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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1567

HOLLOWGRAPH: Microsoft 365 Calendar-Based C2 Malware Targeting Israeli Organizations (Cavern Manticore)

highACTIVE

A stealthy .NET-compiled malware component dubbed HOLLOWGRAPH abuses the Microsoft Graph API and compromised Microsoft 365/Entra ID accounts to plant covert command instructions and exfiltrate data via calendar events dated 2050-05-13, targeting Israeli organizations in a suspected espionage operation. Group-IB attributes HOLLOWGRAPH with high confidence to the Cavern modular backdoor framework, which Check Point Research ties to an Iran-nexus actor tracked as Cavern Manticore (MOIS-linked), with technical overlap to MuddyWater and a low-confidence link to Lyceum.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1567
Also known asHollowGraph, Cavern backdoor framework campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Microsoft Graph API; Microsoft Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD); SysAid SysAid RMM (software-deployment feature abused, not exploited); WinDirStat WinDirStat.exe
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-311, CWE-693
AttributionCavern Manticore (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
MalwareCavern, HOLLOWGRAPH
ToolsSysAid RMM software-deployment feature, WinDirStat
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1001 Data Obfuscation, T1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1072 Software Deployment Tools, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087 Account Discovery and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense, informationtechnology
Target regionsisrael, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1567 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: HOLLOWGRAPH Far-Future Calendar Dead-Drop Event via Graph API

Detects Microsoft Graph API calendar events dated far in the future (e.g. 2050-05-13) with bare-GUID or 'Boss{..}ID{..}' subjects and File{n}.txt-style attachments — the HOLLOWGRAPH covert tasking/exfiltration dead-drop pattern.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1001.002, T1027
  • Data sources: o365_management_activity, microsoft_graph_audit_logs, exchange_online_audit
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation IN ("New-CalendarEvent","UpdateCalendarEvent","MailItemsAccessed")
| eval event_start=strftime(strptime(EventData.start, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), "%Y")
| where event_start>"2049"
| eval subj=EventData.subject
| where match(subj, "^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$") OR match(EventData.attachment_name, "File[0-9]+\.txt")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by user_id, subj, EventData.attachment_name
| where count>=1

Microsoft KQL

OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Workload == "Exchange" and Operation in ("New-CalendarEvent","UpdateCalendarEvent")
| extend EventSubject = tostring(parse_json(Parameters).subject), EventStart = tostring(parse_json(Parameters).start)
| where EventStart startswith "2050-" or EventStart startswith "2049-"
| where EventSubject matches regex @"^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$"
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, EventSubject, EventStart, ClientIP

Sigma

title: HOLLOWGRAPH M365 Calendar Dead-Drop Event with Far-Future Timestamp
id: 8b1f6e3a-hollowgraph-calendar-deaddrop
status: experimental
description: Detects a Microsoft Graph calendar event dated far in the future with a bare-GUID or Boss{..}ID{..} subject, consistent with HOLLOWGRAPH's covert dead-drop tasking/exfiltration channel.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1001.002
    - cve.2026.hollowgraph
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: graph_api
    category: application
detection:
    selection_subject:
        EventSubject|re: '^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$'
    selection_date:
        EventStartDate|startswith: '2050-'
    selection_attachment:
        AttachmentName|re: 'File[0-9]+\.txt'
    condition: selection_date and (selection_subject or selection_attachment)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate far-future placeholder events (rare)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate far-future placeholder/test calendar events created by scheduling automation

