Skip to navigation

Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-1032

Serbian 'Putevi Srbije' Traffic-Fine Smishing Campaign Using Darcula and Phoenix PhaaS Platforms

mediumACTIVE

A smishing campaign impersonates Putevi Srbije, Serbia's state road authority, sending fake traffic-fine notices with urgency and penalty-increase threats that lead to counterfeit government payment portals harvesting payment card data. Group-IB identified typosquatted domains and infrastructure spanning two distinct Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms, Darcula and Phoenix, indicating fraudsters are mixing multi-vendor phishing tooling within a single operation.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1032
Also known asPutevi Srbije Smishing Campaign, Serbian Traffic Fine Smishing
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsPutevi Srbije Public brand / road-fine payment portal (impersonated)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-451, CWE-506, CWE-1021
ToolsDarcula PhaaS platform, Phoenix PhaaS platform, Puppeteer
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1119 Automated Collection, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1566 Phishing, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgovernment administration, transport, finance, consumer citizens
Target regionsserbia, Balkans, Europe, APAC, LATAM, MEA
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1032 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SPL - Smishing Link Click to Typosquatted Government Domain (Exploitation)

Detects proxy/web traffic where a mobile client resolves or requests a newly-registered typosquatted 'Putevi Srbije' lookalike domain shortly after an SMS/RCS/iMessage link tap, indicating initial access via Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) and User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001, T1583.001
  • Data sources: proxy, dns, web_gateway
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype="cisco:wsa:squid" OR sourcetype="pan:threat"
| eval ua_domain=lower(dest_hostname)
| where match(ua_domain, "^putev[a-z0-9\-]*(srb|serbia)[a-z0-9\-]*\.(cc|help|homes|top|icu|com)$")
| eval typosquat_hit=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen dc(src_ip) as unique_clients values(dest_hostname) as domains by src_ip
| where count>0
| sort -count

Microsoft KQL

let TyposquatPattern = @"^putev[a-z0-9\-]*(srb|serbia)[a-z0-9\-]*\.(cc|help|homes|top|icu|com)$";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| extend RemoteHost = tostring(split(RemoteUrl, "/")[2])
| where RemoteHost matches regex TyposquatPattern
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteHost, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Hits=count() by DeviceName, RemoteHost

Sigma

title: Typosquatted Government/Road-Authority Domain Contacted Following SMS Link Tap
id: 7c1a2e10-1032-4a11-9d01-put1032spl001
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS/HTTP requests to newly-registered lookalike domains impersonating the Serbian road authority Putevi Srbije, consistent with the Darcula/Phoenix PhaaS smishing campaign.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/balkans-fake-traffic-fines-phishing/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-01
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.tool.darcula
    - attack.tool.phoenix_phaas
logsource:
    category: dns
    product: web
detection:
    selection:
        query|re: '^putev[a-z0-9\-]*(srb|serbia)[a-z0-9\-]*\.(cc|help|homes|top|icu|com)$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers actively monitoring/sandboxing the reported IOC domains
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Threat-intel/SOC analysts or sandboxes deliberately resolving the reported IOC domains for research

Tuning notes: Update the regex TLD/keyword set as Group-IB or carrier feeds publish new typosquat variants; consider adding a domain-age/WHOIS enrichment lookup to reduce reliance on the static pattern.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • KQL - Mobile Browser Navigation to Typosquatted Road-Authority Domain (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • KQL - requestIdleCallback + IntersectionObserver + atob Deobfuscation Chain in Delivered Web Content (Post-Exploitation Rendering) · unlock with TL Creds
  • KQL - Payment-Card Field Exfiltration to Recently-Registered CDN-Fronted Domain (C2/Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma - Smishing-Delivered Typosquatted Government Domain Access (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma - Obfuscated z-span/z-strong Tag Payload with 2-Second DOM Rescan Loop (Post-Exploitation Rendering) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma - CDN-Fronted Card-Harvesting Panel Callback Beacon (C2/Lateral/Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPL - Base64-Obfuscated Content in Non-Standard z-span/z-strong HTML Tags (Post-Exploitation Page Rendering) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SPL - Card-Data POST to Newly-Registered CDN-Fronted Domain (C2/Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1032.

Sample indicators (3 of 23)

  • Domain: putevs[.]cc
  • Domain: putevie-srbije[.]help
  • Domain: putevti-srbije[.]help

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

23 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

In a campaign discovered by Group-IB on July 1, 2026, cybercriminals impersonated Putevi Srbije, the Serbian public enterprise responsible for national road infrastructure, to defraud victims via SMS phishing (smishing). Victims receive text messages claiming an outstanding traffic fine, using urgency language warning that the penalty amount will increase if not paid immediately. The message contains a link to a cloned government payment portal built to closely mimic the real Putevi Srbije domain and branding.

