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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0345

UAT-10362 Deploys LucidRook Lua-Based Malware Against Taiwanese NGOs and Universities

highACTIVE

China-nexus threat actor UAT-10362 conducts spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese NGOs and universities using LucidRook, a novel Lua 5.4.8-based stager embedded in a 64-bit DLL with Rust-compiled libraries. The tiered toolkit includes LucidPawn (geofenced dropper targeting zh-TW locales) and LucidKnight (Gmail-based recon exfiltrator), leveraging DLL side-loading via masqueraded DISM binaries and compromised FTP servers for C2.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0345
Also known asLucidRook Campaign, Lucid Toolkit
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Microsoft DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management)
AttributionUAT-10362 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareLucidKnight, LucidPawn, LucidRook
ToolsFTP-based C2 with compromised Taiwanese printing company servers
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment, ngo, education, civil-society, academia
Target regionsTaiwan, East Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-04-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0345 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 35 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DLL Side-Loading via DISM Masquerade Binary

Detects execution of a renamed or masquerading dism.exe binary loading a non-standard DLL from a user-writable directory. UAT-10362 abuses DLL side-loading by placing a malicious dismcore.dll alongside a copied dism.exe in %APPDATA% or %TEMP% to bootstrap the LucidRook stager.

  • Language: Splunk SPL
  • ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1036.005
  • Data sources: Endpoint Detection (Sysmon), Windows Process Creation, Windows Image Load Events
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype=sysmon (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=7)
| eval proc_name=lower(OriginalFileName), image_path=lower(Image)
| where (proc_name="dism.exe" OR like(image_path, "%dism.exe"))
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\system32\\%")
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\syswow64\\%")
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\winsxs\\%")
| join ProcessGuid type=inner
  [search index=windows sourcetype=sysmon EventCode=7
   | where NOT like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%\\windows\\%")
     AND (like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%dismcore.dll") OR like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%dismapi.dll"))
   | fields ProcessGuid, ImageLoaded, SignatureStatus]
| eval risk_score=if(SignatureStatus!="Valid", 95, 70)
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, ImageLoaded, SignatureStatus, ParentImage, CommandLine, risk_score
| sort -risk_score
8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Suspicious DLL Side-Loading from User-Writable Paths · unlock with TL Creds
  • Anti-Analysis and VM Detection via WMI and Registry Enumeration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Staged Data Collection and Encrypted Archive Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • DISM Binary Execution from Non-Standard Directory · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shared Library Hijack with Cron Persistence on Linux · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Communication from Non-Browser Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lua 5.4 Runtime Artifacts and In-Memory Stager Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Beaconing and Geofenced Data Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-04-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 35 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0345.

Sample indicators (3 of 35)

  • IP address: 1.34.253[.]131
  • Domain: d[.]2fcc7078[.]digimg[.]store
  • File hash: d49761cdbea170dd17255a958214db392dc7621198f95d5eb5749859c603100a

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 35 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

35 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

UAT-10362 is a previously undocumented China-nexus threat cluster first observed in October 2025 conducting targeted spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and suspected universities. The actor deploys a sophisticated tiered malware toolkit consisting of LucidRook, LucidPawn, and LucidKnight, designed for targeted intelligence collection against civil society and academic institutions in Taiwan.

LucidRook is the primary stager: a 64-bit Windows DLL (~1.6MB, 3,800+ functions) that embeds a full Lua 5.4.8 interpreter alongside Rust-compiled libraries. It masquerades as a COM DLL via a DllGetClassObject export and downloads staged Lua bytecode payloads from compromised FTP servers. The stager implements a safe mode that disables package.loadlib and omits the debug library to harden against analysis. String obfuscation uses a two-stage scheme: per-string arithmetic address calculation followed by XOR decryption with a seed|mask key reconstruction. Host reconnaissance collects user accounts, computer names, driver information, installed applications, and running processes, encrypting results with an embedded RSA public key and packaging into password-protected ZIP archives (archive4.zip) uploaded to FTP C2.

LucidPawn serves as the initial dropper, sharing LucidRook''s COM DLL masquerade technique and obfuscation scheme. It performs geofencing via GetUserDefaultUILanguage(), checking for Traditional Chinese (0x0404/zh-TW) with a 0xF7FF mask that also accepts zh-HK (0x0C04), ensuring execution only on Taiwanese or Hong Kong systems. LucidPawn sends a DNS beacon to an Out-of-band Application Security Testing (OAST) service at d.2fcc7078.digimg.store to verify network connectivity, then decrypts AES-encrypted embedded binaries, establishes persistence via Startup folder LNK files, and launches LucidRook via DLL side-loading.

