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Weakness · ClassCWE-732

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

Likelihood of exploit: HighClass

As of 2026-10-05, CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) underlies 8 CVEs tracked by Threadlinqs, none of them in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and is cited by 38 tracked threats. MITRE rates its likelihood of exploit as High.

CVEs
8Mapped to CWE-732
CISA KEV
0None listed yet
Critical
1CVSS v3 critical CVEs
Threats
38Tracked campaigns citing it
Likelihood
HighMITRE likelihood of exploit

Last updated:

What is CWE-732?

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

When a resource is given a permission setting that provides access to a wider range of actors than required, it could lead to the exposure of sensitive information, or the modification of that resource by unintended parties. This is especially dangerous when the resource is related to program configuration, execution, or sensitive user data. For example, consider a misconfigured storage account for the cloud that can be read or written by a public or anonymous user.

CWE-732 is a class-level weakness in MITRE’s Common Weakness Enumeration, with a MITRE likelihood of exploit of High. Applicable platforms: Language: Not Language-Specific; Technology: Not Technology-Specific; Technology: Cloud Computing.

Source: MITRE CWE (CWE-732 definition, reproduced verbatim). Counts and linkage below are Threadlinqs data.

Consequences

  • Confidentiality — Read Application Data, Read Files or Directories. An attacker may be able to read sensitive information from the associated resource, such as credentials or configuration information stored in a file.
  • Access Control — Gain Privileges or Assume Identity. An attacker may be able to modify critical properties of the associated resource to gain privileges, such as replacing a world-writable executable with a Trojan horse.
  • Integrity, Other — Modify Application Data, Other. An attacker may be able to destroy or corrupt critical data in the associated resource, such as deletion of records from a database.

Source: MITRE CWE, common consequences.

How CWE-732 is exploited in the wild

Threadlinqs maps 8 CVEs to CWE-732, published between 2026-02-04 and 2026-10-04. None of them is in the CISA KEV catalog yet. By CVSS v3 severity the set splits into 1 critical, 3 high, 2 medium. The highest EPSS score in the set is 0.2% (CVE-2026-62195), the modelled probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. 38 tracked threats reference CWE-732 directly or through a CVE it covers; the most recent is “cPanel/WHM CalDAV/CardDAV and WP Toolkit Flaws Enable Cross-Account Access and Root Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-68490, CVE-2026-87899, CVE-2026-87900)” (2026-09-23). Affected products concentrate in Amazon Web Services (1), Docker Inc. (1), FreePBX (1), among 8 vendors in total.

Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

All 8 CVEs mapped to CWE-732, CISA KEV first, then by CVSS score.

Affected vendors

  • Amazon Web Services — 1 CVE
  • Docker Inc. — 1 CVE
  • FreePBX — 1 CVE
  • Juniper — 1 CVE
  • Microsoft — 1 CVE
  • OpenClaw — 1 CVE
  • WebPros — 1 CVE
  • devopspolis — 1 CVE

Threat activity

38 tracked threats cite CWE-732; the 25 most recent are listed.

Mitigations

  • Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
  • Architecture and Design, Operation / Sandbox or Jail: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid…
  • Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
  • System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
  • Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
  • Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
  • Operation, System Configuration / Environment Hardening: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

Source: MITRE CWE, potential mitigations.

Detection methods (MITRE CWE)

  • Automated Static Analysis: Automated static analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. Automated techniques may be able to detect the use of library functions that modify permissions, then analyze function calls for arguments that contain potentially insecure values. However, since the software's intended security policy might allow loose permissions for certain operations (such as publishing a file on a web server)…
  • Automated Dynamic Analysis: Automated dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. However, since the software's intended security policy might allow loose permissions for certain operations (such as publishing a file on a web server), automated dynamic analysis may produce some false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes. When custom permissions models…
  • Manual Analysis: This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
  • Manual Static Analysis: Manual static analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The code could then be examined to identifying usage of the related functions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context of the intended security model of the software.
  • Manual Dynamic Analysis: Manual dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The program could then be executed with a focus on exercising code paths that are related to the custom permissions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context of the intended security model of the software.
  • Fuzzing: Fuzzing is not effective in detecting this weakness.
  • Black Box: Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon…
  • Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode (effectiveness: SOAR Partial): According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Inter-application Flow Analysis

Source: MITRE CWE, detection methods. Threadlinqs detection rules for the threats above are Blue tier and higher.