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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0334

LucidRook Lua-Based Malware Toolkit Used by UAT-10362 in Targeted Espionage Against Taiwanese Civil Society

highACTIVE

Cisco Talos uncovered a new threat cluster tracked as UAT-10362 conducting spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities. The campaigns deliver a novel three-component Lua-based malware toolkit — LucidPawn (dropper), LucidRook (Lua bytecode stager), and LucidKnight (Gmail-based reconnaissance tool) — representing new TTPs from a suspected China-nexus threat actor targeting Taiwan's civil society.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0334
Also known asLucid Toolkit, LucidRook Campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMultiple Windows Endpoints
AttributionUAT-10362 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareLucidKnight, LucidPawn, LucidRook
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1102 Web Service and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsngo, education, civil-society, research, academia
Target regionsTaiwan, East Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-04-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0334 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: LucidRook — C2 Communication via Gmail API Abuse and DNS Callbacks to digimg.store

Detects command-and-control communication patterns associated with LucidKnight reconnaissance tool: anomalous Gmail SMTP/API traffic from non-browser processes, DNS queries to digimg.store callback infrastructure, and network connections to known UAT-10362 C2 IP addresses (1.34.253.131, 59.124.71.242). These C2 channels allow the threat actor to blend with legitimate traffic while maintaining persistent access.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.003, T1071.004, T1102, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, firewall, dns_logs, proxy_logs, edr_network_events
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=3 OR EventCode=22)
| search (
    (EventCode=3 (DestinationIp="1.34.253.131" OR DestinationIp="59.124.71.242"))
    OR (EventCode=3 DestinationPort=587 NOT Image="*\\chrome.exe" NOT Image="*\\firefox.exe" NOT Image="*\\msedge.exe" NOT Image="*\\outlook.exe" NOT Image="*\\thunderbird.exe")
    OR (EventCode=22 QueryName="*digimg.store*")
    OR (EventCode=22 QueryName="*digimg.store" QueryName="*.2fcc7078.*")
)
| eval c2_type=case(
    EventCode=3 AND (DestinationIp="1.34.253.131" OR DestinationIp="59.124.71.242"), "known_c2_ip",
    EventCode=3 AND DestinationPort=587, "smtp_non_browser",
    EventCode=22 AND match(QueryName, "digimg\.store"), "dns_callback"
)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as processes values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(QueryName) as dns_queries values(DestinationPort) as dest_ports by Computer, c2_type, User
| table Computer, c2_type, processes, dest_ips, dns_queries, dest_ports, User, first_seen, last_seen, count

Microsoft KQL

let c2_ips = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in ("1.34.253.131", "59.124.71.242")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, C2Type="KnownC2IP";
let smtp_abuse = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 587
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "outlook.exe", "thunderbird.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, C2Type="SMTP_NonBrowser";
let dns_callback = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
| where AdditionalFields has "digimg.store"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP="", RemotePort=0, InitiatingProcessFileName, C2Type="DNS_Callback";
union c2_ips, smtp_abuse, dns_callback
| summarize Count=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, AccountName, C2Type, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP
| project DeviceName, AccountName, C2Type, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, FirstSeen, LastSeen, Count

Sigma

title: LucidRook C2 via Known UAT-10362 Infrastructure and DNS Callbacks
id: c2050f03-95c7-432d-967f-39925919fc61
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to known UAT-10362 C2 IP addresses, DNS queries to digimg.store callback domain, and suspicious non-browser SMTP connections indicative of LucidKnight Gmail-based C2 communication.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook/
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/digimg.store
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.003
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_c2_ip:
        DestinationIp:
            - '1.34.253.131'
            - '59.124.71.242'
    selection_dns_callback:
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.digimg.store'
    selection_smtp_nonbrowser:
        DestinationPort: 587
        Image|endswith:
            - '\lua.exe'
            - '\luajit.exe'
            - '\python.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection_c2_ip or selection_dns_callback or selection_smtp_nonbrowser
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate connections to Chunghwa Telecom IP ranges for non-malicious purposes
    - Developer tools that query DNS callback services for testing
    - Custom mail-sending scripts using SMTP on port 587
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate connections to Chunghwa Telecom IP ranges for non-malicious purposes
  • Developer tools that use DNS callback services like interact.sh for testing
  • Custom mail-sending scripts using SMTP port 587 for authorized automation

Tuning notes: Remove C2 IP indicators after confirmed takedown. Add additional DNS callback domains (interact.sh, dnslog.cn) if broader coverage desired. Whitelist authorized SMTP-sending applications by process hash.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • LucidRook — Known Malware Hash Execution or Lua Bytecode File Creation · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — System Discovery and Reconnaissance Burst from Lua or Scripting Engine · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — Data Exfiltration via Gmail Web Service and Suspicious Outbound Transfers · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — Obfuscated Lua Bytecode File Dropped in User Temp or AppData · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — Lua Runtime Masquerading as System Service or Legitimate Application · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — DNS Interaction Callback to [indicator] C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — Lua Bytecode Stager Execution via LucidPawn Dropper · unlock with TL Creds
  • LucidRook — Persistence via Scheduled Task or Registry Run Key for Lua Payload · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-04-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0334.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 1.34.253[.]131
  • File hash: d49761cdbea170dd17255a958214db392dc7621198f95d5eb5749859c603100a
  • Email address: fexopuboriw972[@]gmail[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Cisco Talos researchers identified a previously undocumented threat activity cluster designated UAT-10362 conducting targeted spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic institutions. The campaigns deliver a novel malware toolkit collectively referred to as the Lucid family, consisting of three distinct components operating in a coordinated attack chain.

