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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2095

iAuthFlow V2 Phishing Toolkit Enrolls Attacker-Controlled Passkeys That Survive Password Resets

highACTIVE

iAuthFlow V2 is a $10,000 commercial phishing toolkit sold on Russian-language cybercrime forums that uses a browser-in-the-middle (BitM) architecture to enroll attacker-controlled passkeys on compromised accounts. The passkey persists through password resets and session revocation, defeating standard credential-remediation procedures. The seller operates under the handle PHISHLETS and has been active since June 2024, offering modular versions for Google, iCloud, LinkedIn, and Microsoft platforms.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2095
Also known asiAuthFlow v2
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsGoogle Google Workspace; Apple iCloud; Microsoft Microsoft 365; LinkedIn LinkedIn
AttributionPHISHLETS (medium confidence)
MalwareZlader, telegram
ToolsCloudFlare Tunnel
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1114 Email Collection, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1566 Phishing
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsall
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2095 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 14 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: iAuthFlow V2 Phishing Landing Page via Cloudflare Tunnel - Exploitation Phase

Detects access to iAuthFlow V2 phishing pages delivered through Cloudflare Tunnel (trycloudflare.com) subdomains with the characteristic 32-hex-character URL path pattern, targeting Google, Microsoft, Apple iCloud, or LinkedIn credential login pages. The BitM phishing kit delivers a convincing branded phishing page via attacker-controlled trycloudflare.com subdomains while the victim enters credentials.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1036.005
  • Data sources: web_proxy, cloudflare_logs, ssl_decryption
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype=access_combined OR sourcetype=zscaler_ns host=*.trycloudflare.com | rex uri_path="\\/[0-9a-fA-F]{32}" | search http_referrer=*accounts.google.com* OR http_referrer=*login.microsoftonline.com* OR http_referrer=*linkedin.com/login* OR http_referrer=*appleid.apple.com* OR http_referrer=*login.live.com* | eval login_target=case(like(http_referrer,"%accounts.google.com%"),"Google", like(http_referrer,"%login.microsoftonline.com%"),"Microsoft", like(http_referrer,"%linkedin.com/login%"),"LinkedIn", like(http_referrer,"%appleid.apple.com%"),"Apple", 1=1,"Other") | stats count by src_ip, host, login_target, http_referrer, user_agent | rename host as cloudflare_tunnel_host | table _time, src_ip, cloudflare_tunnel_host, login_target, http_referrer, user_agent, count | sort - count

Microsoft KQL

CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor == "Zscaler" or DeviceVendor == "Palo Alto"
| where (DeviceAction == "allow" or DeviceAction == "tunnel")
| where RemoteUrl contains ".trycloudflare.com"
| extend urlPath = extract_all(@"\/([0-9a-fA-F]{32})(\/|$)", RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(urlPath)
| where RequestURL contains "accounts.google.com" or RequestURL contains "login.microsoftonline.com" or RequestURL contains "login.live.com" or RequestURL contains "linkedin.com/login" or RequestURL contains "appleid.apple.com"
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RemoteUrl, RequestUrl, DeviceVendor
| summarize VisitCount = count() by SourceIP, RemoteUrl, RequestUrl
| order by VisitCount desc

Sigma

title: iAuthFlow V2 Phishing Landing Page via Cloudflare Tunnel
id: d4e5f3b2-1a2c-4b8d-9e7f-6a1b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects access to iAuthFlow V2 phishing pages delivered via Cloudflare Tunnel (trycloudflare.com) subdomains with characteristic 32-hex-character URL paths targeting credential login pages for Google, Microsoft, Apple iCloud, and LinkedIn.
references:
  - https://abnormal.ai/blog/iauthflow-v2-phishing-google-passkeys
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-21
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1036.005
  - attack.tool.iauthflow_v2
logsource:
  category: proxy
  product: web_gateway
  service: http
detection:
  selection_cloudflare:
    destination_hostname|endswith: '.trycloudflare.com'
  selection_phishing_path:
    url_path|re: '\\/[0-9a-fA-F]{32}'
  selection_credential_target:
    url_query|contains:
      - 'accounts.google.com'
      - 'login.microsoftonline.com'
      - 'login.live.com'
      - 'linkedin.com/login'
      - 'appleid.apple.com'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Cloudflare Tunnel usage for development or testing
  - Path patterns containing 32-hex-characters that are not iAuthFlow V2 (API keys in URLs)
  - Development or testing environments using trycloudflare.com with login portals
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate development teams using Cloudflare Tunnels for testing
  • API requests with 32-hex-length path segments that coincidentally match
  • Benign Cloudflare Tunnel usage by internal applications

Tuning notes: Tune by excluding known internal development Cloudflare Tunnel subdomains. For high-fidelity alerting, add correlation with VPS IP ranges (Clouvider, Host Telecom ASNs). Consider creating a watch-list of known-good Cloudflare Tunnel usage for exception management.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Network Indicator: Cloudflare Tunnel to Google/Microsoft Login - Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Google Workspace Passkey Enrollment with VPS Origin - Persistence Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious OAuth App Authorization and Passkey Correlation - Alternate Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • [Sigma] iAuthFlow V2 Phishing Page via Cloudflare Tunnel - Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • [Sigma] Google Workspace Passkey Enrollment - Post-Exploitation Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • [Sigma] Suspicious OAuth Token Grant to iAuthFlow V2 Client - Alternate Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • Google Workspace Passkey Enrollment Anomaly - Post-Exploitation Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious OAuth Token Grant Matching iAuthFlow V2 Client - C2 Material Use · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 14 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2095.

Sample indicators (3 of 14)

  • Domain: nax4q7m9[.]org
  • File hash: 9dd237a185b6c2ff26a10cb9d1f670a59c1a0b4b9592fbfb81e085ffaffeca3a
  • Domain: trycloudflare[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 14 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

14 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

iAuthFlow V2 represents a significant evolution in phishing toolkit capability, moving beyond credential theft and session hijacking to persistent authentication method registration. The toolkit employs a browser-in-the-middle (BitM) architecture using two separate browser environments: the victim's browser displays a convincing Google-styled phishing page delivered via a Cloudflare tunnel (trycloudflare.com subdomain), while the attacker operates a separate authenticated browser session on their own server. Credentials and authentication responses are relayed between the two environments in real time, enabling the toolkit to defeat most forms of multi-factor authentication including TOTP, SMS codes, and push notifications.

Once the victim completes authentication, iAuthFlow V2 does not immediately forward them to their inbox. Instead, it displays a fake 'Verification, Processing' loading screen while simultaneously navigating the authenticated attacker-controlled browser session to the victim's Google passkey settings. The toolkit then requests and registers a new WebAuthn passkey bound to an attacker-controlled device or software-based virtual authenticator. According to Abnormal Security's analysis of the seller's demonstration, the passkey was created approximately six seconds after the initial login. The session log recorded 'Passkey created and saved' at 21:37:24, six seconds after the login at 21:37:18.

Google's passkey architecture is the critical enabler: a passkey is a credential registered to the account, not a token derived from the password. As Google's own documentation states, 'changing the password does not remove it.' When the legitimate account owner changes their password and revokes active sessions — normally the definitive response to a compromise — the attacker-enrolled passkey remains valid. The attacker can regain access by selecting 'Try another way' at the login prompt and authenticating with the passkey, bypassing the new password entirely.

The exact storage mechanism for the attacker's passkey private key remains unconfirmed, as Abnormal Security analyzed the kit through seller documentation and demonstration videos rather than independent acquisition. The most plausible mechanism is a Chromium-based software virtual authenticator for WebAuthn, which can perform registration and retain the private key without requiring the victim's physical device. The phishing frontend itself does not handle WebAuthn, keeping the technical complexity isolated to the attacker's infrastructure.

