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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2053

Cavern Manticore's CAV3RN C2 Framework Adds DNS-Based Channel Selection and Google Apps Script Relay

highACTIVE

Iran-linked cluster Cavern Manticore (aka Cav3rn, MOIS-affiliated, overlapping MuddyWater and OilRig sub-group Lyceum) has evolved its modular CAV3RN C2 framework to query DNS A-records under m.studiotikva[.]com before every transaction, using the response's final octet to route traffic through a Google Apps Script relay or a direct HTTPS endpoint. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2053
Also known asProject CAV3RN
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online (Graph API calendar); SysAid SysAid RMM; Google Google Apps Script; Microsoft Windows (DLL search-order / WinDirStat.exe sideloading path)
AttributionCavern Manticore (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
MalwareCAV3RN, HOLLOWGRAPH, TAMECAT - S1193
ToolsSysAid
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1071.004 DNS, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1110 Brute Force, T1113 Screen Capture, T1114.001 Local Email Collection, T1135 Network Share Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1218.011 Rundll32 and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, it services msp, nuclear energy, defense
Target regionsisrael, united states of america, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2053 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: APT42 SpearSpecter LNK Lure - search-ms and WebDAV DavSetCookie Chain

Detects the APT42 SpearSpecter initial-access chain observed alongside Cavern Manticore/CAV3RN reporting: a PDF-themed Windows shortcut (Document.pdf.lnk) that triggers a search-ms: URI and rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie to open a WebDAV session and stage the follow-on PowerShell loader.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1218.011
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval is_webdav=if(match(Image,"(?i)\\rundll32\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)davclnt\.dll") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)DavSetCookie"),1,0)
| eval is_lnk_lure=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)\.pdf\.lnk"),1,0)
| eval is_search_ms=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)search-ms:"),1,0)
| where is_webdav=1 OR is_lnk_lure=1 OR is_search_ms=1
| eval stage=case(is_webdav=1,"webdav_davsetcookie", is_lnk_lure=1,"pdf_lnk_lure", is_search_ms=1,"search_ms_uri")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count by ComputerName, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, stage
| sort - last_seen

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "rundll32.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "davclnt.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "DavSetCookie")
   or ProcessCommandLine has ".pdf.lnk"
   or ProcessCommandLine has "search-ms:"
| extend Stage = case(ProcessCommandLine has "DavSetCookie", "webdav_davsetcookie",
                       ProcessCommandLine has ".pdf.lnk", "pdf_lnk_lure",
                       "search_ms_uri")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Stage
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: APT42 SpearSpecter LNK Lure - search-ms and WebDAV DavSetCookie Chain
id: 8f2a1c4e-6b3d-4e9a-9c1f-2a7d5e8b3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects the APT42 SpearSpecter initial-access chain seen alongside Cavern Manticore/CAV3RN activity - a PDF-themed .lnk lure (Document.pdf.lnk) that triggers a search-ms: URI and rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie to open a WebDAV session and stage the follow-on PowerShell loader.
references:
    - https://darkatlas.io/blog/apt42-ai-assisted-phishing-tamecat-analysis
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.actor.apt42
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    sel_webdav:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'davclnt.dll'
            - 'DavSetCookie'
    sel_lnk:
        CommandLine|contains: '.pdf.lnk'
    sel_searchms:
        CommandLine|contains: 'search-ms:'
    condition: 1 of sel_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative WebDAV client usage (rare via rundll32 invocation in normal workflows)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate administrative WebDAV client usage that invokes davclnt.dll via rundll32 in normal IT workflows (rare)

Tuning notes: Baseline rundll32.exe davclnt.dll invocations in the environment first (some legitimate WebDAV redirector use exists); suppress on hosts where IT explicitly uses search-ms: for approved file-share shortcuts, and prioritize alerts where the lure filename matches the *.pdf.lnk pattern.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Obfuscated PowerShell Loader Spawned from Explorer (TAMECAT/SpearSpecter Loader Chain) · unlock with TL Creds
  • LDAP Brute Force and AD Reconnaissance Consistent with Cavern Manticore ode.dll Module · unlock with TL Creds
  • HOLLOWGRAPH Microsoft 365 Calendar Dead-Drop C2 and Entra ID Token Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • Macro-Enabled OOXML Workbook Spawning Script Host with RunOnce Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • TAMECAT Browser Credential Theft via DevTools Protocol and Non-Outlook .ost Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • HOLLOWGRAPH DNS Tunneling and TAMECAT Netlify-Hosted C2 / SOCKS5 Tunneling · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cavern Manticore uxtheme.dll DLL Sideload via Trojanized WinDirStat.exe · unlock with TL Creds
  • CAV3RN DNS-Based Channel Selection and Google Apps Script C2 Relay · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2053.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 144.172.115[.]17
  • Domain: studiotikva[.]com
  • File hash: 904784c9943d019da332bea2cd03996f

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

A companion module, HOLLOWGRAPH, hides C2 tasking and exfiltration inside Microsoft 365 calendar events via the Graph API, and the wider toolset overlaps with the TAMECAT surveillance framework used by Iran-linked APT42/TA453. Targeting spans Israeli government/IT-provider entities and, via APT42's parallel operations, nuclear-energy-sector and government personnel.

