Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2839
Revolut customers targeted by phishing texts and fake liveness-check page days after social-engineering data breach
Revolut acknowledged on 2026-09-12 that a social-engineering attack, using fraudulent information requests from a spoofed Italian government email address, exposed identity documents, verification selfies and transaction histories of a limited number of customers (~650-700 reported). From 2026-09-14 a customer received a smishing text inside the genuine Revolut SMS thread linking to 93810.app, a page that requested camera access, mimicked Revolut's 'turn your head' liveness check, then asked for a password. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2839 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Revolut data breach September 2026, Revolut smishing liveness-check campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Revolut Revolut customer accounts (KYC data, SMS channel) |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078 Valid Accounts, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1586.002 Email Accounts, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1598.003 Spearphishing Link, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | finance, fintech, cryptocurrency, consumer |
| Target regions | Europe, united kingdom |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2839 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 6 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Revolut Fake Liveness-Check Phishing Domain 93810.app — DNS/Proxy Hit
Detects DNS resolution of, or web-proxy traffic to, 93810.app, the domain hosting the fake Revolut 'turn your head' liveness check that requests camera access and then a password (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14). A hit means a user or device followed the smishing link; treat the user as credential-exposed.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001, T1583.001
- Data sources: web_proxy_zscaler, dns_stream, DnsEvents, CommonSecurityLog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
(index=proxy sourcetype="zscalernss-web") OR (index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns") earliest=-24h
| eval target=lower(coalesce(url, query))
| where match(target, "(^|[/.])93810[.]app([:/?]|$)")
| fillnull value="unknown" user src_ip
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(target) as targets values(sourcetype) as sources by src_ip user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
let ioc = '93810.app';
union isfuzzy=true
(DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Name =~ ioc or Name endswith strcat('.', ioc)
| project TimeGenerated, Source='DnsEvents', Computer, ClientIP, Target=Name),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL contains ioc or DestinationHostName =~ ioc or DestinationHostName endswith strcat('.', ioc)
| project TimeGenerated, Source='CommonSecurityLog', Computer, ClientIP=SourceIP, Target=iff(isnotempty(RequestURL), RequestURL, DestinationHostName))
| summarize Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Targets=make_set(Target, 10) by ClientIP, Computer, Source
| order by Hits descSigma
title: DNS Query for Revolut Fake Liveness-Check Phishing Domain 93810.app
id: 7c1e4b52-3a8d-4f19-9b66-2d5f0a8e91c3
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution of 93810.app, the phishing domain hosting a fake Revolut turn-your-head liveness check followed by a password prompt (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14).
references:
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/?p=466329
- https://hackread.com/revolut-customers-phishing-campaign-data-breach/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583.001
logsource:
category: dns
detection:
selection_exact:
query: '93810.app'
selection_sub:
query|endswith: '.93810.app'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes safely detonating the URL
- Threat-intel enrichment tooling resolving known-bad domains
level: highKnown false positives:
- Analysts or sandboxes intentionally visiting the phishing URL
- Threat-intel enrichment tooling that resolves known-bad domains
Tuning notes: Swap the index/sourcetype for your proxy and DNS sources (e.g. pan:traffic, bluecoat, Infoblox). Exclude security-team scanner IPs. Any hit with a non-blocked action should trigger a credential reset for the user and a check of other devices on the same SMS/phone-link path. No community-observed sibling infrastructure was available in osint_context.json; add siblings to the match regex when TL_OSINT_Scan reports them.
- Endpoint and Mail-Click Telemetry to Revolut Phishing Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Click on [indicator] Followed by Sign-In from Unfamiliar IP (Credential Reuse Follow-On) · unlock with TL Creds
- Government Data Request Followed by Outbound Attachment Release (Breach Workflow Correlation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Numeric-Only .app Domain Lookup (Sibling Infrastructure Pattern for [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- Fake Liveness / Selfie Identity-Check Lure URL on Non-Revolut Host · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser Launched with Revolut Phishing URL [indicator] on Command Line · unlock with TL Creds
- Revolut Brand Lookalike Domain Access (Non-Revolut Host) · unlock with TL Creds
- Government-Domain Data Request to Compliance Mailbox (Out-of-Band Verification Trigger) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 6 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2839.
Sample indicators (2 of 6)
- Domain:
93810[.]app - Domain:
pec[.]interno[.]it
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 6 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Whether the phishing is tied to the breach is unconfirmed.
On 2026-09-12 Revolut publicly acknowledged that a social-engineering attack had exposed data of a limited number of customers. Per multiple reports, the attacker sent fraudulent information requests from an email address on a legitimate government domain (reported as an Italian government/regulator or law-enforcement address; The National and Euronews describe an Italian regulator / the Reggio Calabria prefecture mailbox, and a PEC sender on pec.interno.it was reported). The request reportedly passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC because it originated from a genuine government domain. No Revolut systems were breached: Revolut staff supplied the data in response to the fake request. Exposed data reportedly included identity and contact details, ID copies (passports, driving licences), verification selfies, account statements, transaction histories, IBANs and Bitcoin/wallet references. Revolut states customer funds and systems were unaffected, that it blocked the sender address and alerted authorities and regulators. Reported victim counts differ by outlet: Revolut confirmed about 680 European customers (Euronews); The National cites ~650; the extortionists claim at least 680 accounts, selected by blockchain analysis for large crypto holdings.
