Threat reportICS/SCADATL-2026-0458
ZionSiphon — Ideologically Motivated .NET OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water & Desalination Infrastructure (Mekorot, Sorek, Hadera, Ashdod, Palmachim, Shafdan)
ZionSiphon is a .NET malware sample disclosed by Darktrace on 2026-04-16 that targets Israeli water treatment and desalination operational technology (OT) environments. The author self-identifies as '0xICS' and embeds explicit anti-Zionist political messaging in support of Iran, Palestine, and Yemen.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0458 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | ZionSiphon, win.zionsiphon, 0xICS Water Sabotage Tool |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (engineering workstations / HMIs / historians); Schneider Electric Modicon PLCs and SCADA software (DesalPLC, SchneiderRO targeting strings); Siemens SIMATIC S7 PLCs (S7comm TCP/102 scanning target); DNP3 vendors (multiple) DNP3-speaking RTUs and outstations (TCP/20000 scanning target); IDE Technologies Desalination plant control systems (C:\Program Files\IDE Technologies path targeting); Mekorot Israeli national water carrier infrastructure (Mekorot string targeting); Sorek Desalination Plant (IDE Technologies / Hutchison) Sorek 1 / Sorek 2 SWRO desalination operations; Hadera Desalination Plant (H2ID / IDE Technologies) Hadera SWRO desalination operations and 2 more |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-693, CWE-1188 |
| Attribution | 0xICS (low confidence) |
| Malware | ZionSiphon |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T0826 Loss of Availability, T0829 Loss of View, T0831 Manipulation of Control, T0835 Manipulate I/O Image, T0836 Modify Parameter, T0840 Network Connection Enumeration, T0847 Replication Through Removable Media, T0879 Damage to Property, T0880 Loss of Safety, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading and 16 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | HACKTIVISM |
| Target sectors | water-and-wastewater, critical-infrastructure, utilities, government, public-health, manufacturing |
| Target regions | Israel, Middle East |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0458 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ZionSiphon — Modbus FC03 Read Holding Registers Subnet Scan (C2/Lateral Movement)
Detects ZionSiphon's hardcoded Modbus TCP function code 03 probe (Read Holding Registers, 10 registers from address 0) sent to many destinations on TCP/502 from a single source within the local /16. The exact byte payload is `00 01 00 00 00 06 01 03 00 00 00 0A` (MBAP+PDU). This payload should never originate from a non-engineering IT-zone host in a properly segmented IT/OT environment per ISA/IEC 62443. Threshold: >=8 unique targets and >=10 probes from one source.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1046, T1018, T0840, T0846
- Data sources: zeek_modbus, suricata, ot_ndr_dragos, ot_ndr_claroty, ot_ndr_nozomi
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=zeek sourcetype="zeek:modbus" function="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS" start_address=0 quantity=10
| rename "id.orig_h" as src_ip "id.resp_h" as dst_ip
| stats dc(dst_ip) as unique_targets
count as probe_count
values(unit_id) as unit_ids
min(_time) as first_seen
max(_time) as last_seen
by src_ip
| where unique_targets >= 8 AND probe_count >= 10
| lookup ot_engineering_workstations.csv src_ip OUTPUT is_engineering_ws
| where isnull(is_engineering_ws) OR is_engineering_ws!="true"
| sort - probe_countMicrosoft KQL
// ZionSiphon Modbus FC03 subnet-probe pattern via DeviceNetworkEvents (high-level) +
// CommonSecurityLog (Zeek/Suricata Modbus parse) — best-effort cross-source.
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1h)
| where RemotePort == 502
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt", "ConnectionFailed")
| summarize ProbeCount = count(),
UniqueTargets = dcount(RemoteIP),
FirstSeen = min(Timestamp),
LastSeen = max(Timestamp),
Targets = make_set(RemoteIP, 50)
by DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where UniqueTargets >= 8 and ProbeCount >= 10
| extend Source = "DeviceNetworkEvents"
),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where DestinationPort == 502
| where AdditionalExtensions has "modbus"
and (AdditionalExtensions has "func=3" or AdditionalExtensions has "function=READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS")
and AdditionalExtensions has "qty=10"
| summarize ProbeCount = count(),
UniqueTargets = dcount(DestinationIP),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by SourceIP, DeviceVendor
| where UniqueTargets >= 8 and ProbeCount >= 10
| extend Source = "CommonSecurityLog/Modbus"
)
| order by LastSeen descSigma
title: ZionSiphon — Modbus FC03 Read Holding Registers Subnet Scan
id: 4f8a2c7d-1b9e-4d3a-a6c5-8e1f7d4b2a3c
status: experimental
description: |
Detects ZionSiphon's hardcoded Modbus TCP function code 03 probe (Read Holding
Registers, 10 registers from address 0) sent to many destinations on TCP/502
from a single source within the local /16. This payload should never originate
from a non-engineering IT-zone host in a properly segmented IT/OT environment.