Cavern Manticore (previously tracked under the leetspeak name Cav3rn) is an Iran-nexus threat cluster, assessed as MOIS-affiliated, whose CAV3RN command-and-control framework has been under research-community observation since at least December 2025 (Kaspersky) with a major public disclosure by Check Point Research on 6 July 2026. The framework is modular and plugin-based: an Agent component (`uxtheme.dll`, DLL-sideloaded via a trojanized WinDirStat.exe execution path) loads functional modules for file operations (`mhm.dll`), SQL database access (`db.dll`), LDAP/Active Directory reconnaissance including credential brute-force (`ode.dll`), network reconnaissance (`n-ten.dll`), and SOCKS5/WebSocket tunneling (`n-sws.dll`). Modules are compiled in a deliberate mix of pure .NET Framework (IL-only), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 NativeAOT builds, a strategy that raises reverse-engineering cost per sample and keeps most binaries at zero or near-zero AV detection on VirusTotal. Initial access in the Check Point-documented campaign involved abuse of a legitimate SysAid RMM software-deployment feature, consistent with multi-hop compromise through a trusted IT-provider relationship before reaching Israeli government and IT-sector victims.

As of the August 2026 disclosure (Kaspersky Securelist, 'Project CAV3RN continues', 11 August 2026), the communications layer has been rearchitected around a new domain, studiotikva[.]com (first registered February 2024, allowed to expire February 2026, then re-registered 12 May 2026 via Dynadot and re-delegated to RouterHosting LLC infrastructure on 19 May 2026). The updated communication module (`GoogleService.dll`, .NET 8 NativeAOT) and an inter-component broker (`rnp.dll`, masquerading as the RNP OpenPGP library) query DNS A-records at `<nonce><error-state>.<hex-client-id>.m.studiotikva[.]com` before each transaction; the fourth octet of the returned address is a compact control signal that selects a direct HTTPS request to `api.studiotikva[.]com/api/v1/update/check`, a POST to a Google Apps Script deployment at `script.google[.]com/macros/s/{deployment-ID}/exec` acting as a relay to the real backend, or transaction termination, depending on the octet value and the module's tracked error state. The malware can validate whether its Apps Script deployment ID is stale by comparing a digest against a DNS response, and pull a replacement ID via small chunked DNS responses, letting operators rotate the Google-fronted relay without redeploying the implant. To ordinary network monitoring this traffic resembles legitimate access to a Google-hosted automation service.

A companion module, HOLLOWGRAPH (.NET NativeAOT DLL, first observed operating 3 June-9 July 2026 and reported by Group-IB), abuses the Microsoft Graph API through a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox, treating the account's calendar as a two-way dead-drop: operators plant tasking as calendar events dated far in the future (2050-05-13), and the implant reads 'get'/'send' commands and exfiltrates staged files as encrypted calendar attachments, secured with hybrid RSA-OAEP/AES-256-GCM using separate key pairs for inbound and outbound traffic. A secondary DNS-tunneling channel to cloudlanecdn[.]com refreshes Microsoft Entra ID application credentials (tenant ID, client ID, client secret, mailbox) in small AAAA-record chunks, writing results to a local `logAzure.txt`. Group-IB identified at least 12 HOLLOWGRAPH-infected systems (3 actively communicating), all consistent with Israeli targeting, and noted technical overlap with Lyceum at low-to-medium confidence.

The broader toolset referenced alongside Cavern/CAV3RN includes TAMECAT, a modular PowerShell-based surveillance/collection framework associated with Iran-linked APT42 (closely associated with TA453) and analyzed by DarkAtlas. TAMECAT performs host/network discovery, arbitrary command execution, browser credential and cookie theft (targeting Edge/Chrome via the DevTools Protocol), Outlook .ost mailbox collection, and screenshot capture, communicating over HTTPS to Netlify-hosted endpoints with Discord/Telegram as secondary C2 channels. Delivery in the associated 'SpearSpecter' campaign (deployment evidence from late April 2026) uses spear-phishing with podcast/conference pretexts leading to a PDF-themed Windows shortcut (`Document.pdf.lnk`) that triggers a `search-ms:` URI, WebDAV access via `rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie`, and an obfuscated PowerShell loader chain; an alternate route uses macro-enabled OOXML workbooks that drop registry-persisted (`HKCU\Software\Classes\Key`, RunOnce) PowerShell controllers. DarkAtlas also documents APT42's systematic use of generative AI across the operation lifecycle - target research, persona/pretext generation, multilingual lure translation, and malware coding/debugging - explicitly tying the toolset to defense officials, government personnel, think-tank researchers, and nuclear-energy-sector individuals, including a March 2026 operation against a US think-tank employee during an active US-Iran conflict window.

