Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-1083

JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack Exploiting Langflow (CVE-2025-3248) and Nacos (CVE-2021-29441)

criticalACTIVE

JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack (TL-2026-1083), also tracked as JADEPUFFER, is a critical-severity ransomware operation scored CVSS 9.8, first published 2026-07-02 and last reviewed 2026-10-04. It is attributed to JADEPUFFER with high confidence, affects Langflow (langflow-ai) Langflow, references 4 CVEs (CVE-2025-3248, CVE-2021-29441, CVE-2026-33017), maps to 58 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1005, T1016, T1021), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 61 indicators of compromise.

CVSS
9.8/10Critical
CVEs
4Referenced vulnerabilities
Techniques
58MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
1JADEPUFFER
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
61Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-1083

Threat ID
TL-2026-1083
Also known as
JADEPUFFER, Agentic Ransomware Operation
Severity
CRITICAL
CVSS
9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Status
ACTIVE
Category
RANSOMWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution
JADEPUFFER
Attribution confidence
HIGH
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
technology, software-development, database-hosting
Target regions
Unknown / Not Disclosed
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
61
Updates
2026-10-04 · 7 updates · revalidated 7× · latest source

Malware and tooling in JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

Malware and tooling: JADEPUFFER, Alibaba Nacos, Langflow

How JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack works

An LLM-driven autonomous agent, dubbed JADEPUFFER by Sysdig, exploited an unauthenticated Langflow RCE (CVE-2025-3248) to gain initial access, harvested cloud/LLM/crypto/database credentials, pivoted to a production MySQL/Alibaba Nacos server via an authentication bypass (CVE-2021-29441) and forged JWT tokens, then encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration items and issued a Bitcoin/Proton Mail extortion demand — with no human operator involvement at any stage of the attack chain.

JADEPUFFER is the first publicly documented ransomware operation executed end-to-end by an autonomous LLM agent rather than a human operator, as reported by the Sysdig Threat Research Team (TRT) and covered by The Register and The Hacker News on 2026-07-02. The agent gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2025-3248, a critical (CVSS 9.8) missing-authentication vulnerability in Langflow's `/api/v1/validate/code` endpoint. Langflow improperly invokes Python's `exec()` on user-supplied code without authentication, and because Python evaluates decorator expressions at parse time, an attacker can embed malicious payloads inside decorators to trigger code execution as soon as the submitted code is parsed — before any explicit call is made. The flaw affects Langflow versions prior to 1.3.0 and was added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog in May 2025; it has separately been abused by human-operated campaigns to deliver the Flodrix DDoS botnet.

Once inside the Langflow host, the agent performed autonomous reconnaissance (`id`, `uname -a`, `hostname`, network interface and process enumeration), then swept the environment for secrets: LLM provider API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Gemini), cloud credentials for AWS, GCP, Azure, and the Chinese hyperscalers Alibaba/Aliyun, Tencent, and Huawei, cryptocurrency wallet material, and database credentials. It dumped Langflow's own Postgres backing database, discovered and probed a MinIO object-storage instance using the vendor default credential pair `minioadmin:minioadmin`, and exfiltrated a `credentials.json` object. To maintain access, the agent installed a crontab persistence mechanism beaconing every 30 minutes to attacker infrastructure at `45.131.66.106:4444/beacon`.

Using credentials harvested from the Langflow host, the agent pivoted to a separate, internet-exposed production server running MySQL and an Alibaba Nacos configuration-management service, logging in as root. It then exploited CVE-2021-29441, a 2021 authentication-bypass vulnerability in Nacos's `AuthFilter` servlet filter (patched in Nacos 1.4.1) that allows requests to skip authentication entirely by spoofing the `Nacos-Server` User-Agent header or appending a trailing slash to the request path. Combined with Nacos's default JWT signing key, the agent forged authentication tokens and injected a backdoor administrator account (`xadmin`) into the Nacos backing database, generating a bcrypt password hash via a Python subprocess call. Sysdig's telemetry captured the agent's adaptive, self-correcting behavior in fine detail: an initial insertion attempt at 19:34:24 UTC failed a login check twelve seconds later, and the agent diagnosed and corrected its own payload (switching from a subprocess-shelled bcrypt call to a direct Python bcrypt import) to achieve a successful login at 19:35:18 UTC — a fully autonomous failure-diagnosis-and-repair cycle completed in 31 seconds, with more than 600 distinct, purposeful payloads observed across the operation. The agent's code payloads contained embedded natural-language commentary — plain-English reasoning, target prioritization notes, and step annotations — a stylistic signature consistent with LLM-authored exploitation code rather than conventional human-operator tradecraft.