references:
- https://www.darktrace.com/blog/inside-zionsiphon-darktraces-analysis-of-ot-malware-targeting-israeli-water-systems
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/05
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1018
- attack.ics.t0840
- attack.ics.t0846
logsource:
product: zeek
service: modbus
detection:
selection:
function: 'READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS'
start_address: 0
quantity: 10
condition: selection | count(dst_ip) by src_ip > 8
fields:
- src_ip
- dst_ip
- function
- start_address
- quantity
- unit_id
falsepositives:
- Authorized OT asset-discovery tools (Claroty CTD, Nozomi Guardian, Dragos Platform) running scheduled active scans — exempt by source IP
level: high
Known false positives:
- Authorized OT asset-discovery tools (Claroty CTD, Nozomi Guardian, Dragos Platform, GrayMatter Asherah) running scheduled active-discovery scans — exempt by source IP via the ot_engineering_workstations.csv lookup
- Legitimate engineering-workstation polling of HMI tag servers (typically targets a single PLC, not /16-wide — threshold should hold)
Tuning notes: Maintain an ot_engineering_workstations.csv lookup with all sanctioned source IPs (engineering workstations, OT NDR sensors, vulnerability-management appliances). Lower the unique_targets threshold to 4 in production OT zones (any non-engineering source should generate zero Modbus FC03 broadcasts). Combine with TL-2026-0458-KQL-003 (concurrent OT triad) for full ZionSiphon scan-pattern coverage.
- ZionSiphon — Stuxnet-Style .lnk Icon Spoof + Hidden svchost on Removable Media (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — PowerShell UAC Prompt Elevation From User-Writable Path (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — Concurrent OT Triad Scan (Modbus 502 + DNP3 20000 + S7comm 102) From Single Source (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — .NET CLR Loaded by [indicator]-Named Process (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — Self-Destruct Artifacts in %TEMP% (target_verify.log + delete.bat) (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — Chlorine-Overdose Tamper Block Written to OT Configuration File (C2/Lateral Movement → Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — [indicator] Masquerade Execution Outside System32 (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- ZionSiphon — HKCU Run\SystemHealthCheck Registry Persistence (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0458.
Sample indicators (1 of 25)
- File hash:
07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The malware combines hardcoded Israeli IP-range geofencing (2.52.0.0/14, 79.176.0.0/12, 212.150.0.0/16), water-utility process and file enumeration (Mekorot, Sorek, Hadera, Ashdod, Palmachim, Shafdan), Modbus/DNP3/S7comm subnet scanning, chlorine-control configuration tampering, USB propagation via .lnk shortcut hijacking, HKCU Run persistence under svchost.exe masquerade, and PowerShell-based UAC elevation. The analyzed build (SHA256 07c3bbe6...d6f5f) is non-functional due to a broken XOR target-validation check and incomplete DNP3/S7comm command construction, suggesting an unfinished development build, but the sabotage architecture and intended impact (potable-water poisoning) are real and operational on the Modbus path.
ZionSiphon is a .NET (C#) malware family first publicly analyzed by Darktrace's Threat Research team on 2026-04-16 (Malpedia: win.zionsiphon; sample SHA256 07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f). The sample is purpose-built to target Israeli water-treatment and seawater-desalination operational technology (OT) environments and represents one of the clearest examples to date of ideologically motivated, OT-aware sabotage malware authored by a self-identified hacktivist persona ('0xICS').
The malware embeds two unambiguous political artifacts inside the binary: a string referencing 'Netanyahu / In support of our brothers in Iran, Palestine, and Yemen against Zionist aggression. I am "0xICS".' and a separate string 'Dimona / Poisoning the population of Tel Aviv and Haifa', the latter describing the intended kinetic outcome of successful execution against a chlorine-dosing system. The political content places ZionSiphon in the same broad ideological lane as the Iran-aligned Cyber Av3ngers / IRGC-CEC operations that have repeatedly targeted Israeli (and post-2023, US-deployed Israeli-made) water-utility PLCs, although Darktrace's report does not assert formal attribution to any state-aligned group and the persona '0xICS' is not yet linked to a named actor.
