Skip to navigation

Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0795

OceanLotus (APT32) Supply-Chain Compromise of FireAnt MetaKit Delivers SPECTRALVIPER Backdoor to Vietnamese Stock Investors

highACTIVE

OceanLotus (APT32) compromised the unauthenticated HTTP update channel of FireAnt MetaKit, a Vietnam-based stock-investing data component, to deliver trojanized setup.exe payloads that side-load and inject the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor into OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe. The selectively-targeted campaign ran October 2025 through March 2026 against individuals tied to Vietnam's anti-corruption and financial-market scrutiny.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0795
Also known asFireAnt MetaKit supply-chain attack, Blazing Furnace-aligned OceanLotus campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsFireAnt FireAnt MetaKit; Microsoft Windows (OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe injection target)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-494, CWE-345, CWE-319, CWE-347, CWE-426
AttributionAPT32 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusVietnam
MalwareSPECTRALVIPER
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1036.005 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1055 Process Injection, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol, T1074 Data Staged, T1082 System Information Discovery and 16 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsfinancial, fintech, stock-investing, government, infrastructure, construction, transportation
Target regionsVietnam, Southeast Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0795 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 35 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SPECTRALVIPER DLL Side-Load via Renamed Signed Binary + Injection into OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe — Post-Exploitation

Detects the SPECTRALVIPER persistence/evasion chain: a signed system-named binary (dtlupdate.exe renamed to IntelAudioService.exe, or Toolbox.exe invoked with -uiDll) executing from a non-System32 path and loading a co-located malicious DLL (DtlCrashCatch.dll), followed by cross-process injection into the signed OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe host. Correlates Sysmon ImageLoad (EventCode 7) of DtlCrashCatch.dll by a relocated IntelAudioService.exe with CreateRemoteThread/process-access (EventCode 8/10) targeting OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1036.003, T1055, T1129
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_defender_endpoint, edr_image_load
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=7 OR EventCode=8 OR EventCode=10)
| eval img=lower(Image)
| where (EventCode=7 AND like(lower(ImageLoaded),"%dtlcrashcatch.dll%") AND (like(img,"%intelaudioservice.exe") OR like(img,"%toolbox.exe")) AND NOT like(img,"c:\\windows\\system32\\%"))
   OR ((EventCode=8 OR EventCode=10) AND like(lower(TargetImage),"%onedrive.sync.service.exe"))
| eval phase=case(EventCode==7,"sideload", EventCode==8,"remote_thread", EventCode==10,"process_access")
| stats values(phase) as phases values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dlls values(TargetImage) as inject_targets min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen count by Computer img
| where mvcount(phases)>1 OR isnotnull(mvfind(phases,"sideload"))
| eval reason="Renamed signed binary side-loading DtlCrashCatch.dll and/or injecting into OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe — SPECTRALVIPER"
| table first_seen last_seen Computer img phases loaded_dlls inject_targets count reason

Microsoft KQL

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "DtlCrashCatch.dll"
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("IntelAudioService.exe", "Toolbox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, LoadedDll=FileName, InitiatingProcessSHA1
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "ProcessAccess")
    | where FileName =~ "OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe" or AdditionalFields has "OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe"
    | project DeviceName, InjectTime=Timestamp, InjectAction=ActionType, InjectInitiator=InitiatingProcessFileName
) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, LoadedDll, InjectAction, InjectInitiator, InitiatingProcessSHA1

Sigma

title: SPECTRALVIPER DLL Side-Load via Renamed Signed Binary (OceanLotus)
id: 2c8e9a14-7b3d-4d61-9a02-0795b7d2ca22
status: experimental
description: Detects a relocated signed system-named binary (IntelAudioService.exe / Toolbox.exe) side-loading the malicious DtlCrashCatch.dll from a non-System32 path, the SPECTRALVIPER loader pattern used by OceanLotus.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-charms-spectralviper
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\IntelAudioService.exe'
            - '\Toolbox.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\DtlCrashCatch.dll'
    filter_sys:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
    condition: selection and not filter_sys
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Intel audio or vendor toolbox software loading similarly named DLLs from a signed install path (rare; verify DLL signature and path)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Genuine Intel audio service or vendor Toolbox.exe loading a legitimately signed DLL from its install directory
  • Security tooling performing module-load instrumentation