Tuning notes: Tune the year threshold (currently >2049) to the organization's realistic scheduling horizon; correlate matches with the account's Calendars.ReadWrite OAuth grant history to reduce noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Anomalous OAuth App Registration with Calendars.ReadWrite/Mail.Read Graph Scopes · unlock with TL Creds
  • DPAPI Credential Decryption Consistent with Cavern mhm.dll Module · unlock with TL Creds
  • LDAP/AD Enumeration and SMB Brute-Force Consistent with Cavern ode.dll/n-ten.dll · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cavern C2 HTTPS Beacon with Static User-Agent and X-User-token Header · unlock with TL Creds
  • SOCKS5/WebSocket Tunnel Proxy Consistent with Cavern n-sws.dll · unlock with TL Creds
  • Disguised Credential/Key-Material Artifact Files ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WinDirStat.exe DLL Side-Load of Trojanized uxtheme.dll (Cavern Agent) · unlock with TL Creds
  • High-Volume AAAA DNS Tunneling to Cavern C2 Domains (Entra ID Credential Refresh) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1567.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • Domain: cloudlanecdn[.]com
  • File hash: 37e123bd7998af4eae32718ce254776f36365a80ba56952593dab46f536d4066
  • Domain: hospitalinstallation[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

HOLLOWGRAPH is a .NET DLL implant that treats the calendar of a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox as a two-way covert dead drop, wrapping all command-and-control traffic inside legitimate Microsoft Graph API requests so that it blends into ordinary Microsoft 365 application traffic and never contacts an attacker-owned server directly for tasking. The implant supports exactly two commands: 'get' (retrieve operator tasking) and 'send' (exfiltrate stolen data). To pull tasking, HOLLOWGRAPH queries the compromised mailbox's calendar for an event planted by the operator and dated 2050-05-13 -- roughly 24 years in the future -- so the legitimate mailbox owner is unlikely to ever scroll to it. Event subjects follow bare-GUID or 'Event ID:' / 'Boss{..}ID{..}' naming patterns, and instructions are read from an attached File{n}.txt-style attachment. To exfiltrate, the malware reverses the process: it encrypts the stolen file, creates its own far-future calendar event, and uploads the data as one or more attachments. All calendar-borne communications are secured with a hybrid RSA + AES-256-GCM encryption scheme, using distinct RSA key pairs for inbound tasking versus outbound exfiltration.

A secondary channel supports credential refresh: HOLLOWGRAPH performs DNS tunneling over IPv6 AAAA record queries to the attacker domain cloudlanecdn[.]com, extracting roughly 14 usable payload bytes per 16-byte IPv6 address, reassembling multiple query responses into a UTF-8 payload that updates locally cached Entra ID (Azure AD) credential material. This DNS channel is unencrypted, unlike the calendar channel. A local artifact, logAzure.txt, disguises stored credentials and encryption key material as a routine Azure logging file.

Group-IB ties HOLLOWGRAPH to the Cavern framework with high confidence based on shared command syntax and matching internal tasking structure, but states it cannot confidently attribute the campaign to a previously identified threat actor at high confidence. Check Point Research separately documented Cavern -- a modular, three-format .NET backdoor framework (standard .NET Framework IL, Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 NativeAOT) -- and attributed it to an Iran-nexus, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked cluster it calls Cavern Manticore, which overlaps technically with the known Iranian actors MuddyWater and OilRig's Lyceum subgroup. In a related, separately reported intrusion, Cavern Manticore abused the legitimate software-deployment feature of an already-compromised SysAid RMM instance (no SysAid vulnerability was involved) to push a DLL-sideloading package -- WinDirStat.exe alongside a trojanized uxtheme.dll (the Cavern Agent) -- to a second host inside the same victim network, from which additional Cavern modules (n-HTCommp.dll for HTTPS/WebSocket transport, mhm.dll for file operations and DPAPI credential decryption, db.dll for SQL database enumeration, ode.dll for LDAP/AD reconnaissance and brute-force, n-ten.dll for network/SMB reconnaissance, n-sws.dll for SOCKS5/WebSocket tunneling) were deployed on demand. Cavern's C2 infrastructure is registered through the Iranian hosting/registrar Fars Data, with domains including hospitalinstallation[.]com and its subdomains auth.hospitalinstallation[.]com and google.com.hospitalinstallation[.]com (the latter using a lookalike subdomain for visual obfuscation), plus legacy infrastructure adserviceupdate[.]com and hygienehistory[.]com. Group-IB observed at least 12 infected systems, three of them actively communicating with the operator, across a campaign window running from 3 June to 9 July 2026, consistent with a small, selective footprint indicative of targeted espionage rather than opportunistic crime.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Command and Control

