12, 212.104.141.88, 91.193.19.226, 79.141.161.152
  • Block connections to DHT nodes: 45.135.180.38, 45.135.180.177
  • Block initial staging server: 212.104.141.140
  • Monitor for outbound connections to BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes from router infrastructure
  • Check for presence of /jffs/.asusrouter and /tmp/.sose files on Asus devices

Workarounds

  • Change default router admin credentials immediately
  • Disable remote management interfaces (WAN-side access)
  • Disable SSH access if not required, or restrict to LAN-only
  • Schedule regular router reboots to clear non-persistent malware components
  • Block outbound connections on non-standard ports from router devices

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace end-of-life Asus routers no longer receiving firmware updates
  • Deploy network monitoring for anomalous P2P traffic from edge devices
  • Implement network segmentation to isolate SOHO router management interfaces
  • Deploy DNS sinkholing for known Doppelganger infrastructure
  • Monitor for residential IP proxy abuse in authentication logs

Affected and fixed versions

  • Asus — Home and SOHO Routers
    Vulnerable versions: Multiple models with default/weak credentials; End-of-life firmware
    Fixed in: Latest firmware with hardened SSH configuration
  • Various — Edge Networking Devices
    Vulnerable versions: ARM architecture devices; MIPS architecture devices

Timeline

  • Doppelganger proxy-as-a-service (locked-ioc-3) launched, assessed as rebrand of Faceless service previously powered by TheMoon malware
  • KadNap botnet first detected by Lumen Black Lotus Labs with approximately 10,000 compromised devices
  • Sharp increase in KadNap infections observed; operators stabilized and grew victim pool
  • KadNap botnet maintained approximately 14,000 daily distinct victims with 60% concentration in the United States
  • Active C2 infrastructure identified: locked-ioc-7, locked-ioc-17, locked-ioc-14, locked-ioc-8, locked-ioc-13, locked-ioc-9
  • Persistent Kademlia DHT network nodes confirmed active at locked-ioc-12 and locked-ioc-6
  • Broad industry coverage published: The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, SC Media, TechRadar, SecurityAffairs, CSA, Aviatrix, TechNadu, and others amplify the disclosure
  • Lumen null-routes all KadNap C2 traffic on its backbone and begins distributing IOCs to public threat intelligence feeds
  • Lumen Black Lotus Labs publicly discloses KadNap botnet with full technical analysis and IOCs released on GitHub
  • CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) publishes CISO Briefing with enterprise mitigation guidance specific to KadNap DHT evasion on ASUS edge devices
  • Revalidation confirms botnet remains active; Doppelganger proxy service operational; no full takedown achieved despite Lumen backbone blocking
  • As of 2026-05-29, KadNap remains active: ~14,000 daily Asus/edge-router victims persist and the Doppelganger proxy service stays operational, with no law-enforcement seizure. Lumen's March 10 disclosure only null-routed C2 on its own backbone; the P2P Kademlia-DHT design resists takedown, and no successor supersedes it.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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