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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0212

KadNap Botnet Targeting Asus Routers via Kademlia DHT C2 for Doppelganger Proxy Network

highACTIVE

KadNap is a Linux botnet conscripting Asus routers and edge devices into the Doppelganger criminal proxy network using a custom Kademlia DHT protocol to hide C2 infrastructure. Active since August 2025 with 14,000 daily victims, 60% in the United States.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0212
Also known asKadNap, elf.kadnap
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsAsus Asus Routers (Various Models); Various ARM-based Edge Networking Devices; Various MIPS-based Edge Networking Devices
AttributionDoppelganger Proxy Operators (low confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareKadNap
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1008 Fallback Channels, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstelecommunications, residential, small-business, isp-infrastructure, government, financial
Target regionsNorth America, United States, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Russia, United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, Spain
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0212 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: KadNap C2 — Kademlia DHT Control Node Communication & BitTorrent DHT Abuse

Detects network communication with known KadNap Kademlia DHT final-hop control nodes (45.135.180.38, 45.135.180.177) and anomalous BitTorrent DHT traffic originating from network infrastructure devices. KadNap uses a custom Kademlia DHT protocol over UDP port 6881 to hide C2 traffic within legitimate BitTorrent peer-to-peer flows. Two persistent control nodes serve as the final hop in the DHT chain, representing centralized points of control.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1095, T1090.003, T1573.001, T1008
  • Data sources: firewall, network_traffic, netflow
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="cisco:asa" OR sourcetype="fortinet:fortigate"
(
    (dest_ip="45.135.180.38" OR dest_ip="45.135.180.177") OR
    (dest_port=6881 AND protocol="udp" AND (src_ip="10.*" OR src_ip="172.16.*" OR src_ip="192.168.*"))
)
| eval detection_context=case(
    dest_ip IN ("45.135.180.38", "45.135.180.177"), "kadnap_dht_control_node",
    dest_port=6881 AND protocol="udp", "suspicious_dht_from_infrastructure",
    true(), "unknown"
)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dest_port) as ports sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out by src_ip dest_ip detection_context
| where count > 0
| sort -count

Microsoft KQL

let DHTControlNodes = dynamic(["45.135.180.38", "45.135.180.177"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DestinationIP in (DHTControlNodes)
    or (DestinationPort == 6881 and Protocol == "UDP")
| extend DetectionContext = case(
    DestinationIP in (DHTControlNodes), "kadnap_dht_control_node",
    DestinationPort == 6881 and Protocol == "UDP", "suspicious_dht_from_infrastructure",
    true, "unknown"
)
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), TotalBytesSent=sum(SentBytes) by SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DetectionContext
| sort by ConnectionCount desc

Sigma

title: KadNap Botnet — Kademlia DHT Control Node Communication
id: c3d4e5f6-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f-a3b4c5d6e7f8
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound UDP connections to known KadNap Kademlia DHT final-hop control nodes at 45.135.180.38 and 45.135.180.177 on port 6881. These persistent nodes represent centralized control points in the botnet's DHT-based C2 infrastructure.
references:
    - https://blog.lumen.com/silence-of-the-hops-the-kadnap-botnet/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/11
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1095
    - attack.t1090.003
    - attack.t1573.001
    - attack.t1008
logsource:
    category: firewall
detection:
    selection_control_nodes:
        dst_ip:
            - '45.135.180.38'
            - '45.135.180.177'
    selection_dht_port:
        dst_port: 6881
        protocol: 'udp'
    condition: selection_control_nodes or (selection_dht_port and not selection_control_nodes)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate BitTorrent DHT traffic from user workstations (unlikely from routers and infrastructure devices)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate BitTorrent DHT traffic from user workstations (should not originate from network infrastructure or IoT devices)

Tuning notes: Create a whitelist of known BitTorrent users by src_ip to reduce noise from the UDP port 6881 detection. The DHT control node IP detection requires no tuning — any traffic to those IPs from infrastructure is malicious. Add asset classification to distinguish infrastructure devices from user workstations.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • KadNap Exploitation — Known Malware Binary Hash Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Post-Exploitation — Persistence File Creation & Hidden Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap C2 — Doppelganger Proxy Infrastructure & DNS Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Exploitation — Dropper Script & ELF Binary Execution on Linux · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Post-Exploitation — Masqueraded Persistence & Defense Evasion on Edge Devices · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap C2 — NTP Time Sync Abuse & Encrypted DHT Channel Establishment · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Initial Access — Payload Delivery Server & C2 Infrastructure Connections · unlock with TL Creds
  • KadNap Post-Exploitation — Cron Persistence & iptables SSH Blocking · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0212.

