Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-1531
Operation Poseidon: Konni APT Spear-Phishing Campaign Abusing Google Ads Redirection to Deliver EndRAT
Konni APT (North Korea, RGB-linked, overlaps with Kimsuky) is running 'Operation Poseidon,' a spear-phishing campaign impersonating South Korean financial institutions and North Korean human rights NGOs that abuses legitimate Google Ads (doubleclick.net) and NAVER Marketing redirection infrastructure to deliver LNK-in-ZIP files.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1531 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation Poseidon |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (LNK shortcut file handling / Windows Script Host ecosystem); AutoIt Consulting AutoIt3.exe interpreter (abused as living-off-the-land execution vector); Google Google Ads / ad.doubleclick.net redirection service (abused as URL-hiding infrastructure); NAVER Corporation NAVER Marketing / mkt.naver.com redirector (abused, limited May-July 2025) |
| Attribution | Konni APT (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | AutoItRAT, EndRAT |
| Tools | AutoIt3.exe |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 10 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | financial services, government administration, human rights ngo, banking |
| Target regions | south korea, East Asia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-01-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1531 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 50 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Konni Poseidon — LNK Executed From Extracted ZIP Under Explorer
Detects a Windows shortcut (.lnk) launched with explorer.exe as parent from a Downloads/Temp path, matching the PDF-icon-masqueraded LNK-in-ZIP delivered via Konni's Operation Poseidon spear-phishing lures (financial-institution and NK human-rights-NGO themes).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1036.008
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)\\\\explorer\\.exe$")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)\\.lnk")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)\\\\(Downloads|Temp|AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp)\\\\")
| eval lure_kw=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)(remittance|explanatory|transaction|consent|human.?rights|recruitment)"), "true", "false")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, lure_kw
| where count > 0
| table first_seen, last_seen, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, lure_kw, countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".lnk"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Downloads", "Temp", "AppData\\Local\\Temp")
| extend LureKeyword = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("remittance", "explanatory", "transaction", "consent", "human rights", "recruitment")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, LureKeyword
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: LNK File Executed From Extracted ZIP With Explorer Parent (Konni Poseidon)
id: 4d8a1c2e-1531-4a01-9c11-poseidonspl001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a Windows LNK shortcut spawned by explorer.exe from a Downloads/Temp path, consistent with Konni APT Operation Poseidon PDF-icon-masqueraded LNK-in-ZIP delivery.
references:
- https://www.genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_intelligence/spear-phishing
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-19
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1036.008
- attack.group.g0094
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\\explorer.exe'
selection_lnk:
CommandLine|contains: '.lnk'
selection_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\\Downloads\\'
- '\\Temp\\'
- '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\'
filter_legit:
CommandLine|contains: 'Microsoft'
condition: all of selection_* and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
- Legitimate shortcut files created by installers or IT deployment tooling in user profile paths
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- IT-deployed shortcut files or software installers that legitimately spawn from explorer.exe in user Downloads/Temp folders
Tuning notes: Tune the lure-keyword list to the organization's language/locale (Korean-language equivalents for 'remittance confirmation', 'personal information consent'). Exclude known software-deployment paths (e.g. SCCM cache) via an allowlist filter.
- Konni Poseidon — PHPMailer-Spoofed Financial/NGO Lure With Hidden CSS Padding and Web Beacon · unlock with TL Creds
- Konni Poseidon — EndRAT/AutoItRAT Internal String Markers on Disk or in Memory · unlock with TL Creds
- Konni Poseidon — PowerShell Encoded Command Network Egress Outside Baseline · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: Masqueraded PDF-Icon LNK Extracted From ZIP Archive by Document Viewer/Explorer · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: Registry Run-Key Persistence Created Shortly After Shell Interpreter Spawn From Document Viewer · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: DNS/Proxy Query for Konni Poseidon Reused C2 Domain ([indicator] Family) · unlock with TL Creds
- Konni Poseidon — AutoIt3.exe Spawning PowerShell (EndRAT Loader Chain) · unlock with TL Creds
- Konni Poseidon — Ad-Redirector-to-Archive Download Followed by Reused C2 Domain Beacon · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-01-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 50 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1531.
