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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-1626

Royal Ransomware Uses Qbot and Cobalt Strike to Rapidly Compromise Windows Domains

highACTIVE

Royal ransomware operators, believed to be former Conti 'Team One' members, combine Qbot spearphishing delivery with Cobalt Strike post-exploitation to achieve rapid Windows domain takeover, deliberately trading stealth for speed. AdFind/PowerSploit-driven reconnaissance, pass-the-hash lateral movement, and Dropbox/MegaSync exfiltration precede deployment of Royal's partial-encryption ransomware.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1626
Also known asOperation Royal, Zeon Ransomware
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows Server / Windows Domain Environments
AttributionRoyal Ransomware Group (medium confidence)
MalwareBATLOADER, Qbot/Qakbot, Royal Ransomware
ToolsAdFind - S0552, Chisel, Cobalt Strike, Netscan, PSEXEC, PowerSploit - S0194, Rclone - S1040
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087 Account Discovery, T1090.001 Internal Proxy, T1112 Modify Registry and 23 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealth, manufacturing, education, government administration, critical infrastructure
Target regionsNorth America, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1626 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: AdFind / PowerSploit AD Reconnaissance + Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement (SPL)

Detects the post-exploitation reconnaissance and credential-reuse chain: AdFind or PowerSploit/PowerView querying trusted-domain and group objects, followed by NTLM pass-the-hash authentication and PsExec/NetScan-driven lateral movement over administrative shares — the pivot step between Cobalt Strike deployment and ransomware staging.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1482, T1087, T1550.002, T1021.002, T1135
  • Data sources: windows_security, sysmon, microsoft_defender_advanced_hunting
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4688 (New_Process_Name="*\\adfind.exe" OR CommandLine="*objectcategory=trustedDomain*" OR CommandLine="*objectcategory=group*" OR CommandLine="*PowerView*" OR CommandLine="*Get-NetDomainTrust*")) OR (EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Authentication_Package=NTLM) OR (EventCode=5145 Share_Name="*\\IPC$" OR Share_Name="*\\ADMIN$")
| eval stage=case(match(New_Process_Name,"adfind\.exe") OR match(CommandLine,"objectcategory"),"ad_recon", EventCode==4624,"pth_logon", EventCode==5145,"admin_share_access")
| stats count values(stage) as stages values(New_Process_Name) as processes values(Share_Name) as shares by Computer, Account_Name, src_ip, dest_ip
| where mvcount(stages)>=2
| sort -count

Microsoft KQL

let recon = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "AdFind.exe" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("objectcategory=trustedDomain", "objectcategory=group", "PowerView", "Get-NetDomainTrust");
let pth = DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where LogonType == "Network" and isempty(AccountDomain) == false and ActionType == "LogonSuccess";
recon
| join kind=inner (pth) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, LogonType, RemoteIP
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: AdFind Execution Consistent with Royal Ransomware AD Reconnaissance
id: 9a1c2e3f-4b5d-4e6f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4a5b
status: experimental
description: Detects AdFind or PowerSploit/PowerView command-line execution enumerating trusted domains or privileged groups, a hallmark of Royal ransomware pre-lateral-movement reconnaissance
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/royal-ransomware/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-061a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-22
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1550.002
    - attack.tool.adfind
    - attack.tool.powersploit
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_adfind:
        Image|endswith: '\adfind.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'objectcategory=trustedDomain'
            - 'objectcategory=group'
    selection_powersploit:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Get-NetDomainTrust'
            - 'Get-NetGroupMember'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized Active Directory administrators or auditors running AdFind/PowerView for legitimate domain health checks
level: high

Known false positives:

  • IT/security teams running authorized AD audits with AdFind or PowerView from a known jump host or PAM session

Tuning notes: Exclude known privileged-access-workstation (PAW) or PAM jump-host source IPs used by the AD/security team; raise severity when AdFind/PowerView execution is directly followed (within 15 minutes) by an NTLM network logon and ADMIN$/IPC$ share access from the same host, since that chained sequence has very low false-positive rates.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Qbot Process-Hollowing Injection into Trusted Windows Processes (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cobalt Strike Service Installation with UAC Bypass / Scheduled-Task Escalation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rclone / Chisel Cloud-Storage Exfiltration to Dropbox or MegaSync (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Royal Ransomware File Encryption with .royal Extension and Ransom Note Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windows Event Log Clearing and Security Software Discovery Prior to Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
  • Regsvr32 System Binary Proxy Execution Loading Masqueraded Payload · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qbot Registry Run-Key Persistence + Defender Exclusion Abuse (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cobalt Strike Named-Pipe P2P C2 + Typosquat HTTPS Beaconing (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 33 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1626.

