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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6362

NoName057(16) DDoSia campaign: Intrinsec OpenCTI connector operationalizes DDoSia target configurations

mediumACTIVE

NoName057(16), a pro-Russian hacktivist group, runs volunteer-powered DDoS campaigns with the Go-based DDoSia tool against European targets, including many French public and private entities. On 2026-11-18 Intrinsec's CTI cell released an OpenCTI connector (listed on the Filigran Hub) that ingests DDoSia target configurations from the Witha.Name API, so defenders can treat the continuously renewed target lists as an intent signal. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6362
Also known asDDoSia, Go-Stresser, Operation Eastwood (law-enforcement action)
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsVarious Public-facing web services (government, transportation/logistics, technology/media/telecom, financial) in Europe and NATO states
AttributionNoName057(16) (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareBobik, Dosia, telegram
ToolsGo-Stresser
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood, T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography, T1583.003 Virtual Private Server, T1583.005 Botnet, T1587.001 Malware
MotivationHACKTIVISM
Target sectorsgovernment administration, transport, technology, telecoms, news - media, finance, military, public-utilities, tourism
Target regionsEurope, france, ukraine, italy, sweden, germany, NATO states
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6362 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings — Exploitation (Impact)

Detects the DDoSia (NoName057(16)) application-layer HTTP flood: many requests per minute to one path, nearly every request carrying a unique random query string (cache busting) and many distinct randomized browser User-Agents, sent by volunteer-botnet participants. TL-2026-6362, T1499.002.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1499.002, T1583.005
  • Data sources: web access logs (index=web, sourcetype=access_combined)
  • Severity: medium
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=web sourcetype=access_combined earliest=-15m@m
```comment: DDoSia (NoName057(16)) application-layer flood - random cache-busting query strings and randomized browser User-Agents hammering one path```
| eval uri_query=coalesce(uri_query,"")
| bin _time span=1m
| stats count AS requests dc(uri_query) AS distinct_queries dc(useragent) AS distinct_uas dc(clientip) AS distinct_sources BY _time host uri_path
| eval query_uniqueness=round(distinct_queries/requests,2)
| where requests>=1000 AND query_uniqueness>=0.7 AND distinct_uas>=10
| sort - requests

Microsoft KQL

W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(15m)
| where csUriQuery !in ("", "-")
| summarize Requests=count(), DistinctQueries=dcount(csUriQuery), DistinctUAs=dcount(csUserAgent), DistinctSources=dcount(cIP) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1m), sSiteName, csUriStem
| extend QueryUniqueness = round(todouble(DistinctQueries) / Requests, 2)
| where Requests >= 1000 and QueryUniqueness >= 0.7 and DistinctUAs >= 10
| project TimeGenerated, sSiteName, csUriStem, Requests, DistinctQueries, QueryUniqueness, DistinctUAs, DistinctSources
| order by Requests desc

Sigma

title: DDoSia-Style HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings To A Single Path
id: 6f1c2b8e-3a47-4d19-9b52-7c0e1a4d8f01
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of requests to one URI path carrying a very large number of distinct query strings, the cache-busting behaviour of the DDoSia client (NoName057(16)) application-layer floods
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/anatomy-of-ddosia
    - https://censys.com/blog/ddosia-infrastructure
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/connecteur-opencti-ddosia-noname057/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002
    - attack.resource_development
    - attack.t1583.005
    - attack.tool.ddosia
correlation:
    type: value_count
    rules:
        - ddosia_http_request
    group-by:
        - cs-uri-stem
    timespan: 1m
    condition:
        gte: 1000
        field: cs-uri-query
falsepositives:
    - Search or analytics endpoints that legitimately receive unique query strings at high volume
    - Load tests and synthetic monitoring
level: medium
---
title: DDoSia HTTP Request With Query String (Base)
id: 6f1c2b8e-3a47-4d19-9b52-7c0e1a4d8f02
name: ddosia_http_request
status: experimental
description: Base rule for the DDoSia flood correlation, HTTP GET or POST requests carrying a query string
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/anatomy-of-ddosia
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method:
            - 'GET'
            - 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Base rule only, use through the correlation rule
level: informational

Known false positives:

  • Search, autocomplete or analytics endpoints with legitimately unique query strings at high volume
  • Load tests, synthetic monitoring and marketing campaign spikes with tracking parameters

Tuning notes: Baseline peak requests per path first and raise or lower the 1000 requests/min threshold. Exclude search and API paths with naturally unique queries. Cross-check the target host against DDoSia target lists (Witha.Name feed) to raise priority. DDoSia also randomizes request bodies, so for POST floods add a body or content-length diversity check at the WAF or CDN. Prefer behaviour-based mitigation over geo/ASN blocking because participants are distributed volunteers.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings (KQL) — Exploitation (Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia Go Client Execution And [indicator] (KQL) — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval (KQL) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia HTTP Flood With Random Query Strings (Sigma) — Exploitation (Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia Go Client Execution On Windows (Sigma) — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval (Sigma) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia Go Client Execution And [indicator] — Post-Exploitation (Endpoint) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DDoSia C2 Login And Target Retrieval — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6362.

Sample indicators (3 of 21)

  • IP address: 38.180.143[.]83
  • Domain: witha[.]name
  • File hash: 8ba11c9e3d3f38a2473620579f61119be9ada9bc0e4dc37fc045017f56248473

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

NoName057(16) has conducted distributed denial-of-service campaigns against European targets for several years, emerging in March 2022 days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its DDoSia tool is distributed as compiled Go binaries (the banner suggests the authors call it "Go-Stresser") through Telegram channels and a Telegram bot. Volunteers contribute bandwidth, do not choose targets, and receive target configuration files that are renewed continuously as the group issues new orders. Europol states that participants were paid in cryptocurrency and that gamified elements (leaderboards, badges, shout-outs) sustained involvement.

Recorded Future's analysis describes the client protocol: volunteers register via the DDoSia Telegram bot and receive a client_id.txt containing a unique User Hash; the client ID is a UUID4 with the process ID appended. The client logs in with an HTTP POST to /client/login, reporting system information (username, OS, kernel version and architecture, platform family, CPU cores, registration time, time zone), then retrieves targets with an HTTP GET to /client/get_targets. Requests carry cookies U (User Hash), C (Client ID) and K (random Base32 value). Payloads are AES-GCM encrypted with a key derived from the User Hash and Client ID, which hinders researcher analysis. The decrypted JSON contains a targets array (target_id, request_id, host, ip, type, method, port, use_ssl, path, body, headers) and a randoms section with rules for generating random strings appended to requests to vary traffic and evade simple filtering or caching. Attack type examples are application-layer (http2) floods, with randomized browser-like User-Agent strings.

The control infrastructure is multi-tiered. Recorded Future reports Tier 1 C2 servers rotating with an average lifespan of about nine days, running nginx/1.18.0 on Ubuntu, with Tier 1 connecting only to ACL-restricted Tier 2. Censys, tracking from June 2025, suspects three tiers (client-facing Tier 1, short-lived Tier 2 relays, and Tier 3 core management/accounting), reports about 6 active control servers at any time with a mean lifespan near 2.5 days, VPS hosting (typically Azea, sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2025; AS56971 HostVDS) exposing mostly 22/TCP and 80/TCP. The two vendors' lifespan figures differ because of differing vantage points and methodology. Recorded Future observed new targets added in two daily waves (about 05:00-07:00 UTC and about 11:00 UTC on weekdays), suggesting a Russian work schedule. Over its July 2024-July 2025 window it counted over 3,700 unique hosts targeted (Ukraine 29.47%, France 6.09%, Italy 5.39%, Sweden 5.29%; government/public sector 41.09%, transportation/logistics 12.44%, technology/media/telecom 10.19%).

Operation Eastwood (14-17 July 2025), coordinated by Europol and Eurojust with 12 countries, took down over 100 systems and key central servers, with two arrests (France, Spain), seven arrest warrants (six from Germany, one from Spain), 24 house searches and over 1,000 supporters warned. Recorded Future reports new C2 servers appeared the day the operation ended and the infrastructure was re-established by 23 July 2025; a Vot Tak/RKS.Global investigation reported activity did not decline afterward. Censys put Telegram group subscribers at about 45k before the disruption and about 14k in December 2025.

The 2026-11-18 Intrinsec article describes an OpenCTI external-import connector, published on the Filigran Hub, that queries the API opened by the Witha.Name research group (previously CSV only) and imports DDoSia configuration data into OpenCTI as entities. Intrinsec frames the data as a near-real-time intent signal: targeted sectors, upcoming waves, and whether an organisation's own assets appear in target lists, rather than a post-incident indicator. The article itself lists no IOCs, CVEs or named targets; the IOCs in this record come from Recorded Future and Censys. Severity MEDIUM is an analyst judgment: DDoSia causes availability impact, but Europol reported incidents were mitigated without major disruption.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Impact

T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood

Resource Development

T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1583.005 Botnet; T1587.001 Malware

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Ingest DDoSia target configurations (e.g., via the Witha.Name OpenCTI connector) and check whether your own domains, IPs and hosted assets appear in the target lists
  • Pre-arrange DDoS mitigation (CDN/scrubbing provider, rate limiting, WAF) for any listed public-facing HTTP/HTTPS services
  • Alert on bursts of HTTP GET/POST requests with random query strings or body values and randomized browser User-Agent strings against a single path

Workarounds

  • Block or challenge the client-side patterns (cookie-less high-rate requests, random-string cache busting) at the edge
  • Geo/ASN-based rate limiting is of limited value because participants are distributed volunteers; prefer behavior-based mitigation

Longer-term hardening

  • Operationalize intent signals from DDoSia target feeds into the CTI platform and notify sector peers
  • Maintain tested DDoS runbooks and upstream provider contacts, especially for government, transport and telecom assets

Affected and fixed versions

  • Various — Public-facing web services (government, transportation/logistics, technology/media/telecom, financial) in Europe and NATO states
    Vulnerable versions: Not product-specific; any internet-exposed HTTP/HTTPS service

Timeline

  • NoName057(16) emerges in March 2022 (exact day not stated), days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine; DDoSia first released on Telegram.
  • Censys begins tracking DDoSia control infrastructure (June 2025; exact day not stated).
  • Europol/Eurojust-coordinated Operation Eastwood begins across 12 countries.
  • Operation Eastwood concludes: over 100 systems and central servers taken down, 2 arrests, 7 arrest warrants, 24 house searches.
  • Per Recorded Future, DDoSia C2 infrastructure is fully re-established, with new C2 servers having appeared on the day the operation ended.
  • Censys publishes its DDoSia infrastructure analysis: about 6 active control servers, Telegram group down to about 14k subscribers from about 45k.
  • Intrinsec publishes an OpenCTI connector (Filigran Hub) that imports DDoSia target configurations from the locked-ioc-16 API.

Sources cited

More from NoName057(16)

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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