On 2026-09-17 a group calling itself 'iamnotavillain' posted a ransom demand of 6,000 XMR (about $3 million / EUR 2.61 million) with a 24-hour public countdown, threatening to sell the data otherwise, and claiming 147 GB taken from Italian law-enforcement systems (the law-enforcement compromise is an unverified claim). Reggio Calabria prosecutors reportedly opened an investigation. Infosecurity Magazine additionally reports the group used infostealer-log credentials to compromise Italian Ministry of Interior mailboxes with access held for ~6 months; this appears in a single outlet and is treated as unconfirmed.
The phishing campaign: from 2026-09-14 (two days after Revolut's acknowledgement) a customer received an SMS that appeared in the same conversation thread as genuine Revolut texts, urging the recipient to follow a link to confirm their identity or face account restrictions. The linked page, hosted on 93810.app (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14), requested device camera access, mimicked Revolut's 'turn your head' live-video identity check, and then prompted for the account password. This captures credentials and potentially selfie/video usable for identity fraud, account takeover or recovery-flow abuse. Malwarebytes (Pieter Arntz) stated it is unclear whether the phishing is connected to the breach or is opportunistic scamming exploiting the publicity. Inclusion in a genuine SMS thread suggests sender-ID spoofing, but the sources do not state the mechanism. No attribution of the phishing to the extortion group exists in the sources.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
Execution
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1586.002 Email Accounts
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1598.003 Spearphishing Link
Impact
Stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Do not follow links in unsolicited SMS/email claiming to be Revolut; open the official Revolut app directly
- Block/report 93810.app at web proxies, DNS filtering and mobile threat defense
- Verify the domain in the browser address bar before granting camera access or entering credentials
- Revolut customers who entered a password or completed a fake liveness check should change the password, review active sessions/devices and contact Revolut support in-app
Workarounds
- Use up-to-date anti-malware with web protection on mobile devices
- Treat any page that requests camera access plus a password as suspicious
Longer-term hardening
- Financial institutions: require out-of-band verification (callback to a published channel) for government/regulator data requests, even when the sender domain is authentic and passes SPF/DKIM/DMARC
- Restrict bulk release of KYC documents, selfies and transaction history to a dual-approval compliance workflow
- Customers with large crypto balances should expect targeted social engineering and enable all available account protections
Affected and fixed versions
- Revolut — Revolut customer accounts (KYC data, SMS channel)
Vulnerable versions: Customers whose KYC data was released (~650-700 reported); any customer receiving the smishing text
Timeline
- Revolut acknowledges a social-engineering attack in which fraudulent information requests from a spoofed government-agency email address led to disclosure of a limited number of customers' ID copies, selfies, contact details and transaction histories.
- Phishing domain locked-ioc-2 is first scanned on VirusTotal; the page requests camera access, mimics Revolut's 'turn your head' liveness check, then asks for a password.
- A Revolut customer receives a phishing text in the same SMS thread as genuine Revolut messages, urging identity confirmation to avoid account restriction.
- Malwarebytes publishes analysis of the Revolut smishing and fake liveness-check page, noting the link to the breach is unconfirmed.
- Group 'iamnotavillain' posts a 6,000 XMR (~$3M) ransom demand with a 24-hour public countdown, claiming ~680 targeted accounts and 147 GB from Italian law enforcement; Reggio Calabria prosecutors reportedly open an investigation.
- Hackread reports the phishing campaign, adding exposed IBANs, wallet references and Bitcoin transaction details and that biometric facial telemetry was not compromised.
- The National (~650 users affected, Revolut says it blocked the sender and alerted authorities) and Infosecurity Magazine (infostealer-credential and six-month-access claims, single source) publish further coverage.
Sources cited
- Revolut phishing texts appear days after data breach (Malwarebytes, Pieter Arntz) malwarebytes.com · Blog · 2026-09-17
- Revolut Customers Targeted by Phishing Campaign After Data Breach (Hackread) hackread.com · News · 2026-09-18
- Revolut Customers Targeted with New Wave of Phishing Attacks (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2026-09-21
- Revolut customers' sensitive data exposed in phishing attack that fooled email security checks (Crypto Briefing) cryptobriefing.com · News · 2026-09-12
- Revolut faces $3M Monero ransom demand following customer data compromise (Parameter) parameter.io · News · 2026-09-17
- Revolut hack: criminals steal data of 700 European clients, demand $3M ransom (Euronews) euronews.com · News · 2026-09-17
- Revolut hack / data breach cyber (The National) thenationalnews.com · News · 2026-09-21
- Revolut hacker claims 147 GB stolen from Italian law enforcement (Pasquale Pillitteri) pasqualepillitteri.it · News · 2026-09-17
Previous and next in phishing
- RMM tools distributed via phishing: ScreenConnect, FleetDeck, Datto, SimpleHelp, JumpCloud and N-able abused for remote access Previous report
- EvilTokens (Storm-2992): AI-Chatbot Device-Code Phishing Service Disrupted by Microsoft DCU, Plus AI-Enabled Deepfake and Crypto Drainer Fraud (TRM Labs) Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.