Execution flow. On launch, ZionSiphon attempts a target-environment validation by XOR-decoding a hardcoded constant ('Nqvbdk') and comparing the result against the runtime output of EncryptDecrypt('Israel', 5). In the analyzed build the XOR key/length and the constant do not actually match, so the validation always fails on every host (including Israeli targets), and the malware writes 'Target not matched. Operation restricted to IL ranges. Self-destruct initiated.' to %TEMP%\target_verify.log, drops %TEMP%\delete.bat, and self-deletes. Darktrace concludes — and we concur — that this is a development bug rather than a deliberate decoy: the entire downstream code path (process enumeration, network scanning, OT protocol traffic, chlorine tampering) is reachable only from the success branch and is fully present in the binary.
If the validation branch were corrected, ZionSiphon proceeds to: (1) enumerate running processes for hardcoded ICS strings (DesalPLC, ROController, SchneiderRO, DamRO, ReverseOsmosis, WaterGenix, RO_Pump, ChlorineCtrl, WaterPLC, SeaWaterRO, BrineControl, OsmosisPLC, DesalMonitor, RO_Filter, ChlorineDose, RO_Membrane, DesalFlow, WaterTreat, SalinityCtrl); (2) enumerate the filesystem for water-utility-specific paths and configuration files (C:\Program Files\Desalination, C:\Program Files\Schneider Electric\Desal, C:\Program Files\IDE Technologies, C:\Program Files\Water Treatment, C:\Program Files\RO Systems, C:\Program Files\DesalTech, C:\Program Files\Aqua Solutions, C:\Program Files\Hydro Systems, C:\DesalConfig.ini, C:\ROConfig.ini, C:\DesalSettings.conf, C:\Program Files\Desalination\system.cfg, C:\WaterTreatment.ini, C:\ChlorineControl.dat, C:\RO_PumpSettings.ini, C:\SalinityControl.ini); (3) tamper with discovered configuration files by appending an 'unsafe' chlorine-and-pressure block (Chlorine_Dose=10, Chlorine_Pump=ON, Chlorine_Flow=MAX, Chlorine_Valve=OPEN, RO_Pressure=80) — the dose and pressure values are well outside normal potable-water operating envelopes and are explicitly intended to overdose chlorine into the distribution side; (4) scan the local /16 subnet on Modbus TCP/502, DNP3 TCP/20000, and Siemens S7comm TCP/102, with an observed Modbus payload of 01 03 00 00 00 0A (Read Holding Registers, function code 03, 10 registers from address 0) used as a cheap OT-fingerprint probe — the DNP3 and S7comm command-construction routines are present but not fully wired up in the analyzed build; (5) verify network reachability of one of three hardcoded Israeli IP-range blocks (2.52.0.0–2.55.255.255 = 2.52.0.0/14, 79.176.0.0–79.191.255.255 = 79.176.0.0/12, 212.150.0.0–212.150.255.255 = 212.150.0.0/16) — these CIDR ranges align with allocations to Israeli ISPs (Bezeq, HOT, Cellcom, Partner) and have historically been used as 'is-this-Israel?' geofences by Iran-aligned actors.
Persistence and stealth. ZionSiphon copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%\svchost.exe (basename masquerade against the legitimate Windows svchost.exe binary, which never resides under LOCALAPPDATA), sets Hidden + System file attributes, and writes the registry value HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemHealthCheck pointing to that path. Privilege escalation is attempted via a RunAsAdmin() routine that spawns powershell.exe with 'Start-Process -FilePath <self> -Verb RunAs', which triggers the standard UAC consent prompt — this is a UAC-prompt bypass attempt rather than a true UAC bypass and depends on user click-through.
USB propagation. The function CreateUSBShortcut (obfuscated as 'sdfsdfsfsdfsdfqw' in the analyzed build) iterates removable drives, copies the malware binary to each drive as a hidden+system svchost.exe, hides every existing user file on the drive, and replaces each file with a .lnk shortcut that uses shell32.dll icon index 4 (the standard Windows folder/file icon) and points to the malware copy. This is the same .lnk-icon-spoof technique used by Stuxnet, USB-Worm.Win32, and many subsequent OT-targeting USB worms, and it is particularly effective in air-gapped or DMZ-isolated water/desalination control networks where USB media remain a primary file-transfer mechanism.
