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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1995

WindRelay + SpyNote Combo: NFC Relay Malware Enables Contactless Card Fraud Across Central/Eastern Europe

highACTIVE

Group-IB documents WindRelay, a newly tracked purpose-built Android NFC relay tool, deployed alongside the SpyNote RAT in a vishing-driven fraud scheme. Fraudsters posing as bank employees talk victims into sideloading a personalized SpyNote APK, then abuse its Accessibility Service access to silently install WindRelay, which relays live contactless card data to attacker-controlled devices for card-present purchases and ATM cash-outs, alongside fraudulent digital loans issued via banking-app takeover.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1995
Also known asWindRelay NFC Relay Combo, WindRelay/SpyNote fraud scheme
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsGoogle Android
MalwareSpyNote, WindRelay
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1407 Download New Code at Runtime, T1417 Input Capture, T1418 Software Discovery, T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features, T1516 Input Injection, T1624.001 Broadcast Receivers, T1636.003 Contact List, T1638 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1657 Financial Theft, T1660 Phishing, T1663 Remote Access Software
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, banking
Target regionsczechia, slovakia, slovenia, poland, Central Europe, 151 - Eastern Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1995 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SpyNote Accessibility Self-Grant into Silent WindRelay Sideload — Post-Exploitation

Detects the post-exploitation chain where SpyNote enables/self-expands its Accessibility Service grant and, within minutes, triggers a PackageInstaller install with no visible install UI — the mechanism used to silently sideload WindRelay without a screen-share prompt or further victim interaction.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1624.001, T1453, T1417
  • Data sources: mobile_threat_defense
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=mtd (sourcetype="MobileThreatDefense:AccessibilityEvent" OR sourcetype="MobileThreatDefense:PackageInstall") earliest=-24h
`comment("SpyNote abuses its granted Accessibility Service to self-expand permissions, then silently triggers PackageInstaller to sideload WindRelay with no visible install UI (screen-share bypass)")`
| eval sha1_lower=lower(file_sha1)
| eval phase=case(event_type="accessibility_service_enabled" AND (match(app_package,"(?i)spynote") OR sha1_lower IN ("e05575afe5a01d150daa8b4bb935213cc0e538f6","193078cda795dc2f12983e9b66821f7e67c6495d","38ca1bc31ccdc1c650720abd76bcc619532c0166","22fa5c967b0775c3f3398dcf5dbb46ff80e1708b","bce3d9b06a3fc2312fe5be213f3d98b9350c9b22","bc2bce53d71533c2eb1ccc30fe252ea2774d0100","a72089566a711ed0781d5a36e3c289de0de13e2d")), "accessibility_grab", event_type="package_install" AND install_ui_visible=false, "silent_install", 1==1, null())
| where isnotnull(phase)
| transaction device_id maxspan=5m startswith=(phase="accessibility_grab") endswith=(phase="silent_install")
| where duration<=300
| table _time device_id user app_package sha1_lower duration phase

Microsoft KQL

DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("AccessibilityServiceEnabled","AccessibilityServiceSelfGranted")
| where AdditionalFields has_any ("spynote", "SpyNote")
| project AccTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccActionType = ActionType
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == "FileCreated" and FileName endswith ".apk"
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "com.android.packageinstaller"
    | project InstallTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, FileName, SHA1
) on DeviceId
| where InstallTime between (AccTime .. (AccTime + 5m))
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == "SoftwareDiscoveryDetected" or ActionType == "ContactListAccessed"
    | project DiscTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, DiscActionType = ActionType
) on DeviceId
| project AccTime, InstallTime, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, SHA1, DiscActionType, DiscTime

Sigma

title: SpyNote Accessibility Service Self-Grant Followed by Silent WindRelay Sideload
id: 4c8e1f7a-9b3d-42c6-a15e-6f9d3b2c8a17
status: experimental
description: Detects the post-exploitation pattern where an app enables/self-expands Accessibility Service permissions and, within minutes, silently triggers a PackageInstaller install with no visible UI — the mechanism SpyNote uses to sideload the WindRelay NFC relay payload without a screen-share prompt.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/windrelay-nfc-spynote-rat-combo-fraud/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1624.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1453
    - attack.t1417
    - attack.tool.spynote
    - attack.tool.windrelay
logsource:
    category: application
    product: android
    service: accessibility
detection:
    selection_accessibility:
        ActionType: 'AccessibilityServiceEnabled'
        PackageName|contains: 'spynote'
    selection_silent_install:
        ActionType: 'PackageInstallCompleted'
        InstallUiVisible: false
        InitiatingProcess|contains: 'PackageInstaller'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection_accessibility and selection_silent_install
falsepositives:
    - Enterprise EMM/device-owner silently pushing an approved application via a granted install permission
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Enterprise EMM/device-owner policy silently pushing an approved application via a granted install permission

Tuning notes: The 5-minute accessibility-grant-to-silent-install window is derived from Group-IB's reported 13-minute end-to-end chain; widen to 10 minutes if the MTD agent's event timestamps show clock skew, and exclude device IDs enrolled in a corporate EMM/device-owner profile that legitimately pushes silent installs.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Personalized SpyNote APK Install Windowed to an Active Phone Call — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Accessibility Self-Grant to Silent Sideload with Discovery/Contact Access — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • WindRelay C2 Burst Windowed to Fraudulent Digital Loan Navigation — C2/Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • WindRelay/SpyNote Personalized APK Sideload During Active Vishing Call · unlock with TL Creds
  • SpyNote Accessibility Service Self-Grant Followed by Silent WindRelay Sideload · unlock with TL Creds
  • WindRelay C2 Beacon Correlated with Same-Session Digital Loan Navigation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Vishing-Coerced Sideload of Personalized SpyNote APK — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • WindRelay C2 Relay Burst Correlated with Same-Session Digital Loan Request — C2/Impact · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1995.