Sample indicators (3 of 33)

  • IP address: 181.118.183[.]98
  • Domain: altocloudzone[.]live
  • File hash: 595c869f8ec7eaf71fef44bad331d81bb934c886cdff99e1f013eec7acdaf8c9

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 33 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

33 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Royal ransomware is operated by a private, non-affiliate threat group tracked historically as DEV-0569 and believed to consist largely of former Conti ('Team One') and Ryuk developers; the group briefly branded as Zeon in early 2022 before rebranding to Royal in September 2022. In the campaign profiled here, initial access is achieved via spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments that deploy the Qbot (Qakbot) banking-trojan-turned-loader. Qbot establishes persistence through a Windows Registry Run key and injects into legitimate processes (explorer.exe, mobsync.exe, OneDriveSetup.exe) via a classic CreateProcess/WriteProcessMemory/ResumeThread hollowing workflow to evade detection, while also writing Windows Defender path exclusions and storing configuration under randomized subkeys of HKU\[SID]\Software\Microsoft. Qbot communicates over HTTPS using base64-wrapped, enciphered JSON C2 messages authenticated with a hardcoded, XOR-obfuscated public key.

Once network presence is established, operators deploy Cobalt Strike as a Windows service on multiple hosts, also injected into trusted processes, and pivot to peer-to-peer C2 over Windows named pipes to reduce egress traffic and evade network-based detection while beaconing externally over HTTPS to attacker-registered domains masquerading as cloud/security vendors (e.g., palaltocloud[.]online, kasperslkyupdate[.]com). Cobalt Strike beacons commonly escalate privileges via GetSystem named-pipe impersonation and UAC bypass through scheduled tasks / fodhelper and DLL search-order hijacking. Operators then run AdFind to map Active Directory structure, domain trusts, and local administrator groups, and use PowerSploit/PowerView modules for further host and credential reconnaissance. Stolen credential hashes are reused via pass-the-hash to mount administrative shares and move laterally, commonly assisted by PsExec and NetScan. Prior to encryption, data is staged and exfiltrated to consumer cloud storage (Dropbox, MegaSync) for double-extortion leverage. The ransomware payload itself uses a distinctive partial/intermittent encryption scheme (OpenSSL AES for file data, RSA-encrypted key/IV, selectable encryption percentage tied to file size via an '-ep' parameter) to speed up encryption of large files and reduce detection likelihood, appending the .royal extension and dropping a README.TXT ransom note per directory that directs victims to a Tor negotiation portal rather than stating a ransom amount up front. The group has also used callback phishing, SEO-poisoned BATLOADER installers, and exposed RDP/valid-account abuse as alternate initial access vectors in the broader campaign set, and has targeted healthcare, manufacturing, education, and local government with ransom demands reported as high as $25 million.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Lateral Movement

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1218.010 Regsvr32; T1574.001 DLL

Privilege Escalation

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1055 Process Injection; T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1204.002 Malicious File; T1559.001 Component Object Model

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090.001 Internal Proxy; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Discovery

T1087 Account Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery; T1526 Cloud Service Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry; T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Persistence

T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

lateral-movement

T1550.002 Pass the Hash

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block known Royal/Qbot C2 domains and IPs at the perimeter/DNS resolver
  • Hunt for Qbot Registry Run key persistence and randomized HKU\[SID]\Software\Microsoft subkeys
  • Identify and remove unauthorized Cobalt Strike Windows services
  • Restrict or monitor outbound access to Dropbox and MegaSync from endpoints not normally using them
  • Reset credentials and hunt for pass-the-hash activity for any accounts used by compromised hosts

Workarounds

  • Disable or tightly restrict macro execution and attachment auto-open in email clients
  • Block execution of PowerShell for non-administrative users where feasible

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for process injection (T1055) and named-pipe C2
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and restrict RDP exposure to the internet
  • Implement application allow-listing to block unauthorized use of AdFind, PowerSploit, PsExec, and NetScan
  • Segment networks to limit lateral movement via administrative shares
  • Maintain offline, tested backups given Royal's partial-encryption speed advantage

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows Server / Windows Domain Environments
    Vulnerable versions: All supported Windows Server/AD versions when targeted by credential-theft and lateral-movement TTPs

Timeline

  • Threat actor first surfaces operating a BlackCat-based encryptor under the Zeon brand, later identified as the precursor to Royal.
  • Group rebrands from Zeon to Royal, adopting its own proprietary partial-encryption ransomware payload.
  • Operators launch the 'LockerRoyal' Twitter account to publicize victims and pressure ransom payment.
  • Royal's leak site lists approximately 60 victims in a single November-December window as the group scales callback-phishing and Qbot-based intrusions.
  • CISA and FBI publish joint advisory AA23-061A (#StopRansomware: Royal Ransomware) disseminating TTPs and IOCs.
  • FBI-led international operation disrupts QakBot (Qbot) infrastructure worldwide; CISA publishes AA23-242A detailing seized infrastructure.
  • CISA/FBI issue an update to AA23-061A with revised IOCs and TTPs as Royal activity continues post-Qakbot takedown.
  • CISA re-issues the advisory tracking the group under the BlackSuit rebrand of Royal ransomware.
  • Cyber Security News reports a Royal ransomware campaign combining Qbot delivery with Cobalt Strike for rapid Windows domain compromise, prioritizing speed over stealth.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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