Sample indicators (3 of 50)
- IP address:
109.234.36[.]135 - Domain:
jlrandsons[.]co[.]uk - File hash:
f5842320e04c2c97d1f69cebfd47df3d
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 50 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
15 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
The LNK triggers AutoIt3.exe to load the memory-resident EndRAT (AutoItRAT variant) implant, using invisible-text email padding and web-beacon tracking for evasion and recipient telemetry.
Genians Security Center identified Operation Poseidon, an ongoing Konni APT campaign targeting South Korean financial-sector employees and North Korean human-rights activists/NGOs. The threat actor sends spear-phishing emails, spoofed via PHPMailer, that impersonate financial institutions (with lures such as 'explanatory materials,' 'remittance confirmation,' 'transaction details,' and 'personal information consent' requests) and NK human-rights recruitment/outreach communications. Emails contain CSS 'display:none' hidden English-language padding sentences designed to defeat AI/LLM-based content-classification detection, plus 1x1-pixel image web beacons with Base64-encoded per-recipient identifiers to confirm opens and track engagement.
Malicious download links are wrapped through Google Ads' ad.doubleclick.net redirection mechanism (and, in a smaller May-July 2025 subset, NAVER's mkt.naver.com marketing redirector) so that the true destination — attacker or compromised WordPress infrastructure — is hidden inside legitimate advertising-network URL parameters, defeating simple domain-reputation and URL-category filtering. Clicking the link downloads a ZIP archive containing a Windows LNK (shortcut) file whose icon is masqueraded as a PDF document. Executing the LNK invokes AutoIt3.exe with an embedded AutoIt script and PowerShell, which loads the EndRAT payload directly into memory without dropping additional stages to disk, evading signature-based antivirus.
EndRAT (tracked by Genians as EndRAT / AutoItRAT) is a memory-resident remote access trojan. Internal strings recovered from samples (endServer9688, endClient9688, endServerFile9688, endClientFile9688) and a build-path artifact — 'D:\3_Attack Weapon\Autoit\Build\__Poseidon - Attack\client3.3.14.a3x' — reveal the operator's internal campaign codename ('Poseidon - Attack') and a maintained versioning scheme (client3.3.14), indicating continuous development of a reusable AutoIt-based attack framework rather than a one-off toolset.
Attribution to Konni rests on: reuse of the C2 domain jlrandsons.co.uk across multiple campaigns; identical delivery/attack code shared between the financial-lure and human-rights-lure tracks; a malware family (EndRAT/AutoItRAT) whose versioning is consistent with historical Konni AutoIt-based RAT development; abuse of compromised WordPress sites for staging/C2 matching prior Konni tradecraft; and thematic targeting (South Korean finance, North Korean human-rights circles) that aligns with Konni's documented social-engineering patterns. Konni overlaps significantly with the broader Kimsuky cluster (MITRE ATT&CK G0094; aliases Black Banshee, Velvet Chollima, THALLIUM, Emerald Sleet, APT43, TA427, Springtail, Earth Kumiho, TA406, Vedalia, Earth Imp), a DPRK Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)-attributed espionage group active since at least 2012.