Tuning notes: Validate the DtlCrashCatch.dll Authenticode signature and SHA1 against the IOC list (41CB8CD7..., 5D6194BB...) — legitimate loads are signed and live under Program Files. Extend the injection-target join to additional signed system processes if OneDrive is not present. Lower confidence to medium in environments that legitimately deploy renamed signed binaries.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Trojanized FireAnt MetaKit setup.exe Download + Execution Chain — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPECTRALVIPER Injection into Signed [indicator] + Token Impersonation — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPECTRALVIPER Host Profiling Beacon to [indicator] — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • OceanLotus FireAnt Insecure Update Manifest Fetch over HTTP — Exploitation (Sigma-primary) · unlock with TL Creds
  • OceanLotus Renamed Signed Binary Masquerade + [indicator] Side-Load — Post-Exploitation (Sigma-primary) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPECTRALVIPER XGU::Pivot Named-Pipe Lateral Movement / Orchestration — C2 (Sigma-primary) · unlock with TL Creds
  • OceanLotus FireAnt Insecure HTTP Update Fetch of setup.exe / version.xml — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPECTRALVIPER HTTPS Cookie Beacon zd_cs_pm to Finance-Themed Domains — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 35 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0795.

Sample indicators (3 of 35)

  • IP address: 139.162.11[.]152
  • Domain: financemachinelearning[.]com
  • File hash: D511B77459673EC42163F19E300FF1D233B6C39F

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 35 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

35 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

OceanLotus (APT32), a threat actor aligned with Vietnamese state interests and active since at least 2012, conducted a supply-chain compromise of FireAnt MetaKit — a fintech software component that feeds real-time market data into trading platforms such as AmiBroker and MetaTrader for Vietnamese stock investors. The MetaKit update mechanism fetched its update manifest (metakit.fireant[.]vn/Software/version.xml) and binary (setup.exe) over unencrypted HTTP with no TLS, no code-signature validation, and no integrity verification, allowing the attacker to substitute a malicious downloader that the legitimate Metakit.exe component executed silently.

The trojanized setup.exe first profiled the victim host and reported to a staging server, enabling selective delivery of the second stage only to individuals of interest rather than mass infection. The second stage established persistence and evasion through DLL side-loading: a legitimately signed executable dtlupdate.exe renamed to IntelAudioService.exe side-loaded a malicious DtlCrashCatch.dll loader, which decoded and injected the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor into the legitimate OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe process.

SPECTRALVIPER is a heavily obfuscated x64 Windows backdoor first publicly documented by Elastic Security Labs in 2023 (intrusion set REF2754). It supports PE loading/injection, shellcode injection, file upload/download, file and directory manipulation, token impersonation, and host reconnaissance, and can communicate in either HTTPS or named-pipe mode. In this campaign it beaconed over HTTPS to financemachinelearning[.]com (a domain crafted to blend with stock-market traffic), embedding encrypted host information inside an HTTP Cookie header (the cookie key evolved from euconsent-v2= in prior operations to zd_cs_pm= in the FireAnt campaign). Lateral movement uses an orchestration model in which an orchestrator instance relays commands to other infected hosts over named pipes; recovered RTTI class names include XGU::Pivot, XGU::Pivot::Internal::WaitNew_RemotePipe, ProcessManager/ProcessReflector, and Feature.