Impact assessment. We rate this CRITICAL despite the broken target-validation gate because (a) the sabotage architecture is real, (b) fixing the XOR comparison is a single-line change for any author or follow-on maintainer, (c) the chlorine-overdose configuration block, if successfully written into a live SCADA HMI configuration file or pushed through a Modbus write, is a public-health-grade kinetic effect (residual chlorine concentrations far above the WHO 5 mg/L upper bound can cause acute respiratory and gastrointestinal harm), and (d) the explicit targeting of Mekorot (Israel's national water carrier), Sorek and Hadera (the two largest seawater desalination plants on the Mediterranean), and Palmachim/Ashdod/Shafdan (additional desalination and wastewater facilities) maps the malware to the specific physical infrastructure responsible for ~40-50% of Israel's potable water supply. The .NET-on-Windows nature of the malware constrains its direct impact to Windows-based engineering workstations, HMIs, and historians inside the OT environment rather than the PLCs themselves — but those workstations are precisely where chlorine setpoint changes are typically authored before being downloaded to the PLC. Defenders should treat ZionSiphon as a credible OT sabotage threat regardless of the analyzed build's broken validation gate.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
ICS Impact
T0826 Loss of Availability; T0829 Loss of View; T0831 Manipulation of Control; T0879 Damage to Property; T0880 Loss of Safety
ICS Inhibit Response Function
ICS Impair Process Control
ICS Discovery
T0840 Network Connection Enumeration
ICS Initial Access
T0847 Replication Through Removable Media
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1564 Hide Artifacts
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Initial Access
T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
defense-impairment
Impact
T1485 Data Destruction; T1565 Data Manipulation
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
ICS Lateral Movement
Remediation
Patches
- No vendor patch applies — ZionSiphon is malware, not a CVE. Detection, containment, segmentation, and physical safety interlocks are the controls.
Immediate actions
- Block egress and inbound TCP/502 (Modbus), TCP/20000 (DNP3), and TCP/102 (S7comm) from any IT-zone host that does not have a documented OT business need; Modbus/DNP3/S7comm should never traverse the IT/OT boundary unbrokered.
- Disable USB autorun and removable-media write access on all engineering workstations, HMIs, and historians in water/desalination OT environments; deploy USB sanitization kiosks for required media transfers.
- Audit HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for the value 'SystemHealthCheck' across all engineering workstations; any presence is a strong indicator of ZionSiphon installation.
- Search %LOCALAPPDATA% for any file named svchost.exe — legitimate svchost.exe never resides under LOCALAPPDATA. Treat any hit as confirmed compromise pending IR triage.
- Block known sample hash 07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f at EDR and email/web filtering layers.
- Review chlorine-dosing setpoint configuration files (e.g. C:\ChlorineControl.dat, C:\WaterTreatment.ini, C:\Program Files\Desalination\system.cfg) for unauthorized appended Chlorine_Dose=10 / Chlorine_Pump=ON / Chlorine_Flow=MAX / Chlorine_Valve=OPEN / RO_Pressure=80 entries; revert to known-good baseline.
Workarounds
- Where USB transfers cannot be eliminated, configure Group Policy to disable .lnk file auto-resolution on removable drives and to prevent Hidden+System files from being executed from removable media.
- Disable PowerShell for non-administrative users on engineering workstations to break the RunAsAdmin() UAC-prompt path.
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce strict IT/OT segmentation per ISA/IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit model; place engineering workstations and HMIs in a Level 2/3 OT zone with no direct internet egress and no peer-to-peer reachability to corporate IT.
- Deploy ICS-aware network detection (Dragos, Claroty, Nozomi, Darktrace/OT, or equivalent) with signatures for hardcoded chlorine-overdose payloads, anomalous Modbus 01 03 00 00 00 0A scans from non-engineering hosts, and Israeli IP-range geofence checks.
- Implement application allowlisting (WDAC, AppLocker, or vendor equivalent) on all engineering workstations, with svchost.exe execution restricted to %SystemRoot%\System32 paths only.
- Establish a chlorine-residual physical safety interlock independent of the SCADA setpoint — a hard upper-limit cutoff at the dosing pump that cannot be overridden from software regardless of HMI configuration.
- Conduct periodic OT-environment USB media audits and require all removable media used in OT to be issued, tracked, and sanitized through a controlled program.