Sample indicators (3 of 24)

  • IP address: 85.158.111[.]100
  • File hash: 0b3dbb951de7a216dd5032d783ba7d0a5ecda2bf872643c3a4ddd1667fb38ffe
  • IP address: 89.46.38[.]74

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

24 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Successor to the defunct Faceless proxy service powered by TheMoon malware.

KadNap is a sophisticated Linux botnet discovered by Lumen Black Lotus Labs that targets Asus routers and other edge networking devices running ARM and MIPS architectures. The malware employs a novel command-and-control mechanism based on a custom implementation of the Kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol, allowing it to conceal C2 infrastructure within legitimate BitTorrent peer-to-peer traffic.

The infection chain begins with the download of a shell script (aic.sh) from a payload delivery server. This script establishes persistence by creating a cron job that executes every hour at the 55-minute mark, ensuring the malware survives reboots and process termination. The script renames itself to .asusrouter in the /jffs/ directory — a partition on Asus routers that persists across firmware updates and reboots. It then downloads and executes the primary malicious ELF binary named 'kad', with variants compiled for both ARM and MIPS processor architectures.

The kad binary implements the custom Kademlia DHT C2 protocol through a multi-threaded architecture. First, it connects to hardcoded NTP servers (time-a.nist.gov, time-b.nist.gov, time.windows.com, ntp.asql.co.uk, chronos.csr.net) to fetch the current time and stores it alongside the host uptime. It then computes an XOR key from these timestamps combined with a hardcoded string (6YL5aNSQv9hLJ42aDKqmnArjES4jxRbfPTnZDdBdpRhJkHJdxqMQmeyCrkg2CBQg), which is SHA-1 hashed and used as an infohash for BitTorrent DHT peer discovery.

Two primary communication threads operate in parallel: a Find Peers thread that connects to BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes to search for infected nodes, and a Contact Peers thread that receives a 0x1000-byte encrypted buffer from discovered peers. The initial handshake uses a hardcoded AES key, and the first payload's SHA-1 hash becomes the AES key for all subsequent communications. The final peer in the chain delivers two operational files: fwr.sh (which injects iptables rules to drop incoming TCP traffic on port 22, blocking SSH access and preventing remote remediation) and .sose (a C2 configuration file stored in /tmp/).

Despite the decentralized DHT design, Black Lotus Labs identified that operators maintain two persistent final-hop DHT nodes (45.135.180.38 and 45.135.180.177), representing centralized control points and potential single points of failure. The C2 infrastructure is segmented by device type, with approximately 2 servers dedicated to Asus devices (over 50% of the botnet) and 2 servers for other edge devices.

The botnet feeds the Doppelganger proxy service (doppelganger.shop), which markets anonymous residential proxies for criminal use. Doppelganger is assessed with high confidence by both Black Lotus Labs and Spur security firm to be a successor/rebrand of the defunct Faceless proxy service, which previously monetized victims of TheMoon malware. Users of the proxy service leverage hijacked devices for brute-force credential attacks, targeted exploitation campaigns, and other malicious activities.

The botnet grew from an initial detection of 10,000+ compromised Asus devices in August 2025 to a stable plateau of approximately 14,000 daily active infected devices by December 2025 through February 2026. Geographic distribution shows 60% of victims in the United States, with additional concentrations in Taiwan (5%), Hong Kong (5%), Russia (5%), and smaller percentages in the UK, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain.

Lumen has proactively blocked all network traffic to and from the identified control infrastructure and has distributed IOCs to public threat feeds.

---

**Revalidated on 2026-03-12**

Two days after the initial Black Lotus Labs public disclosure, KadNap has been independently confirmed and amplified by over a dozen security publishers including the Cloud Security Alliance, SC Media, Security Affairs, TechRadar, Aviatrix, and The Hacker News. The threat is assessed as fully active with no observed decline in botnet size or operational tempo.

The Cloud Security Alliance CISO Briefing (2026-03-11) identified a critical structural flaw in KadNap's architecture: despite the sophistication of the Kademlia DHT overlay, all C2 traffic ultimately routes through two persistent intermediary nodes (45.135.180.38 and 45.135.180.177). These nodes have remained consistent across all analyzed samples dating back to August 2025. This provides defenders a retroactive monitoring chokepoint -- organizations that query historical network logs for connections to these two IP addresses can determine exposure prior to this disclosure.

The CSA briefing also explicitly links two critical ASUS vulnerabilities -- CVE-2025-59366 (CVSS 9.8, AiCloud Samba authentication bypass enabling unauthenticated RCE) and CVE-2025-59367 (CVSS 9.8, DSL-series router authentication bypass granting immediate administrative control) -- as plausible initial access vectors alongside the assessed primary vector of credential stuffing. While Black Lotus Labs has not confirmed specific CVE exploitation by KadNap operators, the temporal overlap of these vulnerabilities with KadNap's growth phase warrants defensive attention.