LucidKnight is a companion 64-bit Windows DLL reconnaissance tool with embedded Rust components. It collects computer name, OS version, processor architecture, CPU usage, running processes, and installed software, writing to four TXT files encrypted with a separate RSA public key. Exfiltration occurs via Gmail SMTP using the lettre Rust crate: the sender account fexopuboriw972@gmail.com transmits encrypted archive.zip to the temporary address crimsonanabel@powerscrews.com with a Traditional Chinese subject line.

Two distinct infection chains deliver the malware. The LNK-based vector uses password-protected RAR archives containing LNK files with substituted PDF icons and hidden directories nested four levels deep. The LNK targets the Pester framework Build.bat (a LOLBAS technique) to execute PowerShell, which launches the legitimate DISM binary index.exe. DLL search order hijacking loads the malicious DismCore.dll (LucidPawn), which decrypts embedded binaries to %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Apps, renames the legitimate DISM executable to msedge.exe for persistence, and opens decoy documents. The EXE-based vector distributes 7-Zip archives containing Cleanup.exe, a .NET dropper masquerading as a Trend Micro product with a falsified compilation timestamp (2065-01-12). It Base64-decodes embedded files, drops the DISM executable and LucidRook stager to C:\ProgramData, creates a Startup LNK for persistence, and displays a fake cleanup completed message.

C2 infrastructure leverages two compromised FTP servers (1.34.253.131 and 59.124.71.242) belonging to Taiwanese printing companies whose FTP credentials were publicly exposed on their corporate websites. FTP operations use binary/passive mode with plaintext authentication. The actor generates different passwords and payloads per target using the shared C2 infrastructure, with payload archives protected by unique passwords and RSA encryption. The OAST service at dnslog.ink provides DNS beaconing without dedicated infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1564 Hide Artifacts

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol

persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

initial-access

T1566 Phishing

resource-development

T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block FTP C2 IPs 1.34.253.131 and 59.124.71.242 at network perimeter
  • Block DNS resolution for d.2fcc7078.digimg.store and dnslog.ink
  • Block email communication with fexopuboriw972@gmail.com and crimsonanabel@powerscrews.com
  • Hunt for DismCore.dll in non-standard locations (%APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Apps, C:\ProgramData)
  • Search for msedge.exe binaries that are actually renamed DISM executables
  • Check Startup folders for suspicious LNK files launching msedge.exe or index.exe
  • Scan endpoints for SHA256 IOCs associated with LucidRook, LucidPawn, and LucidKnight

Workarounds

  • Restrict PowerShell execution policies to prevent Build.bat LOLBAS exploitation
  • Remove or rename Pester Build.bat from PowerShell module paths
  • Block .LNK file execution from archive extraction paths
  • Disable FTP protocol at network boundaries where not business-required

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading via DISM binaries
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized DLL loading
  • Monitor FTP traffic for anomalous connections to Taiwanese IP ranges
  • Configure email security gateways to detect Gmail-based exfiltration patterns
  • Implement LOLBAS detection rules for Pester Build.bat abuse
  • Deploy Lua interpreter execution monitoring on endpoints
  • Establish geofencing-aware threat hunting for zh-TW targeted campaigns

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 10 (64-bit); 11 (64-bit); Server 2016; Server 2019; Server 2022
  • Microsoft — DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management)
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (legitimate binary abused for DLL side-loading)

Timeline

  • Cisco Talos observes first spear-phishing attack delivering LucidRook targeting a Taiwanese NGO
  • LNK-based infection chain identified using Pester Build.bat LOLBAS technique with DISM DLL side-loading
  • EXE-based infection chain discovered using locked-ioc-26 masquerading as Trend Micro product in 7-Zip archives
  • LucidKnight companion reconnaissance tool identified with Gmail SMTP exfiltration capability
  • Campaign expanded to suspected Taiwanese universities alongside NGO targets
  • Two compromised FTP servers (locked-ioc-22, locked-ioc-21) at Taiwanese printing companies identified as C2 infrastructure
  • Full analysis of tiered toolkit (LucidRook/LucidPawn/LucidKnight) with Lua 5.4.8 interpreter and Rust components completed
  • Cisco Talos publishes detailed technical analysis and IOCs for LucidRook campaign
  • Widespread media coverage from The Hacker News, CybersecurityNews, GBHackers, and CyberPress
  • As of 2026-05-29, this remains active: Cisco Talos disclosed UAT-10362's LucidRook toolkit on 2026-04-08 against Taiwanese NGOs/universities, an ongoing China-nexus espionage campaign with no reported takedown, arrest, or sinkhole. No CVE/patch applies (DLL side-loading tradecraft), the actor is undisrupted, and compromised-FTP/OAST C2 is trivially rotatable.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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