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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2839

Revolut customers targeted by phishing texts and fake liveness-check page days after social-engineering data breach

highACTIVE

Revolut acknowledged on 2026-09-12 that a social-engineering attack, using fraudulent information requests from a spoofed Italian government email address, exposed identity documents, verification selfies and transaction histories of a limited number of customers (~650-700 reported). From 2026-09-14 a customer received a smishing text inside the genuine Revolut SMS thread linking to 93810.app, a page that requested camera access, mimicked Revolut's 'turn your head' liveness check, then asked for a password. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2839
Also known asRevolut data breach September 2026, Revolut smishing liveness-check campaign
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsRevolut Revolut customer accounts (KYC data, SMS channel)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1586.002 Email Accounts, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1598.003 Spearphishing Link, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, fintech, cryptocurrency, consumer
Target regionsEurope, united kingdom
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2839 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 6 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Revolut Fake Liveness-Check Phishing Domain 93810.app — DNS/Proxy Hit

Detects DNS resolution of, or web-proxy traffic to, 93810.app, the domain hosting the fake Revolut 'turn your head' liveness check that requests camera access and then a password (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14). A hit means a user or device followed the smishing link; treat the user as credential-exposed.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001, T1583.001
  • Data sources: web_proxy_zscaler, dns_stream, DnsEvents, CommonSecurityLog
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=proxy sourcetype="zscalernss-web") OR (index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns") earliest=-24h
| eval target=lower(coalesce(url, query))
| where match(target, "(^|[/.])93810[.]app([:/?]|$)")
| fillnull value="unknown" user src_ip
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(target) as targets values(sourcetype) as sources by src_ip user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

let ioc = '93810.app';
union isfuzzy=true
    (DnsEvents
        | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
        | where Name =~ ioc or Name endswith strcat('.', ioc)
        | project TimeGenerated, Source='DnsEvents', Computer, ClientIP, Target=Name),
    (CommonSecurityLog
        | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
        | where RequestURL contains ioc or DestinationHostName =~ ioc or DestinationHostName endswith strcat('.', ioc)
        | project TimeGenerated, Source='CommonSecurityLog', Computer, ClientIP=SourceIP, Target=iff(isnotempty(RequestURL), RequestURL, DestinationHostName))
| summarize Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Targets=make_set(Target, 10) by ClientIP, Computer, Source
| order by Hits desc

Sigma

title: DNS Query for Revolut Fake Liveness-Check Phishing Domain 93810.app
id: 7c1e4b52-3a8d-4f19-9b66-2d5f0a8e91c3
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution of 93810.app, the phishing domain hosting a fake Revolut turn-your-head liveness check followed by a password prompt (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14).
references:
    - https://www.malwarebytes.com/?p=466329
    - https://hackread.com/revolut-customers-phishing-campaign-data-breach/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_exact:
        query: '93810.app'
    selection_sub:
        query|endswith: '.93810.app'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or sandboxes safely detonating the URL
    - Threat-intel enrichment tooling resolving known-bad domains
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Analysts or sandboxes intentionally visiting the phishing URL
  • Threat-intel enrichment tooling that resolves known-bad domains

Tuning notes: Swap the index/sourcetype for your proxy and DNS sources (e.g. pan:traffic, bluecoat, Infoblox). Exclude security-team scanner IPs. Any hit with a non-blocked action should trigger a credential reset for the user and a check of other devices on the same SMS/phone-link path. No community-observed sibling infrastructure was available in osint_context.json; add siblings to the match regex when TL_OSINT_Scan reports them.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Endpoint and Mail-Click Telemetry to Revolut Phishing Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Click on [indicator] Followed by Sign-In from Unfamiliar IP (Credential Reuse Follow-On) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Government Data Request Followed by Outbound Attachment Release (Breach Workflow Correlation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Numeric-Only .app Domain Lookup (Sibling Infrastructure Pattern for [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fake Liveness / Selfie Identity-Check Lure URL on Non-Revolut Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Launched with Revolut Phishing URL [indicator] on Command Line · unlock with TL Creds
  • Revolut Brand Lookalike Domain Access (Non-Revolut Host) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Government-Domain Data Request to Compliance Mailbox (Out-of-Band Verification Trigger) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 6 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2839.

Sample indicators (2 of 6)

  • Domain: 93810[.]app
  • Domain: pec[.]interno[.]it

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 6 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

6 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Whether the phishing is tied to the breach is unconfirmed.