The operation is notable for blending infrastructure and toolkits from two separate Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) ecosystems: Darcula, a Chinese-language platform that emerged in 2023 offering 200+ ready-made phishing templates and, in its newer iterations, AI-generated pages, Puppeteer-based browser automation, and iMessage/RCS delivery to bypass SMS firewalls; and Phoenix, a centralized administrative-panel PhaaS platform (linked to Reward Points and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing campaigns since January 2024) that gives operators real-time victim telemetry, geofencing, IP filtering, and live-phishing intervention across localized templates for APAC, LATAM, Europe, and MEA regions.

The phishing pages hosted on both platform's infrastructure use significant client-side evasion engineering: content is Base64-encoded and embedded inside custom, non-standard HTML tags (e.g. z-span, z-strong) rather than plain text, defeating static keyword/signature scanners. The obfuscated content is only decoded and rendered client-side via decodeURIComponent(atob(...)) calls, deferred using requestIdleCallback so decoding happens during browser idle cycles, and gated behind the IntersectionObserver API so text is only decoded once it scrolls into the visible viewport. A recurring 2-second polling loop continuously rescans the DOM for newly injected obfuscated nodes, ensuring dynamically added content is also decoded. The phishing infrastructure additionally sits behind Cloudflare/CDN proxy fronting to obscure the true hosting origin and frustrate takedown attempts.

Once a victim submits payment card data (card number, expiry date, CVV) on the fraudulent portal, the data is harvested directly by the operators for immediate fraudulent purchases, resale on dark web card shops, or follow-up social-engineering scams. Victims typically first learn of the compromise via unexpected bank account charges.

The campaign demonstrates a broader financial-fraud trend of PhaaS interoperability: rather than committing to a single phishing-kit vendor, criminal operators appear to be mixing and matching templates, hosting, and back-end panels from multiple competing PhaaS providers within one operation, complicating attribution and blocklist-based defenses that assume a single infrastructure fingerprint per campaign.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy

command-and-control

T1102 Web Service

Execution

T1204 User Execution

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1591 Gather Victim Org Information

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block/monitor the identified typosquatted Putevi Srbije domains at DNS/perimeter and mobile carrier SMS filters
  • Alert Serbian banks and card issuers to monitor for fraudulent transactions tied to the campaign timeframe
  • Report and request takedown of Cloudflare/CDN-fronted phishing domains via abuse channels
  • Publish a public advisory from Putevi Srbije / Serbian CERT clarifying the agency never requests card payment via SMS links

Workarounds

  • Do not click payment links received via unsolicited SMS claiming to be traffic fines; navigate to putevisrbije.rs directly instead
  • Card issuers can apply velocity/geo anomaly rules to catch first-use fraudulent transactions from harvested cards

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy carrier-level RCS/SMS content filtering that inspects rendered (post-JS-decode) page content, not just raw markup
  • Adopt brand-protection / typosquat-monitoring services to catch new lookalike domain registrations early
  • Share IOCs (domains, obfuscation patterns) with regional CERTs and PhaaS-tracking threat-intel communities
  • Educate citizens on verifying government payment notices only via official .gov/.rs channels, never SMS links

Affected and fixed versions

  • Putevi Srbije — Public brand / road-fine payment portal (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: N/A - brand impersonation, not a software vulnerability

Timeline

  • Darcula Chinese-language PhaaS platform emerges, offering 200+ phishing templates targeting government, financial, and logistics brands
  • Phoenix PhaaS platform activity begins, driving Reward Points and Failed Parcel Delivery smishing campaigns globally
  • Netcraft and other researchers report Darcula's shift to iMessage/RCS delivery to bypass SMS firewalls, targeting postal services worldwide
  • Group-IB publishes 'Phoenix Rising' research exposing the Phoenix PhaaS kit's admin panel, geofencing, and real-time victim monitoring capabilities
  • Help Net Security reports on the broader growth and maturation of Chinese-language phishing-as-a-service ecosystems including Darcula
  • Typosquatted Putevi Srbije lookalike domains observed registered across .cc, .help, .homes, .top, and .icu TLDs ahead of active campaign
  • Serbian road users report receiving urgent SMS traffic-fine notices directing them to fraudulent payment portals
  • Group-IB publishes research disclosing the active Putevi Srbije traffic-fine smishing campaign, identifying dual Darcula/Phoenix infrastructure

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats