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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1837

1337_GTWK Linux Kernel Rootkit — AI-Assisted Malware-as-a-Service (elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit)

highACTIVE

1337_GTWK (Malpedia: elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit) is a newly cataloged Linux LKM rootkit + user-space agent sold as a Malware-as-a-Service offering, discovered by independent researcher Prtheus. It hooks kernel functions/syscalls to hide processes, files, and network connections, bypasses Netfilter, blocks kernel updates, and triggers a deliberate kernel panic on unauthorized removal; a circumstantial UTC+7 code artifact and the operator alias 'Markas Escobar' point to Indonesian origin.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1837
Also known as1337_GTWK, elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, GTWK Rootkit
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsLinux Kernel (generic) Linux servers — Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) rootkit
AttributionMarkas Escobar (low confidence)
Nation-state nexusIndonesia
Malwareelf.1337_gtwk_rootkit
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1014 Rootkit, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1113 Screen Capture, T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1837 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: 1337_GTWK C2 Beacon — Host Recon Check-in, Module Re-Download & Screenshot/File Exfil to Published Infrastructure

Detects outbound network connections from a Linux host to one of the four published elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit C2 IPv4 addresses (109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, 217.76.55.116), and the gtwk_app agent's screenshot-capture / file-transfer behavior consistent with its documented C2 loop (host-info beacon, remote command tasking, ingress module re-download, exfil-over-C2-channel). TL_OSINT_Scan (community OSINT corroboration) independently observed 109.199.105.207 tagged as C2 by reporter Fact_Finder03 (ASN AS51167) on 2026-07-15 — before this report — raising confidence that traffic to this IP is malicious even absent other indicators.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1583, T1082, T1016, T1105, T1113, T1005, T1041
  • Data sources: sysmon_linux, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_linux, firewall_netflow
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux (sourcetype="Sysmon:Linux" EventCode=3) OR sourcetype="stream:tcp" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="firewall"
| search dest_ip IN ("109.199.105.207","109.199.110.80","169.58.3.197","217.76.55.116")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(dest_port) as dest_ports by host, dest_ip, Image, User
| eval threat="1337_GTWK C2 beacon (T1071.001/T1583)", osint_corroborated=if(dest_ip="109.199.105.207","yes - TL_OSINT_Scan/Fact_Finder03/AS51167 2026-07-15","no")
| sort - last_seen

Microsoft KQL

let GTWK_C2_IPs = dynamic(["109.199.105.207","109.199.110.80","169.58.3.197","217.76.55.116"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in (GTWK_C2_IPs)
| extend OsintCorroborated = iff(RemoteIP == "109.199.105.207", "yes - TL_OSINT_Scan/Fact_Finder03/AS51167 2026-07-15", "no")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, OsintCorroborated, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| union (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName has "gtwk_app" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("screenshot", "screencap")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP="", RemotePort=int(null), OsintCorroborated="n/a", InitiatingProcessFileName=FileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine=ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName=AccountName
)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: 1337_GTWK C2 Beacon to Published Infrastructure
id: b3e1a5b2-4a6d-4a2e-9f1a-1837gtwk0a03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections from a Linux host to one of the four published elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit C2 IPv4 addresses. 109.199.105.207 additionally carries a TL_OSINT_Scan community sighting (reporter Fact_Finder03, ASN AS51167, 2026-07-15, tagged C2) predating this report.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@prtheus/1337-gtwk-linux-malware-analysis-ac6157014521
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-03
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.resource_development
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1583
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1113
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.tool.gtwk
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationIp:
            - '109.199.105.207'
            - '109.199.110.80'
            - '169.58.3.197'
            - '217.76.55.116'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None expected - dedicated single-purpose C2 infrastructure with no known legitimate use
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • None expected — dedicated single-purpose C2 IPs with no legitimate service hosted; validate via DNS/WHOIS if a shared-hosting or proxy IP is later suspected