On 2026-09-12 Revolut publicly acknowledged that a social-engineering attack had exposed data of a limited number of customers. Per multiple reports, the attacker sent fraudulent information requests from an email address on a legitimate government domain (reported as an Italian government/regulator or law-enforcement address; The National and Euronews describe an Italian regulator / the Reggio Calabria prefecture mailbox, and a PEC sender on pec.interno.it was reported). The request reportedly passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC because it originated from a genuine government domain. No Revolut systems were breached: Revolut staff supplied the data in response to the fake request. Exposed data reportedly included identity and contact details, ID copies (passports, driving licences), verification selfies, account statements, transaction histories, IBANs and Bitcoin/wallet references. Revolut states customer funds and systems were unaffected, that it blocked the sender address and alerted authorities and regulators. Reported victim counts differ by outlet: Revolut confirmed about 680 European customers (Euronews); The National cites ~650; the extortionists claim at least 680 accounts, selected by blockchain analysis for large crypto holdings.

On 2026-09-17 a group calling itself 'iamnotavillain' posted a ransom demand of 6,000 XMR (about $3 million / EUR 2.61 million) with a 24-hour public countdown, threatening to sell the data otherwise, and claiming 147 GB taken from Italian law-enforcement systems (the law-enforcement compromise is an unverified claim). Reggio Calabria prosecutors reportedly opened an investigation. Infosecurity Magazine additionally reports the group used infostealer-log credentials to compromise Italian Ministry of Interior mailboxes with access held for ~6 months; this appears in a single outlet and is treated as unconfirmed.

The phishing campaign: from 2026-09-14 (two days after Revolut's acknowledgement) a customer received an SMS that appeared in the same conversation thread as genuine Revolut texts, urging the recipient to follow a link to confirm their identity or face account restrictions. The linked page, hosted on 93810.app (first scanned on VirusTotal 2026-09-14), requested device camera access, mimicked Revolut's 'turn your head' live-video identity check, and then prompted for the account password. This captures credentials and potentially selfie/video usable for identity fraud, account takeover or recovery-flow abuse. Malwarebytes (Pieter Arntz) stated it is unclear whether the phishing is connected to the breach or is opportunistic scamming exploiting the publicity. Inclusion in a genuine SMS thread suggests sender-ID spoofing, but the sources do not state the mechanism. No attribution of the phishing to the extortion group exists in the sources.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1586.002 Email Accounts

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1598.003 Spearphishing Link

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Do not follow links in unsolicited SMS/email claiming to be Revolut; open the official Revolut app directly
  • Block/report 93810.app at web proxies, DNS filtering and mobile threat defense
  • Verify the domain in the browser address bar before granting camera access or entering credentials
  • Revolut customers who entered a password or completed a fake liveness check should change the password, review active sessions/devices and contact Revolut support in-app

Workarounds

  • Use up-to-date anti-malware with web protection on mobile devices
  • Treat any page that requests camera access plus a password as suspicious

Longer-term hardening

  • Financial institutions: require out-of-band verification (callback to a published channel) for government/regulator data requests, even when the sender domain is authentic and passes SPF/DKIM/DMARC
  • Restrict bulk release of KYC documents, selfies and transaction history to a dual-approval compliance workflow
  • Customers with large crypto balances should expect targeted social engineering and enable all available account protections

Affected and fixed versions

  • Revolut — Revolut customer accounts (KYC data, SMS channel)
    Vulnerable versions: Customers whose KYC data was released (~650-700 reported); any customer receiving the smishing text

Timeline

  • Revolut acknowledges a social-engineering attack in which fraudulent information requests from a spoofed government-agency email address led to disclosure of a limited number of customers' ID copies, selfies, contact details and transaction histories.
  • Phishing domain locked-ioc-2 is first scanned on VirusTotal; the page requests camera access, mimics Revolut's 'turn your head' liveness check, then asks for a password.
  • A Revolut customer receives a phishing text in the same SMS thread as genuine Revolut messages, urging identity confirmation to avoid account restriction.
  • Malwarebytes publishes analysis of the Revolut smishing and fake liveness-check page, noting the link to the breach is unconfirmed.
  • Group 'iamnotavillain' posts a 6,000 XMR (~$3M) ransom demand with a 24-hour public countdown, claiming ~680 targeted accounts and 147 GB from Italian law enforcement; Reggio Calabria prosecutors reportedly open an investigation.
  • Hackread reports the phishing campaign, adding exposed IBANs, wallet references and Bitcoin transaction details and that biometric facial telemetry was not compromised.
  • The National (~650 users affected, Revolut says it blocked the sender and alerted authorities) and Infosecurity Magazine (infostealer-credential and six-month-access claims, single source) publish further coverage.

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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