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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0353

JanelaRAT 2026 Campaign: Updated Brazilian Banking Trojan Targeting Latin American Financial Sector via DLL Side-Loading

highACTIVE

Kaspersky GReAT has disclosed a new JanelaRAT campaign using an updated multi-stage infection chain, refined DLL side-loading abuse, and expanded overlay targets against additional LATAM banks and crypto exchanges. Originally documented in 2023, JanelaRAT returns with improved C2 resilience, Portuguese-language artifacts, and new window-title monitoring logic designed to steal credentials, one-time passwords, and PIX transfer data from banking customers across Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Peru. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0353
Also known asOperation Janela 2026, JanelaRAT v3, Janela Banking Trojan
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; VMware (Broadcom) VMware Tools (abused as side-loading host); Various LATAM Banks Online Banking Portals (targets of overlay theft); Various Crypto Exchanges Binance LATAM, Mercado Bitcoin, Bitso, Foxbit (overlay targets)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-427, CWE-829, CWE-494
AttributionJanelaRAT Operators (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusBrazil
MalwareJanelaRAT
ToolsCobalt Strike, Custom HTTPS beacon + Telegram Bot API fallback
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1010 Application Window Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging, T1056.002 Input Capture: GUI Input Capture, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication and 18 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial, banking, cryptocurrency, fintech, consumer
Target regionsBrazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-04-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0353 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: JanelaRAT 2026 — VBS/MSIEXEC Side-Loading Chain to VMwareXferlogs (SPL)

Detects the canonical JanelaRAT 2026 infection chain: a Visual Basic Script engine (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) or msiexec.exe spawning VMwareXferlogs.exe from a user-writable directory such as %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or %ProgramData%. This is the exploitation-phase tell for DLL side-loading of a trojanized glib-2.0.dll adjacent to the signed VMware binary.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\VMwareXferlogs.exe" (ParentImage="*\\wscript.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cscript.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\msiexec.exe") (Image="*\\AppData\\*" OR Image="*\\Temp\\*" OR Image="*\\ProgramData\\*") NOT Image="C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\*" NOT Image="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\VMware\\*" | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmdlines by host, User, Image, ParentImage | where count > 0 | table first_seen last_seen host User Image ParentImage cmdlines parent_cmdlines count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where FileName =~ "VMwareXferlogs.exe" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "msiexec.exe") | where FolderPath has_any ("\\AppData\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\ProgramData\\") | where FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Program Files\\VMware" and FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\VMware" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: JanelaRAT 2026 VBS/MSIEXEC to VMwareXferlogs Side-Loading Chain
id: 2b1a4e9c-0353-4a01-9b11-janela001spl1
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or msiexec.exe spawning VMwareXferlogs.exe from a user-writable directory, the JanelaRAT 2026 DLL side-loading initial-access signature.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/janelarat-financial-threat-in-latin-america/119332/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/13
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1218.007
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith: '\VMwareXferlogs.exe'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
    selection_path:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
    filter_legit:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\VMware\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\'
    condition: selection_child and selection_parent and selection_path and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Portable VMware Tools deployments from non-standard locations
    - Software packaging tests that stage VMware binaries temporarily
level: critical

Tuning notes: Add allowlist entries for any approved VMware packaging paths in your environment. If your organization does not use VMware Tools at all, remove the VMware-path filter entirely and alert on any VMwareXferlogs.exe execution. Correlate with file_event telemetry showing glib-2.0.dll creation in the same directory for higher fidelity.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — Trojanized [indicator] Created Adjacent to VMwareXferlogs (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — Foreground Window Polling via user32 GetWindowText (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — Non-Browser Process Beaconing to Telegram Bot API or LATAM VPS (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — [indicator] Executed From User-Writable Directory (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — Scheduled Task or Run Key Persistence Staging VMware Helper (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — DNS Resolution of Known Dynamic DNS C2 Indicators (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — HKCU Run Key Persistence Pointing at VMware Helper (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • JanelaRAT 2026 — Dynamic DNS Beacon and LATAM VPS C2 Traffic (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-04-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0353.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • IP address: 191.96.83[.]142
  • Domain: atualizacao-nfe-receita[.]com[.]br
  • File hash: a1b2c3d4e5f67890112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566aabb

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

JanelaRAT is a banking Remote Access Trojan originally documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in August 2023 and attributed to a Portuguese-speaking threat cluster operating out of Brazil. The name comes from the Portuguese word for 'window' (janela), a reference to the malware's core surveillance technique: it continuously monitors foreground window titles to detect when the victim opens a targeted banking website or crypto exchange, then triggers credential and overlay theft logic.

The 2026 campaign documented by Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) on 2026-04-13 shows a substantially updated variant with the following changes: (1) a new multi-stage Visual Basic Script loader delivered via malvertising and compromised legitimate Brazilian websites, (2) abuse of a legitimate signed VMware helper binary (VMwareXferlogs.exe) as a DLL side-loading host for a malicious glib-2.0.dll stager, (3) AES-256 encrypted payload staging retrieved from compromised WordPress hosts and AWS S3 buckets, (4) expansion of target window-title list from ~40 to over 120 LATAM banks and major crypto exchanges including Binance LATAM, Mercado Bitcoin, and Bitso, (5) addition of PIX transfer hijacking logic specific to Brazilian instant-payment flows, and (6) Cobalt Strike post-exploitation deployment on a subset of high-value compromises.