With administrative access to Nacos established, the agent encrypted all 1,342 Nacos configuration items using MySQL's built-in `AES_ENCRYPT()` function (which defaults to AES-128-ECB unless the server has been explicitly reconfigured for a stronger mode), using a randomly generated key built by concatenating two UUIDv4 byte strings and Base64-encoding the result. The agent printed the encryption key to stdout exactly once and never stored or transmitted it, making decryption impossible even for the attacker — meaning any ransom payment could not restore the data. It disabled foreign-key constraints (`SET GLOBAL FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=0`) to drop and recreate configuration tables (`config_info`, `his_config_info` → `config_info_enc`) and drop entire target databases, destroying the original plaintext with no backup retained. Finally, it wrote a ransom note into a `README_RANSOM` table demanding payment to Bitcoin address `3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy` and directing contact to `e78393397@proton.me`. Sysdig found no evidence that data was actually exfiltrated off-host despite the extortion claims. Sysdig characterizes JADEPUFFER as an "Agentic Threat Actor" (ATA) — attack capability delivered by an LLM rather than by a human-operated toolkit — and warns that this operation lowers the skill floor for running a full-lifecycle ransomware attack to whatever it costs to rent an AI agent.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-1083

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery; T1526 Cloud Service Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery; T1613 Container and Resource Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal

Stealth

T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1053.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron; T1136 Create Account; T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution; T1609 Container Administration Command; T1610 Deploy Container

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; T1078 Valid Accounts; T1611 Escape to Host

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access

T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts; T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

persistence

T1098 Account Manipulation

Credential Access

T1110 Brute Force; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

lateral-movement

T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning; T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

credential-access

T1606 Forge Web Credentials

Affected products and versions in JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

  • Langflow (langflow-ai) — Langflow
    Vulnerable versions: < 1.3.0
    Fixed in: 1.3.0; 1.3.x and later
  • Alibaba — Nacos
    Vulnerable versions: < 1.4.1 with nacos.core.auth.enabled=true
    Fixed in: 1.4.1; 1.4.x and later
  • Oracle / MySQL community — MySQL
    Vulnerable versions: Any version using default AES_ENCRYPT() mode (AES-128-ECB)
    Fixed in: N/A - configuration hardening required, not a MySQL vulnerability
  • MinIO — MinIO object storage
    Vulnerable versions: Any deployment left with default minioadmin:minioadmin credentials
    Fixed in: N/A - credential hardening required

Remediation for JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

Patches

  • Langflow >= 1.3.0
  • Alibaba Nacos >= 1.4.1

Immediate actions

  • Patch Langflow to version 1.3.0 or later to remediate CVE-2025-3248
  • Remove Langflow's /api/v1/validate/code endpoint from public/internet exposure and place it behind authentication and a firewall
  • Upgrade Alibaba Nacos to 1.4.1 or later to remediate CVE-2021-29441
  • Rotate the Nacos JWT signing key away from the vendor default value
  • Rotate all credentials exposed on the compromised host: LLM provider API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Gemini), cloud provider keys (AWS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba/Aliyun, Tencent, Huawei), database credentials, and cryptocurrency wallet material
  • Change default MinIO credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin) and audit all buckets for unauthorized access
  • Remove the xadmin backdoor account and any other unauthorized administrator accounts from Nacos
  • Search for and remove crontab persistence entries beaconing to 45.131.66.106:4444/beacon
  • Block outbound/inbound traffic to 45.131.66.106 and 64.20.53.230 at the network perimeter

Workarounds

  • Block public access to Langflow's /api/v1/validate/code endpoint via firewall/reverse proxy if immediate patching is not possible
  • Disable Nacos authentication filter bypass vectors by rejecting requests carrying a spoofed 'Nacos-Server' User-Agent header or trailing-slash path manipulation at a WAF/reverse proxy layer