The base toolkit is priced at $10,000 with additional modules sold separately. The seller, operating under the handle PHISHLETS, has been active on a Russian-language cybercrime forum since June 2024 and maintains a Telegram channel for customer support. The analyzed demonstration targeted Google accounts, but the seller also advertises versions for Microsoft (Microsoft 365), Apple iCloud, and LinkedIn. A test instance was hosted at nax4q7m9[.]org, and phishing pages are delivered through Cloudflare tunnel subdomains of trycloudflare[.]com.

Detection is challenging because the toolkit operates through legitimate infrastructure. The Cloudflare tunnel subdomains are dynamically generated and require no account creation, making them difficult to block at the network level. In Google Workspace, the attack leaves detectable signals in three audit streams: login events showing compressed ~1-second logins from VPS hosting ASNs (Clouvider, Host Telecom), OAuth token grants showing consistent client ID 77185425430.apps.googleusercontent.com with NATIVE_DESKTOP client type, and DEVICE_REGISTER_UNREGISTER_EVENTs from new device registrations. The Google Workspace passkey_enrolled audit event is the most direct indicator of compromise.

Remediation requires a comprehensive approach beyond password reset. The affected account must be investigated for newly registered passkeys, unauthorized OAuth grants, modified recovery methods, malicious Gmail filters and forwarding rules, and unauthorized application access. Password reset and session revocation alone are insufficient. Organizations should consider Google Workspace Advanced Protection Program enrollment for high-risk users, which enforces passkey or security key requirements for sign-in, and the 'Only security key' setting in 2-Step Verification to restrict phishable fallback methods.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Persistence

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1098 Account Manipulation

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy

Collection

T1114 Email Collection

Lateral Movement

T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Do not rely solely on password reset — investigate and remove unauthorized passkeys from the account's security settings
  • Revoke OAuth tokens and grants separately from password reset
  • Review and remove malicious Gmail filters and forwarding rules
  • Disable account and force password reset for eligible standard users via Google Admin console
  • Check for unauthorized recovery methods (phone, email) and delegated access

Workarounds

  • Restrict or block trycloudflare.com domains at the web proxy/gateway level
  • Use WebAuthn-only authentication where phishable fallback methods (TOTP, SMS) can be disabled
  • Monitor for DEVICE_REGISTER_UNREGISTER_EVENT in Google Workspace audit logs

Longer-term hardening

  • Enroll high-risk users in Google Workspace Advanced Protection Program (APP) which enforces passkey/security key requirements
  • Configure 2-Step Verification with 'Only security key' setting to restrict phishable fallback methods
  • Deploy behavioral email security to identify credential phishing by analyzing sender/recipient relationships and URL behavior
  • Implement app access controls to limit high-risk Gmail OAuth scopes to trusted applications
  • Create automated activity rules in Google Workspace Security Investigation Tool to alert on passkey_enrolled events
  • Monitor for rapid login sequences from VPS hosting ASNs as potential BitM infrastructure indicators

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Google Workspace
    Vulnerable versions: All versions with passkey enrollment enabled
  • Apple — iCloud
    Vulnerable versions: All versions
  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365
    Vulnerable versions: All versions with passkey/fido2 support
  • LinkedIn — LinkedIn
    Vulnerable versions: All versions

Timeline

  • Seller operating under handle PHISHLETS becomes active on a Russian-language cybercrime forum
  • iAuthFlow V2 developed with passkey enrollment module, demonstrated against Google accounts via seller demo videos
  • iAuthFlow V2 listed for sale on Russian-language cybercrime forum at $10,000 base price with additional modules for Microsoft, iCloud, and LinkedIn
  • Abnormal Security researchers first identify iAuthFlow V2 being sold on the forum and begin analyzing seller documentation and demonstration videos
  • Abnormal Security publishes detailed technical analysis of iAuthFlow V2, documenting the BitM architecture and passkey enrollment mechanism that survives password reset
  • TL-Intel-Harness initiates tracking of iAuthFlow V2 as a tracked threat under ID TL-2026-2095
  • SecurityWeek, The Register, and Risky.biz publish coverage of the iAuthFlow V2 toolkit, bringing attention to the novel passkey persistence threat

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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