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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1791

1337_GWTK: Malware-as-a-Service C2 Platform Masquerading as Server Administration Tool (Markas Escobar)

mediumACTIVE

1337_GWTK (Malpedia family elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, agent process gwtk_app) is a Malware-as-a-Service command-and-control platform for Linux hosts, marketed as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform' but functioning as a full C2 dashboard with agent management, remote terminal command execution, file browse/preview/download, task queuing, and a self-logging honeypot module.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1791
Also known as1337_GWTK, 1337_GTWK, elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, gwtk_app
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsGeneric / multiple (not vendor-specific) Linux servers running the gwtk_app agent
AttributionMarkas Escobar (low confidence)
Nation-state nexusIndonesia
Malware1337_GTWK, 1337_GWTK, elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, gwtk_app
Tools1337_GWTK C2 Panel
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1014 Rootkit, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1564 Hide Artifacts and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1791 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: 1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (SPL) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read

Detects post-exploitation activity from an enrolled 1337_GWTK agent: a shell (sh/bash/dash) spawned as a direct child of the agent process 'gwtk_app', consistent with operator-issued arbitrary command execution via the panel's Terminal module (Command and Scripting Interpreter); creation of a dot-prefixed, restrictively-permissioned directory under /tmp consistent with the family's Malpedia rootkit classification and undisclosed Hide Artifacts mechanism; and bulk file touches under the same parent process consistent with the panel's Files-module browse/preview/download workflow.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059, T1014, T1564, T1005
  • Data sources: sysmon_for_linux, linux_auditd, edr_process_telemetry, edr_file_telemetry
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

`comment("TL-2026-1791: 1337_GWTK Terminal-module command execution (child shell of gwtk_app) + rootkit-style hidden directory creation + Files-module bulk read/copy")`
index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=1 ParentImage="*/gwtk_app" (Image="*/sh" OR Image="*/bash" OR Image="*/dash")
| eval detection="terminal_module_command_exec"
| table _time, host, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, detection
| append
    [ search index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=11
      (TargetFilename="/tmp/.*" AND TargetFilename="*hidden*") OR TargetFilename="*/.gwtk_hidden/*"
      | eval detection="hide_artifacts_dot_directory"
      | table _time, host, User, TargetFilename, detection ]
| append
    [ search index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=11 ParentImage="*/gwtk_app"
      | stats count as files_touched values(TargetFilename) as files by host, ParentImage
      | where files_touched>=5
      | eval detection="files_module_bulk_read_copy"
      | table host, ParentImage, files_touched, files, detection ]
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

// TL-2026-1791: 1337_GWTK Terminal-module command execution (shell child of gwtk_app) + hidden-directory creation (Hide Artifacts/rootkit) + Files-module bulk read/copy
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "gwtk_app"
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash")
| extend DetectionReason = "terminal_module_command_exec"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FolderPath has "/tmp/." and (FolderPath has "hidden" or FolderPath has ".gwtk")
    | extend DetectionReason = "hide_artifacts_dot_directory"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
  )
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "gwtk_app"
    | summarize FilesTouched = dcount(FileName), Files = make_set(FileName) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
    | where FilesTouched >= 5
    | extend DetectionReason = "files_module_bulk_read_copy", AccountName = "", FileName = strcat_array(Files, ","), ProcessCommandLine = "", InitiatingProcessFileName = "gwtk_app"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
  )
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: 1337_GWTK Terminal-Module Command Execution — Shell Spawned as Child of gwtk_app
id: 8f3a2b1c-6d4e-4a9b-8c7f-1791000e0002
status: experimental
description: Detects a shell (sh/bash/dash) spawned as a direct child of the 1337_GWTK agent process 'gwtk_app', consistent with operator-issued arbitrary command execution via the panel's Terminal module (Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059). The family is Malpedia-classified as a rootkit (T1014) with an undisclosed Hide Artifacts (T1564) mechanism observed in lab simulation as dot-prefixed restrictive-permission directory creation under /tmp; pair this rule with a companion file_event rule for TargetFilename patterns '/tmp/.*hidden*' or '*/.gwtk_hidden/*' to cover that signal (see tuning_notes). The panel's Files module (browse/preview/download, T1005) is additionally covered in the companion SPL/KQL queries via a bulk-file-touch count under the same parent process.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit
    - https://medium.com/@prtheus/linux-malware-1337-gwtk-server-analysis-96e98ecca1fc
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1014
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.tool.1337_gwtk
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/gwtk_app'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate configuration-management or orchestration agents (Ansible, SaltStack, Chef) that spawn shells as children of a custom-named service process
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate configuration-management or orchestration agents (Ansible, SaltStack, Chef) spawning shells as children of a custom-named service process
  • Application caches or temp-file libraries that legitimately create dot-prefixed directories under /tmp
  • Backup or log-rotation jobs that read/copy a large number of files from the same parent process in a short window

Tuning notes: Scope ParentImage matching to the exact enrolled-agent binary path once a confirmed sample/hash is available (no public sample hash exists as of 2026-07-31 -- Malpedia notes a planned 'Part 2' disclosure); until then, alert on the process-name pattern fleet-wide and pair with the companion file_event rule referenced in the Sigma description for the hidden-directory signal.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (KQL) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (KQL) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (KQL) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (Sigma) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (Sigma) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (Sigma) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (SPL) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst · unlock with TL Creds
  • 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (SPL) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1791.

Sample indicators (3 of 18)

  • IP address: 109.199.105[.]207
  • IP address: 109.199.110[.]80
  • IP address: 169.58.3[.]197

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

18 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

It is attributed to an Indonesia-based group calling itself 'Markas Escobar' and is backed by four live C2 IP addresses.