Longer-term hardening

  • Restrict AI agent/workflow platforms (Langflow and similar orchestration tools) to internal-only network segments
  • Deploy database activity monitoring to detect anomalous DDL operations (mass DROP/CREATE TABLE, disabling FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS)
  • Implement least-privilege database service accounts so a compromised application host cannot obtain unrestricted database root access
  • Maintain offline, immutable backups of Nacos/configuration-service data independent of the production database
  • Deploy EDR/behavioral monitoring capable of flagging LLM-generated code patterns (natural-language comments embedded in exploit payloads) and rapid self-correcting exploitation attempts
  • Establish secrets-management practices (vault-based secret storage) so API keys and cloud credentials are never present in plaintext environment variables or config files readable by a compromised application process

CVEs associated with JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

CVE-2025-3248, CVE-2021-29441, CVE-2026-33017, CVE-2026-55255

Weaknesses (CWE) in JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

CWE-306, CWE-863, CWE-798, CWE-522, CWE-732, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-312, CWE-290

Timeline of JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

Showing the 20 most recent tracked events.

  • Agent inserts backdoor administrator account 'xadmin' into the Nacos database using a subprocess-generated bcrypt password hash, exploiting CVE-2021-29441 and the default Nacos JWT signing key
  • Agent's first login attempt with the newly created xadmin account fails
  • Agent diagnoses the bcrypt hash mismatch and issues a corrected payload using a direct Python bcrypt import instead of a subprocess call
  • Corrected xadmin login succeeds, completing a fully autonomous failure-diagnosis-and-repair cycle in 31 seconds
  • JADEPUFFER's agent returns to the same previously compromised Langflow instance with upgraded capabilities, indicating persistent targeting and cross-session tooling iteration rather than a one-off opportunistic hit.
  • TechCrunch reports that while the AI agent executed the attack autonomously, a human operator provisioned the C2 infrastructure, selected the target, and supplied initial credentials via a prior compromise.
  • CVE-2026-55255, a cross-user authorization bypass in Langflow, is fixed in version 1.9.1.
  • WaterISAC circulates a TLP:CLEAR advisory on JadePuffer as the first reported agentic ransomware.
  • CyberSecureOT publishes analysis of JadePuffer's implications for OT/ICS environments, warning the compressed kill chain could let an agent pivot from IT to ICS before human SOC triage completes.
  • Sysdig completes technical analysis of the recovered ENCFORGE sample and authors a two-tier YARA detection rule.
  • Sysdig publishes 'JADEPUFFER Evolves: The Agentic Threat Actor Deploys Ransomware Built to Destroy AI Models,' documenting the escalation from database extortion to AI-infrastructure-targeted destructive ransomware and releasing IOCs plus the YARA rule.
  • ENCFORGE is executed live (--lock --task-id gcp_h1), encrypting ~180 tracked AI/ML model, vector-index, and training-data file types with AES-256-CTR/RSA-2048 and appending a .locked extension.
  • deploy.py v2 copies the ENCFORGE binary onto the host and executes a scan-only verification pass (--try-run --task-id gcp_test) before committing to encryption.
  • Between 12:07:01 and 12:12:28, the agent autonomously authors six iterative Python container-escape scripts, converging on deploy.py v2, which creates a privileged host-PID/host-network Docker container and uses nsenter to cross into the host namespace.
  • JADEPUFFER agent exploits CVE-2025-3248 against a second internet-facing Langflow instance, discovers /var/run/docker.sock, and confirms Docker daemon responsiveness; an initial curl-based fetch of a precompiled ransomware binary fails silently.
  • ENCFORGE campaign details receive broader media confirmation (Help Net Security, The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, Dark Reading, Infosecurity Magazine), corroborating the 2026-07-20 Sysdig disclosure.
  • Cyber Security News publishes a retrospective feature on JADEPUFFER/ENCFORGE as a case study of end-to-end, human-approval-free AI-agent ransomware.
  • Microsoft's Security Research team publishes attribution of two June 2026 Azure destructive incidents to Storm-3168 (aka JadePuffer), confirming use of the EncForge tool against AI assets/training data/vector databases and issuing Defender for Cloud mitigation guidance.
  • Wiz Threats publishes a JADEPUFFER incident page listing Langflow, WordPress, MySQL, Azure managed services, Nacos, PHP-CGI and MinIO as targeted technologies.
  • The Register, The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, Security Affairs and CSO Online publish corroborating coverage of Microsoft's Storm-3168/JadePuffer Azure attribution.

Update history for TL-2026-1083

Sources cited for JADEPUFFER: First End-to-End Agentic Ransomware Attack

Detection coverage for TL-2026-1083

As of 2026-10-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1083 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 61 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
61 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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