Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-0711
EDRChoker — Open-Source Red-Team Tool Silences Cloud-Connected EDR via Windows Policy-Based QoS Bandwidth Throttling
EDRChoker is an open-source red-team tool published in June 2026 by researcher @TwoSevenOneT that neutralizes cloud-connected EDR agents without killing processes or injecting code. It abuses Windows native Policy-Based Quality of Service (QoS) to throttle named EDR processes to ~8 bits/sec, severing the agent's TLS connection to its cloud management plane so it cannot upload detections, fetch policy, or accept remote response actions.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0711 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | EDRChoker |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (Policy-Based QoS / Packet Scheduler pacer.sys); Multiple EDR vendors Cloud-managed EDR agents dependent on persistent outbound connectivity |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-693 |
| Tools | EDRChoker |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1112 Modify Registry, T1489 Service Stop, T1498 Network Denial of Service, T1518 Software Discovery, T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | technology, financial, healthcare, government, manufacturing, critical-infrastructure |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0711 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: EDRChoker QoS Throttle Policy Creation Targeting Security Agent — Exploitation Phase
Detects the core EDRChoker primitive: powershell.exe (or pwsh.exe) invoking New-NetQosPolicy/Set-NetQosPolicy with ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond set to an abnormally low value (< 1 Kbps). At ~8 bps a TLS handshake (3-6 KB cert chain) can never complete, severing a cloud-connected EDR agent from its management plane without killing the process. The regex isolates throttle ceilings under 1000 bps, the band EDRChoker uses.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1685, T1059.001
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*New-NetQosPolicy*" CommandLine="*ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond*" | rex field=CommandLine "ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond\s+(?<throttle_bps>\d+)" | where isnotnull(throttle_bps) AND tonumber(throttle_bps) < 1000 | eval is_edr_target=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(MsMpEng|SentinelAgent|CSFalconService|elastic-agent|CarbonBlack|cb\.exe|cylancesvc|xagt|SEDservice|edr|agent)\.exe"),"yes","no") | table _time host User Image CommandLine throttle_bps is_edr_target ParentImageMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") | where ProcessCommandLine has "New-NetQosPolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond" | extend ThrottleBps = toint(extract(@"ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond\s+(\d+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)) | where isnotempty(ThrottleBps) and ThrottleBps < 1000 | extend IsEdrTarget = iff(ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(MsMpEng|SentinelAgent|CSFalconService|elastic-agent|CarbonBlack|cylancesvc|xagt|edr|agent)\.exe", "yes", "no") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ThrottleBps, IsEdrTarget, InitiatingProcessFileNameSigma
title: EDRChoker QoS Throttle Policy Creation Targeting Security Agent
id: 8f1c2a40-7e3b-4d11-9a2e-1b6c3d4e5f01
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of a Policy-Based QoS policy via New-NetQosPolicy with an abnormally low ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond value used by EDRChoker to silence cloud-connected EDR agents.
references:
- https://cybersecuritynews.com/edrchoker-tool/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-07
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1685
- attack.t1685
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_ps:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'New-NetQosPolicy'
- 'ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond'
selection_low_rate:
CommandLine|re: 'ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond\s+([0-9]{1,3})\b'
condition: selection_ps and selection_low_rate
falsepositives:
- Legitimate network administrators applying genuine low-bandwidth QoS throttling policies
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate network administrators applying genuine low-bandwidth QoS throttling for traffic shaping
- Bandwidth-limit testing in lab environments
Tuning notes: Tune the throttle threshold (< 1000 bps) to your environment's lowest legitimate QoS value. Allowlist sanctioned network-admin service accounts and change-window automation. Raise severity to critical when is_edr_target=yes.
- EDRChoker QoS Policy Registry Artifact Creation — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker Persistent QoS Policy Store Write — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker Security Software Discovery Preceding QoS Throttle — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker QoS Throttle via PowerShell Module Logging — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDR Agent Heartbeat Loss Without Uninstall — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker Remove-Mode Mass QoS Policy Purge — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker QoS Policy AppPath Match Referencing EDR Binary — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- EDRChoker WMI NetQosPolicy Creation Without WFP Filter Add — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0711.
Technical analysis
Enforcement occurs in pacer.sys (an NDIS Lightweight Filter Driver) below the Windows Filtering Platform, evading the packet-block/packet-drop telemetry that catches WFP-based tools such as EDRSilencer.
EDRChoker is a defense-evasion tool that targets the architectural dependency modern EDR platforms have on persistent outbound cloud connectivity. Rather than terminating the EDR process, unhooking its DLLs, or adding a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) block filter, EDRChoker creates Windows Policy-Based QoS policies that match the EDR agent executable by application path and apply an extreme egress bandwidth ceiling of approximately 8 bits per second via the ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond setting. At that rate a TLS handshake — which must transfer a 3-6 KB certificate chain — can never complete, so the agent's mutually authenticated channel to its SaaS/cloud console fails with connection-dropped and timeout errors. The agent process keeps running and appears healthy locally, but it is effectively blind and deaf to its backend: real-time detections are never delivered, threat-intel and policy updates never arrive, and analyst-initiated remote isolation or live-response commands never reach the host.