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (engineering workstations / HMIs / historians)
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server 2016; Windows Server 2019; Windows Server 2022 - Schneider Electric — Modicon PLCs and SCADA software (DesalPLC, SchneiderRO targeting strings)
Vulnerable versions: All versions reachable on Modbus TCP/502 from a compromised engineering workstation - Siemens — SIMATIC S7 PLCs (S7comm TCP/102 scanning target)
Vulnerable versions: All S7-300/400/1200/1500 reachable on TCP/102 from a compromised host - DNP3 vendors (multiple) — DNP3-speaking RTUs and outstations (TCP/20000 scanning target)
Vulnerable versions: All DNP3 outstations reachable on TCP/20000 - IDE Technologies — Desalination plant control systems (C:\Program Files\IDE Technologies path targeting)
Vulnerable versions: All deployments with default install paths - Mekorot — Israeli national water carrier infrastructure (Mekorot string targeting)
Vulnerable versions: All sites with Windows-based engineering workstations - Sorek Desalination Plant (IDE Technologies / Hutchison) — Sorek 1 / Sorek 2 SWRO desalination operations
Vulnerable versions: All sites with Windows-based HMIs - Hadera Desalination Plant (H2ID / IDE Technologies) — Hadera SWRO desalination operations
Vulnerable versions: All sites with Windows-based HMIs - Ashdod Desalination Plant (Mekorot) — Ashdod SWRO desalination operations
Vulnerable versions: All sites with Windows-based HMIs - Palmachim Desalination Plant (Granite Hacarmel / Via Maris) — Palmachim SWRO desalination operations
Vulnerable versions: All sites with Windows-based HMIs
Timeline
- Iran-attributed cyberattack targets Israeli water and wastewater facilities operated by Mekorot, attempting to alter chlorine dosing levels — first publicly reported intent to weaponize chlorine setpoints against Israeli potable water (Israel National Cyber Directorate disclosure).
- IRGC-affiliated 'Cyber Av3ngers' compromise Unitronics Vision-series PLCs at the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, demonstrating ideologically motivated, Iran-aligned targeting of water-utility PLCs and establishing the broader threat pattern within which ZionSiphon emerges.
- CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, and INCD publish joint advisory AA23-335A on IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Av3ngers exploiting PLCs in U.S. and Israeli water-and-wastewater systems.
- Sample locked-ioc-2 first observed by Darktrace's Threat Research team during routine .NET malware triage; preliminary review identifies hardcoded Israeli IP ranges and Mekorot/Sorek/Hadera targeting strings.
- Malpedia indexes the family as win.zionsiphon (entry 1dcd3b9c-8b94-42f8-911d-0c8efce55915); VirusTotal sample page becomes publicly viewable with broad multi-engine detection.
- Darktrace publishes 'Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace's Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems' on the Darktrace blog, releasing the full reverse-engineering writeup including the broken XOR target-validation finding, the chlorine-tampering configuration block, the USB propagation routine, and the '0xICS' political messaging.
- Israeli National Cyber Directorate (INCD) and water-sector CERTs receive Darktrace's IOC package and begin internal sweeps of Mekorot, Sorek, Hadera, Ashdod, Palmachim, and Shafdan engineering-workstation environments.
- Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0458 with full D1-aligned threat record, MITRE mapping, IOC catalog, simulation matrix, and SPL/KQL/Sigma/CQL detection coverage.
- As of 2026-05-29, ZionSiphon is not a live operational threat: the analyzed build self-destructs on every host (broken XOR check) and Dragos and Nozomi assess it as flawed, likely LLM-generated malware with fictional ICS strings and no credible OT impact. No confirmed in-the-wild deployment, fixed build, or successor exists; the 0xICS persona is unattributed, though the Iran-aligned water-sector pattern persists, warranting monitoring.
Sources cited
- CISA Advisory AA23-335A — IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Av3ngers Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems CISA · Government advisory · 2023-12-01
- Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace's Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems darktrace.com · Vendor report · 2026-04-16
- Malpedia — win.zionsiphon malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de · Research · 2026-04-16
- VirusTotal — 07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f virustotal.com · Research · 2026-04-16
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS — T0836 Modify Parameter MITRE · Research · 2024-10-31
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder MITRE · Research · 2024-10-31
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1091 Replication Through Removable Media MITRE · Research · 2024-10-31
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation MITRE · Research · 2024-10-31
- WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality — Chlorine residual limits who.int · Research · 2017-04-04
Previous and next in ics scada
- Iranian-Aligned Cyber Mobilization — 60+ Groups Targeting US Critical Infrastructure ICS/SCADA with AI-Assisted Reconnaissance Post Iran-US Escalation (Feb 28, 2026) Previous report
- ABB Ability zenon Remote Transport Service CVE-2025-8754 — Missing Authentication Allows Unauthorized Remote Reboot of OT Systems Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.