1337_GWTK is a Linux-targeting Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) command-and-control platform first documented by researcher Prtheus on 2026-07-30 and catalogued by Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE) under family ID elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit (alias 1337_GTWK), first observed/detected 2026-07-27. Malpedia classifies the family as a Linux rootkit combined with a code-execution agent, describing it as a modular program 'consisting of several modules, parts of which were likely programmed using AI.'

Operationally, 1337_GWTK presents itself publicly as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform' -- a legitimate-sounding facade for what is in fact a full-featured C2 operator panel with mixed English and Indonesian-language content, gated behind an operator login. The panel enrolls compromised Linux hosts as agents (process name gwtk_app) and exposes seven distinct modules: (1) a Dashboard summarizing general information and agent installation/deployment guidance; (2) an Agents view listing hostname, IP address, operating system, uname output, current user, operator remarks, status, and last-seen timestamp for every enrolled host; (3) a Terminal module letting an operator select an agent and execute arbitrary commands on it; (4) a Files module to browse, preview, and download files from infected agents; (5) a System Files module surfacing recently modified files on compromised hosts; (6) a Tasks module that queues and logs current and historical operator tasks; and (7) a Honeypot module that records commands and login attempts made against the panel itself.

Four C2 IP addresses were documented as live at publication: 109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, and 217.76.55.116. The source analysis attributes the platform to an Indonesia-based group operating under the name 'Markas Escobar.' The analysis further notes Google-cache evidence suggesting the operators had compromised at least one website (infrastructure compromise consistent with MITRE ATT&CK Compromise Infrastructure), though the finding could no longer be independently verified because the target site had returned online by the time of publication. The article states a follow-up 'Part 2' report is planned to disclose additional IOCs, which had not been published as of this RESEARCH pass. The family's classification AS a rootkit (rather than a plain remote-access agent) implies an artifact-hiding capability even though the source does not enumerate specific hiding techniques (see gap note below).

This threat is presently corroborated by a single primary source (the Prtheus/Medium technical writeup) plus its Malpedia catalog entry; no second independent source, victim count, initial-access vector, or persistence/hiding mechanism was identified during RESEARCH, consistent with the gaps flagged at HUNT. A dedicated re-verification pass on 2026-07-31 re-fetched both primary sources in full and ran supplementary WebSearch queries for 'Markas Escobar', 'gwtk_app', and 'elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit' -- no additional independent reporting, victim list, sample hash, or 'Part 2' publication was located. No CVE applies -- this is a malware/C2-platform threat, not a vulnerability. No YARA signatures are published in Malpedia for this family. BeaconBeagle was queried for all four C2 IPs on 2026-07-31 and returned no additional correlation data for any of them.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1036 Masquerading; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1564 Hide Artifacts

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Resource Development

T1583.004 Server; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1587.001 Malware

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the four documented C2 IP addresses (109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, 217.76.55.116) at network egress/firewall.
  • Hunt Linux fleets for a running or scheduled process/binary named 'gwtk_app'.
  • Review outbound connection logs on internet-facing Linux hosts for traffic to the listed C2 IPs.
  • Inspect web server content and logs for unexplained changes consistent with the Google-cache compromise evidence cited in the source analysis.

Workarounds

  • Do not expose Linux server administration/management interfaces directly to the internet without VPN/allow-list controls.
  • If a gwtk_app agent or 1337_GWTK panel artifact is discovered on a host, isolate the host from the network pending full incident response.

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy Linux EDR/host-based monitoring capable of detecting unauthorized remote command execution and bulk file access/exfiltration.
  • Harden internet-facing Linux servers: disable or restrict exposed remote-administration interfaces, enforce least-privilege service accounts.
  • Establish outbound network allow-listing for Linux server fleets to limit unauthorized C2 egress.
  • Monitor Malpedia and related OSINT sources for the promised 'Part 2' follow-up disclosing additional 1337_GWTK IOCs and re-run RESEARCH when it publishes.

Affected and fixed versions

  • Generic / multiple (not vendor-specific) — Linux servers running the gwtk_app agent
    Vulnerable versions: Any Linux host enrolled as a 1337_GWTK agent (distribution/architecture not specified in source)

Timeline

  • 1337_GWTK MaaS C2 platform / elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit family first observed and detected by researcher Prtheus.
  • Source article states a 'Part 2' report is planned to disclose additional IOCs; not yet published as of this RESEARCH pass.
  • Source analysis cites Google-cache evidence indicating the operators had compromised at least one website; verification was no longer possible because the target site had returned online.
  • Prtheus publishes 'Linux Malware 1337_GWTK Server Analysis' on Medium, the first public technical writeup naming the platform, detailing all seven panel modules (Dashboard, Agents, Terminal, Files, System Files, Tasks, Honeypot), the Markas Escobar attribution, and four live C2 IPs.
  • Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE) catalogs the family under ID elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit (alias 1337_GTWK), describing it as a rootkit plus code-execution agent likely partly AI-programmed.
  • MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping (15 techniques across 7 tactics) and IOC extraction (18 indicators) completed for TL-2026-1791.
  • Supplementary WebSearch queries for 'Markas Escobar', 'gwtk_app', and 'elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit' performed; no second independent source, victim list, sample hash, or additional IOC set located, confirming the threat remains single-source as of this pass.
  • BeaconBeagle queried for all four documented C2 IPs (locked-ioc-1, locked-ioc-2, locked-ioc-4, locked-ioc-3); no additional correlation, config, or related-infrastructure matches returned for any of the four.
  • TL-Intel Harness RESEARCH phase re-fetched both primary sources in full (Malpedia catalog + family page, Prtheus Medium article) to cross-check for any newly added detail since HUNT.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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