Tuning notes: Feed the 4 published C2 IPs into a dynamically-updated network watchlist/threat-intel indicator list rather than hardcoding, so newly OSINT-corroborated sibling infrastructure can be added without a query rewrite; extend the gtwk_app CommandLine match if future samples rename the screenshot/exfil subroutines.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • 1337_GTWK Rootkit Installer — Kernel Module Autoload Registration & Hidden Artifact Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK Persistence & Anti-Removal — rsyslog-Masquerading Drop-In, Kernel-Update Pin & Immutable-Flag Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK C2 Beacon — Host Recon Check-in, Module Re-Download & Screenshot/File Exfil to Published Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK Rootkit Installer — Kernel Module Autoload Registration & Hidden Artifact Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK Persistence & Anti-Removal — rsyslog-Masquerading Drop-In, Kernel-Update Pin & Immutable-Flag Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK C2 Beacon — Host Recon Check-in, Module Re-Download & Screenshot/File Exfil to Published Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK Rootkit Installer — Kernel Module Autoload Registration & Hidden Artifact Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GTWK Persistence & Anti-Removal — rsyslog-Masquerading Drop-In, Kernel-Update Pin & Immutable-Flag Abuse · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1837.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • IP address: 109.199.105[.]207
  • File hash: f985d4b43c1c36862b88827ba33a3729328c39be7048e4aeebddbdd676d09f05
  • IP address: 109.199.110[.]80

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

1337_GTWK (Malpedia: elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit) is a previously undocumented Linux malware family combining a kernel-mode Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) rootkit with a user-space C2 agent, marketed as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering. It was first identified in the wild on 2026-07-27 by independent researcher Prtheus, who published a two-part technical analysis on 2026-07-30 (C2 web panel) and 2026-07-31 (rootkit and agent internals); Malpedia cataloged the family the same day as elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit.

The rootkit (gtwk_module.ko / gtwkmod) is built from modular source files (main.c, infra.c, evasion.c, network.c, protect.c, survival.c, control.c, internal.h) and 'intercepts selected kernel functions and system calls' to hide gtwk_-prefixed files, processes, and network connections — including forcing /proc queries for hidden processes to return ENOENT and filtering directory/process listings so hidden processes are invisible to normal enumeration. It bypasses Netfilter and firewall rules to conceal its own network traffic, and blocks kernel security updates by writing an APT preferences pin (/etc/apt/preferences.d/kernel-lts-pin). For anti-removal, it sets the S_IMMUTABLE filesystem flag on its configuration files and triggers a deliberate kernel panic on any unauthorized attempt to unload the module; safe removal requires first writing the token 'sudo@3306' to the procfs control interface /proc/gtwk_cmd/unlock.

Persistence is achieved by registering the module in /etc/modules-load.d/gtwk_module.conf, storing it at /lib/modules/<kernel>/kernel/drivers/base/gtwk_module.ko, and additionally disguising a systemd drop-in override under /etc/systemd/system/rsyslog.service.d/gtwk_module.conf so the module loads under cover of the legitimate rsyslog service (masquerading). A kernel thread named gtwk_runner acts as a watchdog, checking the user-space agent gtwk_app every five seconds and restarting it if killed.

The user-space agent (gtwk_app) retrieves host information (hostname, IP address), receives and executes arbitrary commands from the C2, uploads/downloads files (the codebase's 'downloadFile' routine is actually an upload from the operator's perspective), captures screenshots, and can re-download the rootkit module to recover from remediation attempts. Internally it identifies its own hidden sockets using the marker 0x4754574B.

The C2 side is a web-based administration panel — branded as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform' with mixed English/Indonesian content — offering agent management (hostname, IP, OS, last-seen timestamps), a remote command terminal, file browsing/exfiltration, system-file monitoring, a task queue, and a honeypot-logging feature that captures credentials submitted to the panel. Prtheus found evidence in Google's search cache indicating the platform had been used to compromise at least one website (since remediated). Four dedicated IPv4 addresses serve as C2 infrastructure (109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, 217.76.55.116), and 18 SHA256 sample hashes covering rootkit and agent components have been published; none were correlated to existing C2 configurations on BeaconBeagle at time of research.

Attribution is circumstantial and low-confidence: Prtheus's Part 1 analysis attributes the operation to a group/brand referred to as 'Markas Escobar' (Indonesian for 'Escobar's Base/HQ'), and a debug timestamp routine in infra.c manually adds seven hours to UTC (sec + (7 * 3600)), consistent with a UTC+7 (Indonesia) development timezone. Malpedia's entry additionally notes parts of the codebase were 'likely programmed using AI.' No CVE is associated with this threat — it is not a vulnerability — and the initial infection/access vector remains unconfirmed. No public source repository, YARA rule, or additional independent vendor reporting exists as of this analysis; the only corroborating sources are Prtheus's two articles and the resulting Malpedia catalog entry.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture

Defense Evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

defense-impairment

T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions; T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Persistence

T1543.002 Systemd Service; T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

Remediation

Patches

  • Not applicable — no CVE or vendor vulnerability is associated with this malware family; it relies on an unconfirmed infection vector rather than a specific software flaw