The initial infection vector is spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments tailored to Taiwanese civil society targets. Upon execution, the LucidPawn dropper component establishes initial foothold on the victim system and deploys the primary payload. LucidRook, the core component of the toolkit, is a Lua bytecode stager that leverages the lightweight Lua scripting engine (MITRE ATT&CK T1059.011) to execute obfuscated bytecode payloads. By using compiled Lua bytecode rather than plaintext scripts, the malware evades static analysis and signature-based detection tools that lack Lua bytecode parsing capabilities.

The third component, LucidKnight, is a reconnaissance and data collection tool that abuses Gmail as a command-and-control channel. By tunneling C2 communications through legitimate Gmail infrastructure, the malware blends with normal email traffic and bypasses network security controls that would flag connections to suspicious domains. The toolkit also uses the domain digimg.store for DNS-based interaction callbacks, a technique commonly observed in post-exploitation frameworks for verifying command execution on target systems.

The two command-and-control IP addresses identified (1.34.253.131 and 59.124.71.242) both resolve to Chunghwa Telecom (HINET) address space in Taiwan, suggesting the threat actor either compromised legitimate Taiwanese infrastructure for use as relay nodes or deliberately selected Taiwanese hosting to blend with expected network traffic patterns from the target organizations.

UAT-10362 is assessed with moderate confidence to be a China-nexus threat actor based on victimology (Taiwanese NGOs and universities aligned with civil society and democracy advocacy), operational patterns consistent with Chinese cyber espionage campaigns, and infrastructure choices. The targeting of Taiwan's civil society sector is consistent with long-standing Chinese intelligence collection priorities, particularly monitoring organizations involved in cross-strait relations, democracy promotion, and academic research on sensitive geopolitical topics.

The use of Lua as the primary execution engine represents an evolution in tradecraft for China-nexus actors, who have historically favored compiled languages or common scripting engines. Lua's lightweight footprint, embeddability, and relative obscurity in enterprise security monitoring make it an attractive choice for evading endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions that may not have robust Lua bytecode analysis capabilities.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

execution

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

initial-access

T1566 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block IOC IP addresses 1.34.253.131 and 59.124.71.242 at network perimeter
  • Block domain digimg.store and all subdomains at DNS resolver and proxy
  • Block email addresses fexopuboriw972@gmail.com and crimsonanabel@powerscrews.com
  • Search email gateways for spear-phishing messages targeting NGO and university staff
  • Scan endpoints for SHA256 hashes listed in IOC feed using EDR or YARA rules
  • Monitor for anomalous Lua interpreter or LuaJIT process execution

Workarounds

  • Restrict Lua runtime execution via application control policies
  • Block outbound DNS to non-corporate resolvers to detect DNS tunneling
  • Enable enhanced email filtering for attachments from unknown senders targeting civil society organizations

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for Lua bytecode execution and scripting engine abuse
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized Lua runtime execution
  • Enable DNS logging and monitor for DNS-based interaction callback services (digimg.store, interact.sh, dnslog.cn)
  • Monitor Gmail API and SMTP traffic for anomalous automated access patterns from endpoints
  • Conduct targeted security awareness training for NGO and university staff on spear-phishing threats
  • Implement email authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to reduce spear-phishing effectiveness
  • Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement from compromised endpoints

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple — Windows Endpoints
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server 2016+

Timeline

  • Earliest estimated campaign activity by UAT-10362 targeting Taiwanese NGOs based on infrastructure registration and first observed samples
  • Spear-phishing campaigns delivering LucidPawn dropper observed targeting Taiwanese universities and NGOs
  • LucidRook Lua bytecode stager deployed on compromised systems following successful LucidPawn execution
  • LucidKnight reconnaissance tool observed using Gmail as C2 channel for data collection from compromised organizations
  • DNS callback activity to digimg.store subdomains detected from compromised endpoints, confirming active C2 communication
  • Cisco Talos begins investigation and attribution analysis of UAT-10362 campaign and Lucid malware toolkit
  • Cisco-Talos IOCs repository updated with SHA256 hashes, IP addresses, domain, and email indicators for LucidRook campaign
  • Cisco Talos publishes research report and IOCs for LucidRook malware and UAT-10362 threat cluster
  • As of 2026-05-29, this remains an ACTIVE espionage threat: UAT-10362 (China-nexus) and its custom Lua LucidRook/LucidPawn/LucidKnight toolkit were only disclosed by Cisco Talos on 2026-04-08, with no arrests, takedown, or successor. Its resilient OAST/compromised-FTP infrastructure is trivially replaceable, and EDR-evading Lua tradecraft keeps the actor an undisrupted, ongoing risk to Taiwanese civil society.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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