Genians assesses the campaign as CRITICAL severity and 'difficult to mitigate through a single security solution,' recommending layered, behavior-based EDR defense (process-tree monitoring from document viewers to cmd.exe/powershell.exe/AutoIt3.exe, PowerShell network-egress monitoring, and Attack Storyline-style infection-chain correlation) rather than reliance on signature or URL-reputation controls alone.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
lateral-movement
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Initial Access
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1598 Phishing for Information
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block or quarantine by default any inbound attachments/links from senders impersonating financial institutions or NGO/human-rights outreach
- Apply warning banners for attachments/filenames containing keywords such as 'explanatory materials,' 'remittance confirmation,' 'transaction details,' or 'personal information consent'
- Disable or strip LNK files packaged inside ZIP archives at the email gateway and endpoint
- Block known C2 domains and IPs (see IOC list) at DNS/firewall/proxy
- Hunt for AutoIt3.exe execution originating from Temp/Downloads paths or spawned by explorer.exe following LNK execution
Workarounds
- Strengthen behavior-based detection for post-click redirection flows traversing legitimate advertising domains (ad.doubleclick.net, mkt.naver.com)
- Classify archive/executable downloads reached via advertising-network redirect URLs as anomalous and subject to additional inspection or blocking
- Disable inline image loading / web-beacon rendering in email clients to reduce recipient-tracking telemetry leakage
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy behavior-based EDR with process-tree analytics for document-viewer-to-shell transitions
- Correlate AV signatures, IOC feeds, and machine-learning/XBA behavioral engines to detect multi-stage infection flows
- Implement Attack Storyline-style visualization to trace full infection chains from initial email to C2
- Monitor PowerShell network egress for anomalous external connections outside normal administrative baselines
- Establish automatic endpoint isolation policies for hosts exhibiting fileless C2 behavior
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (LNK shortcut file handling / Windows Script Host ecosystem)
Vulnerable versions: All supported Windows desktop versions - AutoIt Consulting — AutoIt3.exe interpreter (abused as living-off-the-land execution vector)
Vulnerable versions: Any version present on victim endpoints - Google — Google Ads / ad.doubleclick.net redirection service (abused as URL-hiding infrastructure)
Vulnerable versions: N/A - service abuse, not a vulnerability - NAVER Corporation — NAVER Marketing / mkt.naver.com redirector (abused, limited May-July 2025)
Vulnerable versions: N/A - service abuse, not a vulnerability
Timeline
- Limited abuse of NAVER Marketing (mkt.naver.com) click-tracking/redirection infrastructure begins as an early precursor delivery vector, observed on a limited basis May-July 2025.
- Attack pattern shifts to using marketing/advertising URL intermediaries as the primary delivery mechanism; EndRAT/AutoItRAT malware samples are first reported by researchers, marking the pivot from NAVER-only abuse to broader advertising-redirector abuse.
- Konni shifts primary delivery infrastructure to abuse of Google Ads (ad.doubleclick.net) redirection to conceal C2 destinations within legitimate advertising URL parameters, superseding the earlier NAVER-only redirection chain.
- Spear-phishing wave impersonating South Korean financial institutions begins; ZIP archives containing malicious LNK files are distributed to financial-sector employees, dropping EndRAT via AutoIt3.exe.
- A parallel campaign track impersonating North Korean human-rights NGO recruitment/outreach communications is identified, sharing identical attack code and infrastructure with the financial-lure track.
- South Korea's Financial Security Institute (FSI) publishes 'Threat Intelligence Report: Analysis of the LNK Malware Threat from Nation-State Hacking Groups,' a comparative analysis of the LNK-based malware used in the campaign (fsec.or.kr).
- Operators begin stripping the internal build-path artifact ('locked-ioc-1') from newer EndRAT samples, indicating awareness of and adaptation to prior detection/disclosure of the string.
- Genians Security Center publicly discloses Operation Poseidon, detailing the full attack chain, EndRAT/AutoItRAT malware internals, web-beacon/CSS-padding evasion tradecraft, and associated IOCs.
Sources cited
- North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat Focus: Kimsuky CISA · Government advisory · 2020-10-27
- Kimsuky, Black Banshee, Velvet Chollima, Emerald Sleet, THALLIUM, APT43, TA427, Springtail, Earth Kumiho, PatheticSlug, Group G0094 MITRE · Research · 2026-01-01
- Threat Assessment: North Korean Threat Groups Unit 42 · Research · 2024-01-01
- Threat Intelligence Report: Analysis of the LNK Malware Threat from Nation-State Hacking Groups fsec.or.kr · Research · 2025-12-22
- Operation Poseidon: Spear-Phishing Attacks Abusing Google Ads Redirection Mechanisms genians.co.kr · Blog · 2026-01-19
- Konni Group Attack Detection: North Korean Hackers Leverage Russian-Language Weaponized Word Document to Spread RAT Malware socprime.com · Blog · 2025-01-01
- North Korean Konni APT Targets Ukraine with Malware to track Russian Invasion Progress The Hacker News · News · 2025-05-01
- North Korea-linked Konni APT used Google Find Hub to erase data and spy on defectors securityaffairs.com · News · 2025-11-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.