Immediate actions

  • Block network traffic to known 1337_GTWK C2 IPs at the perimeter: 109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, 217.76.55.116
  • Hunt for the 18 published SHA256 sample hashes across EDR/AV coverage and file-integrity baselines on internet-facing Linux hosts
  • Audit /lib/modules/<kernel>/kernel/drivers/base/ for an unexpected gtwk_module.ko (or gtwkmod) object and check /etc/modules-load.d/gtwk_module.conf for unauthorized module registration
  • Inspect systemd drop-in overrides for core services (especially rsyslog.service.d) for unauthorized files such as gtwk_module.conf
  • Check /etc/apt/preferences.d/ for unexpected pinning entries (e.g. kernel-lts-pin) that would silently block kernel/security updates

Workarounds

  • Do not attempt in-place rmmod of a suspected gtwk_module.ko on a production host — unauthorized unload triggers a deliberate kernel panic; isolate the host and rebuild/reimage from a known-clean baseline instead
  • If S_IMMUTABLE-protected config files are found, boot from a trusted rescue/live environment to clear the immutable attribute offline before attempting artifact removal

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy kernel module signing enforcement / lockdown mode on internet-facing Linux servers to block unsigned LKM loading
  • Adopt out-of-band or hypervisor-level process and network visibility (cloud provider agent, network TAP/NetFlow) that does not depend on the in-guest /proc filesystem, since this rootkit falsifies /proc output
  • Deploy eBPF- or auditd-based syscall monitoring that operates independently of in-kernel hooking to detect syscall-table or function-pointer tampering
  • Restrict which accounts/processes may load kernel modules and alert on any insmod/modprobe activity outside change-managed maintenance windows

Affected and fixed versions

  • Linux Kernel (generic) — Linux servers — Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) rootkit
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific — the module is stored under /lib/modules/<running-kernel-version>/, indicating it is built/matched against whatever kernel version is running on the target host

Timeline

  • Independent researcher Prtheus first identifies the 1337_GTWK MaaS C2 web panel in the wild, with Google search-cache evidence indicating prior compromise of at least one victim website (marketed as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform').
  • Prtheus publishes Part 1 analysis, 'Linux Malware 1337_GWTK Server Analysis,' documenting the C2 administration panel's Dashboard, Agents, Terminal, Tasks, Files, System Files, and Honeypot sections, its MaaS distribution model, and attributing the operation to an actor/brand referred to as 'Markas Escobar' based on the panel's mixed English/Indonesian branding.
  • TL-Intel Harness ingests the threat via the Malpedia RSS feed for downstream research and detection engineering; no CVE is assigned and the initial infection vector remains unconfirmed.
  • Analysis documents the gtwk_runner kernel-thread watchdog, which polls the gtwk_app user-space agent every five seconds and restarts it if killed, and the hidden-socket marker 0x4754574B used by the agent to identify its own concealed sockets.
  • Analysis identifies a debug timestamp routine in infra.c that manually adds seven hours to UTC (sec + (7 * 3600)), yielding the circumstantial UTC+7 (Indonesia) development-timezone signal referenced in attribution.
  • Analysis confirms persistence via a systemd drop-in override masquerading as the rsyslog service (locked-ioc-19) and blocking of kernel security updates via an APT preferences pin (locked-ioc-20).
  • Analysis confirms the rootkit's anti-removal mechanism: unauthorized attempts to unload locked-ioc-24 trigger a deliberate kernel panic, bypassable only via the locked-ioc-21 control interface (with companion status endpoint /proc/gtwk_cmd/status) using the token sudo@3306.
  • Malpedia catalogs the family under the identifier elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, noting parts of the malware were likely developed using AI assistance and that no YARA signature yet exists.
  • Part 2 publishes the full IOC set: 18 SHA256 sample hashes covering rootkit and agent components, plus 4 dedicated C2 IPv4 addresses (locked-ioc-22, locked-ioc-23, locked-ioc-26, locked-ioc-25).
  • Prtheus publishes Part 2 analysis, '1337_GTWK Linux Malware Analysis,' detailing the kernel-mode rootkit's eight source modules (main.c, infra.c, evasion.c, network.c, protect.c, survival.c, control.c, internal.h) and the user-space agent (gtwk_app).
  • TL-Intel RESEARCH phase corroborates the published C2 IPs and SHA256 hashes against BeaconBeagle, finding no existing beacon/config correlation on file, and finalizes MITRE ATT&CK and IOC mapping for detection engineering.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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