Notably, KadNap exists within a broader pattern of sustained ASUS router targeting. The AyySSHush botnet campaign, independently discovered by GreyNoise and Censys in March 2025, compromised 9,000+ ASUS routers via persistent SSH backdoors stored in NVRAM on TCP port 53282 -- backdoors that survive firmware updates. The convergence of AyySSHush and KadNap targeting the same device ecosystem within 12 months indicates ASUS SOHO routers are a high-value, systematically exploited class of edge infrastructure.

As of 2026-03-12, no CISA advisory, coordinated law enforcement action, or official ASUS statement specifically addressing KadNap has been released. Lumen's backbone-level traffic blocking remains the primary active mitigation. The threat status remains HIGH with ACTIVE exploitation.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

command-and-control

T1008 Fallback Channels; T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading

credential-access

T1040 Network Sniffing

execution

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

initial-access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply latest Asus router firmware updates from official Asus support
  • Enable automatic firmware updates where supported

Immediate actions

  • Block all identified C2 IP addresses at network perimeter: 85.158.111.100, 89.46.38.74, 154.7.253.12, 212.104.141.88, 91.193.19.226, 79.141.161.152, 212.104.141.140
  • Block DHT control nodes: 45.135.180.38, 45.135.180.177
  • Block domain doppelganger.shop at DNS and proxy level
  • Monitor for outbound connections to public BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes from SOHO routers
  • Check Asus routers for presence of /jffs/.asusrouter or /tmp/.sose files
  • Inspect cron jobs on Asus routers for hourly execution at 55-minute mark

Workarounds

  • Reboot affected routers to clear active malware processes (persistence will re-download on next cron cycle unless cron job is removed)
  • Factory reset affected devices and reconfigure with strong credentials
  • Remove malicious cron entries and delete /jffs/.asusrouter, /tmp/.sose files manually
  • Restore SSH access by flushing iptables rules if port 22 is blocked

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace end-of-life Asus routers with current-generation devices
  • Ensure router management interfaces are not exposed to the internet
  • Implement network segmentation isolating IoT and edge devices
  • Deploy network monitoring for anomalous BitTorrent DHT traffic from infrastructure devices
  • Enforce strong, unique passwords on all router management interfaces
  • Regularly reboot routers to clear non-persistent malware components

Affected and fixed versions

  • Asus — Asus Routers (Various Models)
    Vulnerable versions: Multiple firmware versions — specific models not disclosed
    Fixed in: Latest firmware with security patches
  • Various — ARM-based Edge Networking Devices
    Vulnerable versions: Linux-based firmware with ARM architecture
  • Various — MIPS-based Edge Networking Devices
    Vulnerable versions: Linux-based firmware with MIPS architecture

Timeline

  • Doppelganger proxy service launched, marketing anonymous residential proxies for criminal use as successor to Faceless service
  • Black Lotus Labs algorithm first detects over 10,000 Asus devices communicating with KadNap C2 servers
  • Lumen Black Lotus Labs begins investigation, uncovering malicious files (locked-ioc-18, kad binary) and C2 infrastructure
  • Sharp increase in victim count observed as botnet operators stabilize infection chain and expand targeting
  • Botnet reaches stable plateau of approximately 14,000 daily active infected devices, maintained through February 2026
  • Active C2 IP addresses documented: locked-ioc-6, locked-ioc-16, locked-ioc-14, locked-ioc-7, locked-ioc-12, locked-ioc-8
  • Persistent Kademlia DHT control nodes identified at locked-ioc-13 and locked-ioc-11
  • Lumen proactively blocks all network traffic to and from identified KadNap control infrastructure across their backbone
  • Black Lotus Labs publishes full technical analysis 'Silence of the Hops: The KadNap Botnet' and releases IOCs to public feeds
  • SC Media, Security Affairs, TechRadar, TechNadu, Aviatrix, and VPNcentral publish independent analyses confirming KadNap findings and amplifying IOCs to wider defender community [Source: https://securityaffairs.com/189251/malware/kadnap-bot-compromises-14000-devices-to-route-malicious-traffic.html]
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes CISO Briefing on KadNap, highlighting the structural flaw of two persistent intermediary DHT nodes as a retroactive monitoring chokepoint for defenders [Source: https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/briefing-csa-research-note-kadnap-p2p-router-botnet-dht-evas/]
  • As of 2026-05-29, KadNap remains ACTIVE: the botnet still conscripts ~14,000 daily Asus/edge devices into the operating Doppelganger proxy network, with no takedown, arrests, or successor reported. Only mitigation is Lumen's backbone-level blocking; firmware-surviving /jffs persistence and decentralized DHT C2 keep it resilient, and the threat carries no CVEs (identifiers.cve empty).

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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