Sample indicators (3 of 21)

  • IP address: 88.86.124[.]114
  • File hash: 852322e063872a025b711d5adf08531eac36a265
  • IP address: 185.100.87[.]116

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Group-IB's Fraud Protection team documented a two-malware Android fraud combo active across Central and Eastern Europe since at least November 2025. The scheme begins with a phone call in which the fraudster impersonates a bank employee and claims a problem with the victim's card, then walks the victim through installing an Android APK during the live call. That first-stage app is a personalized variant of the SpyNote RAT — the application label is set to the victim's own name, a deliberate trust-abuse tactic intended to lower suspicion since victims believe they are installing something sanctioned by their bank. SpyNote requests Accessibility Service permission, which it then abuses to silently sideload a second payload, WindRelay, via the device's package installer without triggering a visible screen-share prompt or requiring further victim interaction. WindRelay is Group-IB's newly tracked name for a purpose-built NFC relay tool: once installed, it instructs the victim (still on the phone with the fraudster) to tap their physical contactless payment card to their own handset and enter their PIN. WindRelay reads the live EMV contactless handshake off the NFC chip and streams it in real time over the internet to a second, attacker-controlled Android device, which replays the exchange at a real merchant POS terminal or ATM as if the victim's card were physically present, PIN included. In parallel, SpyNote's remote-control and Accessibility Service access is used to navigate the victim's mobile banking app and issue a fraudulent digital loan in the victim's name — a second monetization path pursued in the same call. Group-IB reports the entire sequence, from the first malicious install through the NFC capture and loan issuance, completes in as little as 13 minutes, well inside the window in which a victim could contact their bank to intervene. The operation has hit victims across Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland; Group-IB attributes the campaign via metadata correlation across 23 WindRelay and 7 SpyNote samples collected between November 2025 and July 2026, alongside 4 shared C2 IP addresses. Group-IB frames the technique as part of a broader, fast-growing NFC relay threat class: Kaspersky separately reported a 188% year-over-year increase in NFC-relay-style Android malware detections (35,600 blocked attacks January-April 2026 versus over 12,300 in the same period of 2025, across families including SuperCard X, PhantomCard, NGate, and modified NFCGate variants), and Group-IB's own prior research on 'Ghost Tap'/TX-NFC-style HCE card-emulation fraud documents a related but architecturally distinct NFC abuse pattern (relay app runs on the fraudster's device using stolen card credentials rather than live-relaying from the victim's phone) that has produced at least $355,000 in documented losses from a single point-of-sale vendor between November 2024 and August 2025.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1407 Download New Code at Runtime

Collection

T1417 Input Capture; T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features; T1636.003 Contact List; T1638 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Discovery

T1418 Software Discovery

Impact

T1516 Input Injection; T1657 Financial Theft

Persistence

T1624.001 Broadcast Receivers

Exfiltration

T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access

T1660 Phishing

Command and Control

T1663 Remote Access Software

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block outbound traffic to the 4 confirmed WindRelay C2 IPs at network/perimeter controls
  • Push mobile threat defense / EDR signatures for the 23 WindRelay and 7 SpyNote sample hashes
  • Alert bank fraud teams to correlate closely-timed digital loan requests with same-session card-present transactions
  • Deploy out-of-band (SMS/app push) confirmation for any high-risk digital lending action initiated during or immediately after a phone call

Workarounds

  • Disable 'install unknown apps' / sideloading permission on Android devices for non-technical users where feasible via MDM
  • Restrict Accessibility Service grants to known, vetted applications via enterprise mobility management policy

Longer-term hardening

  • Mobile threat defense (MTD) monitoring for apps requesting the NFC + Accessibility Service + INTERNET permission combination together
  • Detect and flag Android package installs triggered from within an active phone call session (behavioral telemetry)
  • Bank-side anomaly detection for card-present transactions occurring within minutes of a digital loan issuance on the same account
  • Customer education campaigns explicitly warning that banks never ask customers to install an app or tap their card to their own phone during a call

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Android
    Vulnerable versions: Android devices with sideloading/unknown-sources install enabled

Timeline

  • NFC relay attacks first documented against Czech Republic victims, predating the WindRelay/SpyNote combo, per Group-IB's prior threat tracking.
  • Arrest made in Prague tied to earlier NFC relay fraud activity, referenced by Group-IB as prior regional context for the current campaign.
  • Earliest WindRelay samples in Group-IB's 23-sample set date from November 2025, marking the start of the tracked campaign window.
  • Group-IB publishes 'Ghost Tapped: Tracking the Rise of Chinese Tap-to-pay Android Malware,' documenting the related but distinct TX-NFC/Ghost Tap HCE-based relay fraud pattern.
  • Kaspersky publicly reports a 188% year-over-year surge in NFC-relay-style Android malware detections for January-April 2026 (35,600 blocked attacks vs. 12,300+ in the same 2025 period), corroborating the growth of this technique class.
  • Most recent WindRelay samples in Group-IB's dataset date from July 2026, indicating the campaign remained active through mid-2026.
  • Trade press (GBHackers, Cybersecurity News) republish technical summaries of the Group-IB disclosure the same day, reiterating the 13-minute attack timeline and IOC counts.
  • Group-IB publishes 'Gone with the WindRelay,' publicly disclosing the WindRelay NFC relay tool, its pairing with SpyNote, the 13-minute attack chain, victimology across Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland, and full IOC set (4 C2 IPs, 23 WindRelay + 7 SpyNote SHA1 hashes).

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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