While Check Point, Group-IB, and DarkAtlas each hedge their attribution (technical overlaps with MuddyWater/Lyceum for Cavern/CAV3RN and HOLLOWGRAPH; APT42/TA453 for TAMECAT) rather than issuing a single unified actor name, the shared Iran-MOIS nexus, overlapping TTPs (DLL sideloading, abuse of trusted cloud services for C2, modular .NET/PowerShell tradecraft), and convergent targeting of Israeli and nuclear-energy/government entities are why they are tracked together as part of the same reporting cluster.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.011 Rundll32

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1071.004 DNS; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Discovery

T1087.002 Domain Account; T1135 Network Share Discovery

Credential Access

T1110 Brute Force; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture; T1114.001 Local Email Collection

Execution

T1204.002 Malicious File

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

lateral-movement

T1550.001 Application Access Token

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

stealth

T1574.001 DLL

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block/alert on DNS queries and HTTPS traffic to studiotikva[.]com, api.studiotikva[.]com, m.studiotikva[.]com, hospitalinstallation[.]com and its subdomains, adserviceupdate[.]com, hygienehistory[.]com, and cloudlanecdn[.]com
  • Hunt for uxtheme.dll present outside %SystemRoot%\System32 alongside a WinDirStat.exe binary, and for the file listing C:\ProgramData\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe
  • Audit RMM/SysAid deployment logs for anomalous software-push events originating from IT-provider or MSP accounts
  • Review Microsoft Graph API audit logs for calendar events with anomalous future dates (e.g. year 2050) or unusual attachment patterns, and for anomalous application-token refresh activity
  • Hunt for outbound DNS queries with unusually structured subdomains (hex-like client IDs) to newly-registered or recently re-delegated domains

Workarounds

  • Disable or tightly restrict the 'search-ms:' URI handler and WebDAV client (davclnt.dll) where not operationally required
  • Block execution of Windows shortcut (.lnk) files delivered as email attachments or from WebDAV/network shares

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy behavior-based EDR detection given the majority of Cavern Manticore binaries score zero or near-zero on static AV/VirusTotal detection
  • Enforce application allow-listing and DLL search-order hardening to reduce sideloading risk (uxtheme.dll, texture.dll, net.dll, rnp.dll style abuse)
  • Restrict and monitor use of Google Apps Script, Netlify, and similar low-cost hosting/automation platforms as sanctioned egress channels from corporate endpoints
  • Implement conditional access and anomaly detection on Microsoft Entra ID application credential refresh events
  • Train high-value personnel (nuclear-energy, defense, government, think-tank staff) on AI-enhanced spear-phishing pretexts (podcast/conference/interview invitations)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online (Graph API calendar)
    Vulnerable versions: Abuse of legitimate Graph API calendar functionality via a compromised mailbox, not a product defect
  • SysAid — SysAid RMM
    Vulnerable versions: Abused as a legitimate software-deployment vector via already-compromised IT-provider access
  • Google — Google Apps Script
    Vulnerable versions: Abused as a covert relay/proxy for C2 traffic; not a vulnerability in the service itself
  • Microsoft — Windows (DLL search-order / WinDirStat.exe sideloading path)
    Vulnerable versions: Abuse of DLL load order via a trojanized uxtheme.dll placed alongside a legitimate WinDirStat.exe

Timeline

  • locked-ioc-21 first registered, later reused as the Cavern/CAV3RN DNS-selection and Apps Script relay domain
  • Kaspersky begins ongoing monitoring of Project CAV3RN activity
  • locked-ioc-21 registration expires
  • Open-directory evidence indicates deployment of the APT42 SpearSpecter LNK spear-phishing campaign delivering the TAMECAT-linked loader chain
  • locked-ioc-21 re-registered via Dynadot Inc
  • APT42 SpearSpecter LNK samples submitted to VirusTotal from Sweden, UK, and Ukraine (through 27 May 2026)
  • DNS for locked-ioc-21 redelegated to RouterHosting LLC (ASN 14956)
  • HOLLOWGRAPH begins operating against Israeli mailboxes via Microsoft Graph calendar dead-drop
  • HOLLOWGRAPH module first detected
  • Check Point Research publishes 'Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework', detailing the modular Agent/module architecture and SysAid-abuse initial access
  • Last observed HOLLOWGRAPH communication among the 12 identified infected systems
  • Group-IB publishes HOLLOWGRAPH analysis of the Microsoft 365 calendar dead-drop mechanism
  • DarkAtlas publishes analysis tying APT42's AI-assisted phishing to an expanded TAMECAT backdoor
  • Kaspersky Securelist publishes 'Project CAV3RN continues', disclosing the DNS A-record channel-selection mechanism and Google Apps Script relay
  • The Hacker News publishes a consolidated summary of the Cavern/CAV3RN, HOLLOWGRAPH, and TAMECAT reporting

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

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