The key tradecraft advantage is the enforcement layer. Policy-Based QoS throttling is implemented by the Packet Scheduler (pacer.sys / PSched), an NDIS Lightweight Filter Driver that operates at the NDIS boundary close to the hardware, beneath tcpip.sys and the WFP callout layer. Because no WFP filter is added, EDRChoker does not generate the FWPM filter-add events or the packet-block / packet-drop signals that EDR vendors rely on to catch tools like EDRSilencer (which weaponizes the FwpmFilterAdd0 WFP API). To the defender the symptom is a vague loss of agent connectivity rather than an explicit tamper event.
The tool runs in two modes. Install mode ingests a file of EDR process names and auto-generates one uniquely named QoS policy per process, each named with the process name plus a random GUID (e.g. EDRProcess_<GUID>); these policies persist across reboots so the silencing survives a restart of the host or the agent. Remove mode, invoked with no parameters, enumerates and purges all policies the tool created, cleanly restoring connectivity. The underlying primitive is the PowerShell New-NetQosPolicy cmdlet (and the equivalent MSFT_NetQosPolicySettingData WMI / registry objects), so the activity blends into legitimate network-administration tooling.
Execution requires local administrator privileges (creating machine-scoped QoS policies is a privileged operation), so EDRChoker is a post-exploitation capability used after initial access and privilege escalation, typically immediately before a noisy objective such as ransomware deployment, credential theft, or lateral movement, to ensure the EDR cannot phone home during the operation. Defenders should treat creation of QoS policies that match security-agent executables — especially with very low ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond values — as high-fidelity tampering, and should monitor EDR fleet health for agents that remain 'running' but stop checking in.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
defense-impairment
T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
Impact
impact
T1498 Network Denial of Service
Discovery
Persistence
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Alert on creation of any Policy-Based QoS policy (New-NetQosPolicy / MSFT_NetQosPolicySettingData) whose AppPathNameMatchCondition references a security/EDR agent executable
- Alert on QoS policies with abnormally low ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond values (e.g. < 1 Kbps) targeting any application
- Enable and monitor EDR cloud-connectivity / agent-health telemetry server-side; treat 'process running but not checking in' as a tamper indicator
- Hunt the registry for unexpected keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QoS\ matching the EDRProcess_<GUID> naming pattern
Workarounds
- Block / log PowerShell NetQos* cmdlets for non-administrative network roles via constrained language mode and module logging
- Configure EDR to fail-safe (local enforcement and local quarantine of telemetry) when cloud connectivity is lost rather than silently degrading
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict local administrator rights to reduce ability to create machine-scoped QoS policies
- Deploy WDAC / AppLocker to constrain unauthorized PowerShell and offensive tooling execution
- Use Group Policy to centrally define and lock the QoS policy set so endpoint-created policies are flagged as drift
- Build server-side fleet monitoring that correlates agent heartbeat loss with no corresponding planned change or uninstall
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (Policy-Based QoS / Packet Scheduler pacer.sys)
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server 2016; Windows Server 2019; Windows Server 2022; Windows Server 2025 - Multiple EDR vendors — Cloud-managed EDR agents dependent on persistent outbound connectivity
Vulnerable versions: agents relying on real-time cloud telemetry/management
Timeline
- EDRSilencer (WFP FwpmFilterAdd0-based EDR communication blocking) popularized, establishing the EDR-comms-blocking technique class that EDRChoker evolves.
- Detection engineering initiated for QoS-policy-creation telemetry targeting EDR executables and low ThrottleRate values; simulation requested.
- Threadlinqs Intelligence ingests the tool, confirms the New-NetQosPolicy 8 bps throttle mechanism and pacer.sys enforcement layer, and maps MITRE coverage.
- Cyber Security News publishes technical writeup detailing the Policy-Based QoS throttling technique and its sub-WFP enforcement via pacer.sys.
- Researcher @TwoSevenOneT publishes EDRChoker as an open-source tool on GitHub (github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDRChoker).
Sources cited
- New-NetQosPolicy — Microsoft Learn (NetQos PowerShell module) Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-06-07
- Quality of Service (QoS) Policy — Windows Policy-Based QoS overview Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-06-07
- MITRE ATT&CK T1562.001 — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools MITRE · Research · 2026-06-07
- EDRSilencer — WFP-based EDR communication blocking (technique contrast) MITRE · Research · 2026-06-07
- EDRChoker — GitHub Repository (@TwoSevenOneT) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-06-07
- New EDRChoker Tool Uses Policy-Based Quality of Service to Block EDR Processes cybersecuritynews.com · Blog · 2026-06-07
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.