T1001 Data Obfuscation; T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1078 Valid Accounts; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Execution

T1072 Software Deployment Tools

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Credential Access

T1110 Brute Force; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

stealth

T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the C2 domains cloudlanecdn[.]com, hospitalinstallation[.]com, auth.hospitalinstallation[.]com, google.com.hospitalinstallation[.]com, adserviceupdate[.]com, and hygienehistory[.]com at DNS/perimeter
  • Hunt Microsoft 365 / Microsoft Graph audit logs for calendar events dated far in the future (e.g. 2050-05-13) with bare-GUID or 'Event ID:' / 'Boss{..}ID{..}' subjects and File{n}.txt-pattern attachments
  • Audit OAuth client-credential and app-registration grants against Microsoft Graph API for anomalous calendar/mail scopes
  • Search endpoints for logAzure.txt and config.txt artifacts and for uxtheme.dll loaded outside its legitimate Windows theming context
  • Isolate hosts showing WinDirStat.exe spawned from an RMM/software-deployment tool followed by unexpected DLL loads

Workarounds

  • Disable or tightly scope legacy OAuth app permissions with Calendars.ReadWrite / Mail.Read Graph scopes pending investigation
  • Restrict SysAid (or equivalent RMM) software-deployment jobs to signed, allow-listed packages only

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for anomalous AppDomain loads and .NET NativeAOT execution in non-development contexts
  • Implement Conditional Access policies and MFA hardening for Microsoft 365 / Entra ID accounts, particularly for accounts with calendar-sharing or delegate access
  • Restrict and monitor RMM/software-deployment platform features (remote file push, remote printing, clipboard, file transfer) with least-privilege access to deployment consoles
  • Establish continuous outbound DNS monitoring for high-volume AAAA queries to single domains with high-entropy subdomain labels (DNS tunneling detection)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Microsoft Graph API
    Vulnerable versions: cloud service - all tenants with compromised credentials
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)
    Vulnerable versions: cloud service - accounts with compromised credentials
  • SysAid — SysAid RMM (software-deployment feature abused, not exploited)
    Vulnerable versions: N/A - legitimate feature abuse, no vulnerability involved
  • WinDirStat — WinDirStat.exe
    Vulnerable versions: all versions - abused for DLL sideloading via uxtheme.dll

Timeline

  • Cavern Manticore emerges as a tracked cluster with focused campaigns in early 2026, per Check Point Research / GBHackers reporting on the Cavern framework's origin (approximate date; sources cite 'early 2026' without a specific day).
  • Group-IB observes earliest active HOLLOWGRAPH victim traffic; campaign window begins.
  • Rescana publishes an active-exploitation alert on Cavern Manticore's abuse of SysAid's software-deployment feature to push the trojanized WinDirStat/uxtheme.dll DLL-sideloading package.
  • Rescana issues a correction to its SysAid alert, clarifying that Cavern Manticore had already gained access to the victim environment before abusing SysAid's legitimate software-deployment feature -- no SysAid vulnerability was involved.
  • Last observed active HOLLOWGRAPH victim C2 communication between a compromised mailbox and the attackers, closing the ~5-week observation window (3 June - 9 July 2026).
  • Cyber Security News, The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, Infosecurity Magazine, The Register, and WindowsNews.ai publish coverage of the HOLLOWGRAPH findings, targeting Israeli organizations.
  • Group-IB publicly discloses HOLLOWGRAPH, its Microsoft Graph API calendar-based C2 mechanism, and its high-confidence linkage to the Cavern backdoor framework.
  • Date used by HOLLOWGRAPH operators for planted calendar-event dead-drops, chosen roughly 24 years in the future to avoid discovery by the legitimate mailbox owner.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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