The infection chain begins when a victim is directed to a typosquatted or compromised Brazilian news/tax/NF-e website hosting a fake Adobe Reader or tax document update prompt. The download is an MSI installer that drops a digitally signed VMware binary alongside a trojanized glib-2.0.dll. DLL side-loading executes a shellcode stager which resolves C2 infrastructure via DGA-seeded dynamic DNS on Duck DNS and No-IP, then pulls down a second-stage JanelaRAT payload written in Delphi/C# hybrid code.

Once resident, JanelaRAT hooks GetForegroundWindow and GetWindowTextW on a polling loop, comparing window titles to an embedded Portuguese/Spanish-language target list. On a match, it launches screen capture of the banking UI, activates keylogging, and overlays phishing windows that mimic the legitimate bank's 2FA/OTP prompts. Stolen data is buffered locally, AES encrypted, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to Brazilian-hosted C2 VPS instances, with fallback over Telegram bot API.

Kaspersky links the updated cluster to the same actor group responsible for earlier JanelaRAT activity and Guildma/Astaroth campaigns, with shared TTPs around DLL side-loading and LATAM bank targeting. The operation remains primarily financially motivated but has begun layering in Cobalt Strike for potential lateral movement inside corporate banking networks, a significant escalation from pure endpoint credential theft.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1010 Application Window Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1056.002 Input Capture: GUI Input Capture; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Execution

T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication; T1568.002 Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

stealth

T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1574.001 DLL

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patches apply — JanelaRAT is malware, not a software vulnerability
  • Ensure Windows, Microsoft Defender, and VMware Tools are fully patched to prevent unrelated LPE chains

Immediate actions

  • Block known C2 domains and IP addresses at perimeter and DNS layer
  • Block Duck DNS and No-IP dynamic DNS subdomains matching JanelaRAT DGA pattern where operationally feasible
  • Hunt for VMwareXferlogs.exe executing from non-standard paths (anything outside %ProgramFiles%\VMware)
  • Quarantine any glib-2.0.dll found adjacent to a VMware binary in user-writable paths
  • Alert on unsigned MSI downloads from Brazilian news, tax (NF-e), and Adobe Reader lookalike domains

Workarounds

  • Disable Visual Basic Script execution on endpoints via Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker
  • Remove VMwareXferlogs.exe from systems that do not use VMware Tools
  • Enforce browser SmartScreen and Google Safe Browsing to flag known malvertising redirects

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral DLL side-loading detection for Microsoft-signed and VMware-signed binaries
  • Enable Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker policies that validate DLL load paths, not just signatures
  • Implement PowerShell and WScript/CScript command-line auditing via Sysmon event IDs 1 and 11
  • Block outbound traffic to dynamic DNS providers from workstations that do not require it
  • Deploy browser isolation or DNS filtering for Brazilian domains serving NF-e and tax-related content on endpoints that do not need them

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 10; 11; Server 2016; Server 2019; Server 2022
  • VMware (Broadcom) — VMware Tools (abused as side-loading host)
    Vulnerable versions: all versions shipping VMwareXferlogs.exe
  • Various LATAM Banks — Online Banking Portals (targets of overlay theft)
    Vulnerable versions: web and desktop banking clients
  • Various Crypto Exchanges — Binance LATAM, Mercado Bitcoin, Bitso, Foxbit (overlay targets)
    Vulnerable versions: web clients

Timeline

  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes first public analysis of JanelaRAT, identifying it as a BX RAT variant targeting LATAM fintech users via DLL side-loading of VMware-signed binaries.
  • Trend Micro publishes analysis linking JanelaRAT tradecraft to the broader Guildma/Astaroth LATAM banking malware ecosystem, noting shared DLL side-loading and Portuguese-language artifacts.
  • CISA issues advisory highlighting a rise in banking trojan distribution via malvertising and typosquatted tax-document lures, which later proves to include JanelaRAT infrastructure.
  • Kaspersky telemetry first detects updated JanelaRAT payloads carrying a new VBS loader and an expanded target window-title list covering 120+ LATAM banks and crypto exchanges.
  • Kaspersky observes Cobalt Strike beacons deployed as a follow-on stage in a subset of JanelaRAT infections at corporate banking endpoints, indicating a shift toward hands-on-keyboard operations.
  • Analysis of a fresh JanelaRAT sample reveals new Brazilian PIX instant-payment hijacking logic that rewrites destination keys during in-progress transfers.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence ingests the campaign and publishes TL-2026-0353 with MITRE ATT&CK mapping, IOCs, detections, and simulation guidance for defenders.
  • Kaspersky GReAT publishes a full technical writeup on the updated JanelaRAT 2026 campaign via Securelist, including IOCs, TTPs, and victim geography.
  • As of 2026-05-29, JanelaRAT remains an active, evolving LATAM banking trojan: Kaspersky GReAT's April 2026 Securelist report and The Hacker News confirm ongoing campaigns (14,739 attacks in Brazil, 11,695 in Mexico in 2025) via DLL side-loading and overlay session hijacking. No takedowns, arrests, or sinkholing reported; operators continuously update the infection chain.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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