The campaign evolved over time: the initial 2 October 2025 sample was an unobfuscated test build with hardcoded URLs and reused infrastructure, while builds from roughly 17 October 2025 onward were heavily obfuscated, used API-based downloads, and rotated to fresh C2 infrastructure. The operators also migrated staging servers (from 139.162.11[.]152 to 142.91.98[.]77). A parallel OceanLotus operation (November 2024–February 2026) compromised a Vietnamese infrastructure/transport construction corporation via suspected Microsoft SQL Server RCE, deploying SPECTRALVIPER variants that side-load via the signed Toolbox.exe (requiring a -uiDll parameter) under names such as Genuine.exe, Updater.exe and AutoCAD242.exe. Targeting of stock investors coincided with Vietnam's October 2025 bond-reporting fraud revelations and the broader anti-corruption drive, leading researchers to assess OceanLotus may be acting as a digital arm of the state's domestic surveillance apparatus. No malicious updates have been observed since 9 March 2026, suggesting the FireAnt operation has concluded. No CVE was assigned; the root cause is insecure-by-design update delivery (no TLS, no signature, no integrity check).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1036.005 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1134 Access Token Manipulation; T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1129 Shared Modules; T1204.002 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Collection

T1074 Data Staged

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise

execution

T1559 Inter-Process Communication

stealth

T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Persistence

T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply FireAnt MetaKit updates that add TLS, code-signing and integrity validation once published by the vendor

Immediate actions

  • Block all listed C2 domains and IPs (financemachinelearning[.]com, gatewayrvcenter[.]com, etc.) at perimeter and DNS
  • Hunt for IntelAudioService.exe / DtlCrashCatch.dll side-loading pairs and SPECTRALVIPER injection into OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe
  • Isolate hosts running FireAnt MetaKit updated between October 2025 and March 2026 and inspect for setup.exe of listed hashes
  • Inspect outbound HTTPS for anomalous Cookie headers (zd_cs_pm=) to finance-themed domains

Workarounds

  • Disable or block the MetaKit auto-update channel (metakit.fireant[.]vn) until secure update delivery is confirmed
  • Source MetaKit updates only over a verified out-of-band channel

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading and process injection into signed system processes
  • Enforce application allowlisting to prevent execution of unsigned/renamed loaders
  • Hunt for unexpected named-pipe inter-host communication consistent with the XGU::Pivot orchestration model
  • Require vendors to deliver software updates over TLS with code-signature and integrity validation

Affected and fixed versions

  • FireAnt — FireAnt MetaKit
    Vulnerable versions: update channel served via metakit.fireant.vn over HTTP, Oct 2025-Mar 2026
    Fixed in: pending vendor fix adding TLS + signature validation
  • Microsoft — Windows (OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe injection target)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows x64 hosts running FireAnt MetaKit

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • C2 domain locked-ioc-16 first observed (locked-ioc-25), part of OceanLotus infrastructure staging.
  • Parallel OceanLotus espionage operation begins against a Vietnamese infrastructure/transport construction corporation via suspected Microsoft SQL Server RCE.
  • C2 domain locked-ioc-22 (locked-ioc-27) first observed — the earliest known infrastructure ESET links to the SPECTRALVIPER cluster.
  • C2 domains locked-ioc-19 (locked-ioc-24) and locked-ioc-17 (locked-ioc-26) first observed.
  • First malicious payload delivered via the FireAnt MetaKit update URL (locked-ioc-20/Software/setup.exe); initial unobfuscated test build using staging server locked-ioc-23.
  • C2 domain locked-ioc-15 (locked-ioc-30) first observed supporting the campaign.
  • Stable, heavily obfuscated SPECTRALVIPER builds appear using API-based downloads and fresh C2 infrastructure; Cookie key changes to zd_cs_pm=.
  • Primary beacon domain locked-ioc-14 first observed (locked-ioc-28, M247 Europe).
  • Operators migrate the staging server from locked-ioc-23 to locked-ioc-29 (LEASEWEB Singapore).
  • Corporate infrastructure espionage operation activity ends (November 2024–February 2026 window).
  • Last malicious FireAnt MetaKit update observed; no further malicious updates seen afterward, suggesting the operation concluded.
  • Public disclosure of the OceanLotus FireAnt MetaKit supply-chain attack and SPECTRALVIPER campaigns by ESET and security press.

Update history

Sources cited

More from APT32

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats