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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2453

Browser-in-the-Browser Phishing Campaign Abuses ScreenConnect RMM to Gain Remote Access

highACTIVE

Huntress documented two related August 2026 phishing incidents that used Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) fake windows spoofing get.adobe.com to trick victims into installing rogue ConnectWise ScreenConnect clients, then ran HideCursor.exe/HideUL.exe defense-evasion binaries to hide attacker activity on screen.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2453
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsConnectWise ScreenConnect
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-451
MalwareTrojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml
ToolsConnectWise ScreenConnect, ScreenConnect
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy, T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1564 Hide Artifacts, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2453 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure

Detects execution of a ScreenConnect (ConnectWise RMM) client installer — ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe, AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi, or patch.msi — spawned from a browser or mail-client process, or matching a known malicious SHA256. Both Huntress-documented incidents (BiTB fake get.adobe.com update prompts) ended with a victim executing exactly this pattern to install a rogue trial-relay ScreenConnect client.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_deviceprocessevents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon OR index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(ScreenConnect\.ClientSetup\.exe|AdbRdBkUpsStUp\.msi|patch\.msi)$")
| eval parent_is_browser=if(match(ParentImage, "(?i)(chrome\.exe|msedge\.exe|firefox\.exe|outlook\.exe)$"), 1, 0)
| eval known_bad_hash=if(match(Hashes, "(?i)(41D2097E8AC636A478AA011E12128C03B3B9BB3C8EFCA43D3C4F214AC8B1F07B|9F5910D69A4FBC56FF1854E7E0DF3199FBFDDD7FE6B374F7D816FA6AE70EF991|F048400C23ADD8C75ABE189393D33C873C02C74EEAF43D47B950C8D643763B35)"), 1, 0)
| where parent_is_browser=1 OR known_bad_hash=1
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count by host, User, Image, ParentImage, Hashes, CommandLine
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe","AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi","patch.msi")
    or SHA256 in~ ("41d2097e8ac636a478aa011e12128c03b3b9bb3c8efca43d3c4f214ac8b1f07b","9f5910d69a4fbc56ff1854e7e0df3199fbfddd7fe6b374f7d816fa6ae70ef991","f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","outlook.exe") or isnotempty(SHA256)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution via Browser-in-the-Browser Phishing Lure
id: 8f3d1a2e-6b4c-4e11-9a2f-1d6e7c9b4a01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a ScreenConnect installer or Adobe-themed masquerading MSI/EXE spawned from a browser or mail client, or matching a known TL-2026-2453 hash.
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/phishing-bitb-rmm-attacks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-11
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.001
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.tool.screenconnect
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe'
      - '\AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi'
      - '\patch.msi'
  selection_hash:
    Hashes|contains:
      - '41D2097E8AC636A478AA011E12128C03B3B9BB3C8EFCA43D3C4F214AC8B1F07B'
      - '9F5910D69A4FBC56FF1854E7E0DF3199FBFDDD7FE6B374F7D816FA6AE70EF991'
      - 'F048400C23ADD8C75ABE189393D33C873C02C74EEAF43D47B950C8D643763B35'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\outlook.exe'
  condition: selection_hash or (selection_image and selection_parent)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate IT-approved ScreenConnect installer deployment initiated by an administrator downloading from the organization's own approved instance URL
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate IT/MSP-approved deployment of a ScreenConnect client from a browser download of the organization's own known-good instance URL

Tuning notes: Maintain an allowlist of the organization's approved ScreenConnect instance ID(s)/download URL and suppress alerts where the download source or ParentImage matches that approved instance; alert only on unrecognized instance IDs or hashes.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2453.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • IP address: 144.172.115[.]59
  • Domain: adoube[.]vu
  • URL: hxxps://wir[.]consultingics[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest&c=GOODVIBE

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-08-25 and 2026-08-31, Huntress investigated two related but independently-executed incidents that combined phishing, Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) UI spoofing, and abuse of legitimate ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) software to establish persistent remote access.

In Incident 1, a victim received a phishing email in Gmail containing a link to a fake 'Safe access browser check' CAPTCHA page at adoube[.]vu (a domain that visually typosquats 'adobe'). The page led to a second lure at adoube[.]vu/filedocacess/file.html displaying a blurred document and prompting the victim to 'download updated Adobe PDF Reader to view the files.' Clicking through rendered a Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) window entirely within the webpage's HTML/CSS/JavaScript, spoofing the legitimate get.adobe.com address bar, padlock, and URL to make the fake download prompt appear trustworthy. The victim executed the resulting installer, ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe (SHA256 41d2097e8ac636a478aa011e12128c03b3b9bb3c8efca43d3c4f214ac8b1f07b), served from a ScreenConnect trial-relay subdomain (hosthiifran.screenconnect.com) rather than an organization-approved instance. This installed a first rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID 9c1aea531ba4c511, SHA256 9f5910d69a4fbc56ff1854e7e0df3199fbfddd7fe6b374f7d816fa6ae70ef991) as a Windows service, relaying through instance-uxh86b-relay.screenconnect.com. From that session, the attacker used cmd.exe with curl to pull down and install a second rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID 7c1d255d0efefde6, SHA256 f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35), which communicated with a dedicated C2 endpoint at 144.172.115[.]59:8041. The attacker then executed HideCursor.exe (SHA256 fc96a04c615847f0fb1391f04d9d1aac7f78ddfb7d459168df0a4172b98354e2) from C:\Users\REDACTED\Documents\ScreenConnect\Temp\ to suppress visible cursor movement and conceal hands-on-keyboard activity from the logged-in user.

Incident 2 followed the same tradecraft template a week later via a different initial-access vector: a phishing message delivered through AT&T Office@Hand (a RingCentral-based unified-communications product) linked to a fake PDF-viewer page at selectstructure[.]com[.]au/freedom/adobedocument.html. The BiTB flow again spoofed an Adobe download prompt, leading the victim to run AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi, staged on a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (victory.mkc1.digitaloceanspaces.com). This installed a first rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID d751818fd46e5ca9) as a Windows service relaying through relay.goldenmelon.us. A second rogue client, delivered as patch.msi (instance ID c19e38a20f1ba492) from wir.consultingics.com, communicated with scx.illuminantgroup.net via relay.illuminantgroup.net and was flagged by Microsoft Defender as Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml. The attacker executed a second concealment binary, HideUL.exe, to suppress cursor visibility and reduce on-screen indicators of interactive remote control.

Neither incident involves a software vulnerability or CVE: the entire chain relies on social engineering (phishing + BiTB UI deception) and abuse of legitimate ScreenConnect trial/relay infrastructure to obtain hands-on remote access while evading a victim's visual detection and, in at least one case, real-time EDR signature detection. Huntress' 2026 Cyber Threat Report notes RMM abuse rose 277% year-on-year and now features in roughly a quarter of investigated incidents, consistent with a broader industry trend of threat actors preferring 'living off trusted software' (legitimate, code-signed RMM tools reconfigured to attacker-controlled relays) over custom malware to blend into normal IT traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1564 Hide Artifacts

Execution

T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Persistence

T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Privilege Escalation

T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Initial Access

T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Inventory all ScreenConnect (and other RMM) instances installed in the environment and immediately terminate any instance ID not provisioned or approved by IT/the managing MSP
  • Block network egress to the identified relay/C2 infrastructure: instance-uxh86b-relay.screenconnect.com, relay.goldenmelon.us, relay.illuminantgroup.net, scx.illuminantgroup.net, and 144.172.115.59:8041
  • Isolate and forensically image any endpoint observed running HideCursor.exe or HideUL.exe
  • Reset credentials and review MFA/session activity for any account associated with a compromised endpoint

Workarounds

  • Enforce application allowlisting (AppLocker/WDAC) to block execution of unsigned or newly-downloaded installers from Downloads/Temp directories
  • Restrict outbound RMM/relay traffic to a pinned, organization-approved instance ID or relay host via egress firewall rules

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement an approved-RMM allowlist and alert on installation of any unapproved remote-access/RMM software (maps to T1219)
  • Deploy EDR detections for ScreenConnect Windows-service creation from non-standard install paths or unrecognized instance IDs
  • Add network detection for outbound connections to *.screenconnect.com trial-relay subdomains that do not match the organization's known/approved instance ID
  • Run recurring user-awareness training covering Browser-in-the-Browser lures and unsolicited 'update your PDF reader' prompts

Affected and fixed versions

  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect
    Vulnerable versions: all - abused via rogue trial-instance/relay deployment rather than a version-specific vulnerability

Timeline

  • Attacker executes locked-ioc-20 from C:\Users\REDACTED\Documents\ScreenConnect\Temp\ to conceal on-screen mouse activity.
  • Attacker uses cmd.exe with curl from the first ScreenConnect session to install a second rogue client (instance 7c1d255d0efefde6) that beacons to C2 at locked-ioc-19:8041.
  • First rogue ScreenConnect client (instance 9c1aea531ba4c511) installs as a Windows service, relaying through locked-ioc-10.
  • Victim executes ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe (SHA256 locked-ioc-3), downloaded from the trial-relay subdomain locked-ioc-13.
  • Victim is shown a Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) fake window spoofing get.adobe.com, prompting download of a fake Adobe PDF Reader update.
  • Incident 1: victim receives a phishing email in Gmail with a link to a fake 'Safe access browser check' CAPTCHA lure at locked-ioc-22.
  • Attacker executes locked-ioc-21 to suppress cursor visibility and reduce on-screen indicators of interactive remote-control activity.
  • Second rogue client, delivered as locked-ioc-23 (instance c19e38a20f1ba492) from wir.consultingics.com, communicates with locked-ioc-15 via locked-ioc-14; Microsoft Defender flags the binary as Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml.
  • First rogue ScreenConnect client (instance d751818fd46e5ca9) installs as a Windows service, relaying through locked-ioc-17.
  • BiTB fake Adobe browser page prompts download of locked-ioc-18, staged on the DigitalOcean Spaces bucket locked-ioc-11.
  • Incident 2: victim receives a phishing message via AT&T Office@Hand (RingCentral) with a link to a fake PDF-viewer page at locked-ioc-16.
  • Huntress publishes 'Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence,' documenting both incidents.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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